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The research investigated the impact of EU law and policies on direct taxation in 
REITs, and movement towards a harmonised EU-REIT with common direct 
taxation of REITs profits. It represents the first comparative study of EU member 
state REIT regimes to identify an emerging common understanding informed by 
European jurisprudence and Europeanization policy and theory.  
 
After identifying the fundamental elements of a REIT (following the original US 
model) within a context of Europeanization theory, the research examined EU 
policy mechanisms (such as goodness of fit and adaptational soft pressure) and 
the impact of relevant case law from the European Court of Justice. It then 
presented in-depth case studies of three member states: France (example of a 
well-established REIT regime), Bulgaria (a new accession state) and Spain (a 
recent REIT regime).  
 
The research found an emerging common understanding between member states’ 
REIT regimes, offering the prospect of a European harmonised REIT form 
distinguishable from the US model. It also found negative approaches to direct 
taxation in cross-border situations, and member state concerns about loss of 
sovereignty and tax base, which should be recognised within any harmonised 
direct tax regime.  
 
The research can claim to be the first comparative analysis of MS REIT regimes to 
address a common understanding, and thus is relevant to practitioners and 
academics in the fields of European law and international taxation. It has potential 
to contribute towards an improved common direct taxation approach and the 
harmonisation of European REITs within the wider processes of Europeanization. 
The research was limited to REIT regimes in EU member states, and further 
research could analyse relevant member state tax regimes outside the 'common 
understanding' REIT model, and further explores issues of loss of sovereignty and 
tax base in member states. 
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Section 1 – 
Introduction and Dimensions of Europeanization 
 
 
Chapter I: Introduction to the Research –  
Challenging MSs Tax Regimes  
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Financial Investments in Real Estate have strengthened in recent years with the 
ease of moving money in the global financial market. Globalisation has fuelled a 
hunger in Investors to extend their focus from domestic to international 
investments, motivated by beneficial tax regimes in the country where the 
investment target is located, allowing higher yields. International taxation is an 
evolving field, in which conflicting or converging interests between States, or 
between States and taxpayers, shape the applicable national rules.1 The 
globalisation of real estate investment continues as new sources of capital flow 
into the sector, ranging from individuals to the largest institutions in the world. 
Investments in real estate provide relatively stable yields compared with the 
stock markets volatility, and have become attractive to investors, especially 
where foreign countries offer beneficial tax regimes. Governments are thrown 
into competition, making their tax regimes more attractive for foreign investors. 
Some governments have pushed down tax rates2 or introduced tax free zones 
in their countries3 in what has been called a “race to the bottom”.4 
 
1 See Malherbe (2008), p. 1. 
2 See i.e. decreased corporate tax rate´ in the European Union (EU) i.e. in Bulgaria (10%, 
Cyprus and Ireland (12.5%) whereas the EU average is at 22.85% (see KPMG (2013)).  
3 See in the EU Poland with its Economic free trade zone. 
4 See Meisel (2004), p. 41. Races to the bottom are described in game theory by the prisoner's 
dilemma, originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher working at RAND in 1950. This 
is an exercise in which the optimal outcome for the entire group of participants results from 
cooperation of the participants, but it is put in danger by the fact that the optimal outcome for 
each individual is to not cooperate while the others do cooperate (see Poundstone (1993)).  
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REIT popularity grew as a result of increasing globalisation and the related 
cross-border flow of capital resources, looking to optimise their tax treatment 
through the use of applicable Double Tax Treaties (DTT). This is of little interest 
to the domestic shareholder in a domestic REIT, but rather for the non-domestic 
investor/shareholder. Due to the transparent “flow-through” tax treatment, 
dividends are distributed from the domestic REIT to the foreign shareholder 
without the dividend being taxed prior to its distribution at the level of the 
domestic REIT. Consequently, besides analysing the DTT situation applicable 
for their real estate investment at issue, foreign Investors also assess their 
choice of REIT according to the applicable tax treatment before investing into a 
foreign REIT (“REIT Shopping”). This research explores whether there is a 
“common understanding” in MSs REIT regimes in compliance with EU5 law or 
whether MSs share a kind of “negative understanding”, thus ignoring EU law. 
This development may be called the “Europeanization of MS tax regimes”.6 
 
2.   Literature review  
The discrimination of the non-domestic shareholder in a foreign REIT continues 
to be a topic of debate with both academic and policy circles7 and questions 
remain unanswered regarding the concept to revise and/or adjust MSs REIT 
regimes to becoming compliant with EU law. Europeanization can result either 
from legislative means or New Modes of Governance8, and neither has been 
empirically addressed to a sufficient extent. Thus, this thesis can contribute to 
knowledge of the Europeanization of MSs REIT regimes, in particular, in relation 
to direct tax treatment, in MSs through legislative means and EU harmonisation 
activities. 
 
Since the introduction of the REIT regime in the USA in the 1960s academic 
literature focused on the classical US-REIT model.9 Beside, there is little 
5 The abbreviation “EU” in the context of this thesis refers to the European Union established 
with the “Treaty on European Union” (OJ 2010/C 83/01, vol. 53, 30 March 2010), Art. 1 I, 
thereby succeeding the (former) European Community (Art. 1 III), and is used for the EU as 
such as well as its Institutions synonymously. 
6 The abbreviation “MS” or in it plural “MSs” refer to the Member States of the European Union 
(EU) only. 
7 See i.e. EU REIT Coalition (2009), p. 16; Cornelisse (2006 Part 1 and 2). 
8 See Falkner (2007). 
9 Chan/Erickson/Wang (2003), Block (2002), Garrigan/Parsons (1997) and Imperiale (2002). 
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material and information available on EU REIT regimes. Literature and Papers 
on REITs generally focus on certain domestic regimes, usually in the language 
of the MS, so language hinders the use of the literature outside the certain 
country and comparative research is limited.10 Literature has not tended to a 
comparative approach, which might offer guidance on the choice of structure for 
Investors. The academic literature11 comprises books on REITs in general, the 
EU and its law in general12, the freedoms and single ECJ decisions with its 
official publications13 as well as official publications from the Commission14 
supplemented with academic and popular papers by academics and 
consultants, mainly coming from the legal and tax court.  
 
In Europeanization research:  
 
“… few case studies have focused on the relationship between the 
behaviour of smaller member states in the EU and the degree of 
their domestic adaptation to the external environment of the 
Union…”15 
 
This research contributes case studies of France, Spain and Bulgaria, thus 
expanding Europeanization research beyond the “usual suspects” of Germany, 
France and the UK.16 
 
Comparative research, where extant, is limited to comparative illustrations 
where REIT regimes are illustrated by generally describing17 local MS18 regimes 
10 See for instance with MSs like Bulgaria, Italy, Spain, Lithuania and Finland. For Benelux, UK, 
France and Germany some information is available in English language, but focuses on 
domestic regime. 
11 See i.e. Commission (1979); Chalmers (1994); Cerioni (1999); Cordewener (2002); EPRA 
(2005); Wunderlich (2005); Cornelisse (2006 Part 1 and 2); Jochum (2006); Mullaly (2007); 
Malherbe (2008); Evers (2010) et al. 
12 See i.e. Barnard (2004); Weatherill (2003); Schwarze (2007).  
13 Source i.e. OJ. 
14 Academic literature and papers provide sources on harmonisation activities in the EU with 
focus on direct taxes and company taxation, see i.e. Weiner (2002 – 2002b); Persoff (2004); 
OECD (Reports 1998, 2006, 2007, 2011); Council (2009); Commission (1997, 1999, 2002, 
2003, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011) et al. 
15 See Hanf/Soetendorp (1998), p. 3. 
16 See Vink/Graziano (2007), p. 17. 
17 See i.e. EPRA (2004, 2009 and 2013b, Europe) and Ernst & Young (2005 Tax). 
18 See i.e. Schäfer (2007), McGreal/Sotelo (2008) and Wijs (2010). 
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only19. This type of comparative illustrations on a country-by-country approach 
are found with EPRA’ s “Global REIT Survey” issued since 200420 and the 
“Guide to REITs” by Simontacchi/Stoschek,21 both providing a basic grounding 
for this research though. Comparative illustrations on EU REIT regimes first 
increased with the establishment of REIT regimes in core MS to the EU such as 
in France, UK, Germany, Italy and Spain in particular.22 Even though limited 
still23 literature comprise generally of the German, UK, Dutch, French,24 and 
sometimes the Italian25 as well as Spanish regimes only.26 This type of 
advanced comparative illustrations of MS REIT regimes provide for a 
comparison by listing the features of MS REIT regimes by tables, thus, 
visualising its common criteria and differentiators. These comparisons are found 
in studies by Ernst & Young27, PWC28, CMS29 and KPMG,30 linked with the 
features of a classic US-REIT.31 However, these studies provide only for a 
descriptive illustration focusing on legal and economic details32, performance 
comparisons, platform effectiveness, capital allocation, transactions, financing33 
19 See i.e. for the US-REIT: Chan/Erickson/Wang (2003), Block (2002), Garrigan/Parsons (1997) 
and Imperiale (2002) all for the US REIT. 
20 See the EPRA´ “Global REIT Survey”, at: http://www.epra.com/regulation-and-
reporting/taxation/reit-survey/. Today this Survey in its recent edition of 2013 includes all existing 
regimes introduced since its first publication except for one regime only what is the Hungarian 
SZIT (see EPRA (2013)). 
21 See Simontacchi/Stoschek (2012), which together with EPRA Global REIT Survey (EPRA 
2013), provide for the most extensive illustration of Global REIT regimes, but 
SImontacchi/Stoschek add some analysis “...to discern...some common patterns”, however, not 
being “exhaustive” especially with respect to any common pattern towards a “common 
understanding” in between EU REIT regimes as used in this research thesis though (General 
Report, p. 4). 
22 See EPRA (2013). 
23 See Funk (2008) limited to Netherlands and Belgium on the European level. 
24 See i.e. Wijs (2007) and (2007a), EU REIT Coalition (2009), p. 16; Leibold/Nass, (2008); 
Schmid, H. M. et al. (2007); Booth (2006); Suárez (2009). 
25 See i.e. EPRA (2007), p. 27. 
26 See Eichholtz/Kok (2007). 
27 See Ernst & Young (2010), p. 35 et seqq. spotlighting the 4 regimes in the US, UK, Australia 
and Japan only. 
28 See PWC (2013a) listing 20 of the some 34 REIT regimes globally including 9 of the 13 extant 
Regimes in the EU but missing Greece, Lithuania, Hungary and Ireland. 
29 See CMS (2008) provide for an overview of the key rules governing REITs in six European 
countries (UK, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, France and Germany). 
30 See KPMG (2007) providing for a high level summary of inter alia six REIT regimes in Europe 
(UK, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands). 
31 The US-REIT model. 
32 Criteria of focus are i.e. legal from, statutory capital requirements, shareholder limitations, 
stock listing, requirements as to qualifying assets, leverage ratio, sanctions, taxation and 
incentives for conversion (see i.e. Müller (2010), p. 3). 
33 See Ernst & Young (2012a). Study limited to the performance of six countries only which are 
Australia, France, Japan, Singapore UK and the US, Whereas, Ernst & Young (2013) focuses 
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and taxation of single REIT regimes.34 Furthermore, books by McGreal/Sotelo35 
and Schäfer36 provide a context for the development and success of REITs, 
thus, being only descriptive too.  
 
Academic research comparing REIT regimes beyond a pure descriptive 
illustration is rare.37 The first academic papers going beyond a simple listing of 
single regime features were published in 2007 from Maastricht University38 
followed in 2010 by the Technical University of Darmstadt.39 However, none of 
the publications provide a full comparative analysis, or focus on criteria that 
investors may expect from a European REIT regime, or identify suspect 
regulations not compliant with EU law. Eichholtz/Kok (2007)40 and Müller 
(2010)41 have identified a missing standardisation of regimes, Knebel/Schmidt 
(2008)42 found suspect rules on shareholder conditions. Hughes/Lewis (2008)43 
and Bone-Winkel et al. (2008) compared advantages of the REIT regimes within 
the EU's competition of vehicle structures.44  
 
Recent studies such as Cornelisse (2006 Part 1 and 2) and Müller (2010) have 
contributed to the understanding of MS REIT regimes, but have not touched 
upon the Europeanization of EU REIT regimes and the emergence of the 
EuroREIT. This thesis explores the impact of the EU on the (direct) tax 
treatment of the non-domestic shareholder in MS REIT regimes, and the 
on economic details such as platform effectiveness, capital allocation, transactions, financing 
and emerging markets. 
34 See i.e. KPMG (2007); Funk (2008), regarding the Netherlands and Belgium; Leib/Nass 
(2008) and Schmid et al. (2007) regarding France, Germany and UK; Booth (2006) and Suarez 
(2009). 
35 See McGreal/Sotelo (2008). 
36 See Schäfer (2007). 
37 Examples for comparative analysis may be found i.e. with Nowak/Schreier/Simon (2005); 
Eichholtz/Kok (2007); Pfnür/ Müller (2010); Müller (2010). Pfnür/Müller and Müller are missing 
regimes such as Lithuania, Finland and Spain all of which were established already and shall 
have included for completeness in full though. 
38 See Eichholtz/Kok (2007). 
39 See Pfnür/Müller (2010).  
40 See Eichholtz/Kok (2007), p. 17 et seqq. 
41 See Müller (2010), p. 44/45. 
42 See Knebel/Schmidt (2008), p. 263 et seq. 
43 The comparative analysis by Hughes/Lewis (2008) comprise of a direct comparison of the 
regimes in France, Germany and UK as well as the US-REIT, even though partly only (see 
Hugh/Lewis (2008), p. 90 et seqq.). 
44 See Hughes/Lewis (2008), p.94 et seq. and Bone-Winkel et al. (2008), p. 46 et seqq. 
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likelihood of a mutually acceptable or harmonised EuroREIT model, an area not 
addressed by prior studies.  
 
Comparative analyses generally focus on the corporate law side of REIT 
regimes, usually on single country regimes rather multi-regime comparisons. 
There is limited research on the tax regimes of different REITs, which is 
surprising considering that the taxation of a REIT is its cornerstone.45 Domestic 
literature discusses the local domestic taxation of the REIT at company level, 
and tax treatment of shareholders, mostly in the form of papers and guidance by 
tax consultants.46 Few publications pick up the tax treatment of non-domestic 
Investors either corporate or individual under domestic REIT regime.47 The 
international consulting firms (Ernst & Young48 or KPMG49) and international 
Law Firms each come from their professional focus50 and provide the first 
comparative survey of regulatory framework and the tax regime of REITs.51  
 
The literature review thus shows a gap of knowledge on Europeanization effects 
on the local level, especially with respect to domestic direct tax regimes in MS 
REIT regimes. Only Cornelisse (2006)52 and Wijs (2014)53 introduces suspect 
regulations in certain regimes limited to mainly tax issues, not issues of 
company laws and State aid. However, their contribution is high-level only 
without analysing neither the relevant case law nor the Treaty’s54 fundamental 
Freedoms55 applicable. This thesis will, therefore, go beyond extant studies to 
set into context of the Treaty framework and ECJ case law, combining company 
45 See i.e. Stoschek/Dammann (2006). 
46 See i.e. Ernst & Young (2005); Cornelisse (2006, Part 1/2) and OECD (Report 2007); EPRA 
(2013b). 
47 See i.e. most recently Wijs (2014), p. Section 7.3/7.4. 
48 See i.e. Ernst & Young (2012a). 
49 See KPMG (2007). 
50 The focus usually is either taxation or legal focussed only (see i.e. CMS (2008); Loyens & 
Loeff in: Wijs (2007 and 2007a). 
51 See Simontacchi/Stoschek (2012), General Report, p. 3. 
52 See Cornelisse (2006 Part 1 and 2). 
53 See Wijs (2014). 
54 Articles in this thesis do all refer to the Treaty unless specifically otherwise indicated. “Treaty” 
in the context of this research refers to the consolidated Version of “The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union”, together with its Annexes and protocols thereto, as they 
result from the amendments introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, which was signed on 13 
December 2007 in Lisbon and which entered into force on 1 December 2009 (see OJ 2010/C 
83/01, vol. 53, 30 March 2010). 
55 The fundamental freedoms referred to are the freedom of movement of goods (Art. 28), of 
services (Art. 56) and of capital (Art. 63) and the freedom of establishment (Art. 49).  
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law and (direct) tax law to conceptualise a compliant standardised EuroREIT. It 
seeks to identify common grounds for a European typed REIT concept, 
recognising MS Tax sovereignty while proposing the allocation of taxing rights 
and, thus, tax revenues. The research, therefore, focuses on the interaction of 
the laws of the EU and the MS and its impact especially to MS tax regimes and, 
thus, its REIT regimes.  
 
3.   Research aims 
The aim of this research is to investigate the impact of the EU on direct taxation 
in the case of REITs, and whether EU policies in this area have led MS to adjust 
their REIT regimes. The research assesses the impact of the EU through its 
“hard” policies and relevant case law passed by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), and through “soft” policies are on the harmonisation of tax policies 
through greater transparency. While there has been a removal of barriers to the 
internal market by the EU56 i.e. through the customs union and the 
establishment of competition rules, competence for direct tax policies remained 
with the MS, not subject to the list of shared competences with the MS. Each 
domestic REIT regime therefore follows national policies. 
 
Nevertheless, the research will show whether in the absence of a fully 
harmonised internal market and more specifically without a harmonised and 
uniform company law all of the MS REIT regimes require essentially the same 
conditions and criteria for companies under its REIT regime. This will become 
visible in the area of taxation, which under the sovereignty of each of the MS´ 
harmonisation shall even less extant yet. However, from Literature57 it appears 
that with regard to the tax treatment there seem to be common understanding in 
between MSs to tax income at source though. The taxation follows the principle 
of territoriality that is the levying of withholding tax in cross-border investment 
scenarios. In order to safeguard domestic tax revenue MS tax regimes are 
suspect of violating the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Treaty, i.e. 
the free movement of capital, thereby breaching one of the essential criteria of 
REITs that is, the tax transparency and taxation of income at shareholders level 
56 See Art. 3 I lit. a) and b). 
57 See i.e. Cornelisse (2006 Part 1 and 2), Müller (2010). 
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only. However, the ECJ made it clear that although direct taxation falls within 
the sole competence of the MS, they must nonetheless exercise that 
competence consistently with EU law58, in accordance with the Treaty’s 
principles.59 
 
The research will explore the idea of a harmonised EU-REIT (as requested by 
the five leading European real estate formations in the “EU REIT Coalition”), a 
compliant European REIT model, and whether harmonisation between MS REIT 
regimes may be possible. The harmonisation of REIT regimes in the EU 
towards a EuroREIT regime on EU level requires not only assistance from the 
EU and its institutions, but from MS´ too. This holds true in particular for the 
harmonisation of (direct) taxes that are not in the competence of the EU rather 
is of MS´ sovereignty. Therefore, harmonising activities on EU level shall be 
analysed to provide insight for future developments and the potential to 
assisting the emergence for a harmonised REIT at EU level. 
 
Focus in this respect, however, will be towards “soft” policies in the area of 
direct taxes and potential concepts for the EuroREIT and its direct tax treatment. 
This is owed the fact that very little attention has been devoted in the European 
tax literature to the systematic analysis of (i) the compliance of the direct tax 
treatment provided by MS REIT regimes with EU law and of (ii) the analysis of 
solutions possible for taxing domestic originated income by foreign REITs 
without breaking through of the tax transparency of the REIT regime and 
safeguard MS tax revenue though. This lacking analysis is not only a likelihood 
of the complexity of the subject matter60, rather a result of the lack of taking a 
holistic view not only on different areas of the law but linking it with areas of 
sovereignty, policy and culture, thus, with political sciences’ European studies. 
Thus, analysis is not limited to calling for emergence of activities on OECD61, 
EU institutional level62 or to proposing for bilateral solutions63, rather analysing 
ECJ’s case law to the emergence for change to MS direct tax regimes, even 
58 See i.e. Case “Test Claimants”. 
59 See i.e. Case “Avoir fiscal”, para 107. 
60 See Somontacchi/Stoscheck (2012), General Report, p.3. 
61 See i.e. OECD’s Report (1998) and its project on Harmful Tax Practices (OECD (2007). 
62 See i.e. Commissions’ Code of Conduct (Commission (1998) and its call for increased tax co-
ordination in between MSs (Commission (2006), p. 4. 
63 See i.e. Cornelisse’s proposal to renegotiating DTTs (Cornelisse 2006, Part 2). 
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though not of competence by the Treaty to the EU and, more specifically, taking 
the efforts made already with the discussions about comprehensive methods for 
consolidated base of taxation to combining the results64 with existing standards 
in the EU already like the Directive on the Automatic Exchange of Information 
(AEIO). Thus and thereby, closing the gap of potential loss of tax revenue that is 
creating a hindrance to MS to agree on a mutual acceptable concept for a 
common tax regime in cross-border situations to MS REIT regimes providing 
basis for a harmonised EU REIT regime, the EuroREIT. 
 
The final question, therefore, shall be whether mechanisms identified already 
provide for solution to the tax treatment of income derived by foreign REITs or 
has built ground for change to occur. In this context the thesis discusses this 
concept of a consolidated tax base to allocate tax revenue between States in 
the case of REITs. Hereto, the findings from the comparative analysis and 
analysis of EU law will be conceptually linked with findings of the European 
Studies, with regard to movements in the EU towards the integration. In order to 
identify a process possible to forecast future development, the findings are set 
into context. Thus, activities by MSs and EU institutions shall be analysed 
providing basis towards harmonisation and, thus, the development of a 
European typed REIT regime and the development of the EuroREIT.  
 
4.   Research framework and methodology  
There seem observation with early legal scholarship on the EU essentially being 
based on assumption that European Integration through law, seen through a 
lens of constitutionalism, is an exercise in “rendering the EU more state like” 
and that these assumptions persist in EU legal scholarship today. However, the 
legal academic community and those outside of it have questioned these 
assumptions for at least a decade. Moreover, whatever political scientists may 
think, EU legal scholarship is not concerned exclusively with doctrinal 
exposition, but with “how and why the law is more than the functional 
handmaiden of political actors”.65 Thus, this thesis assumes that law plays a 
64 See for overview i.e. Weiner (2002) and Martinez-Serrano/Patterson (2003). 
65 See Hunt/Shaw (2009), p. 4. 
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significant role in the integration process according to de Burca.66 In this context 
this thesis approaches the research question from the point of view provided by 
the ECJ in its Case “Kadi”, where the ECJ see EU law as if it were a domestic 
legal system and, thus, EU law is seen as a “separate and parallel regime”.67 
However, it shall not result into acknowledging EU law as a sui generis system, 
rather, to conceptualise the EU’s legal order as if it were that of a state, and to 
conduct legal analysis on the basis occurred in Case “Kadi” though. As legal 
scholarship on EU integration, this thesis, therefore, focuses on the integration 
of (EU) law (legal integration) in MSs and integration through (EU) law (the roles 
of law in the processes of political integration) taking account of EU “hard” and 
“soft” law.68 Thus, the research is different to those of the social science 
scholarship of EU Studies. 
 
Understanding the research as legal research, this thesis, is based on a legal 
positivist approach in that it accepts law as the observable phenomenon on 
legislation, custom, adjudication by courts and other legal institutions. This 
approach is used to systemise the relevant norms in MS REIT regimes, and to 
understand the relationships between different bodies of legal norms as well as 
to analysing the output of he ECJ and its coherence and accuracy of its 
application of sources of law i.e. EU law. In this context the research is neither 
about explaining change in the social nor political world, but about the 
exposition and analysis of legal doctrine i.e. EU’s legal “policy”, legislation and 
(ECJ) case law that is the EU’s legal system. 
 
4.1  Research framework 
Wincott69 observed that “legal and political science analyses of European 
integration took place more or less in isolation from one another” the research 
takes account of political science i.e. European integration Studies even though 
focusing on legal doctrine i.e. European law though. Hereto, Walker70 provide to 
connecting legal and political science in research of European integration 
66 See de Burca (2005). 
67 See Case “Kadi v Commission”, C-402/05, (2008), ECR-I6351. 
68 See Capeletti (1986), 
69 See Wincott (1995), p. 293. 
70 See Walker (2008). 
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though. Walker’s differentiation of levels of interaction71 comprising “institutional 
incorporation”, “system recognition” and “normative coordination”72 taking a 
legal approach to situations of integration Institutional incorporation at the first 
level is represented where the host normative order (Host MS) makes general 
provision for the normative decisions of an external agency (EU) to be 
incorporated and treated as authoritative within the host normative order73, such 
as MS’s relationship with the EU. Furthermore at the level of “system 
recognition”, providing for the second level of interaction, there is no general 
institutional mechanism, but there is recognition of another system formalised by 
the host on a systematic level, understood as intrinsic to the self-definition of the 
host system, such as incorporation of jus cogens norms.74 The third level is that 
of “normative coordination” as a result of the application of codes of conduct 
voluntarily. This is not as strong as compulsory institutional incorporation, but is 
more than bilateral connections between legal orders only.75  
 
The Levels of interaction provided by Walker form a doctrinal legal point of view 
are used to bridge legal and political sciences. Analysing the impact of the EU’s 
legal order on MS’s legal systems and legislation involves identifying the 
legislative activity of EU institutions and its law relevant i.e. applicable Treaty 
provisions and ECJ case law. Walker’s levels of interaction provide framework 
for the analysis of judgements from the ECJ, which might be operating at one of 
these levels. Using Walker’s levels of interaction in the context of EU law 
provide mean to identify MS motivation and drivers for interaction with the EU 
and in between MSs, from a legal doctrinal point of view. 
 
However, identifying the level of interaction legally gives clarity to the degree of 
connectedness between national and EU legal systems, but does not answer 
the question whether this is resulting from a process going forward leading to 
MS’s legal systems becoming closer, rather from pure hierarchy of the legal 
71 See Walker (2008), p. 373. 
72 Walker’s levels of incorporation comprise of total five levels. However, the fourth level of 
“environmental overlap” and “sympathetic consideration” will not be of focus to this thesis since 
these levels provide for a different kind of interaction and does not occur directly between legal 
systems, but is the overlap in the social and economic environments impacted by different legal 
orders (see Walker (2008), pp. 373 et seqq.). 
73 Ibid, p. 374. 
74 Ibid, p. 379. 
75 Ibid, p. 382. 
 
11 
                                                     
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
Challenging MSs tax regimes 
 
systems involved. This question is not subject to legal research, but of political 
science. Hereto, Europeanization is used to providing answer and outlook to 
further development by explaining the process happening linking the facts to 
each other. 
 
Europeanization is a concept that is used to explain a variety of changes within 
European politics and “can be a useful entry-point for greater understanding of 
important changes occurring in our politics and society”76. With the process of 
Europeanization Walker’s levels of interaction are “translated” into the 
dimensions of Europeanization. Focused on the domain of Polity dimensions of 
Europeanization equal with Walker’s levels of interaction: institutional 
incorporation equals down-loading, “system recognition” assumes to comprise 
some degree of up-loading as well as “normative coordination” more likely 
represents case for cross-loading though. 
 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on legal research on MS REIT regimes as well as 
the (legal) impact by the ECJ on them in order to understand how we got where 
we are with respect to certain criteria of MS REIT regimes. To answer the 
question whether today’s situation was inter partes resulting from a case 
decided by the ECJ only, rather being part of a process on-going the concept of 
Europeanization is applied to identifying examples of the process i.e. 
downloading, uploading and/or crossloading. To prevent misinterpretations in 
between legal and social sciences through the translation of the findings using 
Walkers conceptual (legal) approach, Europeanization forms the overarching 
theoretical framework of the research though, focussing upon the dimensions, 
mechanisms, and outcomes by which European processes and institutions 
affect domestic-level processes and institutions. 
 
A number of academics recommend a focus on the domestic level to gauge the 
impact of the EU.77 The bottom-up research design approach to 
Europeanization assesses whether the EU has impacted at domestic level, from 
the pre-existing situation.78 In this context the (sub-)framework analyses the 
76 See Featherstone (2003), p. 3. 
77 See i.e. Moumoutzis (2011), Radaelli/Pasquier (2007) and Exadaktylos/Radaelli (2009). 
78 See Rees/Quinn/Caunaughton (2009). 
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connectedness in between MS REIT regimes and between the national and the 
EU legal system. Hereto, the structured framework derives in part from analysis 
of the US-REIT model (legal requirements, operating activities, status, tax 
treatment and sanctions), with further criteria such as MS sovereignty in direct 
tax and the EU legal framework. The analysis follows the three-step approach to 
Europeanization, which will involve the discussion of “misfit”, testing the 
“common understanding” with relevant EU “hard” law, and from “goodness of fit” 
adaptational pressure applied to MS.  
 
Figure I.4-1: Conceptual framework 
 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
The legal research for applicable EU law include the Treaty and its provisions 
(“primary EU law”), and secondary sources (“secondary EU law”), representing 
“hard” policy. Research has been limited to the fundamental freedoms as a 
broad “benchmark”, with ECJ decisions providing for an “indirect” power in the 
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absence of a “direct” competence by the Commission.79 This kind of indirect 
loss of sovereignty may be limited, as recognised in its ruling “Cassis de Dijon” 
that where a genuine interest is the subject of protection, national restrictive 
rules may remain compatible with the Treaty.80 The concepts provided by 
settled case law may serve as a blueprint, and their principles applied to MS´ 
tax regimes in order to assess (non-)compliance with EU law. As a result, 
however, MSs face a high degree of institutional incorporation (Walker’s first 
level) that is by the EU though the ECJ downloading its “hard” law. The 
expanding legislative activity of EU institutions e.g. the ECJ incidentally affects 
MSs autonomous commitments towards the EU i.e. in direct tax. MS may, 
furthermore, be pressured for domestic change to its REIT regimes especially 
with regard to tax treatment too. However, the impact of EU “hard” policies may, 
thus, not only be one of incorporation only, but of recognition and coordination 
going forward, thus, inducing uploading and cross-loading too the process of 
Europeanization may be identified. 
 
The research will focus on the idea of a harmonised EU-REIT as requested by 
the five leading European real estate formations in the “EU REIT Coalition”81, 
who have asked the Commission to introduce an EU-REIT regime to prevent 
national regimes not being in compliance with European law, disadvantage 
companies transferring to a tax haven.82 It will document the conditions and 
circumstances for the creation of a harmonised EuroREIT, thus, assessing the 
impact of the EU and the level of this change in the area of direct tax in the MS 
creating possibility for a harmonised EuroREIT. This will provide for MSs to 
adjust their domestic tax laws while recognising MS tax sovereignty as a basis 
of today’s political order. 
 
 
 
79 See i.e. ECJ Case C-208/00, “Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company 
Baumanagement GmbH (NCC)” (Case “Überseering”), (2002), ECR I-09919 and Case C-
212/97, “Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen” (Case “Centros”), (1999), ECR I-01459. 
80 See Case C-120/78, “Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein” (Case 
“Cassis de Dijon”), (1979), ECR I-00649. 
81 The formations are the RICS, the European Landowners Association, EPRA, the European 
Group of Valuers Association and ULI. 
82 Immobilien Zeitung (2007). 
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4.2  Europeanization 
Europeanization as research concept is rather young having increased its 
popularity since the 1990s in academic research83, there is neither unified 
understanding nor approach existing in academic literature of the European 
Studies.84 
 
While Europeanization is understood to mean different things to different 
authors and has been used in different ways, it is, however, now an 
acknowledged concept for political scientists to analyse the impact of the EU. 
Europeanization is understood as a process of “change affecting domestic 
institution, politics and public policy”. Domestic change can come about as “… 
MS adapt their processes, policies, and institutions to new practices, norms, 
rules and procedures that emanate from the emergence of a European system 
of governance…”.85 
 
But still, there seem little consensus to its definition varying in defining it as a 
process, output or impact86 rendering it “… meaningless … providing little 
common ground”87, thus being “still in its infancy”88 at an early stage of its 
conceptional development89 and be viewed as a “disorderly field”90 that “… 
remains …(of)… theoretical interest … (only)”91 though. Thus, Europeanization 
is a complex process that is first to be defined what Europeanization actually 
is92 since the term is used in different ways and for different purposes.93 
 
Consequently, Europeanization lacks an undisputed definition or in more 
positive words is of “… a somewhat loose definition…”94. A major research 
83 See Vink/Graziano (2007), p. 3. 
84 See for overview e.g. Howell (2004a), p. 43 et seqq. 
85 See Börzel/Risse (2000), p. 6. 
86 See Jones/Clark (2010), pp. 12/13. 
87 See Radaelli (2000), p. 13. 
88 See Töller (2004), p. 1. 
89 See Bulmer/Lequesne (2005), 11. 
90 See Olson (2002), p. 922.  
91 See Dyson (2002), p. 3. 
92 See Buller/Gamble (2002), p. 4. 
93 See Bomberg/Peterson (2000).p. 3. 
94 See Featherstone/Kazamias (2001), p. 14. 
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project by the European University Institute on Europeanization (EUI)95 provided 
definition of the term as referring to  
 
“… the emergence and development at the European level of distinct 
structures of governance, that is, of political, legal and social 
institutions that formalise and routinise interactions among the 
actors, and of policy networks specialising in the creation of 
authoritative European rules.”96 
 
The definition by EUI leads to the understanding of Europeanization as primarily 
concerned with patterns of national adaptation to European Integration, thus the 
impact of the EU on its MS.97 Dyson/Goetz (2002) resumed this understanding 
explaining that Europeanization is: 
 
“… sometimes used narrowly to refer to implementation of EU 
legislation or more broadly to capture policy transfer and learning 
within the EU. It is sometimes used to identify the shift of national 
policy paradigms and instruments to the EU level. (Other)…. times it 
is used in a narrower way to refer to its effects at the domestic level 
… or in a more expansive way to include effects on discourse and 
identities as well as structures and policies at domestic level.”98 
 
Comparative analyses invoking the EU understand Europeanization as an 
independent variable to explain changes in national arenas.99 Ladrech (1994) 
captured the EUI approach of “national adaptation” to setting in motion the 
discussion of Europeanization in this context shall be understood as an 
 
95 The European University Institute (EUI) was established in 1972 and is an international centre 
for doctorate and post-doctorate studies and research, situated in Florence.  
96 See Bartolini/Risse/Strath (1999), p. 2. 
97 See George (2001) and its reference to “... the effect of pressures form the EU ...”. 
98 See Dyson/Goetz (2002), p. 2. 
99 See Ladrech (2010), p. 12 and Hix/Goetz (2000), p. 23 who identified change in domestic 
systems or Europeanization as (dependent) variable. 
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“… incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics 
to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of 
the organisational logic of national politics and policy making”.100  
 
This definition is marked as the starting point of the understanding of 
Europeanization, which in its most explicit form according to Howell is 
“conceptualized as the process of down-loading EU” associated with “top-down” 
procedures.101 Thus, it is the nature and extent of EU influence over policy-
making processes in different states, that is the extent of Europeanization.102 In 
this context Risse et al. (2001) conceptualised Europeanization as  
 
“… the emergence and the development at the level of distinct 
structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social 
institutions associated with political problem solving that formalizes 
interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specialising in 
the creation of authoritative European rules …”.103 
 
The procedures are described such as “distinct modes of European Governance 
(that) have transformed aspects of domestic politics”104 or “influence deriving 
from European politics impacting MS”105 involving a response to the policies of 
the EU.106 Though, Europeanization is not a process107 itself. Rather, it is a 
process starting a development along certain steps on activities pre-defined 
leading to a specific result. The result according to Literature is always 
described as interaction being the outcome. Therefore, Europeanization shall be 
understood as a mechanism that is not a process itself but a description of what 
happens at European level between MS and MS towards the EU and its 
institutions as well as vice versa. The result may not be limited to integration108, 
100 See Ladrech (1994), p. 69/70. 
101 See Howell (2002), p. 1. 
102 See Adshead (2002), p. 29. 
103 See Risse et al. (2002), p. 3. 
104 See Buller/Gamble (2002), p. 17. 
105 See Herriter (2001), p. 3. 
106 See Featherstone (2003), p. 3. 
107 Process in this context shall be defined as a deterministic Process where each individual 
status conditionally depends on the preceding one and is determined by this status. 
108 European integration has been defined as the shifting of the activities and loyalties of 
national actors towards a supranational centre (see Haas (1958)). It is a process whereby “... 
national actors forego the desire or ability to conduct policies independently and seek instead to 
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rather changing mind-sets, reality and perceptions. Hereto, the example is 
negative integration109, which is not a result of a certain process rather pressure 
or omission. However, neither pressure nor omission as such involves activity 
by any means, rather, it “happens”, though, is not simply “out there”110. This 
emphasises what is known as the 'top-down approach' to Europeanization with 
change emanating from the impact of the EU onto the national policy and MSs 
are viewed as re-active towards changes in the EU.111 
 
However, a second dynamic that has been mostly neglected is the 
“interactive”112 character of Europeanization. While “top-down” Europeanization 
still is a valid concept, there has become awareness of further dimensions to 
Europeanization though, recognising the interdependence113 of the involvement 
of “up-loading”114 by MS or “bottom-up”115 Europeanization by MSs projecting 
their domestic issues to EU level116 “… to “export” domestic policy models, 
ideas and details to the EU …”,117 leading to a “… two way process118, between 
the domestic and the EU levels, involving both top-down and bottom-up 
pressures …”119. These processes are better to explain by different ways of 
looking at what Literature has developed in many different “faces” but referring 
all to the same.120 In this sense Risse et al. (2001) have identified 
make joint decision or delegate decision making power to new organs and are persuaded to 
shift their expectations and activities to this new centre” (see Lindberg (1963), p. 6/7). Part oft he 
process of course, involves, according to the Preamble of the Treaty, “... lay the foundation of an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe ...”. In this context “integration” is understood as 
“positive integration” that is when EU obligations prescribe an institutional model to which 
domestic arrangements have to be adjusted with limited or none national discretion (see 
Knill/Lehmkuhl (1999). Example in this respect is seen with EU primary law i.e. Directives that 
are direct applicable in the MSs. 
109 Negative integration is where EU legislation alters the domestic rules of the game that is the 
extent to which European policies have altered the strategic position of domestic actors (see 
Knill/Lehmkuhl (1999), p. 3)). Example hereto is with the ECJ case law in direct tax where the 
ECJ gives pressure on the MSs to i.e. adjust their tax regimes, though, direct taxation not being 
part of delegated competence tot he EU level rather is of the sovereignty of the MSs still. 
110 See Bulmer/Burch (2000), p. 9. 
111 See for Europeanization as “down-loading” i.e. Börzel/Risse (2000), Buller/Gamble (2002, 
Goetz/Hix (2000) and George (2001). 
112 See Bomberg/Peterson (2000), p. 6; Howell (2003), p. 7. 
113 See Featherstone/Kazamias (2001), p. 7/14. 
114 See Börzel (2003), p. 3. 
115 See Howell (2004), p. 4. 
116 See Bomberg/Peterson (2000), p. 6. 
117 See Bulmer/Burch (2001), p. 6. 
118 See Bomberg/Peterson (2000), p. 2, 7, Börzel (2001), Bulmer/Burch (2001) and George 
(2001), p. 1, who, however, looked at the interrelation in the case oft he EU and the UK only. 
119 See Featherstone/Kazamias (2001), p. 6. 
120 See Olsen (2002). 
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Europeanization with the “emergence and development ... of structures… at the 
European level” (bottom-up) leading to “… the creation of authoritative rules …” 
(top-down).121 Hereby, through the analysis of structures and policies and the 
part the EU plays in “… diffusion and construction …”122 examples for 
Europeanization are found.123 Thereby, the process show a “pattering” of action 
and omission at various levels of participants and interaction in between and 
with themselves by which finally a (national and institutional) pattering of 
decision making gives way to a European pattering.124 Consequently, where 
Europeanization incorporates an interactive process in that it involves bottom-up 
and top-down procedures.125 
 
Furthermore, other definitions that take “more general concepts”126 needs to be 
taken into account provided by Radaelli (2003), who describes Europeanization 
as consisting  
 
“… of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) 
institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, 'Ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and 
subnational) discourse, political structures and public choices.”127 
 
From this 'bottom-up' approach Europeanization occurs when MS begin to affect 
the policy of the EU in a given area. However, a more nuanced analysis posits 
that the institutional interaction of policy actors at the various levels of European 
governance leads to the re-definition of national, regional and other identities 
within a European context, where the multiple levels of governance in Europe 
121 See Risse et al. (2001), p. 3. 
122 See Radaelli (2000). 
123 See Howell (2003), p. 11. 
124 See Jones/Clark (2010), p. 11. 
125 See Howell (2002), p. 3 with reference to Börzel (2002), p. 193, and her emphasis to 
Europeanization to one that entails “the evolution of European institutions that impact on political 
processes and structures of the member states”. 
126 See Howell (2002), p. 3. 
127 See Radaelli for one of the broadest definitions of Europeanization in: Radaelli (2000), p. 4, 
(2003), p. 30. 
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are not seen as necessarily in opposition to one another. Rather, 
Europeanization is a circular128 and interactive process129 of  
 
“… complex interactive top-down and bottom-up process(es) in 
which domestic polities, politics and public policies are shaped by 
European Integration and in which domestic actors use European 
Integration to shape the domestic area.”130 
 
In other words Europeanization cannot be distracted from either the domestic or 
the EU level of policy-making since it conditionally involves the interaction of the 
two131 and are needed to be considered in an understanding of the EU as 
process.132 Even though adaptational pressure for domestic structural change is 
at issue Europeanization does not come from a single European rule or policy, 
but from a combination of various Europeanization processes.133 
 
Additional perspective of Europeanization is the “horizontal approach”. Different 
to vertical mechanisms, which is about the definition of policies at EU level and 
its methabolisation at domestic level, thus, adaptational pressure. Whereas, 
horizontal mechanisms “… involve a different form of adjustment based on the 
market or patterns of socialisation”.134 This approach takes into account the 
transfer of politics, policies and policy making between MS. The transfer is 
based on a form of “soft law”, therefore, it is not enforceable, but is based on 
“best practice” and mutual recognition.135 Hence, the process of 
Europeanization includes “top-down” processes, as well as “bottom-up” and 
round-about processes136 (“cross-loading”137).138 Therefore, Europeanization is 
being conceptualised  
128 See Goetz (2002), p. 4 who concluded, “Europeanisation is circular rather than unidirectional, 
and cyclical rather than on-off”. 
129 See Howell (2003), p. 7. 
130 See the recognition of the broadness of Europeanization by Dyson/Goetz (2003), p. 20. 
131 See Featherstone/Kazamias (2001), p. 5/6. 
132 See Howell (2003), p. 8. 
133 See Green Cowles/Risse (2001), p. 218. 
134 See Radaelli (2003), p. 41. 
135 This interaction in between MSs is what Bomberg/Peterson (2000) have in mind with policy 
transfer driven by MSs to sharing common concern to solve policy problems (see 
Bomberg/Peterson (2000), p. 13). 
136 See Rees/Quinn/Connaughton (2009), p.16. 
137 See Howell (2004), pp. 46 et seqq. 
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“… as a process that involves not only hierarchical (top-down) 
processes, but also bottom-up processes, whereby domestic actors seek to 
upload norms to the European arena, and horizontal processes, whereby 
norms can be diffused across MS using the EU as a facilitator of norm and 
policy diffusion.”139 
 
Figure I.4-2: Interaction between MS and the EU 
 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Thus, Europeanization is about the practices in “being and becoming 
European”, creating the conditions defining Europe and, thus, an approach of 
the study of developments of contemporary Europe.140 In this context 
Europeanization can provide a point of reference for domestic actors who not 
merely react to European impulses but anticipate such impulses by inducing 
bottom-up processes changing the European level or by “using” or 
“endogenising” Europe in domestic politics independent to specific pressures 
from Brussels. In other words, Europeanization includes the domestic political 
domain as well as the impact of EU activities and an interactive nature, thus is a 
“complex process”.141 The interaction between the actors and levels is a 
perpetual process going forward and is illustrated by Figure I.3-1. 
 
138 See Howell (2004a), p. 5 et seqq. (7). 
139 See Mulcahy (2009), p. 23. 
140 See Harmsen/Wilson (2000), p. 24. 
141 See Bomberg/Peterson (2000), p. 7. 
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However, the interaction is not limited to vertical activities, either top-down or 
bottom-up, rather comprise of horizontal activities to cross-loading polities, 
politics and public policies. The interaction i.e. in between MS occurs in both 
vertical levels either by sharing practices to transform of what is down-loaded by 
the EU, i.e. through ECJ case law indirectly influencing domestic direct tax laws 
of the MS, or by building alliances in up-loading polities, politics and policies to 
the EU or via the EU and its Institutions (down) to other MS, i.e. in the case to 
pressuring MS to agree to the automatic exchange of information in direct 
tax.142  
At the same time, beside vertical mechanisms, there are horizontal mechanisms 
in place, i.e. before u-loading policies et al. MS may interact to aligning interests 
or bench-marking themselves to managing their expectations before being up-
loaded to representing MS’s position to the subject topic at issue. In fact, the 
mechanisms are interrelated building a “triangle” of mechanisms driving 
Europeanization. 
 
Obviously, Europeanization concerns a complex interrelationship between 
processes of change taking place at the EU and national levels.143 In this 
triangular relationship Europeanization appears on different levels whether it is 
down-loading, up-loading or cross-loading and it is subject to the certain topic at 
issue whether the certain process is accounted for one of the levels relevant. 
However, processes may not account for just a single “cause” since every 
reaction is caused by an action, but the action may be triggered by another 
142 Further to the agreement reached on 14 May 2013 on the mandate to improve the EU’s 
agreements with Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Andorra and San Marino, and the 
consensus on the scope of the revised Directive, the European Council of 22 May 2013 called 
for the adoption of the revised Directive before the end of 2013. See i.e. the case of 
Luxembourg having been pressured by the EU strongly assisted and lobbied by the bigger 
economies such as the MSs of Germany and France (see Proposal 2013/0188 for a Council 
directive amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory exchange of information in the 
field of taxation). The scope of automatic exchange of information within MSs under the 
Proposal of directive will be the same as under US FATCA (FATCA - Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Act. US tax rules designed for the US to collect information on US taxpayers, their 
income and their assets, from non-US financial institutions, directly or through other tax 
authorities) and will follow the same schedule, i.e., effective as from 1 January 2015. As a result, 
the availability of information to report should not come as an issue for financial institutions 
because of this Proposal of directive. Further to the implementation of the proposed directive 
together with the Directive, almost any kind of income received by a EU resident would be 
subject to automatic exchange of information. Taxable income as from financial year 2014 would 
thus be concerned by such automatic exchange of information if the proposed directive is 
adopted by the EU Parliament and the EU Council (see i.e. Ernst &Young (2013a)). 
143 See Olsen (1996). 
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effect of impact itself that “caused” the action. Therefore, even MS interact in 
between themselves this activity may be caused by activities on-going on EU 
level. Furthermore, activities may have up-loaded from MS level and policies 
have been taken up at the EU level and downloaded back and so on and so 
forth. Especially in such cases of interaction in a series of activities over a 
longer period of time, which is usually the case for decision-making in the EU, 
the identification of the “causal effect” is limited. Thus, Europeanization is built of 
all levels of interaction and comprise of a “… thicker understanding and 
perspectives of processes at work in the EU”.144 
 
Figure I.4-3: Dimensions of Interrelation 
 
Source: Adapted from Howell (2004a)145 
 
Obviously, the level playing field for the MS is framed by the Treaty and 
competences transferred to the EU as well as sovereignty stayed with the MS. 
However, compliance with the Treaty’s fundamental freedoms (primary EU law) 
and pressure provided with ECJ case law (secondary EU law) on MS to 
adjusting domestic rules and regulations, thus, affecting MS’s sovereignty. 
Nevertheless, in order to identify the “impact” sought after this research will not 
prejudge the role of the EU as the source of change domestically, rather focus 
on the domestic level being the crucial aspect of “… identifying the effects and 
pressures stimulated by the diffusion of European integration …”146 and, thus, 
144 See Dyson (2000). 
145 See Howell (2004a), p. 49. 
146 See Rees/Quinn/Connaughton (2009), p.16. 
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assessing the impact of the EU.147 In this context the level (top-down, bottom-up 
or cross-loading) for causal effect shall be assisted by the identification of the 
qualitative aspect of the effect too. Thus, it is important not only to assess 
whether the EU has mattered (“caused”), but the degree to which it has 
mattered (“quality”), since the potential impact of the EU is dependent on the 
level of adaptational pressure exerted on the domestic level as well as the 
extent to which mediating factors can affect this level of change. 
 
Hereto, Risse et al. (2001) provided for explanation based on the “goodness of 
fit” test.148 The test is based on the assumption that adaptational pressure 
conditionally comprise of an underlying situation differing significantly to the 
situation at issue, thus, MS feel the need for change and pressure for adaptation 
emerges.149 Therefore, at the first level of the test question has to made 
whether a certain EU initiative provide a challenge for domestic actors and 
institutions with regard to a situation that is in “misfit” with “formal or informal 
norms, rules, regulations, processes, and practices”.150 Based on the existence 
of “misfit” it shall be assessed the level of the “goodness of fit”, which is the 
assessment associated with the level of adaptational pressure applied on the 
domestic level.151 Though, the level of pressure to adapt an initiative determines 
the intensity of change necessary, thus, it constitutes a necessary condition for 
domestic change.152 In the third-step the “goodness of fit” test is about the 
impact on domestic level focusing on the mediating factors explaining the 
degree of change at the domestic level shaping the outcome of 
Europeanization.153 Therefore, Börzel/Risse (2003)154 argue that “misfit” 
 
“… is only the necessary condition for domestic change. Whether 
misfits produce a substantial effect at the domestic level depends on 
the presence of various factors facilitating adaptation and serving as 
catalysts for domestic change. Only if and when these intervening 
147 See Börzel/Risse (2012), p. 6. 
148 See Risse et al. (2001), p. 6 et seqq. 
149 See Börzel (1999) and (2005), p. 50. 
150 See Risse (2001), ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152 See Börzel/Risse (2012), p. 6.  
153 See Risse et al. (2001), p. 6. 
154 See Börzel/Risse (2003), p. 63. 
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factors are present can we expect a transformation of policies, 
politics, or polities in the member states.” 
 
Mediating factors in this context can be “… cultural factors and state tradition … 
(which are) … important in shaping the way in which European legislation is 
received at the national level”.155 In addition to the identification of the factors for 
the process of change, the areas of impact at the domestic level are important. 
According to Radaelli (2012) the EU can impact at domestic level through a 
broad range of phenomena, 
 
“… the process of Europeanisation may take place via the 
constraining power of legislation, ideational and learning processes 
of socialisation and convergence around shared paradigms of public 
policy, the re-calibration of identities and material resources …”.156 
 
Therefore, a number of domestic domains are impacted by EU initiatives, which 
have already been categorised into three domains, which are policy, politics and 
polity.157 
 
Figure I.4-4: The three domains of change 
 
155 See Rees/Connaughton (2009), p. 19. 
156 See Radaelli (2012), p. 2. 
157 See i.e. Börzel/Risse (2003), p. 63. 
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Source: Börzel/Risse (2003) 
 
Finally, Europeanization shall be measured with regard to its process that is 
outlined as the “outcomes of domestic change”.158 The degrees of domestic 
change are inertia, retrenchment, absorption, accommodation and 
transformation.159 Inertia occurs when there is an absence of change due to 
resistance of the MS rather as a result of “goodness of fit”.160 However, 
resistance can also be sustained for a period of time particularly where EU law 
is concerned.161 Retrenchment “involves the empowering of a coalition of 
domestic actors who oppose EU-inspired changes”162 and can even serve to 
increase the “misfit” between national and EU requirements.163 Absorption 
refers to a level of low change, as MS are unable to “incorporate European 
requirements into their domestic institutions and policies without substantial 
modifications of existing structures and the logic of political behaviour”.164 
Accommodation represents a moderate level of change, as MS do not have to 
change core domestic features but rather adapt these existing domestic 
features to meet EU requirements.165 Finally, transformation represents the 
strongest level of change, which requires the MS to conduct a major adjustment 
of domestic features, “MS replace existing policies, processes, and institutions 
by new, substantially different ones, or alter existing ones to the extent that their 
core features and/or underlying collective understandings are fundamentally 
changed”.166  
 
Though, having conceptualised Europeanization there seem to be overlapping if 
not contradiction with European integration. It seems difficult to distinguish that 
these concepts, thus, need to be clarified with regard to its differences and 
similarities.167 Olson (2002) concluded that European integration and 
Europeanization perceives very little difference if not could be seen identical 
158 See Börzel (2005), p. 58. 
159 See Ibid and Featherstone/Radaelli (2003), pp. 37 et seqq. 
160 See Börzel (2005), p. 58. 
161 See Ibid and Quaglia et al. (2007). 
162 See Quaglia (2007). 
163 See Börzel (2005), p. 58. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 Ibid. 
167 See Howell (2002), p. 6, (2003), p. 15 et seqq., (2004a), p. 41 et seqq. 
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since the EU was a political project and it is the way that European integration 
and Europeanization could be seen as one and the same.168 Schmidt (2001) on 
the other hand distinguishes Europeanization as the process having impact on 
domestic structures, whereas European Integration represents construction and 
formulation of policy at EU level.169 Thus, developed governance institutions at 
the supranational level indicate European integration. However, this 
understanding was already used by Risse (2001) to conceptualise 
Europeanization too with outlining the “… emergence and development at the 
European level of distinct structures of governance …”.170 But these 
developments do not come out of nowhere, rather are result of MSs (inter-
)action with the EU level though. This activity is what is conceptualised as 
Europeanization in terms of uploading and downloading and crossloading 
though.  
 
Thus, there is not an overlap, but interaction in between European integration in 
it is the emergence and development of EU policy and Europeanization in it is 
the retroactive effect on the MSs.171 Howell (2002/2004a) distinguishes in 
between integrative legislation provided by the EU and a diverse domestic 
interpretation brought about through Europeanization, but argues for a 
“continual interaction” between the two.172 Therefore, “both the emergence and 
development of EU institutions and the formulation of rules at the EU level may 
be understood as aspects of European integration”.173 Those aspects comprise 
of vertical impulses i.e. from top-down and bottom-up, whereas horizontal 
impulses i.e. through coordination in between MSs lack of clear direction 
though. With its vertical impulses, however, the EU impacts hierarchal 
(vertical=top-down) the politics of MSs. Hereto, there are two ways of impacting 
in that instruments used are positive and negative integration. With positive 
integration the EU develops a distinct European model of policy. Example to this 
is the Monetary Union “in which a fully fledged institutional model of monetary 
168 See Olsen (2002). 
169 See Schmidt (2001). 
170 See above, p. (17). 
171 See Radaelli (2003), p. 29. 
172 See Howell (2003), p. 19/20. 
173 See Howell (2004b), p. 8. 
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policy is being diffused to the countries of the Euro-zone”.174 Policy making 
though positive integration forces MSs to implement and, in case, adjust their 
national rules. Whereas, negative integration comprise hierarchical influences 
on MSs without, however, stipulating a certain institutional model of policy. This 
is relevant e.g. in establishing the Common Market (market-making) through the 
reduction of barriers, rather actively creating the market (market-shaping). 
Instead, the EU is working towards “mutual recognition” of national rules i.e. 
through the ECJ with its Case “Cassis-de-Dijon”. 175 Though, negative 
integration incorporates politics by the EU in order to fuel “harmonisation” of 
national rules. Thereby, Europe touches upon constitutive norms such as state 
sovereignty176, thus, the EU is indirectly setting impulses to seek for 
competences. Thus, negative integration may undermine state sovereignty 
leading to a loss of national competence though. However, this is done without 
the setting of a certain institutional model of policy, rather excluding alternatives 
for action for national governments to safeguard the common market. In this, 
with its vertical instruments the EU acts form a top-down perspective impacting 
MSs through “hard” EU law. This is complemented with horizontal activities in 
fields of politics without expressed competence by the EU i.e. direct tax policies. 
Here, the EU is to stimulate and motivate MSs for inter-governmental 
cooperation only without the possibility to using hierarchical influence. 
 
However, it appears from horizontal impulses that MSs are involved and, thus, 
actively taking part in the processes. Starting form horizontal coordination MSs 
may up-load their ideas to the EU level where these ideas may be downloaded 
through means of positive or negative integration. With this interaction, however, 
it is difficult to distinguish between Europeanization and European integration 
and evidence for causation.177 Thus, a clear analytical separation of cause and 
effect of European policy begs a “chicken and egg” question.178 Furthermore, 
the conceptualisation of Europeanization in that it comprise top-down and 
bottom-up processes at the same time, there is no clear view of what is the 
174 See Radaelli (2000), p. 16. 
175 See Case “Cassis de Dijon”. 
176 See Risse (2001). 
177 See Bulmer/Burch (2001), p. 81. 
178 See Featherstone (2003), p. 19. 
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dependent and what is the independent variable that the “chicken and egg” 
question “Who is affecting whom?” can even be answered less. 
 
But it becomes clear MSs are not in a passive position only though.179 Rather, 
MSs are “takers” in that receiving policies from the EU level and “shapers” in 
that they involve in designing European policy.180 Though, they are actively 
engaged influencing European policies, but assisting the implementation of 
policies at their national levels as well. Therefore, Europeanization is a two way 
process between the domestic and the EU levels, involving both top-down and 
bottom-up pressure.181 Consequently, Europeanization may be defined as the 
source of change through MS uploading to the EU level and European 
integration representing the outcome as well as looking to European integration 
as the source of change and Europeanization the outcome of change on MS 
governmental, legal and regulatory structures.182 In other words, European 
integration comprises of the environment on which Europeanization impacts or 
from which it emanates.183 
 
Figure I.4-5: The relationship between the EU and its MS: Bottom-up and Top-down 
179 See Radaelli (2003) who assumes a passive role by MSs within its conceptualisation of 
Europeanization. 
180 See Börzel (2003). 
181 See Featherstone/Kazamias (2001), p. 6. 
182 See Schmidt (2001), p. 3 and Howell (2003), pp. 20. 
183 See Howell (2002), p. 6. 
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Source: Adapted from Börzel (2003), p. 2 
 
However, as discussed above there is always the question where a process has 
started and come to an end, rather, accepting the “process” being an on-going 
development. Therefore, this thesis follows the concept of Integration being a 
“teleological view of the process”184, thus, the result of a process.185 Whereas, 
Europeanization goes beyond representing the process, which is the process of 
change itself recognising the interaction in between various levels of European 
politics and societies.186 Though, conceptually there are differences between 
Europeanization and European integration there is also a process between the 
two that is seamless.187 Therefore, European Integration is concerned with the 
construction of a European “centre” or a European “whole” (only)188, thus, 
comprises of the environment on which Europeanization impacts.189 It is to 
conclude that both European integration and Europeanization share similarities, 
though, there are differences still. Similarities, however, seem to provide 
184 See Harmson/Wilson (2000), p. 19. 
185 See Howell (2004a), p. 10 for Europeanization as meso theory in terms of “process”. 
186 See Howell (2003), p. 20. 
187 See Howell (2002), p. 6. 
188 See Howell (2003), p. 20. 
189 See Howell (2003), p. 21, (2004a), p. 9. 
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tendency of being predominant with a view to the causal mechanisms of 
integration and Europeanization identified though.190 
 
Figure I.4-6: Interaction of aspects of the “process” of Europeanization  
 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
In this European integration continues to deepen despite major crises and 
attempts to take back sovereignty. A growing number of MSs are reacting to a 
more constraining EU by negotiating opt-outs. Examples are prominent i.e. with 
the most controversial cases of differentiated integration: the British and Danish 
opt-outs from Economic and Monetary Union and European policies on borders, 
asylum, migration, internal security and justice. However, opting-out or in other 
words preventing from integration of national policies, thus safeguarding 
national sovereignty prevent national governments to influence even politically 
sensitive areas covered by their opt-outs. The taking place of European 
integration through everyday negotiations transforms national interests into 
European ideals. It is usually assumed that MSs opt out to preserve 
sovereignty, but national opt-outs may actually reinforce the integration 
process.191 
 
The preceding discussion points out that Europeanization lacks a paradigmatic 
consistency, thus, is not a rigorously specified analytical concept. However, it 
190 See Eising (2003), p. 400. 
191 See Adler-Nissen (2015). 
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provides a focal point for genuinely interdisciplinary dialogues concerned with 
the multidimensional processes of change occurring in contemporary Europe.192 
Therefore, Europeanization as a process is explicitly about the transformation of 
local, regional, national and international structures and relations, that is, about 
the practices involved in “being and becoming more European”, thus, an 
approach to the study of developments in contemporary Europe.193 Even though 
this development, thus Europeanization, becomes most visible through vertical 
mechanisms such as down-loading by enabling to clearly identify “cause” and 
“effect”, the concept lacks to fully explain the interactions at work in the 
formulation and diffusion of EU policy.194 Europeanization in this context shall, 
therefore, understand as the process explaining the relationship and interaction 
of MS and EU institutions producing change on domestic level and at the level 
of the EU and how this is processed.195 This thesis, therefore, includes an 
analysis of the interaction of the aspects of the “process”196 in vertical (to-down, 
bottom-up and policy transfer) and horizontal (cross-loading and (policy) 
transfer) terms as well as identifying change at EU and domestic level and its 
“interwoven relationships” and aspects of fit and misfit.  
 
4.3  Research methodology 
The research methodology is mixed, comprising legal and sociological 
methods.197 As a “common understanding” between MS is sought in order to 
test compliance with EU law198 the research followed a comparative legal and 
jurisprudential approach. Other social science methodologies (as discussed 
recently. by Howell)199 offered valuable insights, but the research approach has 
192 See Harmson/Wilson (2000), p. 20. 
193 See Harmson/Wilson (2000), p. 24.  
194 See Howell (2004a), p. 11. While, domestic change may follow from globalisation in general, 
the research traces specific domestic changes on MS level to developments emanating from the 
policy-making output of the EU institutions and its influence on MS policies and behaviour. 
Europeanization is, therefore, understood as the change within a MS whose motivating logic is 
tied i.e. to a EU policy. To this point, “… the concept of Europeanisation offers a more accurate 
sense of, explanation, for aspects of domestic change than globalisation…” (see Ladrech 
(2010), p. 6). 
195 See Radaelli (2006), p. 59 with reference to Giuliani (2003), p. 152, and the idea of 
Europeanization as “explanandum”. 
196 See Figure I.4-6. 
197 As set out in Figure I.4.7. 
198 In “filling the gap of limited research on the existence of congruencies” as stated by 
Pfnür/Müller (2010). 
199 See Howell (2013). 
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concentrated upon legal and jurisprudential methods, drawing upon ECJ case 
law analysis and country case studies followed a comparative analytical format.  
 
The use of grounded theory for part of the research was considered at an early 
stage in the research project. Grounded theory develops categories, which are 
derived from the data and, based upon their perceived relative importance, 
embeds the categories within more general and broader theories.200 In this case 
the researcher’s previous professional experience with REITS helped to 
formulate the conceptual framework, with grounded theory applied to a limited 
extent in the initial identification of the country case study jurisdictions, and 
drawing upon doctrinal legal research to generate a comparative framework of 
analysis.  
 
Comparative law research is undertaken to identify common themes across 
different legal systems. This thesis compares MS REIT regimes from a legal 
perspective with the intention first to test whether the legal regime of REITs and 
its criteria are true across different systems, and, secondly to determine whether 
the understanding of REITS (“common understanding”) reflects a consistent 
manner of dealing with behaviour across MSs, or represents a local 
idiosyncrasy.201 Thereby, the comparative methodology is aiding the 
harmonisation of laws.  
 
Figure I.4-7: Research Methodology  
200 See Silverman (1993); Howell (2013a). 
201 See Cryer et al. (2011), p. 28. 
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Source: Adapted from Biggam (2011)202 
 
Thus, the research begins by determining the existing law in MSs for its REIT 
regimes. Following this doctrinal research in a particular area of REITs it is 
followed by a consideration of the problems currently affecting the law and the 
policy underpinning the existing law, highlighting, the flaws in such policy, which 
is the non-compliance of REIT regimes with EU law. This in turn lead the 
researcher to propose changes to the law (law reform) focusing to the reform 
tax laws introducing a harmonised concept for taxation. The research is based 
on comparative research though. As such, to mitigating concerns towards 
comparative studies and its difficulties of comparing “like for like”, the research 
start to define a REIT using the US-model REIT regime. From here, framework 
of criteria is drawn comprising the basis for comparative research, which is 
limited in scope to REIT regimes in EU MSs though.  
 
Table I.4-1: Framework of REIT criteria 
REIT criteria 
Legal requirements 
202 See Biggam (2011). 
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Legal form 
Share Capital 
Registered Seat 
Listing 
Stock Exchange 
Shareholder conditions 
Operating activities  
Acquisition and Sales 
Leasing 
Ancillary Services 
Development 
Status 
Asset Test 
Income Test 
Gearing Test 
Distribution Test 
Tax treatment (REIT level) 
Income Tax 
Capital Gains 
Withholding Tax 
Sanctions 
Penalty 
Loss of status 
  
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
From the definition of the criteria that are defining a REIT regime, extant 
regimes in EU MSs are identified and “REIT-like” regimes203 excluded. Using 
the framework established the comparative analysis of REIT regimes in MSs it 
was assumed that MSs provide different legal and cultural environments likely 
leading to a range of conceptual approaches within each of the criteria of the 
framework, rather the identification of a common single understanding of their 
REIT regimes.  
 
Thus, in order to manage the range of concepts, but having a single benchmark 
for the comparative analysis to identify a “common understanding” in between 
the regimes and, thereafter, analysing its compliance with EU law, the analysis 
makes use of the mathematical concept of “the least common denominator”. 
Herewith, the understanding extant to date in MSs is reduced to extracting a 
common model for a REIT, thus, the identification of a “common understanding” 
203 “REIT-like” regimes differ to (true) REIT regimes in non-compliance with essential criteria for 
REITs i.e. Legal requirements (Listing), Status (Distribution Test) and Tax treatment (see 
Framework of REIT criteria, Table I.4.8, and Chapter II, Sec. 2 below for the definition of a 
REIT). 
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in between MSs and its REIT regimes. In order to identify the common 
understandings compliancy with EU law the research is subject to evaluative 
research in its second part focusing on the tax treatment of REITs in the EU. 
Since the analysis of direct tax rules depends on the legal quality, thus the legal 
form, of an entity, the research in this part includes the regime legal 
requirements too. The research for this part begins by collecting all relevant 
primary law including relevant case law in order to demonstrate how the 
particular law is not working. Hereto, the identification and definition of relevant 
primary law explores issues of competence in direct tax between the EU and 
MS sovereignty. This aspect of the research is draws upon comparative 
research in legal systems and doctrinal legal focus. Rather than following a 
political science and government approach, the research analyses ECJ cases 
relevant for MS REIT regimes, including both tax and company law related 
cases204, the benchmark for analysis being the “common understanding” model 
of the EU REIT, identifying potential discrepancies and non-compliance with EU 
“hard” law.  
 
Following the doctrinal part, the research seeks to identify the impact of the EU, 
thus, the outcome of EU law analysed in the case of REITs in the EU. The 
demonstration is of the law not working involving case studies are seen as 
complementary for the research strategy to answer the research questions and 
provide for in depth analysis of MS regimes.205 Herewith, the REIT regimes of 
the MS comprising the case study are benchmarked with the “common 
understanding” as well as to identify in detail deviations from EU law relevant, 
thus, potential non-compliance. A case study, therefore, offers opportunity to 
study a particular subject not limited to pre-defined criteria, but involving 
environmental, cultural and other factors. Although there is critique for the case 
study method because of its inability sometimes to provide reliable and general 
204 There were only five such decisions before 1990, but around 40 in the 1990s and more than 
35 since 2000 solely in the field of direct taxation (see http://europe.eu.int/comm/taxation_ 
customs/publications/taxation/document/court_cases_direct-taxation_en.pdf. 
205 While the first phase of the research comprise of all the REIT regimes extant in MSs and are 
studied with their essential criteria this comparative analysis shall not represent case studies 
though.  
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findings206, focusing on a limited number of three cases will help to investigate 
easier any impact of the EU in a real life context. 
 
The three case studies are of France, Bulgaria and Spain, providing for different 
environments, experience and impact. Beside the doctrinal analysis of the 
criteria focused i.e. legal requirements and tax treatment of the REIT regimes, 
the research in its third part is complemented with a political science approach 
to EU studies based on liberal intergovernmentalism207 seeking to explain why 
the European integration process in the area analysed is unfolded trying to 
predict its future trajectory by applying the process of Europeanization to 
analyse the impact of EU law and to assess potential for law reform i.e. through 
harmonisation. The case studies allow verification of the impact by the EU and 
its outcome on domestic level to MS adjusting their REIT regimes accordingly. 
Focusing on the legal requirements and tax treatment the REIT regimes of the 
MS subject to the case studies are analysed for their “goodness of fit”. The 
findings identify the degree of adaptational pressure providing examples for the 
process of Europeanization though. The cases of France, Bulgaria and Spain 
have been chosen to provide different examples towards Europeanization. The 
situation of France a founder MS of the EU established one of the first REIT 
regimes and thus is impacted by the EU’s “hard” policies since its introduction in 
2003, thus representing a case of top-down Europeanization. Bulgaria 
established its domestic REIT regime before its accession to the EU, thus 
representing a case of anticipating the EU by a bottom-up process. Spain 
represents a MS having established its domestic REIT regime most recently, 
and adapting EU law, revising the tax treatment as a result of cross-loading 
Europeanization. 
 
Based on this, the research will reach tentative conclusion that the current REIT 
regimes with its legal requirements and tax treatment needs amendment by 
MSs and, furthermore, that there is need for new law. Thus, on the findings, the 
research concludes whether current MS REIT regimes need amendments with 
their direct tax treatment and/or there is need for a harmonised REIT regime. 
206 See i.e. Collis/Hussey (2009). 
207 See Bache (2010) with reference to Andrew Moravcsik. 
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Therefore, in its third part, beside the case studies, the research analyses 
activities on EU level focusing on “soft” policies established and harmonising 
activities regarding direct tax treatment. According to Müller (2010) activities by 
the Commission to harmonise direct tax laws throughout the EU have not been 
successful and may not be realistic, hindering the development of a universal 
EU-REIT.208 Though, direct taxation and, thus, harmonisation, is subject to MS’s 
expressed cooperation due to its sovereignty for direct tax, the research focuses 
finally to formulate a model concept for a European REIT, the “EuroREIT”, 
comprising a structure compliant with EU law and proposing for a solution for 
direct tax treatment. Based on accepted regimes in between MSs such as the 
automatic exchange of information and tested models for allocating tax 
revenues in cross-border situations such as the formulary apportionment of 
income, a concept used in the USA for the apportionment of tax revenue in 
between its States is discussed. The proposed EuroREIT, therefore, provide 
concept for the allocation of direct taxes in the MS of residence of a REIT 
without MS to fear a loss of tax leakage, thus, respecting MS sovereignty 
though. Having formulated the concept for the EuroREIT steps for its 
implementation are outlined giving an understanding to the likelihood of the 
processes giving birth to this regime.  
 
Thus, the research is of comparative law research to trying to identify common 
themes across different legal system with the intention of assisting 
harmonisation of laws by providing solution to the fear of loss of revenue by MS 
and its sovereignty to direct tax. The research, therefore, is to discuss whether 
the expanding activity of EU institutions incidentally affects MS sovereignty in 
direct tax.209 Although the discussion involves analysis of the national and EU 
levels, in relation to the EU-MS relationship, it assumes a high degree of 
“institutional incorporation” where the host normative order (=MS) makes 
general provision for the normative decisions of an external agency (=EU law) to 
be incorporated and to be treated as authoritative within the host normative 
order.210 Furthermore, the research assumes that there is also a degree of 
intersystem recognition where there is no general assumption of any institutional 
208 See Müller (2010), p. 2. 
209 See Lickova (2008), p. 463. 
210 See Walker (2008), p. 373. 
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mechanism, but there is recognition of another system formalised by the host on 
a systematic level, understood as intrinsic to the self-definition of the host 
system, such as incorporation of jus cogens norms.211 
 
In the context of EU law the focus on “institutional incorporation” and 
connectedness between national and EU legal systems, thus comparative 
law212, seems to require the use of comparative methods within (EU) legal 
research methodologies.213 Therefore, with its first part the research makes use 
of comparative law as its research methodology while comparing the different 
MS REIT regimes under its national legal systems identifying a “common 
understanding” or model, which in the following is analysed with relevant EU 
applicable to the identified issues. With finally discussing the degree of 
harmonisation and potentially reforms of that area, the research is taken form a 
constitutionalist approach. Constitutionalism in this context shall be understood 
as “the ideology behind the process of constitutionalisation and the ideology 
behind constitutions as outcomes”.214 Therefore, the research is looking for the 
possibilities of “constitutional translation” from MS to the EU to identifying 
evidence of constitutionalisation beyond the MS, thus, the European integration 
process.215 However, this methodological approach primarily focuses on the 
“problems of translation” of the core normative concepts of constitutionalism 
from the state to the EU setting216, which is an exercise in “rendering the EU 
more state like” only.217 Rather, instead taking a one-dimensional approach and 
exclusively dealing with doctrinal exposition focusing on the regulatory dynamic 
of the EU only, account shall be taken of all relevant dynamics including those 
from the EU to the MS as well as in between MS, thus, considering “how and 
why the law may be more than the functional handmaiden of political actors”.218 
 
Therefore, whereas the starting point of this research is following a doctrinal 
legal research methodology focusing to answer questions for the harmonisation 
211 Ibid, p. 379. 
212 See Cryer/Hervey/Sokhi-Bulley (2011), p. 28. 
213 The use of “comparative methods” for research in EU la was “traditional” method is pointed 
out by i.e. Lenaearts (2003). 
214 See Tsagourias (2007), p.1. 
215 See Walker (2005). 
216 See Weiler (1999), p. 599. 
217 See Cryer/Hervey/Sokhi-Bulley (2011), p. 17. 
218 See Hunt/Shaw (2009), p. 4. 
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of laws of MS, emphasis is given to the advantages of a non-doctrinal, more 
pragmatic approach. This provides opportunity to include aspects related to 
legal practice and injecting a greater sense of social and political reality into 
it.219   
 
Data collection techniques are both quantitative and qualitative.220 Quantitative 
method is considered to include empirical research, whereas qualitative is of 
descriptive nature, usually for non-empirical data221. For the analysis data is 
reduced using the mathematical “least common denominator” to identifying the 
“common understanding” in between the regimes analysed, with regression 
analysis to gain better understanding in between various relationships and its 
interactions. The identification of applicable EU “hard” law and analysis of ECJ 
cases is doctrinal research, predominantly concerned with the analysis of legal 
principle and how it has been developed and applied. However, this doctrinal 
research is not simply a case of finding the correct legislation and the relevant 
cases to making a statement of the law, which is objectively verifiable. Rather, 
“it is a process of selecting and weighting materials taking into account 
hierarchy and authority as well as understanding social context and 
interpretation. For this reason it can be argued that doctrinal research is 
qualitative”.222 
 
Data collection in research may comprise of two types of data, which are 
primary and secondary data.223 The research begins with data about the US 
REIT model as a framework for analysis of EU REIT regimes. Secondary 
analysis follows EPRA’s Global REIT Survey224 providing for REIT regimes 
globally high quality data readily available and accessible in English language. 
Other survey data are also employed.225 For analysis of EU “hard” law data 
collected is case law by the ECJ, together with any relevant EU legislation 
dealing with company and/or direct tax law topics. The researcher collected ECJ 
219 See McConville (2007), p. 90/91. 
220 See Bryman/Bell (2011). 
221 See Gummeson (2000). 
222 See Dobinson/Johns (2007), p. 21/22. 
223 See i.e. Saunders (2009). 
224 See EPRA (2013). 
225 Surveys for secondary analysis used beside EPRA (2013), comprise i.e. Pfnür/Müller (2010), 
Müller (2010), Eichholtz/Kok (2007), Simontacchi/Stoschek (2012) et al. 
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decisions since the 1970s with the major emphasis on cases ruled in the last 10 
years. Other sources included books, journals, industry reports and statistics 
etc., especially for the EU “soft” policies discussed.  
 
For primary data, some interviews were undertaken for the three case studies. 
Generic data of MS REIT regimes included the MS selected for case studies, 
but the research question required further local information for generating, 
validating or questioning data on domestic REIT regimes, especially where 
domestic data was only in local language (especially for Bulgaria). The 
researcher used semi-structured interviews with local professionals, obtained 
through his professional network in the European Real Estate Industry built over 
the last twenty years. These comprised Lawyers and Tax Specialists providing 
for data on REIT law, company and tax legislation. Since the information 
required for the case studies varied questions for informants were designed 
differently, based on a list of themes and areas to cover, with some 
standardised questions. The researcher omitted or added questions or areas 
depending on the situation and the flow of the conversation. There was a risk of 
subjective interpretations or misunderstanding, this was accepted for 
information not accessible by other means. Using a number of informants 
safeguarded reliability and validity, and data from surveys and literature could 
be checked through questions of informants for the purpose of the case studies.  
 
The research considered issues of research ethics during the data collection 
process.226 Privacy during data collection was safeguarded since the informants 
approached were personal contacts of the researcher or introduced by personal 
contacts. Confidentiality concerning the information shared was assessed on 
the basis of the nature of information (whether available in the public domain). 
Anonymity was not an issue for the use of information, and information obtained 
will not be misused from the interested party in a way that could affect them. 
 
5.   Chapter Structure 
226 Discussion of the importance of potential ethical issues can be found i.e. in: Sunders (2009). 
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This thesis is structured in three sections focusing on the dimensions, 
mechanisms and outcome of Europeanization in MS REIT regimes. Section 1 
introduces the research and the dimensions of Europeanization in EU REITs. 
Section 2 explores the mechanism of Europeanization that is the “goodness of 
fit” of MS REIT regimes and adaptational pressure on MS. Section 3 presents 
the outcome of Europeanization and potential for a harmonised “EuroREIT” 
going forward. 
 
Section 1 – Introduction and Dimensions of Europeanization 
 
Chapter I:  Introduction to the Research sets out this thesis and focus of 
research, its originality, and importance. The literature review describes source 
material and its quality. Europeanization is introduced for the conceptual 
framework, and its methodology underlying the concept of integration of themes 
and disciplines are discussed. Law, economics and political science theory each 
provide for parts of a puzzle to draw a holistic view on the development of 
REITs under the EU Treaty. Finally, the research framework and methodology is 
outlined and the thesis chapter structure provided. 
 
Chapter II:  REITs in the EU: A comparative analysis – This presents a 
structured framework for comparing MS REIT regimes, identifying the degree of 
harmonisation and compliance with EU law. This includes definition of the 
“REIT” and identification of common criteria, a description of the first REIT 
established, the classical US-REIT regime, as the “model” for its successors. 
The analysis of the US-REIT provides a structured framework for the following 
comparative analysis of MS REIT regimes  
 
Secondly, a comparative study analyses the MS REIT regimes in the EU, firstly, 
looking into technical characteristics and, secondly, evaluating a shared 
understanding considered for establishing REIT regimes. In the absence of a 
common definition for REITs a structured framework is applied to test each MS 
REIT regime against key criteria identified: Legal requirements, Operating 
activities, Status and Tax treatment.227 The comparative analysis identifies 
227 In the absence of a undisputed definition and variations of means to indirect invest in real 
estates some regimes are to be viewed as being REIT-like not meeting the core criteria for a 
REIT though. Those regimes are out of scope for this research as well as REITs outside the EU 
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whether the regimes follow a certain model representing a EU typed model of 
REIT.228 Based on the results a “common understanding” between the regimes 
analysed is identified by the mathematical concept of the “least common 
denominator”. The “common understanding” of EU REITs allows an assessment 
of “misfit”, thus, the impact of the EU on MS REIT regimes. Where MS have 
adopted the US REIT model Europeanization would not be involved. 
 
Section 2 – Mechanism of Europeanization: “Goodness of fit” and 
adaptational pressure 
 
Chapter III: MS REIT regimes and EU law – This chapter focuses on “hard” 
policies provided by the Treaty and its fundamental Freedoms (primary EU law), 
identifying the regulations relevant for analysing impact of the EU. Although 
direct taxation is not of EU competence the Freedoms have unlimited priority 
and MS´ must exercise their direct taxation powers with the Treaty. EU law as 
well as International Company law is analysed to identifying connecting factors 
for the “misfit” test. Focusing on cross-border activities, it identifies investment 
potentially non-compliant with EU law. Thus, this chapter provides a framework 
of EU law applicable to REIT regimes with focus on legal requirements 
(company law) and tax treatment (direct tax law). 
 
Chapter IV: MS REIT regimes and ECJ case law – The ECJ through its case 
law provides further interpretations of EU law especially on the freedoms. Focus 
is given to the question whether non-domestic REITs shall legally be eligible to 
benefit from the domestic REIT regime and its tax treatment for domestic REITs. 
The research analyses key decisions by the ECJ to set the framework for a 
domestic tax regime for EU law compliant REITs. A new approach considers 
ECJ cases of tax origin and also corporate or consumer law. ECJ case law 
provides additional criteria for the “misfit” analysis of MS REIT regimes and 
potential infringements of EU law.  
in Europe since the political and legal framework of the EU does apply for MSs only but this 
special framework triggers the movements and processes that will be subject to research here. 
Therefore, relationships and any horizontal effect for non-EU residents are outside the scope as 
well. 
228 The focus is on EU REIT regimes, therefore, will exclude the regime established in the non-
EU MS Turkey, the GYO, from further analysis in this thesis, even though qualifying as REIT 
regime though. 
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Section 3 – “Outcome”: The impact of the EU 
 
Chapter V: REITs in MS - Case Studies – This chapter evaluates case studies 
of three MS REIT regimes: Bulgaria, France and Spain. These countries show 
variance in their constitutional structure, administrative culture, judicial structure 
and culture, and structure of civil society so that it is expected to see variance in 
the form and degree of Europeanization of its REIT regimes. By incorporating 
Spain and Bulgaria into the sample it is aimed to counter a selection bias in 
Europeanization research: studies on small MS still tend to be under-
represented229 as do studies on the new central and eastern European MS.230 
Through the case studies Europeanization becomes visible in respective 
domestic REIT regimes. 
 
Chapter VI: EU “soft” policies and the EuroREIT – Based on a common 
understanding between MS a harmonised “EuroREIT” is emerging, but MS 
sovereignty in direct tax still hinders harmonising the (direct) tax treatment. In 
the absence of any competence in direct taxation with the EU, “hard” policies 
are not engaged, and activities of the Commission towards harmonisation are 
limited. Therefore, the case of “soft” policies and proposals in which the 
Commission extols the virtue of best practise etc., for example the “moderation” 
of MS towards harmonisation of structures (i.e. corporate structures, common 
tax base et al.) is analysed focused on “facilitated coordination”231 by the EU. 
This chapter provides a model of a compliant European REIT bringing together 
the findings from the analysis´ to combine its results since a theoretical 
framework of a European REIT has not previously been subject to research. 
With the results of this analysis the concept for the “EuroREIT” is outlined and 
becomes visible with a realistic possibility for its implementation though. 
 
Chapter VII: Conclusion – The Europeanization of MS tax regimes – The 
analysis shows a convergence of national politico-administrative structures in 
229 See Haverland (2007/2005). Spain may not be considered as a small MS, but a “small(er)” 
economy different by size versus Germany, UK or France and, thus, not part of the “usual 
suspects” group (see Vink/Graziano (2007), p. 17). 
230 The CEE MSs have mostly been studied with regard to pre-accession conditionality, e.g. by 
Grabbe (2006/2001) or Schimmelpfennig/Sedelmeier (2005/2004), but tend to neglected since). 
231 See for term by Bulmer/Radaelli (2005), p. 345. 
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the case of MS REIT regimes. The assumption made in public administration 
literature232 that distinctive national models of governance gradually blend into a 
common European pattern, reflecting the influence of EU practice and increased 
borrowing between national systems (a “common understanding”) is confirmed. 
REIT regimes are not public administrative structures, but show patterns of 
convergence and the “Europeanization” of EU REIT regimes. Necessary 
interactions in between the two levels of governance and in between the MS are 
already underway. Compliance of each MS REIT regime under EU law does not 
necessarily lead to the harmonisation of MS REIT regimes through establishing 
a EuroREIT, thus harmonisation establishes a common minimum level, rather 
than a uniform standard throughout the EU.233 Pursuing the EuroREIT remains 
a possible to “Europeanize” REIT regimes. 
 
 
232 See i.e. Harmsen (2000), p. 53/54. 
233 See Goetz/Hix (2000), p. 4. 
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Chapter II: REITs in the EU – A Comparative Analysis 
 
 
1.  Objectives for this Chapter  
This chapter seeks a definition of the REIT and its essential criteria. Focus is 
given to the US-REIT, the first and so-called “model” REIT. From the analysis of 
the US-REIT its relevant criteria provide a framework as a basis for the 
subsequent analysis of REIT regimes in EU MSs. This research is the first 
comparative analysis of the essential criteria of REIT regimes in the EU allowing 
the identification of a “common understanding” between them. For the 
identification of the common understanding, the analysis uses the “least common 
denominator”. as a starting point to track the impact of the EU.207 The “common 
understanding” of MSs REIT regimes is compared with the US-REIT model, to 
identify influences from the US and thus exclude impact from the EU.   
 
The, objectives of this chapter are, therefore: 
 
• providing definition of a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT); 
•  analysing the US-REIT – model in order to set up the structured framework 
for comparative analysis of MSs REIT regimes 
•  defining the set of MSs REIT regimes extant in the EU; 
•  conducting a cross-sectional study of MSs REIT regimes along the criteria 
of the structured framework to establishing a comparative analysis; 
• comparing the “common understanding” with the criteria identified for the 
US-REIT to identify the impact the US-REIT on MSs REIT regimes; and 
• identifying the “common understanding” in between MSs REIT regimes 
based on the “least common denominator” in order set basis to identify the 
impact of the EU. 
 
207 There is critique that the “common understanding” represents the “least common denominator”-
idea does not represent example to the extent to which national politics are Europeanized, rather is 
represents the bare minimum that is politically possible only.207 Nevertheless, the “common 
understanding” provides for a starting point to build basic understanding in order to track the 
impact of the EU (see i.e. Bomberg/Peterson (2000), p. 33). 
 
 
 
45 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
REITs in the EU 
 
 
2.   Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) – A Definition 
Investments in the asset class “real estate” can be conducted in various ways. 
The classical type of investment is directly in a property, by acquiring ownership of 
the land and building. Private individuals for personal use or a private property 
portfolio primarily uses the direct investment in real estate. Where the activities 
are as financial investment, there issues i.e. financing, taxation, management and 
others become important. For third party financing taxation is important, beneficial 
tax treatments become more attractive through investment vehicles such as 
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs).208 
 
Indirect investments are selected according to return and risk used primarily by 
high volume investors, or small volume investors in pooling vehicles such as real 
estate trusts and real estate funds perhaps not able to acquire a single property at 
full ownership, or into a private portfolio big enough to provide the benefits of the 
portfolio. Real estate funds may participate with other investors into a pool of 
assets to benefit from a diversified portfolio or real estate assets. An external 
management company dedicated to the pool of assets or distinct to the Investor 
may manage assets. This is where REITs interest small and large-scale investors. 
 
Usually, these indirect investments are made in a fund or shares of listed or 
unlisted real estate companies,209 which depend upon the tax treatment applicable 
in the country of residence.210 Different tax regimes create competition among 
countries and vehicles available. There is, however, no common ranking of 
vehicles globally since available vehicles and tax regimes vary, as does the 
taxation of the investor. A vehicle benefits one investor may not be best for 
another. To take advantage of beneficial tax treatment for real estate investment 
vehicles, and, attract capital, a number of countries have created special tax 
regimes allowing benefiting from a “flow-through” treatment. These types of 
regimes provide for tax transparent treatment leaving the taxation of profits 
208 See Knoflach/Körfgen (Schäfer 2007), p. 8. 
209 See Table II.2-1. 
210 See Knoflach/Körfgen (Schäfer 2007), p. 8. 
 
 
 
46 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
REITs in the EU 
 
distributed to the level of the Investor only211 and are referred to as “REIT 
regime”.212 
 
Figure II. 2-1: REITs within the investment universe 
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Although REITs have existed for more than 30 years there is no general accepted 
definition. REITs are trusts or publicly listed corporations, formed in accordance 
with their national regimes, that employ share capital to acquire, manage or 
finance real estate. They are not trusts as most people will understand the term 
but they are just like any other private investment company. The substantial 
difference is that once registered as REITs, companies will benefit from various 
tax breaks and these advantages are passed on to the investors. The company 
owns revenue producing commercial and residential properties, which in turn 
generate potentially high returns for investors. This OECD defines: 
 
“… a REIT is a widely held company, trust or contractual or fiduciary 
arrangement that derives its income primarily from long-term investment 
in immovable property (real estate), distributes most of that income 
annually and does not pay income tax on income related to immovable 
property that is so distributed. The fact that the REIT vehicle does not 
211 See Kater (Schäfer 2007), p. 53ff. 
212 This investment vehicle is called “REIT regime” after the US flow-through regime of some 30-
years ago (see Chan/Erickson/Wang (2003); Block (2002); Garrigan/Parsons (1997) and Imperiale 
(2002)). The term “REIT regime” is used in this thesis to refer to the entire set of rules and 
regulations that apply to REITs irrespective of its sources in either/and corporate, tax or regulatory 
laws and context applicable. 
 
 
 
47 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
REITs in the EU 
 
pay tax on that income is the result of tax rules that provide for a single-
level of taxation in the hands of the investors in the REIT …”.213  
 
The EU REIT Coalition defines a REIT as “… a company which: 
 
• has to derive the majority of its income from property 
investment; 
• pays no taxes at corporate level; however, a very high 
proportion of net earnings is paid out as dividends to 
shareholders who are then taxed; 
• has the option – but not necessarily the obligation – of public 
listing; and 
• functions within a specific legislative framework and under 
supervision of authorities.”214 
 
The term “Real Estate” in this context refers to undeveloped land (“green field”), 
lots about to be developed, and existing buildings. REITs are corporations, which 
own and actively manage income generating commercial or residential real estate 
interests. Forms of investment are classical direct and indirect to purchase, 
develop, manage and sell property assets. REITs generally receive the majority of 
their income from passive real estate investments, are often highly liquid stocks, 
and may operate as stock exchange quoted company (public REIT) or as closed 
company open to a limited circle of investors (private REIT). They are similar to a 
privately hold real estate holding company but giving private investors with modest 
means to invest in a diversified portfolio and own shares in the pooled 
arrangement (REIT) and benefit from large, professionally managed and operated 
property portfolios.215 A REIT share is thus similar to any other dividend-paying 
share that represents ownership in an operating business, and has to compete 
and earn its allocation of capital based on performance, not only on its asset 
class.  
 
213 See OECD (Report 2007), p. 3 and OECD (Report 2008), in: EPRA (2009), Recital 3.3, p. 8. 
214 See EU REIT Coalition (2007), Annex II. 
215 Zell (1997), p. xvii. 
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However, the most important aspect of REITs is their unique tax treatment that is 
no tax is levied at the corporate or vehicle level neither for realised capital gains 
nor on real estate generated income. They are “flow-through” financial 
intermediary entities; middlemen for the distribution of profits and income to 
investors provided certain conditions are met. Regardless of national jurisdiction, 
tax-efficient real estate vehicles generally have certain common features, which 
include: 
 
Tax: Tax transparency of corporate level216 and taxation of income 
levied on the dividends at investor’s level; 
 
Distribution: Net income distributed to the shareholders at a minimum in a 
range of 80 to 100% of their net income; 217 
 
Liquidity:  Liquid secondary market due to stock exchange listing. 
 
Though, REITs worldwide are structured in various forms depending on national 
legislation and avoid taxation at the corporate level,218 they are considered to be 
tax regimes, but also characterised by regulatory requirements and restrictions 
governed by company laws.219 Thus, MS’ emphasis is more on tax law (i.e. Italy 
and the UK), others with emphasis on company law (i.e. Germany) and others 
where the REIT regime is not even codified (i.e. the Netherlands). Nonetheless, 
irrelevant of the codification of a REIT regime in national laws REIT regimes share 
common features comprising for a REIT regime, which are the features outlined 
above. Otherwise, a regime lacking of either feature may not be considered being 
a REIT rather a REIT-like regime only.220 
 
 
 
216 Transparency means that, among others, it allows investors to accurately assess the liquidation 
value of the vehicle’s underlying assets. 
217 Block (1998), p. 21. 
218 Chan (2003), p.58. 
219 Simontacchi/Stoschek (2012), General Report, p. 4. 
220 REIT-like regimes will not be subject to this thesis since EU REIT regimes are of focus only. 
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3.   The US-REIT - The “model” for REITs 
 
3.1  Fundamentals 
The first REITs established by way of special trust structures can be found in the 
USA since 1880, but after a decision by the US Supreme Court in the 1930s 
REITs lost their special tax status and exemption from the tax transparency.221 
The reinvention of REITs came in 1960 with the “Real Estate Investment Trust 
Act” by the US–Congress222 introducing a “REIT-Section” into the income tax 
treatment223 to make investments in large-scale, income producing real estate 
accessible to smaller investors.224 The Congress decided that the way for average 
investors to invest large-scale commercial properties was the same as they 
invested in other industries, through purchasing equity. As shareholders benefit by 
owning stocks of other corporations, the stockholders of a REIT earn in the same 
way a pro rata share of the economic benefits that derive from the production of 
income through commercial real estate ownership. Herewith, REITs provide 
advantages normally not available to smaller investors, such as “… the spreading 
of risk loss by the greater diversification of investment … (and) … the benefits of 
expert investment counsel”.225 Over time REITs regulation has been eased further 
to make them more attractive to investors and increase their competitiveness as 
an investment product. With congressional blessing of real estate tax shelters, the 
real estate marketplace was converted from an industry largely disciplined by 
basic supply and demand, to a real estate marketplace where tax shelters drove 
the investment and overdevelopment of commercial real estate. That created an 
explosion of overbuilt, nonviable real estate development activity, and after the 
1986 Tax Reform Act investors began seeking current income and long-term 
growth as a real estate investment performance characteristics. REITs used the 
new established right to reform its property management services and the Act 
limited direct real estate investment tax benefits.  
 
221 See Nowak (2005), p. 173. 
222 See Huesmann (2005), p. 41. 
223 See in its sections 856-860 of the US-Internal Revenue Code (IRC). 
224 See Napoli (2004), p.67. 
225 See US Congress Committee Report in Decker (1997), p. 3. 
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The Omnibus-Budget Reconciliation Act in 1993 gave Pension-Funds the 
opportunity to invest in REITs226; and the REIT Simplification Act of 1997 
introduced the “de-minimis-rule” under which REITs were entitled to receive small 
parts of their income from non-real estate services); and the 1999 REIT 
Modernisation Act decreased the obligation of REITs to distribute their income to 
its shareholders from 95% to only 90% of the taxable profit. In 2001 REITs were 
allowed to reinvest up to 20% of their assets into subsidiaries not necessarily 
offering real estate services. These tax benefits together contributed after 2000 to 
a second REITs boom.227 The REITs target group of potential investors changed 
from mainly small investors to institutional investors, who now dominate their 
shareholdings.228  
 
3.2  Legal requirements 
US-REITs may be structured as Corporation, Association or Trust229 and have to 
be incorporated in one of the 50 US states or the District of Columbia as taxable 
for federal purposes. Any entity taxable as a domestic corporation under US 
federal income tax law can elect to be treated as a US-REIT. Two thirds of US-
REITs are organised as corporations under state law, while the remainder are 
business trusts.230 Thus, listing at a stock exchange is not mandatory but 
shareholdings have to be open and publicly tradable and must be transferable 
without restriction. Therefore, to ensure stock liquidity231, five or less investors 
may not own more than 50% in a REIT (so called “five-or-fewer rule”232).  
 
3.3  Operating activities 
All regimes impose restrictions on the permitted activities of a REIT vehicle. The 
basic underlying principle is that its business scope must focus for purchasing, 
holding and management and is restricted to only limited interests (so-called 
226 See NAREIT (2005), p. 52. 
227 Stock/Teske (2005), p. 188. 
228 NAREIT (2004), IFD (2005), p. 6. 
229 See Brady/Conlin (2004), p. 81. 
230 See King (1997), p. 49. 
231 See Reiss (2005), p. 28. 
232 The requirement must be met during the last half of the taxable year (see IFD (2005), p. 9). 
Furthermore, the US regime requires the REIT having a minimum of 100 shareholders 
(“shareholder-test”) until the commencement of the second (living-)year of the REIT (See Brandon 
(1997), p. 90). 
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“asset value thresholds”)233 that is the “income-test”234. There is a growing 
tendency towards a more active investment approach whereby REITs are in fact 
starting activities of entrepreneurial nature. The US system can here be seen as 
the most liberal in this respect.  
 
3.4  Status  
A minimum of 95% of the invested assets must comprise real estate assets such 
as real estate property, real estate related investments (including investments in 
mortgage loans secured by real estate property), cash, government securities, 
corporate shareholdings or in shares of other REITs. At least 75% of the REITs 
gross income must derive from real estate related income (rents, mortgage 
interests or selling assets), however, 95% of the REITs gross income must come 
from the above-mentioned sources including other passive forms of income such 
as dividends and interests from non-real estate sources (e.g., bank deposits).235 
Shareholdings in another corporation’s stock are limited to up to 10%.236 
Furthermore, real estate located outside the United States qualifies as a good real 
estate asset for the Asset test. Therefore, US-REITs have increasingly invested 
around the world in the last decade and still pushing further overseas.237 
 
In order to maintain the REIT status it is conditional for the REIT to pay out at least 
90% of taxable income as dividends to shareholders238 allowing REITs to retain 
additional capital, if deemed to be necessary and appropriate by REIT 
management. Income generated through divestures (e.g., capital gains) does not 
need to be distributed to investors.239  
233 See Sec. 856 (c) (5) (A), (B) IRC. 
234 See Murphy (2004), p 4/5. 
235 Consequently, no more than 5% of a REITs income may derive from non-qualifying sources, 
such as service fees, development activities for third parties or a non-real estate business. 
236 Additionally, the REIT Modernization Act of 2001 offered REITs the possibility to create and 
hold up to 25% of the REITs assets in a TRS, which offers real estate development and trading 
activities or “dealer property activities” for which the REIT would otherwise need to employ an 
independent party. 
237 See Smith (2005). 
238 See Sec. 856 (a) to (c) IRC. 
239 Under certain circumstances, however, but not further explained in this thesis, an excise tax 
may become due if a REIT is not distributing all of its income/capital gains (See King (1997), p 
47/48). As a result, most of the capital growth and property maintenance and betterment must 
come from new money raised in the investment marketplace from investors who have confidence 
in the REITs future prospects and business plan, from recycling proceeds from like kind 
exchanges, or by attracting capital through joint ventures. 
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3.5  Tax treatment 
Besides being organised under one states law in accordance with the required 
legal form of an entity to be qualified as a REIT it must for tax purposes elect the 
REIT status by filing a special tax return240 for the year in which the company 
wishes to become a REIT. REITs are regarded as “Investment Conduits”, which 
avoid taxation in the sense that only net income distributed through dividends is 
taxed on shareholder level with the full individual income tax rate. There is no 
taxation on a corporate level unless minimum 90% of the profits are distributed.241  
 
With respect to withholding taxes, the US system draws a clear distinction 
between domestic (US) and foreign shareholders. Only in connection with 
dividend distributions to foreign shareholders is withholding tax applied. The 
“ordinary income” dividends (dividends sourced out of ordinary income) are 
subject to withholding tax at a 30% rate. Such rate can be reduced pursuant to tax 
treaties concluded by the US with countries of residence of the recipient of the 
dividend to 15%. The “capital gains” dividends are subject to 35% withholding tax. 
This withholding tax cannot be reduced under the prevailing tax treaties. 
 
3.6  Sanctions 
The violation or breach of single regime conditions will, generally, not trigger a 
loss of status already but may lead to penalty payment. A failure to the asset test 
will lead firstly to the obligation to cure for within a 6-month timeframe. Further 
violation to this as well as i.e. insufficient distribution of income will consequently 
trigger the taxation of the deficient dividends and the non-qualifying assets, 
though. Other failures will be penalised with a USD 50.000 payment. Where, 
however, the REIT cannot prove reasonable cause for its violation of regime 
conditions or where there is no reasonable cause, the REIT may technically loose 
its status and will be banned from re-applying for a period of five years. 
 
 
240 Form 1120-REIT. 
241 See Martichielli/MacCrate (1996), p. 7. 
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3.7  Conclusion – The US-REIT as a model for the EU 
The US-REIT serves as a model for other REITs comprising of the key criteria 
outlined.242 The US-REIT functions within a specific legislative framework and 
under supervision of the US authorities with the option – but not necessarily the 
obligation – of public listing. Operational activities comprise of passive property 
investments and services thereto only. Provided the majority of its income is 
derived from eligible activities the REIT pays no taxes at corporate level, but a 
high proportion of net earnings at a rate of 90% must be distributed as dividends 
to the shareholders of the REIT who are then taxed at their individual level.  
 
Table II.3-1: Overview on the US REIT regime 
Requirement Criteria US REIT 
Legal  Legal form Corporation (LLC,/LLP), Association or Trust 
  Share Capital no minimum requirement 
  Registered Seat domestic  
  Listing not obligatory  
  Shareholder conditions min. 100 shareholders 
    Max. 5 single holdings own >50% 
Operating 
activities Acquisition and Sales qualified 
(Passive property 
investments) Leasing qualified 
  Asset Management  qualified for own assets 
  Development qualified for own portfolio 
Status Asset Test min. 75% of real estate, bonds or cash 
    max. 5% “bad income” 
    max. 10% shares in another REIT 
    max. 20 in TRS 
  Income Test min. 75% from real estate 
    min. 95% incl. bonds and cash 
  Gearing Test max. 60% 
  Distribution Test 90% 
Tax REIT Level Tax exempt if distributed 
  Capital Gains Tax exempt if distributed 
  Withholding Tax 
Generally 30% but may be reduced to 15% 
in DTT case  
      
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
The US-REIT requires the REIT to register within the USA. Whereas, it allows for 
the REIT to stay private since the stock listing of the REIT is optional only. 
Choosing for staying private as a REIT, its shareholders may not benefit form the 
liquidity of the stock markets though. A private REIT is not excluded from the 
242 See for REIT Definition Section 2, above (EU REIT Coalition (2007), Annex II). 
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application of the beneficial tax treatment, offering its shareholders tax 
transparency in full. Profits distributed are neither taxed at the level of the REIT 
nor at distribution to shareholders, but for cross-border investments by non-
domestic shareholders withholding tax applies. Thus, profits distributed are taxed 
already before being in the hands of the foreign investor at a generally high rate of 
30%, reducible under applicable DTT to 15%. 
 
Governments around the world establishing domestic REIT regimes have used 
the US-REIT as “model”. This research explores whether MS have used the US-
REIT model as a “blueprint” to establishing domestic REIT regimes, using the 
structured framework above for benchmarking MSs REIT regimes against the 
“model” US REIT. 
 
4.   REIT regimes in the EU  
A number of countries have since created special tax regimes known as the “REIT 
regime”, after the US, with countries with an Anglo-Saxon background the first to 
introduce them.243 Development was slow with 6 regimes established from 1969 
to 1994, but since 2000 more than 20244 countries have established REIT 
regimes, as a “State of the Art”245 investment vehicle. The global development of 
REIT regimes included the European real estate and capital markets, but there is 
a perception that a European REIT market does not exist yet.246 
 
243 See i.e., Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, South 
Korea, Canada, Puerto Rico and South Africa. 
244 There are more than 20 regimes established in Europe and additional further REIT-like regimes 
too. See Exhibit II.4-1, “Chronological overview on the introduction of REIT regimes globally” 
(excluding those regimes to be qualified as REIT-like only). Outside the EU, Turkey is the only 
country having established a REIT regime, introduced in 1995 (See EPRA (2010), Turkey). To 
date 25 T-REICs listed amounting to a total market capitalisation of USD 8,237mn representing 
0.76% of the global REIT market though (See EPRA (2010), Turkey, p. 2). However, since the 
research focuses on REIT regimes in the EU only, the Turkish REIT will be out of scope and not 
subject to further analysis though. Different to EPRA (2013, Europe,) and Simontacchi/Stoschek 
(2012) the REIT in Turkey is regulated mainly by the Communiqué of the Capital Markets Board 
named as Communiqué regarding the Real Estate Investment Trusts (Gayrimenkul Yatirim 
Ortakliklarina Iliskin Esaslar Tebligi) (No. 11, Serial. VI) dated November 8, 1998 
(“Communiqué”).Switzerland introduced in 2007 the KAG Act, but qualifying vehicles are REIT-like 
only being comparable with the Luxembourg SIF type contractual Funds not sharing distribution 
obligations (See Kühne/Schunk/Keller (2009), p. 8, 10f., 33ff.). 
245 See Väth (1999), p. 2.  
246 See Müller (2010), p. 2. Traditionally, the European markets provided for tax privileged vehicles 
and regimes as trusts, open-end or closed-end funds, i.e. the open-ended funds in Germany.  
 
 
 
55 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
REITs in the EU 
 
The first country after the USA in Europe was the Netherlands in 1969 with the 
establishment of the “Fiscale Beleggingsinstelling” (FBI), but not until the first 
decade of the 21st century did the European REIT landscape develop significantly. 
Belgium was second with the SICAFI regime in 1995, followed by Greece´ REIC 
(1999), France´ SIIC (2003), Bulgaria and its JSSPIC (2004), the UK and German 
REITs, the Italian SIIQ (2007), Lithuania (2008), Finland and the Spanish SOCIMI 
(2009)., Hungary (SZIT, 2011) and Ireland (IRE-REIT) were the last MSs to 
establish their REIT regimes.247 Today, there are some 13 REIT regimes in the 
EU248, representing more than a third of the global inventory.249 
 
Table II.4-1: REIT regimes in the EU - overview 
Year250 MS REIT-Regime251 Abbreviation 
1969 Netherlands Fiscale Beleggingsinstelling FBI 
1995 Belgium 
Société d'investissement à capital fixé en 
Immobilière SICAFI 
1999 Greece Real Estate Investment Company REIC 
2003 France Société d'investissement Immobilière Cotées SIIC 
2004 Bulgaria Joint Stock Special Purpose Investment Company JSSPIC 
2007 
United 
Kingdom UK Real Estate Investment Trust UK-REIT 
2007 Germany Germany Real Estate Investment Trust G-REIT 
2007 Italy Società di Investimento Immobiliare Quotate SIIQ 
2008 Lithuania Lithuanian REIT L-REIT 
2009 Finland Finish REIT F-REIT 
2009 Spain 
Sociedad Cotizada de Invérsion en el Mercado 
Inmobiliario SOCIMI 
2011 Hungary Szabályozott Ingatlanbefektetési Társaság SZIT 
2013 Ireland Real Estate Investment Trust IRE-REIT 
    
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
 
247 There are further concepts for tax efficient vehicles extant in the EU i.e. in Austria (Immobilien 
Investmentfonds, IIF), Luxemburg (Special Investment Fund, SIF) and Portugal (Sociedades de 
Investimento Imobiliario, SIIMO). However, defining a REIT using the definition following from the 
“classical” US-REIT these concepts may be understood as REIT-like typed only since missing core 
criteria of a REIT as to its tax transparency and distribution requirement in particular. Therefore, 
these regimes will not be subject to further analysis and are out of scope of this thesis that focuses 
on REIT regimes only. Furthermore, the Swiss SICAV is out of scope as well since Switzerland is 
not only a non-MS to the EU, but its SICAV regime is REIT-like only. 
248 See EPRA (2013b), Simontacchi/Stoschek (2012), Ballázs/Holló (2011).  
249 See EPRA (2013b). 
250 “Year” refers to the year in which the regime came into effect, even in case of retroactive effect 
of the national legislation establishing the domestic REIT regime.  
251 The REIT regime is named using the international accepted notation rather the original one that 
may not uses the Latin alphabet (i.e. like the ones of Greece, Bulgaria or Lithuania). 
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5.  Characteristics of REITs in the EU  
Do REITs in the EU share common features and criteria? The movements and 
processes can best be analysed by identifying the concepts of the regimes 
existent. The literature acknowledges that “… REITs around the world are 
beginning to look and function very much the same  “252, or that “… there are 
many similarities when comparing individual country REIT regimes in Europe 
…”253, or that “… the general framework of the various REIT regimes is to a large 
extent identical “and “slowly becoming harmonised”254. Extant research comprises 
comparative illustrations of REIT regimes in large economies of the EU (UK, 
Germany and France) and established REIT regimes (Netherlands and Belgium). 
These studies list each regime with its regulations but without peer-to-peer 
comparison, and studies by Eichholtz/Kok (2007)255 and Müller (2010)256 do not 
cover all REIT regimes in MSs. For comparative analysis this research uses the 
criteria in the structured framework, which are the legal requirements (legal form, 
listing and shareholders), operating activities, status (asset, income, gearing and 
distribution test), tax treatment and sanctions.257 
 
Focus is given to the identification of a “common understanding” of the REIT. The 
comparative analysis shows the range of regulations as to core criteria of a REIT. 
The long history and global success of the classic US-REIT indicates that the 
regimes introduced by the MSs follow a “common understanding” aligned to the 
US-REIT model. Special focus is given to the tax treatment as direct taxation is 
directly linked to MS’ national revenue and is likely of special national interest.  
 
 
 
252 See Wechsler (2008), p.49. 
253 See Hughes/Lewis (2008), p. 88. 
254 See Wijs (2007a). 
255 Eichholtz/Kok (2007). 
256 Müller (2010). 
257 Each MS REIT regime will be tested according those key criteria identified in Sec. 3 above. 
Therefore, using these criteria some of the existing real estate investment vehicles that are kind of 
tax beneficial in European countries i.e. the German open-ended fund as well as the Luxemburg 
Special Investment Fund will not be qualified as REITs since they are lacking some of the core 
criteria i.e. the existence of any distribution requirement as to dividend payments and the listing of 
the vehicle at a stock exchange. Consequently, these Fund vehicles (open-ended or closed-ended) 
of i.e. Germany and Luxembourg will not be further evaluated within this thesis, though. 
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5.1  Legal requirements 
 
5.1.1 Legal form & Residency 
EU REIT regimes mostly require a qualified legal form of a limited liability or a 
limited partnership with shares under domestic corporate law. Somehow different 
is the approach of the Netherlands FBI regime that is a pure tax regime, not 
dependent on satisfying certain regulatory requirements (security laws). The legal 
form requires a limitation of liabilities258 but leaves its type optional. Consequently, 
not only a corporate like a NV is eligible for the FBI regime but fund structures 
such as a FGR.259 Another special form is provided under the UK regime close 
companies, 260 And similarly with the Finnish F-REIT regime.261 Lithuania's L-REIT 
regime provides for a joint stock company and an investment fund managed by a 
management company.262 REITs in the EU are no special legal corporate types 
rather stock listed public companies benefiting from special privileges upon 
registration as REIT with the tax authorities. 
 
Table II.5.1-1: Requirements for Legal form & Residency by MSs REIT regimes  
      
  Legal form Share Capital Registered Seat  
FBI   
NV, BV, FGR or similar 
foreign legal form 
EUR 18.000 - 45.000 domestic (either 
MS)   
SICAFI   SA, SCA EUR 1,25mn domestic    
REIC   
AE EUR 25mn domestic (either 
MS) 
  
SIIC   
SA, SCA EUR 15mn domestic (either 
MS) 
  
JSSPIC   
Joint Stock Company 
(AD) 
EUR 256.000mn domestic    
UK-REIT   Closed-ended Company EUR 60.000 domestic    
G-REIT   
Joint Stock Company 
(AG) 
EUR 15mn domestic    
SIIQ   Societá per Azioni (SpA) EUR 40mn domestic    
L-REIT   
Joint stock comp. / 
Investment Fund 
EUR 43.500 domestic   
F-REIT   
Public limited company 
(closed-end) 
EUR 5mn domestic    
258 E.g. a Public limited (liability) company (NV), a private company with limited liability (BV) or a 
unit trust (FGR). 
259 The FGR “fonds voor gemene rekening” is a unit trust (UK)/mutual funds (US). 
260 See sec. 236 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (HMRC (2005a), section 4 Para 
4). 
261 See EPRA (2013b), Finland, p. 1/2. 
262 Minimum share capital LTL 431.600 (approx. 125.000€). 
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SOCIMI   
SA EUR 5mn domestic (either MS 
or EEA) 
  
SZIT   Nyrt EUR 37mn domestic    
IRE-REIT   PLC EUR 38mn domestic    
            
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Requirements for share capital vary significantly according to local corporate laws. 
There seem to be a three-class society where with the first group requiring capital 
in a range of <€100.000; the FBI requires the lowest capital at between €18.000 
and 45.000 depending on the legal form chosen the L-REIT (€43.500) and the UK-
REIT (€60.000). The second group requires substantial capital in a range of some 
quarter of a million Euros up to 5mn Euro: JSSPIC (€256.000), the SICAFI 
(€1.25mn), the F-REIT and the SOCIMI (each at €5mn) regime. The third group is 
asking for double digit amounts of millions of Euros raging from €15mn (SIIC) to 
€40mn (SIIQ). The G-REIT regime requires a minimum equity at the end of each 
business year of at least 45% of the gross asset value263 and the minimum share 
capital may be significantly higher. The majority of 9 regimes out of the total 13 
require the company for a domestic residency,264 while others allow for residency 
in either MS or in EU/EEA.265 
 
5.1.2 Listing 
According to the legal form by which a REIT has to be established in form of a 
public corporate almost all MSs require for a listing of the REIT.266 There is one 
263 See § 15 REITG. 
264 Group of regimes that require for domestic residency for domestic REITs and at least for a 
permanent establishment for foreign REITs are for the SICAFI, JSSPIC, UK-REIT, SIIQ, L-REIT, F-
REIT, SZIZ, IRE-REIT and the G-REIT as outlined. 
265 The group of regimes that do not limit the residence of a REIT being domestically only but allow 
for residence in either MS are for the FBI, REIC, SIIC and the SOCIMI as outlined. 
266 This is a consequence of MS´ fear that REIT regimes will be abused for private structures. 
Consequently, the listing is obligatory even in MS where its REIT regime does not have a 
mandatory listing but does require for the respective domestic legal form in case the company want 
to qualify and opt for REIT status. This is the case i.e. for the FBI in the Netherlands. FBIs do not 
have to be publicly listed companies. However, FBIs, which are listed or market to the public, fall 
under the supervision of the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM), as does any 
other investment fund and, thus, benefit from lower regulatory requirements though. The FBI under 
the supervision of the AFM is sometimes called as a “regulated FBI”.266 Similar reasoning exists for 
the F-REIT where according to the Companies Act a public limited company may be listed only, the 
Funds-Act provides for a listing unless the Finish Financial Supervisory Authority (“FIN-FSA”) 
grants exemption (see for overview of MS REIT regime requirements i.e. re listing requirements 
Table II.5.1-1). 
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exception existing for the L-REIT that may be established by way of a joint stock 
company, but listing is not mandatory.  
 
Table II.5.1-2: Requirements to the Listing of REITs by MSs regimes  
      Legal    
    Listing Stock exchange   
FBI   
obligatory for regulated 
FBIs 
any EU stock exchange 
  
SICAFI   obligatory domestic   
REIC   obligatory any EU stock exchange   
SIIC   obligatory any regulated stock exchange market   
JSSPIC   obligatory any EU stock exchange    
UK-REIT   obligatory any recognised stock exchange   
G-REIT   mandatory either MS / EEA   
SIIQ   mandatory  either MS / EFTA   
L-REIT   
not mandatory  any regulated stock exchange market in 
the EU / EEA 
  
F-REIT   
obligatory  any regulated stock exchange market in 
the EU / EEA 
  
SOCIMI   
obligatory any regulated stock exchange market in 
the EU / EEA 
  
SZIT   obligatory domestic   
IRE-REIT   
obligatory any regulated stock exchange market in 
the EU 
  
          
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
More flexibility is given for MS REITs with respect to the location that is the stock. 
Listing at the domestic267 stock exchange is required for the Belgium SICAFI and 
the Hungarian SZIT only,268 whereas, all other regimes allow a listing at “any EU” 
stock exchange (FBI, REIC, JSSPIC) or “either market” in a MS, including the 
EEA,269 any “regulated” (SIIC, L-REIT, F-REIT, SOCIMI and IRE-REIT), “any 
recognised” Stock Exchange,270 or in the case for Italian SIIQs271 any EFTA 
267 Here again, the Netherlands FBI and the Bulgarian JSSPIC allow for a non-domestic listing 
instead of a domestic one provided that the listing is made at a stock in another MS. 
268 See Zorn (2011). 
269 Expressively eligible for G-REITs (see § 10 REITG). 
270 As defined in sec. 841 of ICTA; See CTA 2010 Chapter 2, Section 528 based on section 106(3) 
to (9) of, and paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 17 to, FA 2006. The term 'recognised stock exchange' 
occurs throughout the Taxes Acts and in various tax regulations. For example it is used in the 
definition of investments which may be held in ISAs and in the qualifying criteria for the quoted 
Eurobond exemption. Recognised stock exchange legislation is found under S1005 ITA 2007. 
HMRC considers the designation of a stock exchange as a recognised stock exchange under 
S1005 ITA 2007 on receipt of a request made by a stock exchange. The fact that a particular 
exchange is not recognised may simply mean that recognition has not been requested. The phrase 
'listed on a recognised stock exchange' in respect of shares and securities is now defined at 
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country with which an exchange for tax information is granted by respective DTTs, 
so-called “white-list” countries.272 Similar provision has come into effect with the 
reform of the Spanish SOCIMI in 2012, making this system more accessible than 
the stock exchange.273 
 
5.1.3 Shareholder requirements 
REITs are vehicle for private individuals who otherwise have no access to 
investing into real estate. Therefore, all REITs shall be publicly held to safeguard 
for access274 provided for the FBI and L-REIT its public legal forms being used 
though.275 Compliance with this requirement is, furthermore, provided by 
requirements to types and quota´ of shareholdings with general and specific typed 
limitations.276 All other regimes have specific conditions277 providing for limitations 
for single shareholdings irrelevant of its type of holders,278 a maximum of 10% for 
single shareholdings, or limiting single shareholdings to a maximum of 5 holding 
section 1005(3) ITA. This means shares and securities which: a) are admitted to trading on that 
exchange and b) included in the official UK list maintained by the Financial Services Authority (in 
its capacity as the UK Listing Authority) or are officially listed in a qualifying country outside the UK 
in accordance with provisions corresponding to those generally applicable in EEA states. Although 
the list established by HMRC for this purpose excludes some countries, it provides for a large 
number including i.e. South Africa, Thailand and the Cayman Islands (see for lists of “recognised 
stocks” at: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/fid/table1-rse.pdf and http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/fid/table2-
rse.pdf). 
271 The “White-List” see Article 1 para. 374 of law no. 244 of 24th December 2007 (budget 
legislation for the financial year 2008). 
272 The SIIQ seeking listing at the Italian Stock Exchange Market the company is allowed to choose 
between the MTA market (i.e. “Mercato Telematico Azionario”) by following its ordinary listing rules 
and a listing on the Expandi Market272 by means of a simplified procedure. The MTA is an order 
driven market and operated by Borsa Italiana for the negotiation of shares, warranties, convertible 
bonds, UCIT shares or units) by following the ordinary listing rules. Expandi is a market arranged 
and operated by Borsa Italiana for the negotiation of shares, bonds, warrants and options which 
are not admitted to official listing at the Italian Stock, the Borsa Italiana. Here, the Borsa Italiana 
SpA simplifies listing procedures (Market Regulations). Expandi is designed for the purpose of 
meeting the demands of small and medium enterprises to access capital markets. However, a 
company that seeks listing at the Expandi market must reach a market capitalisation equal to at 
least €200m (see Brustia/Masitrello (2009), p. 3; Rizzi (2007), p. 16/17). 
273 See Lucas (2013), p. 40; De Haro/Fernandéz (2013), p. 21. 
274 See Table II.5.1-3: Shareholder conditions for REITs by MS regimes. 
275 See Sec. 5.1.2 above. 
276 I.e. to single holdings, corporate/institutional ones and individual shareholders, free float and 
voting rights. Here two groups of regimes can be identified which are regimes that require for 
limitations to any shareholder (FBI and JSSPIC). The FBI requires any company for a minimum of 
75% Dutch resident shareholders, either corporate or individual. Whereas, the JSSPIC require min. 
50 Founders for establishing a REIT under the Bulgarian regime. (see Table II.5.1-3: Shareholder 
conditions for REITs by MS regimes). 
277 See Table II.5.1-3: Shareholder conditions for REITs by MS regimes. 
278 See EPRA (2013b), UK, p. 3; Germany, p. 3. 
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more than 5% of the REIT´ shares.279 The SIIQ does not allow for more than 51% 
of the shares being held by a single shareholder.280 
 
Table II.5.1-3: Shareholder conditions for REITs by MSs regimes  
      Shareholder  conditions       
    
Single 
sharehol-
dings (in 
general) 
Corporate 
Shareholdings 
Shareholdings 
by Individuals Free float Voting rights   
FBI   
n/A max. 45%  max 25% n/A n/A 
  
SICAFI   n/A n/A n/A min. 30%  n/A    
REIC   none           
SIIC   
n/A max. 60%  max. 60% min. 15% by 
Individuals 
with each less 
2% 
min. 15% by 
Individuals / 
max. 60% by 
Corporate 
  
JSSPIC   
n/A min. 30%  n/A n/A max. 5% 
voting shares 
by any single 
holding 
  
UK-
REIT   
max. 10%  n/A n/A min. 35%  n/A   
G-REIT   
max. 10%  n/A n/A min. 15%  max. 3% of 
each free float 
holding 
  
SIIQ   
max. 51%  n/A n/A min. 35%  max. 51% of 
each single 
holding 
  
L-REIT   none           
F-REIT   n/A max. 10%  n/A n/A n/A   
SOCIMI   n/A n/A n/A min. 25% n/A   
SZIT   
n/A max. 10% n/A min. 25% max. 10% 
corp. 
Shareholders 
  
IRE-
REIT   
max. 5% and 
max. 5 such 
shareholdings 
max. 10% n/A min. 35%    
                
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Limitations for special types of shareholders are provided by almost half of the 
regimes,281 mostly set for corporate shareholdings at a maximum of 10%282 up to 
a maximum of 60%,283 or for shareholdings by Individuals at a maximum of 25% 
279 See EPRA (2013b), Ireland, p. 3. 
280 See EPRA (2013b), Italy, p. 3. 
281 See Table II.5.1-3: Shareholder conditions for REITs by MS regimes. 
282 See i.e. EPRA (2013b), Ireland, p. 3. 
283 See EPRA (2013b), France, p. 3/4. 
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and 60% respectively.284 Almost all regimes, 8 out of 13, provide for conditions to 
the free-float of shares ranging from 15% to 35%.285 However, conditional for 
opting as UK-REIT is the requirement to meet existing regulations on close 
companies286. The company must have more than 5 shareholders and at least 
35% of its shares must be subject to free float at the stock. The same requirement 
exists for the SIIQ where at least 35% of the shares must be “widely held” as well. 
But, additionally, there shall be no person (including individual or body or 
corporate) in a UK-REIT being a “holder of excessive rights”.287 Limitations on 
voting rights range between 5% (JSSPIC) to 51% (SIIQ).288 
 
5.2   Operating activities 
MSs regimes may only invest passively in real estate (option rights on real estate, 
shares in affiliated companies investing in real estate and real estate certificates). 
Passive investments are to realise a yield on investment expected for this type of 
investment, and include acquisition and sale of real property and leasing. 
Exception is given by the SOCIMI, which is limited to urban real estate.289  
 
Ancillary services and development are generally qualified activities for REITs 
under most regimes290 except for the SIIQ291 and SIIC292, although limitations 
apply in general for ancillary activities to maximum 20-50% of the GAV,293 
developments to maximum 20 - 40% of GAV and to own account, minimum 
284 See EPRA (2013b), Netherlands, p. 3. 
285 See Table II.3.1-3: Shareholder conditions for REITs by MS regimes. 
286 Within the meaning of section 414 of ICTA. 
287 A shareholder is a holder of excessive rights in case he is beneficially entitled (either directly or 
indirectly) to at least 10% or more (i) of the dividends paid, (ii) the UK-REITs ordinary share capital 
or (iii) of its voting rights (see CTA 2010 Chapter 6, Section 551ff. and the Definition in Section 
553). 
288 Ibid. 
289 This is an interesting detail of the regime and one shall know that the Spanish law differentiates 
between urban real estate that are existing within a community and other real estate in rural 
locations. However, “urban” refers primarily towards residential properties (see Ley Art. 2). 
290 See Table II.5.2-1. 
291 Ancillary activities are not explicitly prohibited but may not exceed 20% of the companies 
business in total as well. However, the income from “qualifying” leasing activities will benefit from 
the special tax regime. Consequently, even though the SIIQ may eligibly engaged with ancillary 
activities up to 20% the respective profits are fully taxable though (see EPRA (2013b), Italy, p.3). 
292 See EPRA (2013b), France, p. 3. 
293 So called “crédit-bail immobilier”, have not been counted tax advantageous ancillary activities 
until end of year 2004 but was changed by the Finance Act 2005. 
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holding periods of 3 to 7 years,294 and servicing through a separate legal entity or 
service company.295) These activities are not eligible for tax exemption under the 
regime, subject to full296, or partly taxation of its respective income.297 
 
Table II.5.2-1: Conditions to Operating activities of REIT regimes in MSs - overview 
     Operating activities (Passive property investments)   
    
Acquisition 
and Sales Leasing 
Ancillary 
Services   Developments   
     Eligibility Conditions  
FBI   
qualified qualified qualified for 
own assets 
only 
qualified sep. legal entity   
SICAFI   
qualified qualified qualified for 
own assets 
only 
qualified  min. holding 5 yrs   
REIC   
qualified qualified qualified qualified  single development 
max. 40% GAV 
  
SIIC   
qualified qualified max. 50% 
but fully 
taxable 
qualified  max. 20% GAV   
JSSPIC   
qualified qualified Qualified 
through 
service 
company 
not qualified n/A    
UK-REIT   
qualified qualified qualified  qualified 
 
own account only / 
single development 
max. 30% GAV / 
min. 3 yrs holding 
  
G-REIT   
qualified qualified Qualified 
through 
100% 
subsidiary 
only 
qualified  max. 20% GAV   
SIIQ   
qualified qualified not qualified qualified  not eligible for tax 
exemption 
  
L-REIT   qualified qualified qualified qualified max. 20% GAV   
F-REIT   qualified qualified qualified  qualified  own account only   
SOCIMI   
qualified qualified max. 50% 
but fully 
taxable 
qualified  min. holding 7 yrs    
SZIT   qualified qualified qualified qualified  n/A   
294 For the FBI there is no such determination expressively but the requirement for a “long-term” 
holding can be allocated within the range of its peers in the EU (see Table III.5.2-1; EPRA (2013b), 
Europe). 
295 See § 1(2), 3(5) REITG. 
296 This is expressively stated for the UK-REIT where even while those business activities that are 
not property rental business by definition of the CTA 2010 are not qualifying business for benefiting 
from the UK-REIT regime they are eligible provided that the conditions of the UK-REIT regime as 
set out in Chapter 2 of the CTA 2010 are still met and are so-called “residual business” of the 
company (see Definition in CTA 2010 Chapter 1, Section 522 and Chapter 2, Section 531(3)(b)). 
Eligible business does not mean tax exempted of benefited business at the same time, but is 
excluded from tax exempt status as developed more detailed below within “Tax treatment” (see 
Stock/Teske (2005), p. 189). 
297 See Table II.5.3-1. 
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IRE-
REIT   
 
qualified 
 
qualified 
 
Qualified but 
>25% fully 
taxable 
 
qualified  
 
max. 30% GAV / 
min. holding 3 yrs 
  
                
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
5.3   Status 
 
5.3.1 Asset test 
All regimes have introduced an Asset test requiring assets of immovable property 
at a minimum of 70% - 80%.298 Furthermore, some regimes provide additional 
limitations for single investments at 20%299 - 40%, setting minimum numbers of 
assets for a qualified portfolio of min. 3 or 4, limitations for own used properties 
and investments outside EEA,300 limitations to shareholdings in real estate 
companies of maximum 10-90%,301 thresholds to limit investments in immovable 
property other than real property i.e. mortgage bonds of maximum 10% to 30, 
limitations for the use and quality of assets and a requirement that assets for 
investment must be not subject to any legal dispute though.302 
 
Three regimes limit REIT´ activities to residential properties (G-REIT, F-REIT and 
SOCIMI). Domestic residential properties built before the establishment of the 
REIT regime are excluded and those built afterwards are qualified investments.303 
Similar case is for the SOCIMI whose activities are limited to passive investments 
in domestic urban real estate.304 The F-REIT allows residential real estate 
298 Ibid. 
299 However, this limitation may not be limited to a single real property. According to the Royal 
Decree of 7.12.2010 (RD of 1.12.2010 a “single asset” is not only considered in the case of a 
consolidated entity but in case the entity comprise of one or more re property assets as well if they 
are to be considered to represent a “single investment risk” as may be assessed as such by the 
FSMA on the basis of i.e. the location of the real property, the final counterparty risk and the 
economic market risk (See Bollen (2010), p. 13). 
300 See EPRA (2013b), Greece, p. 3. 
301 See Table II.5.3-1. 
302 See EPRA (2013b), France, p. 3. 
303 Eligible investment in real estate for a G-REIT that are domestic portfolio properties which are 
being used primarily for residential use and provided that they have been built before January 1st, 
2007. In turn, any investment in domestic residential used property is qualified where the assets 
have been built after January 2007 and by way or investing indirectly into real estate companies or 
REITs. However, the market existing for residential properties interesting for institutional investors 
is comprised of products that are of prior building dates (see § 3(9) REITG). 
304 This is an interesting detailing with the Spanish law that differentiates between urban real estate 
that are existing within a community and other real estate in rural locations. There is no wording to 
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investments only to boost housing investment305 and end double taxation of 
profits.306  
 
Table II.5.3-1: Conditions to Status of REIT regimes in MSs - overview 
        Status       
       Asset Test       
FBI   
    no 
restrictions 
    
  
SICAFI   
immovable 
property 
max. 20% of  GAV into  single  Property  
  
REIC   
min. 80% qualified 
investments 
max. 90% 
investments in 
AE with real 
estate purpose 
max. 10% of 
total assets 
own used 
single 
property 
max. 25% 
GAV 
assets 
outside 
EEA max. 
10% GAV   
SIIC   
immovable 
property 
 n/A    
  
JSSPIC   
immovable 
property 
max. 10% 
mortgage bonds  
max. 10% in 
service 
companies 
no assets 
subject to 
legal 
disputes 
 
  
UK-REIT   
immovable 
property 
min. 3 property 
for rental 
business 
min 75% 
assets 
property rental 
business 
for single 
max. 40% 
GAV for 
single asset 
 
  
G-REIT   
immovable 
property (ex. 
Residential < 
1.1.07 
min. 75% 
qualified 
investments 
   
  
SIIQ   
immovable 
property 
min. 80% 
qualified 
investments 
   
  
L-REIT   
min. 4 immovable 
properties 
max. 40% GAV 
single property 
investment 
max. 20% in 
securities / 
companies 
max. 30% 
separate 
real estate 
assets / 
company or 
single comp. 
max. 30% 
securities 
issued by 
single real 
estate 
company   
F-REIT   
immovable 
residential 
property 
min. 80% 
qualified 
investments 
    
  
exclude commercial real estate investments; however, “urban” refers, therefore, towards domestic 
residential properties mainly (see Ley Art. 2; See Sec. 5.2 above). 
305 See Property Week Global (2010). The Commission has authorised under EU state aid rules 
the introduction of REITs in Finland that is aiming to encourage investment in affordable rental 
housing only. However, after respective assurances by the Finish government the Commission 
was satisfied that the regime does not involve state aid as any profits made by the REIT will be 
subject to tax at shareholder´ level very much like the profits made by individual investors investing 
directly in the real estate market. This, because the exemption from corporate income tax is linked 
to the requirement of immediate distribution of annual profits to shareholders, at the hand of which 
taxation takes place. Thus, this mechanism puts the tax treatment of an investment in a REIT at 
par with the taxation of direct investments by individuals in real estate (eubusiness.com: 
“Commission approves tax exemptions for Finnish Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)”, at 
http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/state-aid-finland.125, 12.11.2010. 
306 See Flak (2008). 
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SOCIMI   
immovable 
“urban” properties 
min. 80% 
qualified 
investments 
min. 3 year 
holding of 
qualifying 
assets 
  
  
SZIT   
immovable 
property 
min. 70% 
qualified 
investments 
max. 20% 
GAV single 
property 
investments 
  
  
IRE-REIT   
immovable 
property 
min. 75% 
qualified 
investments 
max. 40% 
GAV single 
property 
investments 
min. 3 
immovable 
properties in 
first 3 yrs 
 
  
                
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
5.3.2 Income test 
MSs regimes provide for a minimum volume of income generated from qualifying 
investments. The thresholds required mostly equal the ones for the Asset test and 
ranging from 70 to 80%.307 However, almost half (6) of the regimes have not set 
any restrictions or requirements in this respect.  
 
5.3.3 Gearing test 
Going further to the gearing test is appears a more aligned understanding of the 
regimes with each of them setting for limitations except for the SIIC and the 
SOCIMI regimes which does not provide for any restrictions hereto, rather, in case 
of the SIIC, provide for the application of the thin cap rules though.308 The range 
for eligible leverage is between 20% for short term loans and 80% with the 
majority of regimes set a maximum at an average of just under 60%309 overall,310 
whereas, under the UK-REIT and the SIIQ regime the leverage quota is up for a 
financing cost ratio the so-called “balance of business test” of 75:25311 and the 
company´ By-laws.312 
307 See Table II.5.3-2. 
308 The SIIC regime does not provide for any limitation of leverage. However, the French thin 
capitalization rules in place may, under certain circumstances, lead de facto to a limitation of 
leverage though but will not be further evaluated here since this is outside the scope of this 
illustration (see EPRA (2013b), France, p. 5). 
309 Special case is with the SICAFI: The RD of 7.12.2010 introduced, however, that in order to 
secure continue management of the debt ratio, the SICAFI is required to submit a financial plan to 
the FSMA as soon as the debt ratio exceeds 50% already and to describe measures to be taken to 
prevent the debt ratio from exceeding 65% and must be affirmed in a special report by the SICAFI 
statutory auditor (See Bollen (2010), p. 13). 
310 See Table II.5.3-2. 
311 As a learning from the so-called “financial crisis” and the absence of products as potential 
qualified investment targets the Consultation paper proposes to take away the pressure for REITs 
to have its funds reinvested in order to meet the requirements of the “balance of business test” to 
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5.3.4 Distribution test 
Since the distribution requirement is a core criterion, there should be a high 
proportion of dividends that must be distributed annually but not at a rate of 100% 
necessarily.313 All REIT regimes in the EU provide for such ratios ranging from 
80% to 100%314 with the exceptions of the REIC requiring a distribution in at 50% 
and the L-REIT, with no minimum requirement. 315  
 
Table II.5.3-2: Conditions to Status of REIT regimes in MSs (cont’d) - overview 
      Status     
    Income Test Gearing Test Distribution Test   
FBI   no restrictions max. 60% 100%   
SICAFI   
no restrictions max. 65%  min. 80% 
  
REIC   
no restrictions max. 75% (max. 40% for 
Developments) 
min. 50% 
  
SIIC   
no restrictions no restrictions (thin cap 
rules apply) 
min. 85% 
  
JSSPIC   
no restrictions short term loans max. 
20%  
min. 90% 
  
UK-REIT   
min. 75% qualified 
income 
Finance cost ratio of 
1.25:1 
min. 90% 
  
G-REIT   
min. 75% qualified 
income 
max. 66.25% min. 90% 
  
SIIQ   
min. 80% qualified 
income 
acc. Company by-laws 
(max 30% EBITDA 
interests expenses) 
min. 85% 
  
L-REIT   
n/A max. 75% of NAV no requirement, 
subject to REIT´ 
bylaws   
F-REIT   
min. 80% qualified 
investments 
max. 80% min. 90% 
  
SOCIMI   
min. 80% qualified 
investments 
n/A min. 80% 
  
SZIT   
min. 70% qualified 
investments 
max. 65% of GAV min. 90% 
  
IRE-REIT   
min. 75% qualified 
investments 
max. 50% of GAV min. 85% 
  
            
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
extent the holding period for cash enabling the REIT to wait for the right opportunity to invest even 
the balance of business test might be exceeded (See Woolich (2011), p. 27). 
312 By-laws may provide for a maximum of 30% of the EBITDA to interest expenses though (see 
EPRA (2013b), Italy, p. 4). 
313 See Barkow/Stanislawek (Schäfer (2007), p. 233 et seqq. 
314 See Table II.5.3-2. 
315 While the regime in general is aligned to the classic US-REIT the L-REIT, does not provide for a 
distribution obligation of the REIT to its shareholders but leaves this to regulate by the REIT itself 
and its By laws. Herewith, the regime clearly outlines it assumes to see the obligation of profit 
distributions to be included in the by-laws though (see EPRA (2013b), Lithuania, p.5). 
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5.4   Tax treatment 
The tax treatment of the REIT has already been outlined as its key feature being a 
tax transparent vehicle.316 Following the income of a REIT is not taxed at its level 
rather flow-through to its shareholders and being taxed at the shareholder´ 
individual level either corporate or individual. Therefore, analysis is made as to 
whether MSs REIT regimes follow this approach.  
 
5.4.1 Investment scenarios and scope of analysis 
In the context of this thesis analysis is given to the tax treatment of income at the 
level of the domestic REIT in terms of income tax and capital gains tax. 
Furthermore, since this thesis will analyse the situation of the foreign REIT 
operating cross-border is of focus though. In this context there are different 
scenarios for investment possible: 
 
I. direct in domestic real property;  
II.  “direct” in domestic real property through a local special purpose 
vehicle317 that qualifies for subsidiary; 
III. indirect in domestic real property through a (partial) shareholding in a 
local special purpose vehicle318; 
IV. indirect in shares of a local REIT; or 
V. through moving the place of management to investing direct or indirect 
in real property in the other MS. 
 
For the purpose of the comparative analysis the investment scenarios of a direct 
investment in domestic real property (Scenario I), and the indirect investment in 
shares of a domestic REIT (Scenario IV) are of focus. In this “outbound” case 
question arises as to whether the foreign REIT is eligible to opt for REIT status 
316 See Sec. 2 above. 
317 This investment scenario is viewed of “direct” type since the REIT is setting up its own 
subsidiary rather through a partial capital participation in a company not qualifying for 
representation as “subsidiary”. A “special purpose vehicle” (SPV) may be set up using any legal 
form for company according to the applicable domestic law but meeting the conditions set out for 
qualification as the REIT´ subsidiary in that (other) MS. 
318 The SPV may have a transparent partnership structure or a local corporate structure that might 
qualify for REIT status locally though (see EPRA (2009), p.10. 
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under the (domestic) REIT regime in the Host State.319 Where in case of an 
inbound investment the income is not taxed at the level of the REIT the situation 
for a (corporate) non-resident shareholder in a non-domestic REIT will be of focus 
for the analysis of the tax treatment at the (foreign) shareholder level and any 
levied tax from its cross-border activities.320 Here, the outbound case of an 
Investor invested in real estate in another MS in general is of interest with regard 
to potentially discriminatory and distorting elements in MSs (REIT) taxation 
regimes.321 
 
Figure II.5.4-1: Cross-Border investments – overview of scenarios 
 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
5.4.2 Domestic REIT  
The tax treatment of a REIT corporation at its level is the most crucial and 
sensitive part of the regimes due to government’s fear of abuse and negative 
impacts to their overall revenues.  
 
 
 
319 The case of a foreign REIT investing directly in real property cross-border into another MS 
where neither a specific REIT regime nor comparable other beneficial treatments for this type of 
investor is provided is, however, different, especially in the absence of a “EuroREIT” and the non-
existence of express mutual recognition. Therefore, the situation of an investment in real property, 
by a REIT company, in another MS not providing for a domestic REIT regime is out of scope of this 
analysis. It goes for the foreign (non-REIT) investment company, which does not meet the criteria 
of another MS´ REIT regime, thus, not being in a substantially comparable situation though. 
320 See EPRA (2009), Recital 3.12. – 3.15., p. 10. 
321 The analysis under EU law, however, is subject to Chapter IV below. 
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(1)   Income tax 
One of the main features of a full REIT regime is its tax transparency whereby the 
income of the REIT “flow-through” to the shareholder and is not taxed at the level 
of the REIT rather in the hands of its shareholders though. This holds true for any 
portion of income resulting out of the REITs providing for that such income is 
generated from qualifying activities. Whereas, the tax treatment for any income 
out of non-qualifying activities does not fall under the tax transparent treatment 
and is taxed at REIT level according to the ordinary rules for corporate´ of the 
respective domestic tax law. Since this analysis´ focus is on REITs and its special 
business the following focus is given to the treatment of qualifying income only. 
Generally all regimes provide for tax transparency on REIT level, thus, a full tax 
exemption.322  
 
Two REIT regimes provide a different approach. The REIC imposes taxation of 
income at a rate of 10% of the ECB interest rate plus 1%.323 The income of the 
SZIT is subject to corporate income tax, but not payable and subject to sanctions 
only, 324 with a 2% transfer tax payable at SZIT level, thus the SZIT is effectively 
tax exempt like the REIC. 
 
 (2)  Capital gains tax 
The situation for the tax treatment of capital gains at the level of the REIT 
generally follows the “flow-through” approach as well.325 Thus according to almost 
all of the regimes capital gains are tax exempt.326 However, there are some 
regimes which require the fulfilment of additional conditions to be met that gains 
are at least accrued into a reinvestment reserve if not directly reinvested they are 
in fact tax exempt.327 Exemption has to be made for the SIIQ, which applies the 
ordinary corporation taxation, but the entry tax would mitigate any incoming capital 
322 See for an overview Table II.5.4-1: Taxation of REIT – overview. 
323 Since the Interest rates had been held at 1% for just under two years following the financial 
crisis and global recession it was recently in April 2011 raised up to 1.25%, which represents a 
very low level though. Thus, at this very low level of the Greece tax rate of just 0.225% (Example: 
ECB interest rate at 1.25% lead to a tax rate fort he income taxation of a REIC as follows: 10% x 
(1.25% + 1%) = 0.225% tax payable by the REIC) and represent kind of a “stamp duty” only that 
the regime can rather be qualified a tax exempt model (see EPRA (2013b), Greece, p. 5).  
324 See Sec. 5.5 below for further details on Sanctions (Dévald/Antal (2011)). 
325 See for an overview Table II.5.4-1: Taxation of REIT – overview. 
326 Ibid. 
327 See i.e. FBI, SICAFI and SZIT (see i.e. for FBI EPRA (2013b), Netherlands, p. 6), whereas L-
REIT and F-REIT require additional conditions to be met. 
 
 
 
71 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
REITs in the EU 
 
gains.328 In the F-REIT the tax exemption may be mitigated by a penalty tax 
charge linked to certain additional conditions on the sale of less than 10% of the 
assets during a tax year.329 
 
5.4.3 Foreign REIT  
 
(1)  Shareholder in domestic REIT 
Applying tax transparent treatment to distributions of dividends to the non-resident 
shareholder leaves the Host State without tax revenue due to the tax sovereignty 
of each MS. Therefore, the MS of residence of the REIT may generate tax 
revenue from domestic income only by levy tax at source330.  
 
Therefore, most MSs levy tax on distributions from the REIT to non-resident 
shareholders through withholding taxation of dividends distributed by the domestic 
REIT. Consequently, all MSs regimes except two provide for withholding taxation 
rules.331 Only the REIC332 and JSSPIC333 do not withhold tax at the distribution of 
dividends to its non-resident shareholders, all the others withholding tax at rates 
between 15% and 28%,334  
 
328 See EPRA (2013b), Italy, p. 5. 
329 See EPRA (2013b), Finland, p. 5. Furthermore, a penalty tax mitigating the tax exemption are 
where shares in mutual real estate companies have been held for five years, and at least ten years 
have elapsed from the initial use of the buildings owned by a mutual real estate company and 
more than five years have elapsed from a comprehensive modernisation fulfilling certain criteria 
(as defined in legislation). 
330 See EPRA (2009), p. 11. It is outside the scope of this analysis to give overview or elaborate on 
each of the types of shareholder situations and their (individual) tax rates in MS for dividend 
received. A overview of the taxation of investments in commercial real property in Europe is given 
by Werner (2002). 
331 See for an overview Table III.5.4-1. 
332 See EPRA (2013b), Greece, p. 8. 
333 See EPRA (2013b), Bulgaria, p. 7. However, this exemption from withholding tax applies only 
where the corporate shareholder is a EU/EEA resident. Otherwise, a 5% withholding tax is levied 
though. 
334 Under the SZIT regime withholding tax applies at ordinary corporate tax rates, which is 19% 
according to a survey of global corporate tax rates by KPMG. A 10 percent corporate income tax 
rate applies for taxable income up to HUF 500 million (approximately USD.2.500.000). The excess 
is taxed at 19 percent. These rates are expected to be applicable also in 2013. An additional local 
business tax (LBT) of up to 2 percent is applicable based on the adjusted net sales (certain 
expenses are deductible). This local business tax is deductible for corporate income tax purposes. 
From 1 July 2007, a minimum tax (AMT) applies. The AMT base amounts to 2 percent of total 
income, as decreased by the cost of goods sold and the value of intermediated services and some 
further adjustments. Please note that deduction of cost of goods sold and mediated services is 
capped (see KPMG (2013)).  
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A special case is the SICAFI, which does not levy withholding tax and seems to 
fall in the minority group of MSs like Greece and Bulgaria, but this reflects an 
exception only where the income by the foreign REIT was not received from a 
domestic company.335 Considering that usually investments in real property are 
made through the interposition of an SPV,336 a resident company, the income 
generated must not benefit from the exemption, but is subject to a withholding tax 
at a rate of 25%. As the assessment depends on the type of activity of the foreign 
REIT, the levy of withholding tax on its income from domestic activities is not 
excluded the regime is similar to most MS´ that apply withholding tax. 
 
Almost all regimes provide eligibility for the foreign shareholder for a tax credit 
under the regulations of an existing DTT, generally based on the OECD Model 
Treaty where a withholding tax at a rate of 15% applies.337 In addition to the 
DTT´s, the foreign REIT´ being a corporate investor from another MS could also 
benefit from the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive. Above an ownership level of 
between 10% and 25% specified by the respective applicable DTT, foreign 
investors are entitled to demand that their withholding tax rate be reduced 
between 5% and 15%. If the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive is applied, withholding 
tax may not be levied at all in some cases. It is therefore possible to avoid 
withholding taxation in full where the respective rate is 15% or lower, whereas, in 
other cases the final levy can be reduced significantly though.338 
 
(2)   Direct investment in domestic real property 
The foreign REIT may operate cross-border in another MS through investments in 
real property in the Host State. The domestic REIT shall not view the treatment of 
income by the non-domestic REIT generated from these direct investments 
different to investments. Repatriation of profits from direct investments generated 
cross-border affects MS´ tax sovereignty and may forfeit tax revenue. Whether a 
foreign REIT may be burdened with any tax levied on income generated from 
335 See EPRA (2013b), Belgium, p. 9. 
336 The use of SPVs for investment into Belgium real property is market usage, since in the case of 
sale of the real property any sale conducted by way of an “Share Deal”, that is to sell the shares in 
the SPV holding the real property, is treated tax advantage under Belgium law due to the non-
applicability of transfer tax which in case of an Asset Deal would be triggered though. 
337 See Art. 10 II OECD (2012).  
338 Therefore, this tax rate is recommended as a solution for cross-border investments in the case 
of REITs in the EU by EPRA as well (see Wijs (2010), p. 13). 
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domestic investments in real property at the repatriation of such income into its 
Home State is subject to eligibility under the REIT regime in the Host State. 
However, the domestic regime usually is not eligible for the foreign REIT to benefit 
there from. An exception may be made for two regimes, which are the FBI and the 
SIIC regime under which a foreign REIT may apply for treatment under the 
domestic regime provided, however, the foreign REIT meets all requirements 
under the respective regime though.339 In all other cases the foreign REIT will be 
treated under the domestic rules with its income generated from its direct 
investment in real property in the Host State under the ordinary rules applicable 
for a non-resident corporate.340 The rules applicable under the respective 
domestic regimes provide for tax rates between 10% (JSSPIC) and 33,99% 
(REIC)341 subject to any DTT, credit and relief in the Home State. 
 
Table II.5.4-1: Taxation of REIT – overview  
  Domestic REIT   Foreign REIT 
REIT  Income  Capital Gains Indirect Direct in vestment 
      
 
withholding tax 
domestic 
regime eligible tax treatment 
FBI 
 0% Tax 
(effectively 
exempt) 
tax exempt, 
unless distributed 
15% but tax 
credit in DTT 
case possible 
yes, provided 
foreign REIT 
meet all 
requirements for 
FBI 
 0% Tax 
(effectively 
exempt) 
SICAFI 
 tax exempt tax exempt, 
unless distributed 
15%-25%, 
depending on 
income source, 
but tax credit in 
DTT case 
possible 
not eligible  ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate 
REIC 
10% of ECB 
interest rate 
plus 1% 
tax exempt n/A not eligible  ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate at 
33,99% 
SIIC 
 tax exempt tax exempt 15% but tax 
credit in DTT 
case possible 
yes, provided 
foreign REIT 
meet all 
requirements for 
SIIC 
 tax exempt 
JSSPIC 
tax exempt tax exempt n.a. not eligible  withholding Tax at 
10% 
339 Under the condition that a foreign REIT is comparable in nature, form and behaviour to an FBI 
and comply with all FBI requirements it is eligible to obtain FBI status and, thus, benefit from the 
0% tax treatment for its domestic income though (see EPRA (2013b), Netherlands, p. 9). In France 
the election for SIIC regime is possible too subject the foreign REIT meets the conditions under the 
SIIC regime with regard to the legal form, shareholder requirements and the Asset test (see EPRA 
(2013b), France, p. 12/13). 
340 See for an overview Table II.5.4-1. 
341 Ibid. 
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UK-
REIT 
tax exempt tax exempt 20% but tax 
credit in DTT 
case possible 
not eligible  ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate at 20% 
(income and cap. 
gains) 
G-REIT 
Fully tax 
exempt 
tax exempt 25% + 5,5 
solidarity 
surcharge = 
26,375% total 
but tax credit in 
DTT case 
possible 
not eligible  ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate  
SIIQ 
tax exempt ordinary corporate 
taxation 
20% but tax 
credit in DTT 
case possible 
not eligible  ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate at 
27,5% 
L-REIT 
tax exempt  tax exempt  24,5% but tax 
credit in DTT 
case possible 
not eligible  ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate at 15% 
withholding tax 
F-REIT 
tax exempt tax exempt, 
subject to 
conditions 
max. 28% but 
tax credit in DTT 
case possible 
not eligible  ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate  
SOCIMI 
 0% Tax 
(effectively 
exempt) 
0% corporate 
income tax  
21% but tax 
credit in DTT 
case possible 
not eligible  ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate  
SZIT 
Income fully 
tax exempt, 
but 2% 
transfer tax 
tax exempt, 
unless distributed 
yes, at ordinary 
corp rates 
not eligible  ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate  
IRE-
REIT 
tax exempt not taxable yes, at 20% not eligible  ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate at 20% 
            
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
5.4.4 Findings 
The tax treatment by MS´ REIT regimes follows the concept of tax transparency in 
general. This holds true especially for the treatment of the income of the 
(domestic) REIT at its level that “flows-through” to its shareholders. The MSs 
regimes do neither levy income tax nor capital gains tax. The latter holds true 
except the SIIQ regime under which capital gains are subject to ordinary corporate 
taxation though.342 
 
The flow-through concept, however, is implemented down to the shareholder level 
in case of the shareholder being resident only. Different result is found, however, 
for the non-resident shareholder. In order to safeguard for tax revenue all MSs 
342 See Table II.5.4-1. 
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levy withholding tax on any distributions by their respective (domestic) REIT to 
their (non-resident) shareholders. Consequently, the non-resident shareholder has 
to experience its distributions received from the domestic REIT are levied with 
withholding tax.343 This treatment is applied in case of cross-border activities by 
the non-resident (foreign) REITs as well. As the foreign REIT will not be eligible for 
the domestic REIT regime there is benefit from the tax exemption at its REIT level. 
However, the foreign REIT is treated according ordinary rules applicable for non-
resident corporate´ at rates on average above 20% though.344 The only 
exemptions are provided under the FBI and SIIC regimes, which are eligible for a 
non-resident REIT as well provided, however, the foreign REIT is capable of 
meeting all of the requirements under the FBI or SIIC regime respectively. 
However, within the group of the MS´ regimes these two regimes are truly unique 
in this respect, whereas, all other regimes apply for domestic REITs only.345 
 
Where withholding tax is levied to the dividend payment made by the REIT to its 
foreign shareholder, compensation will be eligible for a tax credit, relief or any 
other means of reduction of the tax in the case of and according to a DTT to be 
applied. Where DTTs are applicable and provide for the usual rate at max. 
15%346, the taxation may be eliminated economically in full. However, this case 
was found under the SIIC regime only, whereas, with most other regimes 
withholding tax will apply at rates higher than those possibly compensated under a 
DTT. Therefore, taxation of profits still remains since the respective tax rates are 
at a level above 20% regularly though.347 Thus, the economic burden from this 
taxation is with its shareholders while being immediately deducted from the 
dividend payments made to the non-domestic shareholders. 
 
5.5   Sanctions 
Each regime requires conditions to be met by the company before being eligible or 
qualified for entering the regime and becoming a REIT. Consequently, those 
conditions and requirements have to be fulfilled in each of the following years after 
343 Ibid. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid. 
346 According to the recommendation by Art. 10 II OECD (2012) at the rate of 15%. 
347 See Table II.5.4-1. 
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having qualified for REIT status. Thus, compliance with the regime conditions is 
monitored constantly348 with sanctions applies in case of non-compliance. 
However, there is no consistent concept within the regimes providing for a 
catalogue of sanctions rather there are provisions in a more or less specified way. 
Common approach by the regimes is that difference is made with a view to the 
violation or breach of regime conditions. Here, two groups of sanctions can be 
identified. The first group of sanctions is leading to penalties, whereas the second 
group of sanctions leads to the loss of status.349 
 
5.5.1 Penalties 
As a rule with all regimes the breach of single regime conditions350 is sanctioned 
with penalties only.351 The penalties, however, are mostly not expressively 
specified but usually include specifications for remedy by the REIT352, 
recommendations by the supervisory authority with a view to regularising the 
situation or impose temporary or suspending sanctions,353 up to penalty 
payments,354 tax burdened for “breach adjustment”355 introduced by refusal of 
348 See EPRA (2013b), Europe. 
349 See Annex 1, European REITs – Specifics overview. 
350 Regime conditions are usually those related to the legal requirements, operating activities and 
status. However, the SOCIMI provide for information obligations and penalises a violation of this 
obligation already (see Ley). 
351 Exemption, however, is with certain violations in case for the G-REIT that even in case they are 
not met no consequences are provided for. This holds true i.e. for the Asset and Income test 
requirements to a REIT servicing company. EPRA summarizes that a breach of the 20% limits set 
in § 12 REITG are covered and penalised under § 18(5) REITG. However, there is no justification 
for since § 16 (6) REITG does not provide for services by the REIT-Servicing company defined in § 
1 (2) REITG but expressively refers to activities by the G-REIT or its real estate Subsidiaries 
defined in § 1 (1) Nr. 2 REITG. There, § 1 (1) REITG clearly makes a differentiation in between 
those real estate companies (§1 (1) Nr. 2 REITG) referred to in §§ 16(6), 18(5) compared to REIT-
Servicing companies (§ 1 (1) Nr. 3 REITG). 
352 Most of the breach´ of the “tests” that must be fulfilled for being under REIT status may only 
seen as a “minor breach” that are to be ignored. This holds true for the conditions set out In 
Chapter 2 of the CTA 2010 (the “conditions”) i.e. the conditions for company, the property rental 
business, distribution of profits and the balance of business (CTA 2010 Chapter 8, Section 561-
566). However, the UK-REIT has to give notice to an Officer of the Revenue and Customs (CTA 
2010 Chapter 8, Section 561(2). The notice shall be given by an “officer of the Revenue and 
Customs” rather “the Commissioners for HMRC”; see Notes CTA 2010, Chapter 9, Section 572, 
sub-section 1798 ; CTA 2010 Chapter 9, Section 572) at any time a relevant breach happens to 
the conditions(CTA 2010 Chapter 8, Section 561(3)) including a specification for remedy (CTA 
2010 Chapter 8, Section 561(4)). 
353 E.g. the BCF may ask the market authorities to suspend the listing of the shares of such 
SICAFI) (see EPRA (2013b, Belgium, p. 8). 
354 According to Art. 31 SPIC penalties range from BGN 5.000 (EUR 2.500) to BGN 10.000 (EUR 
5.113). 
355 See i.e. under the UK-REIT regime: To ignore a “minor breach” means that these cases will not 
cause the UK-REIT regime to terminate for the company See Notes CTA 2010, Chapter 8, Section 
563-564, 566 and 568, sub-sections 1773, 1776, 1783 and 1790). However, those cases may lead 
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respective income gained through the violation. Thus, this income portion is taxed 
according to the ordinary tax rates like an ordinary company without REIT 
status.356 Exemption is provided under the FBI regime that may be viewed as 
being more flexible or stringent though. Under this regime Penalties are not 
envisaged anyways. Where an FBI constantly is in breach of single regime 
conditions is at risk to loosing its status though.357 
 
5.5.2 Loss of Status 
The REIT is at risk of loosing its tax transparent status under all regimes when 
constantly breaching single regime requirements over a certain period of time or a 
multiple violation of regime requirements (“serious breach”358).359 The relevant 
“period of time” for a constant breach may be within a fiscal year, but may be 
longer depending the type of requirement up to 3 to 10 years360 with the sole 
exception for the REIC.361 
to additional taxes on profits that have been gained out of such breach serving as a penalty to the 
UK-REIT only. Additionally, the HMRC has the power to levy additional taxes if they consider that 
the UK-REIT has entered into arrangements with the main purpose of obtaining a major tax 
advantage (CTA 2010 Chapter 5, Section 545) (see UK-REIT at CTA 2010 Chapter 5, Section 545 
(Tax Assessment by HMRC); CTA 2010 Chapter 6, Section 551(Tax consequences of distributions 
to “holder of excessive rights”).  
356 This was seen recently happening with “Foncière Massena”, the real estate arm of Group 
Assurances du Credit Mutuel, which have been on of five SIICs which saw its tax privileges 
suspended in 2010 and leading to tax payments due to this suspension of € 7mn. The suspension 
followed difficulties with the stock market context in the first semester of 2010 that did not allow 
Foncière Massena to comply with the shareholding requirements that is the requirement to keep 
the maximum shareholding by a single shareholder at a maximum of 60%. This non-compliance 
has lead to the “final-exit” from the tax transparent status of the SIIC Regime after December 31st 
with a further €11mn in exit costs. Majority owners in a total of five French SIICs were required to 
sell shares before the end of 2010 to avoid the loss of status i.e. losing their tax transparent status. 
Aside from Foncière Massena, they are SIIC de Paris, Tesfran, Doci Lyonnais and MB Retail 
Europe. All of them have yet to comply with the regulation (see PropertyEU (2012a)). 
357 See EPRA (2013b), Netherlands, p. 5. 
358 See UK-REIT at CTA 2010 Chapter 9, Section 574 according to which a breach is a “serious 
breach” of at least two different conditions that have occurred during a ten-year period and that the 
UK-REIT has not relied more than 4 times on minor breaches during that certain time CTA 2010 
Chapter 9, Section 577(2) - (4)). 
359 See Table II.5.5-1: Sanctions by REIT regimes in MS - overview 
360 Where, however, the G-REIT violates i.e. any of the aforementioned conditions not only once 
but a single condition consecutive over a period of 3 years the G-REIT will lose its status with the 
ending of the third business year of the G-REIT. This applies not only to the Asset and Income test 
but to the minimum equity requirement as well as to the free float conditions and the maximum 
single shareholding requirement too (see § 18 (3) – (5) REITG). Moreover, the violation of any 
condition out of the Asset and Income test, the Distribution test and/or to the way of providing 
ancillary services to third parties for a period of five consecutive years will lead to the loss of status 
as well effective with the end of the fifth business year of the G-REIT (See § 18(5) REITG). As a 
general rule it is fair to conclude that a minor breach will not lead to a removal from the regime 
unless the breach a “serious breach” (CTA 2010 Chapter 9, Section 574) of at least two different 
conditions that have occurred during a ten-year period and that the UK-REIT has not relied more 
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Table II.5.5-1: Sanctions by REIT regimes in MSs - overview 
      Sanctions   
    Penalty Loss of status   
FBI   
n/A constant breach of (single) regime requirements 
during tax year   
SICAFI   violation of (single) conditions constant breach of (single) regime requirements   
REIC   violation of regime conditions n/A   
SIIC   
violation of (single) conditions constant breach of (single) regime requirements  
  
JSSPIC   violation of (single) conditions systematic breach / failure of conditions    
UK-
REIT   
violation of certain REIT 
conditions, ex minor breaches 
constant breach of regime requirements over 10 
year period   
G-REIT   
violation of (single) conditions constant breach of (single) regime requirements/ 
Delisting and Trading   
SIIQ   
violation of (single) conditions constant breach of single regime requirements  
  
L-REIT   violation of (single) conditions violation of regime requirements   
F-REIT   violation of (single) conditions arrangements with purpose of tax avoidance   
SOCIMI   
violation of information 
obligations 
violation of regime requirements 
  
SZIT   
violation of information 
obligations 
violation of regime requirements 
  
SZIT   
violation of (single) conditions violation of regime requirements 
  
          
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
5.6  Findings 
The comparative analysis shows differences in the criteria for MSs REIT regimes. 
The main conclusion is that the REIT regimes analysed all comply with the criteria 
for a REIT, based upon the three cornerstones of REITs: 
 
Liquidity - through providing a secondary market due to mandatory 
stock listing 
 
Distribution -   of profits almost in full to the shareholders and 
 
Tax transparency -  at REIT level shifting the taxation of income at investor’s 
level.362 
than 4 times on minor breaches during that certain time (CTA 2010 Chapter 9, Section 577(2) - 
(4)). 
361 See EPRA (2013b), Greece, p. 5. 
362 The understanding holds true for the treatment of the domestic REIT and its income at domestic 
level distributed to the domestic shareholder though (see Sec. 5.4.2 above). 
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For the investor REITs are a capital markets instrument with attractive tax 
treatment, but large disparities exist under national policies.363 Aside from 
technical criteria, European REIT regimes aim to create an advantageous position 
within its domestic market and within the competition of the MSs regimes to attract 
capital flows364 in its domestic market through FDIs in general or specifically in its 
REIT regime.365 Legislation for public REITs with domestic ownership serves 
several economic policy goals of strategic domestic importance to its local real 
estate market.366 Thus, MSs created economic incentives to attract institutional 
investors as identified in the case of the G-REIT and the SIIQ regime.367 
 
Table II.5.6-1: Spectrum of requirements to REIT regimes in the EU - overview 
Requirement Minimum   Maximum   
  Rule Regime Rule Regime 
          
Legal          
Legal form Investment Fund 
L-REIT 
Joint Stock Company (AG) 
G-REIT u.a. 
Share Capital EUR 43.500 L-REIT EUR 29mn REIC 
Registered 
Seat 
domestic (either MS or 
EEA) SOCIMI 
domestic 
G-REIT u.a. 
Listing not mandatory (Private 
REIT allowed) 
L-REIT mandatory 
G-REIT u.a. 
Stock 
Exchange 
any regulated stock 
exchange (EU, EEA) 
SOCIMI domestic 
SICAFI  
Shareholder 
conditions 
none 
L-REIT / 
REIC 
max. 5% single 
shareholdings and less 5 
such shareholdings IRE-REIT 
    
 
max. 10% corporate 
shareholdings  IRE-REIT 
    
 
min. 35% free float  
IRE-REIT 
 
   
363 Here, large disparities exist mostly owed to singular national politics. MS´ structures aim to 
secure for preventing loss of tax base due to a fiscal competition of the Regimes existing (see 
Hughes/Lewis (2008), p. 88). 
364 See Knoflach/Körfgen (Schäfer 2007), p.4. 
365 This was publicly communicated recently by the Hungarian government, which stated its 
motivations to introducing the SZIT in an attempt to “… make the Hungary one of the most 
competitive MS and the financial services centre of CEE or the Luxembourg of Eastern Europe …” 
(see kvg (2011)). 
366 See kvg (2011). 
367 The investments in a G-REIT qualify to the real estate quota for the tied asset pool of i.e. 
Insurance Companies and Pension Funds because the regulator as being comparable to a direct 
real estate investment accepts it. The Italian SIIQ Regime on the other hand exempts Pension- 
and other Investment-Funds, as well as SIIQs, from any withholding tax (see EPRA (2013), Italy, p. 
5). 
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Operating activities (Passive property investments)     
Acquisition 
and Sales 
Qualified with no major differences 
  
Leasing Qualified with no major differences   
Ancillary 
Services 
qualified  
REIC 
Max. 50% “ancillary” but 
fully taxable SIIC 
Development qualified w/o condition  SZIT  not qualified JSSPIC 
Status         
Asset Test 
no restrictions 
FBI 
min. 80% passive 
investments REIC 
Income Test no restrictions FBI min. 80% qualified income REIC  
Gearing Test 
n/A 
SOCIMI 
max. 30% /max. term 1 
year JSSPIC 
Distribution 
Test 
n/A 
L-REIT 
100% 
FBI  
Tax (REIT 
level)         
Income Tax 
tax exempt SICAF 10% of ECB interest rate 
plus 1% 
REIC 
Capital Gains 
tax exempt G-REIT Ordinary corporate 
taxation 
SIIQ 
Withholding 
Tax 
n/A 
REIC 
max. 28% but tax credit in 
DTT case possible 
F-REIT 
Sanctions         
Penalty n/A 
FBI 
violation of information 
obligations SOCIMI 
Loss of status Delisting and Trading / 
shortfall of distribution, 
breach shareholder 
requirement 
G-REIT / 
SIIQ 
n/A 
REIC 
          
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Albeit differences in details the general approach is very similar in between the 
MSs regimes.368 The comparison of each of the conditions shows a spectrum in 
detail with restrictions by regimes providing for complex regulations, more liberal 
requirements, and others not providing for any limitations at all. However, the 
analysis has provided result that in between the regimes their regulations are very 
close usually providing for a limited range of conditions and requirements that are 
similar if not equal, thus a wide understanding of common criteria´.369 Beside 
similarities identified with the comparative analysis in between MSs REIT regimes 
there is question whether these similarities represent a “common understanding” 
already, building basis for the harmonisation of European REITs to towards a 
“EuroREIT” regime though. 
 
368 See ANNEX 1, European REITs – Specifics. 
369 Ibid. 
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6.  Existence of a “common understanding” 
The question whether there is joint “European” understanding extant is, therefore, 
analysed further, and common criteria of the EU REIT regimes are analysed to 
identify the existence of a case for a “least common understanding”. “Common 
understanding” in this respect does not reflect any unanimous nor equal 
understanding. Rather, it is referred to as “the understanding” that is found as 
some basis shared in all of the regimes and its requirements. Mathematically, the 
“least common factor” describes the factor that is the lowest number to be found 
for two numbers that are possible to divide a denominator in an equation. 370 
Outside mathematics this concept is not applicable but its idea is used in everyday 
language.371 Here, the saying used refers to the “least common factor” as the 
understanding that is common in between different opinions expressed to a 
certain topic and, therefore, shared in between the opinions even though they are 
still not conform.  
 
The saying of the “least common understanding”, however, may be understand 
critically as a compromise at the lowest level an, therefore, being of questionable 
consensus.372 Some say this is exactly the way that usually politic is made on the 
level of the EU what is called “harmonisation”. While aiming to create a common 
market within the harmonisation of rule and regulations the outcome of the 
harmonisation debate seem to be the lowest level shared in between rules and 
regulations. This process, however, is viewed as “a race to the bottom” whereby 
step by step the common market becomes a market of the lowest quality. 
However, the identification of the existence for a “common understanding” in 
between MSs REIT regimes shall not promote a non-quality level but identify a 
joint understanding being a level playing field from which possible solutions 
acceptable by MSs can be drawn. Hereto, coming from the analysis the spectrum 
of MSs regime´ solutions comprise of joint understanding expressed by common 
philosophies and the visibility of common grounds. The “common understanding” 
370 See Wikipedia.org at: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemeinsamer_Nenner. 
371 The “Common understanding” is used i.e. in German language being a metaphor for a joint 
agreement (see Wikipedia.org at: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemeinsamer_Nenner. 
372 See Wikipedia.org at: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gemeinsamer_Nenner. 
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in this respect and as a result of the analysis given above can be identified along 
the lines of the criteria from the analysis.373 
 
6.1  Legal requirements 
In terms of legislation, REITs do not have a uniform legal structure within the EU 
as seen from the comparative analysis above.374 Within the range of legal forms 
eligible under MSs REIT regimes understanding exist for a REIT regime possible 
of capital market viability.375 Consequently, MSs regimes376 require REITs to be 
established using the form of a regulated vehicle.377 Regulated, however, is not 
limited to vehicles that are under the supervision of a financial authority but are at 
last “regulated” indirectly by a stock exchange. Vehicles that can be summarised 
under the definition above are usually public company forms based on shares, 
which can be traded at the stock exchange. Thus, a legal form of any corporate 
whereby the capital of which is divided into shares is of the “common 
understanding” for a (European) REIT in MSs regimes378 providing for statutory 
capital at some €15mn considering a mathematical mean level in between the 
MSs regime requirements.379 
 
Based on MSs domestic corporate laws residency as well is required domestically 
in the certain MSs where the REIT is incorporated.380 Considering that some of 
the regimes are pure tax regimes rather a new type of a corporate even regimes 
allowing for residency in either MS often require the REIT to provide for a 
permanent establishment domestically though. The capital market orientation MSs 
REIT regimes are reflected by having the requirement for a mandatory stock 
listing to be eligible to qualify for REIT status.381 Mandatory listing builds a 
“common understanding” in between the MSs and their REIT regimes, but must 
not be limited to the respective domestic stock(s) only rather may be organised at 
373 See Sec. 5 above. 
374 Ibid. 
375 See Pfnür/Müller (2010), p. 698. 
376 Except for the L-REIT, see Sec. 5.1.2 above. 
377 See Tables II.5.1-1 and II.5.1-2. 
378 See Sec. 5.1 above. 
379 See Tables II.5.1-1. 
380 Ibid. 
381 See Table II.5.1-2. 
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any regulated stock exchange in either MS or a signatory state to Treaties of the 
EU i.e. within the EEA and/or EFTA.382  
 
Table II.6.1-1: Common understanding of legal requirements - overview 
Requirement Criteria MSs Regimes* 
Legal  Legal form Corporation / Stock Company 
  Share Capital EURO 15m 
  Registered Seat domestic 
  Listing obligatory 
  Stock Exchange regulated stock in either MS/EEA 
  Shareholder conditions  
  corporate holdings max. 30% 
  shareholding by individuals min. 25 % 
  free-float min. 25 % 
  voting rights min. 25% by individuals 
    max. 50 by corporate  
    * Based on “common understanding” for criteria 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Furthermore, the legal requirements provide for shareholder conditions in order to 
safeguard that REIT are accessible for small investors and shares are possibly 
widely held.383 However, as a consequence of the fact that MSs regimes generally 
allow for a public REIT only, individuals at a maximum of 25% limit shareholdings 
to prevent majority holdings as to corporate shareholdings for a maximum of 30% 
and shareholdings.384 Furthermore, a free-float of REIT´ shares is “understood” to 
be at a minimum of 25%.385 Herein, the rational behind limiting corporate 
shareholdings, thus, promoting small investors shareholdings and safeguarding 
for a sufficiently free-float, additionally, regimes provide for limits with respect to 
voting right alongside the shareholding at a maximum of 50% of voting rights by 
corporate shareholdings and a minimum of 25% held by Individuals.386 Finally, 
there is already a “common understanding” with regard to the legal requirements 
to identify that shall reflect the possible legal requirements for a “European” REIT 
model already. Thus, a (European)REIT shall be established as a public limited 
company on shares providing for a share capital of EURO 15mn and is obligatorily 
to list at a regulated stock exchange in either MS or the EEA region. There shall, 
furthermore, be shareholder conditions setting limits for shareholdings by 
382 See Sec. 5.1.2 above. 
383 See Table II.5.1-3. 
384 Ibid. 
385 Ibid. 
386 Ibid. 
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corporate at 30% as well as their voting rights a maximum of 50% though. 
Individuals shall assist individual shareholdings with the requirement for minimum 
shareholdings at 25% and respective level of voting rights aligned thereto. The 
same threshold shall be secured for free-float at 25% though. 
 
6.2   Operating activities 
There is a “common understanding” identified to the operating activities for 
passive property investment to qualifying for REIT activities only.387 Passive 
investments comprise of the acquisition and sale of immovable property388 as well 
as its leasing and management of the portfolio.389 Compared to listed real estate 
companies and its value creating activities trading focused business models or 
development activities are not qualified activities for a REIT.390 This “common 
understanding” finds its confirmation with the rules as to any ancillary activities 
that are allowed but limited for own assets.391 
 
Table II. 6.2-1: Common understanding of operating activities - overview 
Requirement Criteria MSs Regimes* 
Operating activities 
Acquisition and 
Sales qualified 
(Passive property investments) Leasing qualified 
  Ancillary activities  qualified, for own assets 
  Development qualified, for own assets 
 * Based on  “common understanding” for criteria  
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
6.3   Status 
With regard to the Status of MSs REIT regimes there is a very similar if not joint 
approach towards the conditions as to Asset, Income, Gearing and Distribution 
test extant.392 Thus “common understanding” is identified for the set of conditions 
for Status of a (European)REIT providing under the Asset test for a minimum of 
75% of qualifying assets of immovable property type from which with respect to 
387 See Sec. 5.2 above. 
388 See Definition according to Art 6 II OECD-Model (2012). 
389 See Table II.5.2-1. 
390 See i.e. by the introduction of minimum holding periods (SICAFI, SOCIMI), a maximum to the 
total GAV (L-REIT, G-REIT, SIIC, REIC) or both (UK-REIT). 
391 See Sec. 5.2 above. However, where income is generated out of any activities in excess of 
limitations set or from non-qualified activities is not eligible for tax transparent treatment of REIT´ 
income. 
392 See Table II.5.3-1 and Table II.5.3-2. 
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the Income test a minimum of 75% of income must be generated. The use of 
leverage under the Gearing test shall be limited to maximum of 60% from a total 
portfolio point of view (GAV). The distribution test requires a quota at a level of 
90% minimum distribution annually to the shareholders. 
 
Table II. 6.3-1: Common understanding of status - overview 
Requirement Criteria MSs Regimes* 
Status Asset Test min. 75%  
  Income Test min. 75%  
  Gearing Test max. 60% 
  Distribution Test min. 90%  
  * Based on “common understanding” for criteria 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
6.4   Tax Treatment 
The analysis of the tax treatment by MSs REIT regimes has shown that there is 
for “better of for worse” a joint understanding, thus the different regimes apply very 
similar if not the same model.393 Distinction is made in between the treatment of 
the domestic (resident) REIT and the foreign (non-resident) REIT. With the latter 
situation of cross-border activity by a foreign REIT there are mainly two situations 
to find either the direct investment in domestic real property or the indirect 
investment by way of shareholding in a domestic REIT.394 
 
6.4.1  Domestic REIT 
Since the tax transparency was already outlined as being one of the core features 
for a “true” REIT regime generally all MSs regimes follow this concept.395 Income 
at the level of the REIT provided and to the extent the income is derived from 
qualifying activities is not subject to income tax. This qualified income is tax 
exempt and will be taxed at the shareholder level at the respective individual tax 
rate applicable for a certain shareholder.396 The same holds true for the treatment 
of capital gains as well where almost all regimes do not levy tax on these gains 
even if this treatment may be subject to the further condition to accrue or reinvest 
such profits though.397 
393 See Table II.5.4-1. 
394 Ibid. 
395 Ibid. 
396 See Sec. 5.4.2 (1) above. 
397 See Sec. 5.4.2 (2) above. 
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With respect to the tax treatment there is a “common understanding” identified for 
tax transparent treatment at the (domestic) REIT level for income tax as well as 
capital gains tax in full.398 
 
6.4.2  Foreign REIT 
Further, “common understanding” is identified as to the treatment of any 
distributions made for the benefit of a foreign shareholder in a domestic REIT. 
MSs regimes all follow a similar path and levy withholding tax to the distributions 
made to the non-resident shareholder, either individual or corporate.399 This 
understanding holds true for all of the qualifying income, though non-qualifying 
income generally will not benefit form the tax exemption.400 Even though MSs do 
not levy any withholding tax and with other MSs regimes tax rates differ, however, 
not significantly, there is “common understanding” identified for a withholding tax 
rate at 20%.401 
 
Generally, under all regimes levying withholding tax it may be lowered if not totally 
avoided in case where a DTT was conclude in between the relevant MSs or the 
Parent-Subsidiary-Directive applies, thus, possibly leading to a de facto tax 
exemption though.402 In between all MSs there are respective DTT´s in place that 
are based on the OECD Model Treaty.403 Generally, foreign shareholders will, 
therefore, generally benefit from a tax credit, relief et al. However, there may not 
be compensation in full since there is a “common understanding” for an applicable 
tax rate at a maximum of 20%, which exceeds a possible i.e. credit at a rate of 
15% only. Thus, since the withholding tax rates are usually higher than 15%, there 
is effectively taxation of dividends distributed to the foreign (corporate) 
shareholder though.404 
 
398 See Table II.5.4.1. 
399 Ibid. 
400 See Sec. 5.4 above. 
401 See Sec. 5.4.3 (1) above.  
402 Ibid. See Table II.5.4-1. 
403 See OECD Model (2012). 
404 See Sec. 5.4.3 (1) above, and Table II.5.4-1. 
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Where the foreign REIT decides to invest direct cross-border in real property in 
the territory of another MS the foreign REIT will not benefit from the beneficial tax 
treatment. There is “common understanding” identified that the foreign REIT is not 
eligible as a foreign corporate to opt for the domestic REIT regime of the Host 
State.405 Rather, “common understanding” is the treatment of profits to be 
repatriated from the domestic level of its source to the foreign REIT in another MS 
such income is subject to the ordinary treatment for non-resident corporate. The 
tax is levied at a rate at 20% accordingly. A possibility for lowering the tax levy is 
subject to the application of a DTT or the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive as outlined 
above though.406 
 
6.4.3  REIT taxation 
There is “common understanding” in between MSs that the domestic REIT is 
treated fully tax exempt for income and capital gains tax, whereas, the foreign 
REIT operating cross-border, either direct or indirect, does not benefit from this tax 
transparency. The beneficial tax treatment under the domestic REIT regime shall 
not be eligible though. Thus, dividend payments received from a domestic REIT 
shall be levied with withholding tax and income generated from direct investments 
in real property shall not flow-through to the foreign REIT rather be taxed 
according the ordinary treatment for non-resident corporate income though. 
 
Table II. 6.4-1: Common understanding of tax treatment - overview 
Requirement Criteria MSs Regimes* 
Tax treatment Domestic REIT tax transparent treatment 
  income tax tax exempt 
  capital gains tax tax exempt 
  Foreign REIT  
   
  Indirect investment  
  foreign shareholder max. 20% withholding tax 
   
 Direct investment  
  domestic regime eligible not eligible  
  tax treatment ordinary treatment for non-resident corporate  
 * Based on “common understanding” for criteria 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
405 Even though the FBI and SIIC provide for the option to apply for the domestic regime this 
possibility would result in the set-up of a subsidiary REIT under the domestic regime and, thus, 
does not reflect a case of a the recognition of a foreign corporate under the domestic regime as 
such (see Sec. 5.4.3 above). 
406 Ibid. 
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6.5   Sanctions 
As it resulted from the analysis sanctions are existing on the level of penalties only 
and/or the level of the loss of status.407 The specificities for certain facts leading to 
either consequence varies that a determination of a “common understanding” is 
not selective in its details. However, “common understanding” is existent to the 
extent that any violation of single regime conditions leads generally to penalties 
only which are imposed by way of additional tax burdens. Whereas, it is “common 
understanding” identified as well that any constant or systematic breach of regime 
conditions lead to a loss of status though.408 
 
Table II. 6.5-1: Common understanding of sanctions - overview 
Requirement Criteria MSs Regimes* 
Sanctions violation of single regime conditions Penalty 
  
constant / systematic breach of regime 
requirements w/o reasonable cause Loss of status 
 * Based on “common understanding” for criteria   
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
6.6  Common understanding of a European REIT 
It is to conclude that even though MSs REIT regimes are not harmonised, they 
share a joint understanding of the key criteria for a REIT regime. Moreover, there 
is not only a joint understanding of the principles as such rather similar concepts 
and rules have been used and views that are shared rather a “common 
understanding” identified providing for a level playing field that serve for the 
nucleus of the discussion towards the foundation of a “EuroREIT”. The “common 
understanding” identified provide for clear conditions not only to the key criteria of 
a REIT but for detailed concepts as well.409 
 
Table II. 6.6-1: Common understanding of the “European REIT” - overview 
Requirement Criteria MSs Regimes 
Legal  Legal form Corporation / Stock Company 
  Share Capital Euro 15m 
  Registered Seat domestic 
  Listing obligatory 
407 See Sec. 5.6 above. 
408 See Table II.5.5-1. 
409 See Table II. 6.6-1. 
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  Stock Exchange regulated stock in either MS 
  Shareholder conditions  
  corporate holdings max. 30% 
  
shareholding by 
individuals min. 25 % 
  free-float min. 25 % 
  voting rights min. 25% by individuals 
   max. 50 by corporate 
   
Operating activities Acquisition and Sales qualified 
(Passive property investments) Leasing qualified 
  Asset Management  qualified, for own assets 
  Development qualified, for own assets 
   
Status Asset Test min. 75%  
  Income Test min. 75%  
  Gearing Test max. 60% 
  Distribution Test min. 90%  
   
Tax treatment Domestic REIT tax transparent treatment 
  income tax tax exempt 
  capital gains tax tax exempt 
  Foreign REIT  
   
  Indirect investment  
  foreign shareholder max. 20% withholding tax 
   
 Direct investment  
  domestic regime eligible not eligible  
  tax treatment 
ordinary treatment for non-
resident corporate  
   
Sanctions Penalty 
violation of single regime 
conditions 
  Loss of status 
constant / systematic breach of 
regime requirements w/o 
reasonable cause 
   
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
The European REIT according to the “common understanding” identified may be 
established with the legal form of a public limited company having a share capital 
of min. Euro 15mn with its seat in the MS of its tax residency. 410 The listing of the 
company is obligatory; however, there is flexibility as to the stock for listing that 
may be any regulated stock in either MS or in the EEA region.411 Consequently, in 
order to be eligible to opt for the (domestic) REIT status and to benefit from tax 
transparent treatment domestic presence and stock listing can be called “common 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid. 
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understanding” in between MSs and its regimes. In order to safeguard for the 
smaller investor to taking part as shareholder in a REIT company corporate 
shareholding shall be limited to max. 30%, whereas, the regime shall require the 
company to comprise at least 25% of shareholdings by Individuals, therefore the 
free-float of shares shall be at a minimum at the same level of 25% though. 
Furthermore, whereas the voting rights for Individuals shall be at minimum 25% 
they must not exceed a quota of 50% for corporate shareholdings.412 
 
The operating activities shall comprise of passive investments into immovable 
property only. Core activities hereto i.e. acquisition and sale as well as leasing of 
property are qualified activities that shall count for at least 75% of the asset 
activities (Asset test) and be reflected at the same amount in the income of the 
REIT (Income test). Further activities, such as asset management as well as 
development activities shall be qualified activities but limited to wards own assets 
only. Moreover, the REIT is limited in using leverage at a maximum of 60% of the 
GAV and must distribute its profits to its shareholders at a minimum of 90% on an 
annual basis.413 
 
The tax treatment of the European REIT follows the tax transparent treatment that 
is any income flow-through to its shareholders and will be taxed in their hands at 
personal tax rate´ only. Understanding is given for the foreign shareholder in a 
domestic REIT and the foreign REIT operating directly cross-border as well. The 
European REIT shall levy withholding tax prior to the distribution of dividends to 
the non-resident shareholder, either corporate of individual. With the remainder of 
its activities in the Host State the European REIT will face ordinary treatment for 
the non-resident corporate though.414  
 
Lastly, the European REIT shall be in compliance with the regime requirements 
during the full fiscal year in order to prevent to being sanctioned. Sanctions may 
be possible in case of the violation of ingle regime conditions with penalties i.e. 
additional tax payments on i.e. non-qualifying portions of income that have been 
generated in excess of the limitations set for the operating activities. However, the 
412 See Table II. 6.6-1. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Ibid. 
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loss of status may occur where the REIT constantly and systematically is in 
breach of regime requirements though.415 
 
7.   Comparison US REIT vs MSs REITs 
Even though the “common understanding” identified in the previous section 
represents the “least common understanding” shared between MSs it reflects a 
level of possible agreement already, building ground for the harmonisation of MSs 
REIT regimes leading to a jointly recognised REIT regime for the EU which may 
be called a “European REIT model”416 or “EuroREIT” already.417 With regard to 
the research question whether the EU has impacted MSs REIT regimes a 
question is to answer a to which extent the US-REIT was used as a “model” by 
MSs and, thus, its impact on MSs REIT regimes. The identification of similarities 
enables the researcher to identify causal relationship in between the criteria of the 
REIT regimes. Therefore, the comparison of the US-REIT “model” versus the 
European REIT in the version of the “common understanding” sets the basic 
understanding for any impact on MSs REIT regimes whether influenced by the 
US-REIT and/or the EU. 
 
Table II.7-1: Comparison: The “classic” US-REIT model v. MS REIT regimes - overview 
Requirement Criteria US REIT MSs Regimes* 
Legal  Legal form 
Corporation (LLC,/LLP), 
Association or Trust 
Corporation / Stock 
Company 
  Share Capital no minimum requirement Euro 15m 
  Registered Seat domestic  domestic 
  Listing not obligatory  obligatory 
  Stock Exchange domestic  
regulated stock in 
either MS 
  
Shareholder 
conditions min. 100 shareholders min. 25 % free float 
    
max. 5 single holdings 
own >50% 
max. 30% corporate 
holdings 
      
voting rights max 25% 
by Individuals / max 
50% by Corporate 
Operating 
activities Acquisition and Sales qualified qualified 
(Passive property 
investments) Leasing qualified qualified 
  Asset Management  qualified for own assets 
qualified, for own 
assets 
415 See Table II. 6.6-1. 
416 See Lewis (2010), p.4-7. 
417 See Pfnür/Müller (2010); Hughes/Lewis (2008), p. 88-97. 
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  Development qualified for own portfolio 
qualified, for own 
assets 
Status Asset Test 
min. 75% of real estate, 
bonds or cash 
min. 75% qualified 
investments 
    max. 5% “bad income”   
    
max. 10% shares in 
another REIT   
    max. 20 in TRS   
  Income Test min. 75% from real estate 
min. 75% qualified 
income 
    
min. 95% incl. bonds and 
cash   
  Gearing Test max. 60% max. 60% (average) 
  Distribution Test 90% 
min. 90% (average) 
annually 
Tax REIT Level Tax exempt if distributed 
qualified income tax 
exempt 
  Capital Gains Tax exempt if distributed tax exempt 
  Withholding Tax 
Generally 30% but may be 
reduced to 15% in DTT 
case  max. 20% (average) 
Sanctions Penalty violation of single regime conditions 
  Loss of status 
constant / systematic 
requirements 
breach of regime w/o 
reasonable cause 
 * Based on “common understanding” for criteria  
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Comparing the US-REIT “model” and its criteria with the version of the “common 
understanding” of MSs REIT regimes similarities, if not equalities, are visible. 
There is a clear joint understanding with regard to the “cornerstones”, which 
create the international standard for REITs that are “Distribution” and “Tax 
transparency”.418 MSs REIT regimes follow the requirement for the distribution of 
profits almost in full to the shareholders on an annual basis at a level of 90% and, 
thus, sharing the requirement of the US-REIT. Furthermore, there is joint 
understanding for tax transparency at REIT level shifting the taxation of income to 
the level of the shareholder only. Furthermore, both regimes share the 
understanding to treating non-domestic shareholders different to domestic ones by 
excluding them form the transparent treatment applying withholding tax on 
dividend payments though. 
 
For the remaining criteria, there is joint understanding as well419 except, however, 
for the legal requirements. The most important difference is seen with the criteria 
418 See Table II.7.1. 
419 Ibid. 
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for stock listing. There is common understanding within MSs REIT regimes setting 
the requirement for public REITs only, whereas a listing is not obligatory for the 
US-REIT though and may be established as private REIT as well. Furthermore, in 
case a US-REIT is a public REIT listing is required at a domestic stock only. 
However, this shall not be a difference in the sense of term, since the “domestic” 
market for the USA is their internal market, whereas, the “internal market” in the 
EU comprise the territory of all MSs, therefore, the listing at “any regulated stock 
in either MS” is a comparable requirement in this respect though. Furthermore, 
differences in details extant with a view to the Shareholder Conditions may not 
create a substantive difference a such, rather reflect similar ideas i.e. providing for 
a minimum of free float and limiting single shareholdings. Thus, different solutions 
in details within ranges of a general joint understand though. Therefore, it is valid 
to conclude that all MSs have orientated themselves on the US-REIT model while 
establishing their REIT regimes. Even though the US-REIT was not simply used 
as a “blueprint” overall the similarities of all MSs REIT regimes with the “classic” 
US-REIT are clearly identifiable.420 Whether this proof for almost exclusive impact 
by the US-REIT, thus, excludes any impact by the EU is not a valid summary 
though. Even where impact seems to be extant i.e. with focus on the tax 
treatment, these rules may be a logic result of MSs’ tax sovereignty and their fear 
of loss of tax base having resulted in rule providing for withholding taxation for 
non-domestic shareholders and the respective dividend distributions though. 
Anyways, any impact of the US-REIT model will finally become visible once the 
impact of the EU is identified in the following chapters.  
 
8.   Conclusion - Emergence of a standard 
The comparison of the existing 13 MSs REIT regimes has shown no single 
European REIT Model yet. The detailed comparison of criteria has shown a wide 
spectrum of regulations where strict restrictions with complex single purpose rules 
are facing liberal requirements. MSs regimes vary in the EU because of local 
conditions and legal and tax framework.421 Differences, however, are not based 
on a different understanding of the ideal REIT vehicle, but reflect divergent MSs 
domestic legal system and tax sovereignty, seen in particular in the tax treatment 
420 See Table II.7.1. 
421 See Annex 1. 
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of foreign shareholders in a domestic REIT, and treatment of income generated by 
a foreign REIT in another MS. There is clear “common understanding” between 
MSs REIT regimes in the least common denominator of each of the criteria in the 
structured framework, creating a kind of “European REIT”-model. Rather, classical 
instruments to safeguard its tax base by way of applying withholding tax and rules 
for the ordinary treatment of non-resident corporate are applied.422 Thus cross-
border activities are hindered, and fundamental freedoms of the internal market in 
the EU may be being violated. 
 
There is impact from the US-REIT model, but MSs REIT regimes follow local 
conditions and legal and tax framework. The development of European REITs 
shows that their success follows similar concepts, common structures and 
requirements. A “common understanding” can certainly represent a EU model of 
best practice with potential for a harmonised model for a “EuroREIT”. 423  
 
The next chapter analyses MSs REIT regimes in the context of “hard” law. 
 
 
422 See Table II.7.1. 
423 Thus, they are votes in Literature that MS regimes are far from being harmonised though (see 
Cornelisse (2006 Part 2), p. 75). 
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Section 2 – 
Mechanism of Europeanization:  
“Goodness of Fit” and Adaptational Pressure 
 
 
This section is grouped around the policy impact of the EU with focus on the 
mechanisms used by the EU. Basis was built in the previous chapter with the 
European REIT model based on the “common understanding” identified. In order 
to analyse the impact of the EU on MS REIT regimes, this REIT model of 
“common understanding” is to analyse with respect to applicable EU law. The 
discussion around REIT regimes in the EU does not only impact tax laws, but 
company laws of the MS too as it was seen in the previous chapter. Taking up the 
suspicion raised that MS REIT regimes are in violation of some of its details with 
regard to EU law, this chapter is to identify the statutory framework applicable to 
the goodness of fit test and to analysing adaptational pressures therefrom. 
Therefore, this chapter focus on EU policies that may be described as “hard”, that 
are the Treaty and compulsory directives and regulations though. The 
identification of such hard policies will provide the basis to the understanding of 
the impact of the EU providing input into MSs domestic policy structures through 
negative integration. Negative integration is, beside positive integration 424, “… 
most indicative of “top-down” Europeanization, where the EU legislation triggers 
adaptational pressure and subsequent (potential) change”.425 Herewith, MS are 
obliged to respond to EU legislative input into their domestic systems, that is the 
potential Europeanization effects result from the legal obligation to comply with EU 
law. Therefore, the following Chapter IV focus on the identification of the relevant 
“hard” policies followed by Chapter V, which is about identifying ECJ case law 
applying EU “hard” law leading to the identification of suspect rules in MS REIT 
regimes, thus, resulting in adaptational pressure to MS to adjust its domestic 
regimes, thus negative integration is involved. 
 
424 Negative and positive integration equally representing examples of top-down Europeanization. 
425 See Radaelli (2010), p. 181. 
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Chapter III: MSs REIT Regimes and EU law 
 
 
1.   Objectives for this Chapter 
REITs have emerged in the EU showing the desire for market transparency and 
the elimination of barriers to entry. 426  Real Estate investors have traditionally 
limited their investments to local markets,427 but development is taking place in 
real estate428 for investing cross-borders “… involving the transfer of capital to 
undertake business activities…”429 as is the case of cross-border investments in 
real property. This development is assisted by the liberalisation of trade 430 , 
interregional investments compared to intraregional investment, indicating that 
(global) investors are venturing beyond their territories.431 The success of REITs is 
catalysed by its beneficial tax treatment becoming a location factor for investor´ 
investment planning.432 Tax and corporate laws of MSs are dominated by national 
imprint, and domestic tax marking national sovereignty reflecting MS´ economic 
and social politics,433 and a uniform REIT regime does not exist in the EU exist.434 
Rather, the legal treatment of REITs in MSs is far from being harmonised and no 
“one fits all” regime,435 but “common understanding” of the core criteria´ of a REIT 
regime is extant.436 The existence of common understanding, however, has no 
say about the quality of this understanding whether being in compliance with 
applicable supranational laws i.e. EU law. The existence of a “common 
understanding” might not be a case for harmonisation, rather differentiation. Thus, 
fields of conflicts are obvious and rules for resolution are of interest. In the context 
426 See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25th, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 
11, 16 (1058), the so-called Treaty of Rome (hereinafter the “Treaty”). 
427 See Brown (2003), p. 289. 
428 See above Chapter II. 
429 See Harrison (2000). 
430  This allows free flow of goods, services and capital, and technological changes in 
communication and transportation allowing the movement of capital between countries. For a more 
detailed account of the factors of globalisation of international business, see Hill (2002). 
431 See Lachmann (2005), p. 11; Chen/Mills (2006), p.28. 
432 See Hatje (2006), p. 9. 
433 See Chapter II, Sec. 5 above; Hatje (2006), p.9. 
434 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.6. 
435 Ibid, with further reference to i.e. Cornelisse (2006 Part 1), p. 4, Hughes/Lewis (2008), p. 95. 
436 See above Chapter II, Sec. 6. 
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of the Union and its Members EU law builds the framework for the competences of 
MSs and the EU, providing a statutory framework with the Treaty as its primary 
source, its objective, the “internal market”, and the freedoms as guiding principles 
to achieving its objective. Here, collision to applicable domestic law, building a 
framework within the sovereign domestic legislator acting independently, may limit 
its sovereignty. 437 Therefore, this chapter is about: 
 
• to define the constituent framework of EU law438 building the framework for 
MSs and its REIT regimes, thus, relevant for compliance; 
• to provide an overview of sources of EU law building the framework to each 
of the requirements of REITs from primary EU law; 
• the identification of Treaty Freedoms applicable to the specific areas of tax 
and company law in cross-border situations; and 
• to include in the analysis, furthermore, additional secondary EU law and 
other connecting laws like international company law.  
 
As a result this chapter provide for the framework of EU law applicable in the case 
of MSs REIT regimes using the model of “common understanding” with focus to 
the legal requirements (company law) and (direct) tax treatment rules in order to 
identify EU law applicable to MSs REIT regimes building basis for the “goodness 
of fit” test. 
 
 
437 Example hereto is i.e. with the Finish F-REIT for which the finish government was to seek for 
the approval by the EU Commission to establish its REIT focussing on residential real properties 
only (Property Week Global (2010)). The Commission has authorized under EU state aid rules the 
introduction of REITs in Finland that is aiming to encourage investment in affordable rental housing 
only. However, after respective assurances by the Finish government the Commission was 
satisfied that the regime does not involve state aid as any profits made by the REIT will be subject 
to tax at shareholder´ level very much like the profits made by individual investors investing directly 
in the real estate market. This, because the exemption from corporate income tax is linked to the 
requirement of immediate distribution of annual profits to shareholders, at the hand of which 
taxation takes place. Thus, this mechanism puts the tax treatment of an investment in a REIT at 
par with the taxation of direct investments by individuals in real estate (see eubusiness.com 
(2010); Liinanki (2008)). 
438 This thesis focuses on EU law in its essential sense that is the Treaty of the European Union in 
its post-Lisbon version, which goes back to the Treaty of Rome of 1957 on the European 
Economic Community and its legal system. Thus, the provisions provided by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of the European Council are carved out. Here, importance in 
the context of tax laws increases but sets legal subject that is to separate (see Baker (2000), p. 
298). 
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2.   Source of EU law – Primary European law 
The Treaty upon which the EU is founded provides the “benchmark” with which 
MSs REIT regimes must comply. Even in case of no express competence for the 
EU and original competence stayed with its MS they 
 
“… must … exercise (their) competence consistently with Community 
law.”439 
 
Therefore, the Treaty440 is considered to be the primary source of EU law.441 The 
basis of any other legal action must be founded on a Treaty provision. The Treaty 
and its regulations are securing for the establishment and safeguarding of internal 
market. Thus, the Treaty provisions are considered “primary EU law” 442 and as 
such are supreme. This results from the objective of the Treaty. When the EU was 
established, it required a transfer of sovereignty for certain specific areas of policy 
from the MS to the EU.443 This meant that some legal matters that had been the 
sole prerogative of a MS were no longer within its control.444  
 
The question is, whether there are grounds for competence existing within the 
Treaty in the relevant fields of interest with REITs going cross-border. Hereto, 
focus is to the fields of corporate law and taxation. Along the criteria for REITs 
according to MSs regimes the provisions identified of being suspect to infringe EU 
439 See e.g. Case C-80/94, “G.H.E.J. Wielockx v Inspecteur van der Directe Belastingen” (Case 
“Wielockx”), (1995), ECR I-2493, para 16. 
440 The “Treaty” is meant to be the three founding “treaties” of which the EU is build on that are (1) 
the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) of 1952 and the 
two Treaties of Rome (2) establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and 
(3) the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1958, thus since the Merger Treaty 1965 the 
“European Community” in its revised version according to the Single European act of 1986, and 
the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), the Nice Treaty, February 2003), the Maastricht Treaty 
(November 2003) and lastly the Lisbon Treaty (2009). 
441  The ECJ considers the Treaty being an independent legal framework with its own legal 
principles different from other public international law (see Cordewener (2004), p. 6). 
442  Where the Treaty serves as the enabling act, then what is required is the equivalent of 
delegated legislation. Hence, acts established by the legislative institutions 442  of the EU are 
considered to be “secondary EU law”. These are listed in Article 249, which are regulations, 
directives and decisions. Although recommendations and opinions are mentioned, these are not 
legally binding. 
443 See Case C-26/62, “Van Gend en Loos (NV Allgemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming) v 
Netherlands Administratie de Belastingen” (Case “Gend & Loos”), (1963), ECR 00001. 
444 See Case C-6/64, “Costa v ENEL” (Case “ENEL”), (1964), ECR 585. 
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law in the previous section will be analysed including especially REIT conditions 
as to legal requirements and tax treatments. 
 
2.1  Sources for “Legal requirements” 
The legal requirements of MSs REIT regimes deal with criteria such as the legal 
form for REIT companies and their residence as well as listing requirements and 
shareholder restrictions. Those conditions are relevant in the corporate laws of 
MSs. Hereto, MSs have not transferred expressed competence to the EU other 
than the general competence for activities to establish a common internal market, 
Art. 2 and 3. However, these competences by Art. 3 does not include exclusive 
competence for corporate laws to the EU, rather, this competence is subsidiary to 
MSs taking activities themselves.445  
 
However, with regard to discrimination there are standard legal norms provided by 
the Treaty, which inter alia446 is the general prohibition of discrimination based on 
residence (Art. 18) providing important ground for assessing MSs conditions for 
legal requirements though. Unfortunately, Art. 18 is broad in the scope of the 
Treaty while prohibiting “… any discrimination on grounds of nationality …”, thus 
prohibits the discrimination of nationals from other MSs.447 It should, however, be 
noted that Art 18 applies independently to situations governed by EU law only for 
which the Treaty lays down no specific rules of non-discrimination.448 This order 
for “equal treatment of nationals” is, however, already implicit in the economic 
freedoms of the Treaty representing its least common understanding. Thus, where 
445 The so-called “Principle of Subsidiary” is laid down in Art. 5 expressively. For activities towards 
mutual recognition of companies the principle of subsidiarity becomes visible i.e. with Art. 293. 
Here, the Treaty expressively allocates activities within the field of corporate law that is the 
recognition of companies throughout the EU in the hands of the MS asking for their negotiations in 
between themselves. Thus, activities in this field and a competence for the EU to act will be of 
secondary law nature only that is by way of regulations, directives and decisions as provided for 
with Art. 249. 
446 Beside the Non-Discrimination there are further standard legal norms provided by the Treaty 
with relevance to tax law that is the free movement of private individuals (Art. 21 I) that is linked to 
the Citizenship of the Union (Art. 20). Hereto, the ECJ has declared this norm subsidiary to the 
fundamental freedoms even though the norm has a scope independent from the freedoms though 
(see Case C-413/99, “Baumbast and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department”, (2002), 
ECR I-7091, para 76). Thus, private individuals might rely on this norm while experiencing tax 
disadvantageous in the context of the change of residence on grounds of private reasons. 
447 See Lenz (2003), Art. 12 (pre-Lisbon numbering), recital 2 et seqq. 
448 See Case C-25/10, “Missionswerk Werner Heukelbach eV v État Belge” (Case “Missionswerk”), 
(2011), ECR I-00497, para 18 with further reference to Case C-311/08, “SGI”, (2010), ECR I-0000, 
para 31 and Case “Schmelz”, (2010), ECR I-10465, para 44. 
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and when the economic freedoms i.e. the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom of movement of capital are applicable they provide specific rules on don-
discrimination449 there is no room left for the application Art. 18 i.e. in the context 
of tax laws and Art 18 does not apply.450 
 
2.2  Sources to “Taxation” - EU competence v. MSs sovereignty 
Different situation is with competences in the field of taxation. Economic policy i.e. 
tax and trade policy is of competence with the MSs only.451 Therefore, the Treaty 
is silent in the Articles under Title 1 “Categories and Areas of Union 
Competence”452 on tax policy and to any competence for the Commission on 
neither its harmonisation nor the abolishment of discriminating tax measures are 
mentioned within the aims and objectives of the Treaty.453 However, the Treaty 
provide under Title VII 454 in its Chapter 2 for “Tax Provisions” 455 expressively 
though. These provisions deal with “…the harmonisation of legislation concerning 
… indirect taxation …”456 only but not for direct taxes.457 This is because tax policy 
falls under the principle of subsidiarity towards the fiscal autonomy of the MSs. 
Nevertheless, the second type of provisions regards general prohibitions for MSs 
to establish or maintain obstacles to intra-Community movement and trade. 
Therefore, even in areas with sovereign competence by MSs and that are not 
harmonised, like direct taxation, MSs are bound to respect their general 
commitment to Community loyalty under Art. 2, thus, 
 
“… although direct taxation falls within their competence, the Member 
States must none the less exercise that competence consistently with 
Community law”.458 
449  See i.e. Case C-422/01, “Försäkringsaktiebolaget Skandia (publ), Ola Ramstedt v 
Riksskatteverket” (Case “Skandia”) (2003), ECR I-06817, para 61. 
450 See Cordewener (2004), p. 9; Case “Missionswerk”, para 19. 
451 See Wieland (2001), p. 119. 
452 See Articles 2 – 6. 
453 See Oppermann (2005), p. 359. 
454 “Common Rules On Competition Taxation and Approximation Of Laws”. 
455 See Art. 110 – 113. 
456 MSs competences are exclusively in the field of indirect taxation i.e. for value added tax and 
excise duties (see Commission (1985), para 163). 
457 See Art. 113. 
458 See e.g. Case “Wielockx”, para 16; Case C-279/93, “Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Schumacker” 
(Case “Schumacker”), (1995), ECR I-225, para 21; Case C-264/96, “Imperial Chemicals Industries 
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In particular, national direct tax provisions (including international tax conventions) 
must not compromise the freedoms enshrined in the Treaty. Therefore, direct 
taxation i.e. by way of corporate income and withholding taxation, is not of 
competence of the EU but stays within MSs sovereignty only. Thus, again tax 
regimes of MSs as well as their regulations and treatments have to comply with 
the Treaty and its internal market objective to which the Freedoms building a 
source to analysing suspect tax regulations.459 In Addition, tax regimes may be 
suspect in light of other Treaty provisions i.e. the state aid rules according to Art. 
107 et seqq. A regime that provide for tax exemption for a certain undertaking may 
be viewed as being “selective” in terms of the state aid rules and, thus, being 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it affects trade between the MSs. 
Therefore, any tax exempt regime is potentially suspect of running the risk of 
breaching state aid rules and must be analysed in light of Art. 107 et seqq. 
 
As far as “EU Tax law” is concerned one talks about national and bilateral non-EU 
law of or between MSs, which are the national tax laws, and bilateral treaties i.e. 
DTT´s. As a consequence supranational non-EU law plays no practical role within 
what is called EU tax policy. EU tax policy is a result of competences MSs have 
transferred to the EU with their accession and making use of these transferred 
competences affects the fiscal autonomy of ones MS essentially. These 
competences can be found in the Treaty’s Articles to Competition 460 , 
Discrimination461 and the four Freedoms462. As soon as the EU acting on these 
plc (ICI) v Colomer” (Case “ICI”), (1998), ECR I-4695, para 19; Case C-311/97, “Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc v Elliniko Dimosio” (Case “RBS”), (1999), ECR I-2651, para 19. 
459 There are, however, further legal bases potentially of tax law relevance that are contracts 
annexed to the Treaty i.e. the contract with the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) on the 
European Economic Area (EEA) (see for its relevance for tax laws Case C-321/97, “Andersson et 
al”, (1999), ECR I-3551) as well as Treaties concluded by the EU based on Art. 217 the so-called 
“treaties on association” with countries for accession or candidate to the EU and its provisions 
orientated in its content on the economic freedoms of the Treaty though (see i.e. on the freedom of 
establishment Cases C63/99, “R. v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Gloszuk 
and Gloszuk”, (2001), ECR I-6369 (Poland); C-235/99, “R. v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Kondova”, (2001), ECR I-6427 (Bulgaria); C-247/99, “R. v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department, ex parte Barkoci and Malik”, (2001), ECR I-6557 (Czech Republic); C-
268/99, “Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v Staatssecretaries van Justitie”, (2001), ECR I-8615 
(Poland and Czech Republic). 
460 See i.e. Art. 3 I lit. b) and especially those on State Aids in Art. 107-109. 
461 See Art. 18 et seqq. 
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fields the fiscal interests of the MSs are perplexed. Therefore, the Treaty limits the 
competences for the EU in its “tax provisions” in Art. 110 – 113. These Treaty 
provisions, which explicitly or implicitly refer to taxation find their justification in 
their contribution to Community policies, and in particular to the objective of the 
achievement of the internal market. There is, however, limited scope of action for 
the EU, which is the internal market, the fundamental freedoms and additional 
legislative competences.463 In order to create an internal market without internal 
“frontiers” being hindrances and obstacles for free trade in between the MSs the 
Commission is provided with the general competence to organise for the 
abolishment of obstacles to the internal market by taking measures necessary for 
the “…establishment and functioning of the internal market” in Art. 114 I. This 
competence is not unlimited but is focused to areas where the Commission has 
exclusive competence provided by the Treaty only.464 Art 3, however, does not 
provide such competence in the area of direct taxation though.465 But one has to 
consider that the Treaty clearly mandates the EU to the harmonisation of taxes as 
stated by Art. 113 (specific harmonisation of laws) to the extend “… necessary to 
ensure the establishment and the functioning of the internal market….”. That 
condition states again the principle of subsidiarity to activities of the EU but at the 
same time limits the principle to the extend that common aims under the Treaty 
call for and need activity by the EU as far as the principles of the EU466 cannot or 
not as sufficient be reached by MSs actions than by the EU directly.467 
 
Having the above in mind the Treaty requires for indirect tax harmonisation but 
any measures in the field of direct taxation are not enfolded by Art. 113. 468 
However, harmonisation in this respect means the standardisation of corporate tax 
regimes as well as tax rates and bases in all MSs.469 Therefore, direct taxation 
appears to remain the prerogative of MSs their national sovereignty. This 
462 See Art. 28 et seq. on the free movement of goods, 45 et seqq. on the free movement of 
persons, 49 et seqq. on the right of establishment, 56 et seqq. on the freedom of services and 63 
et seqq. of capital and 28 et seqq. 
463 Hatje (2006), p. 10. 
464 See Art. 3. 
465 Furthermore, the Treaty does not provide any other competence in the field of direct taxation 
neither as part of the “share competence” of Art. 4, nor as “supportive” or “coordinative” actions 
within Art. 5 and 6. 
466 See Art. 2. 
467 See Art. 5. 
468 See Schwarze (2007), p. 155. 
469 See Nickson (2004), p. 182. 
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prerogative for the MSs finds its affirmation with Art 115 and its provisions for 
unanimity with decisions that are being made according to this rule. By providing 
for unanimous votes in order to take measures in the field of direct tax policies the 
core area of MSs sovereignty is confirmed.470 This does not mean that there is no 
subsidiary competence with the Commission at all. In addition there is 
competence according to Art. 115 for the approximation of tax laws as 
Schwarze 471 outlined. Here, the Council may upon recommendation by the 
Commission enact a Directive to the approximation of regulations of MSs where 
those have direct effect on the functioning of the common market. However, any 
measure whether based on Art. 113 or Art. 115 are subject to the unanimous 
approval by all MSs though.472 
 
Thus, any measures by the MSs have to be compliant to the internal market 
objective of the Treaty and must, therefore, be free of any obstacles to the free 
movement of i.e. persons, services and capital.473 Therefore, even though there is 
no express source for activities in the Treaty they must be compliant with the 
Freedoms of the Treaty. Thus, the framework set by the Freedoms is considered 
as a source in this context.474 
 
3.   The fundamental freedoms  
In the absence of harmonisation in the field of direct taxes, the MSs are “…at 
liberty … to determine the connecting factors for the purpose of allocating powers 
of taxation … between themselves.”475 This does, however, not mean that MSs 
sovereignty is unlimited where there has not been a transfer of (even partial) 
competences to the EU.476 The ground on which EU law is based is the so-called 
470 The attempt set by Germany and France to introduce for qualified majority vote failed with the 
negotiations for the EU constitutional contract of Lisbon (see Presidency (2003)). 
471 See Schwarze (2005), p. 155. 
472 See Schwarze (2005), p. 156. 
473 See explicit wording of Art. 3 I lit. c) Treaty in its pre-Lisbon version, whereas the principle was 
moved post-Lisbon to Art. 26 II. 
474 The objectives of the Freedoms and their applicability to the questions identified to MSs REIT 
regimes will be discussed further below separately in detail (see Section 3.2 below). 
475  See Case C-307/97, “Compagnie de Saint Gobain, Zweigniederlassung Deutschland v 
Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt” (Case “Saint Gobain”), (1999), ECR I-6161, para 56. 
476 Beside Art 54 that provides for the mutual recognition of companies the pre-Lisbon version of 
the Treaty express its expectation for the prevention of double taxation in Art. 293 2nd and 3rd 
indent that established ground for the MSs to assist harmonisation by entering into conventions. 
Any activities necessary for adaptation or harmonisation in these areas must be of priority for the 
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“internal market”-principle outlined with Art. 3 – 6 and Art. 26 in particular. 477 
According to Art. 26 II the internal market  
 
“… shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of … goods … capital is ensured …”. 
 
However, this more general worded principle does not provide for a legally 
enforceable position. Therefore, reference must be taken to the Treaty and its 
economic freedoms i.e. the freedom of establishment (Art. 49) and the freedom of 
movement of capital (Art. 63). The scope of the freedoms is to eliminate the 
factual and legal barriers that hinder the full coverage of the internal market 
principle. 
 
For any activities by MSs i.e. in the field of direct taxation its competences are 
limited to the extent that MSs may exercise their powers consistently with EU law, 
thus i.e. especially with the Freedoms of the Treaty.478 This seems to be true 
especially for the areas of interest as to REIT regimes in the EU that are the 
mutual recognition of companies and the avoidance of double taxation where the 
freedoms are fully exercisable. 479  Therefore, in the absence of specific 
competences transferred by the MSs to the EU with the Treaty, it rests with the 
freedoms to serve as the benchmark for the compliance of MSs REIT regimes 
with EU law though.480 
 
The basis of the European integration builds the common internal market. Hereto, 
the internal market was to serve for the European integration. Therefore, since the 
MSs themselves and has to be organised by respective conventions in between the MSs prior to 
any competence for the EU coming into play. Such kind of a Ranking of competences in the area 
of international corporate law is sounded by the ECJ in Case C-81/87, “Regina v HM Treasury and 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue ex parte Daily Mail and general Trust plc.” (Case “Daily Mail”), 
(1988), ECR 5483, para 21 et seqq. The EU has attempted to deal with this point by seeking 
uniformity in the whole Community, or at least on the basis of “equivalents”, thereby, to set 
secondary law i.e. under the powers of Art 50 II though. As a result of this requirement, a 
Convention on the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Bodies Corporate was signed in 1968 by 
the six founder MSs of the EU that time the European Community, still. However, this Convention 
is not in force since the MSs did not ratify it though. 
477 The internal market was numbered Art. 3 I lit. c and 14 II of the Treaty pre-Lisbon. 
478 See i.e. Case “Schumacker”. 
479 See Case “Überseering”, para 54 et seq. 
480 For the assessment of the application of Article 18 in the context of the economic freedoms see 
Sec. 3.3 (1) below.  
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early days the EU481 is based upon free trade between MSs.482 But the Treaty 
express in Art. 3 the Community’s emphasis on “…establishing an internal 
market…” still. However, where the Treaty post Lisbon seem to assume an 
internal market already being extant, even though not fully achieved, 483 while 
listing the basis for the internal market only, Art. 2 and 3 pre-Lisbon listed the 
activities and measures to reach an internal market still. Hereto, the most obvious 
requirement was to remove trade barriers. The definition of the “common internal 
market” was given by the ECJ in Case “Gaston Schul” according to which decision 
the common internal market relies upon the abolishment of hindrances to intra 
community trade with the aim to merge national markets into a unified market that 
shares those conditions of a full internal market to the best extent possible.484 This 
principle of “functional integration” 485  is outlined and described as being an 
“internal market” as: 
 
“…an area without internal frontiers in which free movement of goods, 
services and capital is ensured …”.486 
 
In the absence of uniform Community law in this area obstacles and distortions 
that could hinder the common market perspective of the Treaty freedoms that 
have direct effect MSs may have to consider that their domestic REIT regimes are 
incompatible with its prevailing Community law. There is a risk that there is friction 
between MSs tax provisions in REIT regimes where is actually no ground existing 
in order to justify different treatment of the foreign REIT compared with the 
domestic REIT. Thus, the principles of EU law that prohibit the discrimination of 
foreign nationals and residents are of issue.487 
 
481 That time the EU was known as the European Community the European Economic Community 
still. 
482 As it was stated in Art. 2 pre-Lisbon still. 
483 Where the pre-Lisbon version of the Treaty was called “The Treaty Establishing the European 
Community”, the post-Lisbon version is now called “The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU” (see 
OJ 2010/C83) and Art 26 I outlining the “… establishing or …. functioning …” of the internal 
market. 
484 See Case C-15/81, “Gaston Schul Douane Expediteur BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en 
Accijnzen Roosendaal” (Case “Gaston Schul”), (1982), ECR 1409, para 33. 
485 Schwarze (2007), p. 31. 
486 See Art. 26 II. 
487 See Art. 8. 10 and more importantly 18. 
 
106 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
MSs REIT regimes and EU law 
 
Any competence whether exclusive or subsidiary must be exercised in order to 
achieve the objectives of the Treaty in establishing the common internal market by 
harmonising the rules relevant in MSs on a EU level for which prohibition of 
discrimination and the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty a formative and setting 
out for the guiding framework to any competencies used for both the Commission 
on EU level and the MSs themselves.488 Accordingly, the ECJ has stated in 1983 
already that the basis under which it considers potential harmful regulations are 
the fundamental freedoms489, which the ECJ in general understands under the 
meaning of the prohibition of discrimination. Thus, the Freedoms have nearly 
unlimited priority and national provisions must not be discriminatory. 
 
Considering the issue at question as to whether REIT regimes provide for 
compliant framework to corporations and their respective cross-border activities 
within the EU potential fields for collision may be extant to the relevant conditions 
and activities. As for capital mobility, the Treaty focuses mainly on two types of 
freedom. The first is the right of any Community firm to set up in another MS that 
is the freedom of establishment.490. The second type concerns financial capital 
with the free movement of capital.491 With a view to cross-border activities by 
REITs and its shareholders focus will be given to the content of these two capital 
markets freedoms and its impact on MSs REIT regimes. The Freedom of 
movement of services will be shortly discussed as well but not analysed in detail 
since it serves as a “catchall” provision and is, as it will be outlined in more detail 
below492, be subordinate to the two main capital markets freedoms. 
 
3.1  Freedom of Establishment 
The main provisions of the Treaty concerned with the right of establishment and 
the freedom to provide services apply to companies. Hereto, the Treaty provides 
in its Art. 49 for the freedom of establishment by stating that the: 
 
488 Schwarze (2007), p. 28. 
489 See Case C-270/83, “Commissison v France” (Case “Avoir fiscal”), (1986), ECR 273, para 24. 
490 See Article 49 et seqq. These “rights of establishment” are essential to integration in sectors 
with high “natural” trade barriers, e.g. in sectors such as insurance and banking, here physical 
presence in the local market is critical to doing business. 
491 Article 63 et seqq. 
492 See Sec. 3.3 below. 
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“…restriction on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a MS in the 
territory of another MS shall be prohibited…”. 
 
3.1.1  Scope and statute´ elements 
The scope of the freedom in Art. 49 I do not concern self-employed Individuals493 
only but this freedom is granted both to natural persons and to legal persons 
equally.494 Hereto, Art. 54 I extend the coverage of Art 49 by stating expressively: 
 
“Companies … shall ... be treated in the same way as natural persons 
who are nationals of MS.” 
 
Companies in the meaning of Art 49, 54 II are  
 
“companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including 
… other legal persons governed by … private law …”. 
 
The concept in Art. 54 may be irritating since para 1 uses the term “company” 
whereas para 2 calls the same subject “legal person”. However, in so far EU law 
does follow a separate definition for “legal person” that is different from national 
laws of the MSs. Thus, any type of a company may to be subsumed a “company” 
under Art. 54 provided for the existence of an adequate separation with the ability 
to take part and act under its own name in legal relations.495 
 
3.1.2 Types of establishment 
The Treaty identifies two rights for companies, namely, establishment and 
provision of services, what is called “primary establishment” (Art. 49 II) and the 
right to establish themselves in another MS by setting up agencies, branches or 
493  See Case C-221/89, “R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factorame” (Case 
“Factorame II”), (1991), ECR I-3905, para 20; Case C-55/94, “Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine 
degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano” (Case “Gebhardt”), (1995), ECR I-4165, para 25 (“…the 
concept of establishment within the meaning of the Treaty is, therefore, a very broad one, allowing 
a Community national to participate, on a stable and continuous basis, in the economic life of a MS 
other than his State of origin and to profit therefrom, so contributing to social and economic 
penetration within the Community in the sphere of activities as self-employed persons…”.). 
494 See confirmation with Case “Gebhard”, para 23. 
495 See Randelzhofer/Forsthoff (1999), Art. 48, recital 7. This includes, therefore, the condition for 
any company to follow a pecuniary reward and, thus, excludes non-profit firms or organisations, 
Art. 54 II. 
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subsidiaries, the so-called “secondary establishment” (Art. 49 I).496 As to REITs 
there are consequently two situations for a REIT to operate cross-border to fall 
under the freedom of establishment. First, a REIT having established itself and its 
registered seat in one MS is moving its central place of management in another 
MS, which is a case for “primary establishment” (=investment scenario V.) and 
secondly the REIT that keeps its registered seat and place of management in one 
MS but, additionally, establishes a subsidiary in another MS; what is called 
“secondary establishment” (=investment scenario II.).  
 
The obvious observation to be made is that for both types primary and secondary 
establishment the criteria to be resident in a MS in order to proof not to be a non-
EU corporation the REIT fulfils the criteria to be resident in one MS. According to 
the majority in Literature, the criteria of residence of companies equals the 
understanding for individuals that only those companies that are resident outside 
the EU are excluded.497 Therefore, a REIT corporation making use of either type 
of establishment comply with the statute elements of Art. 48 in conjunction with 
Art. 49 I 2. As a result, the REIT moving its business into another MS either by 
way of primary or secondary establishment falls under the spatial and personal 
scope of the freedom of establishment subject to meeting further conditions in 
order to validly rely on the freedom of establishment in cases of discriminatory 
treatment while operating in another MS i.e. conditions relevant for the local 
vehicle used to qualify for a “subsidiary” though. 
 
3.1.3 Direct cross-border activity without setting up of a subsidiary 
There is, however, a third case for REIT activities, however, to consider in a cross-
border context. The situation is the one of a REIT that is having its registered seat 
and place of management in one MS where the REIT conducts is main business 
activities as well. But in addition to the activities in its MS of incorporation the REIT 
invests direct in real property in one or multiple other MSs, as part of its 
496  There has been a discussion in Literature on the determination of the place of central 
management and activities of a subsidiary only by linking this question to the place where the main 
activities are exercised by the company but was diminished after the ECJ decided in “Centros” that 
the economic focus was not distinctive rather that the intention of the founder(s) of the company 
primarily decide. Therefore, this discussion does not need to be repeated anymore (see Case 
“Centros”. 
497 See Randelzhofer/Forsthoff (1999), Art. 43, recital 46 et seqq. 
 
109 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
MSs REIT regimes and EU law 
 
operational business (=investment scenario I.). In this scenario the REIT does 
neither move its place of management outside the MS of its incorporation nor is 
the REIT using a local SPV structure in the other MS for its investment in real 
property. Rather, the REIT is investing direct cross-border. Where, however, the 
investment is conducted directly, thus, no local SPV intermediary is used that 
might qualify for a subsidiary of the foreign Investor though, neither primary nor 
secondary establishment is concerned. 
 
Consequently, the situation where a REIT neither moves its seat nor sets up a 
subsidiary in another MS but likes to undertake business in another MS 
occasionally only will not benefit from the freedom of establishment while investing 
in the other MS. Thus, the freedom of establishment does not comprise 
investment scenario I.498  
 
3.1.4 “Establishment” by participation 
Another case of direct investment activity cross-border is purely by way of capital 
participation in a local entity. Here, the REIT does neither move its place of 
management nor sets up a subsidiary rather the REIT is engaged indirect through 
shareholdings in local SPVs or through local vehicles.499 Following the findings 
from the direct cross-border case above ((1.3)) the freedom of establishment 
seems not concerned, neither through primary nor secondary establishment. 
Especially, since none of the activities themselves nor the local SPV of which the 
shares are held, however, may qualify as a subsidiary of the (foreign) REIT 
(=investment scenario III. and IV.). 
 
To answer the question for qualifying criteria for a local subsidiary is subject to its 
country of its establishment. However, to answer the question of connecting 
criteria for a subsidiary, thus, whether in these scenarios the freedom of 
establishment is concerned the freedom may be defined in general. Hereto, 
reference is made to the description of the freedom in Art 49 II since EU law does 
not provide for any definition on this though. According to Art. 49 II the freedom of 
establishment comprises the commencement and exercise of business 
498 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.4.1 above (Figure II.5.4-1). 
499 The investment in a local vehicle might include capital participations in a local REIT as well. 
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independently as well as the establishment and administration of a company. 
Therefore, the extent of protection is not limited to the incorporation and operation 
of a subsidiary but include the prohibition of any restrictions to it too.500 Therefore, 
a subsidiary is a fixed organisation of the company in the other MS that is deemed 
to be included into the economic environment of that other MS in order to exercise 
an independent business. 501  However, the statute element of a effective and 
intended exercise502 of a business shall assist to carve out those undertakings 
which do not fall within the scope of the freedom of establishment. Therefore, for 
any assumption of a business with reference to Art. 3 an activity within economic 
life is necessary and its exercise may be viewed as effective where the activities 
from the subsidiary are not marginal only. Furthermore, beside its integration into 
the political economy503 a distinction of the freedom of establishment towards the 
freedom of services is possible since the one referring to the freedom of 
establishment will not integrate into the political economy as such. 
 
Therefore, the shareholding in a local SPV may not exceed what is, however, 
necessary to exercise business independently nor to administer the (target) by the 
shareholder itself. However, contrary to the direct cross-border case, the 
investment in shares by a foreign REIT in a REIT in another MS while neither 
setting up a subsidiary nor moving its place of management in that other MS 
(=investment scenarios III. and IV.) qualify for the benefits of the freedom of 
establishment though504 Hereto, Art. 55505 ensures the freedom of establishment 
through participation in companies506 and the right to pursue economic activities, 
through a company, under the conditions laid down by the legislation of the other 
MS for its own resident.507  
 
 
500 See Randelzhofer/Forsthoff (1999), Art. 43, recital 63. 
501 Ibid, recital 13. 
502 Ibid, recital 14 et seq. 
503 Ibid, recital 22 et seqq.; Rhem (2004), p. 32 et seq. 
504 However, activities in case of investment scenarios I. and IV as well as II. and III. (see Chapter 
III, Sec. 3.4.1), where shareholdings are concerned the foreign REIT may be able to validly rely on 
the freedom of service and/or the freedom of capital that, therefore, will be discussed in the 
following Section. 
505 Formerly Article 294 pre-Lisbon. 
506 As well as the free movement of capital (see Case “Daily Mail”, p. 5511). 
507 See Case C-246/89R, “Commission v. United Kingdom”, (1989), ECR I-3125, p. 3133. 
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3.1.5 Test for company 
As concerns natural persons, the question arises whether the person is a national 
of a MS. This question will for them be decided on the basis of the law of the MS 
that confer to nationality and other MS have to abide by that decision.508 Thus, in 
order to benefit from the provisions on freedom of establishment, a company must 
be 
 
 “… formed in accordance with the law of a MS …”509 
 
and fulfil alternatively one of the three possible connection criteria with the 
Community as Art. 54 I states to  
 
“… having their registered office, central administration or principal 
place of business within the Community …”. 
 
As such, Art. 54, para 1 calls for the “test of company” to be complied with by 
asking the company for having its (i) registered office, (ii) central administration or 
(iii) principal place of business within the Community. However, one of the main 
problems encountered is that whereas self-employed natural persons 510  are 
uniform in their identity across the Community, this does not apply to companies. 
As indicated, companies should be able to conduct business on the basis of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality but it has to be considered that MSs have 
different requirements with regard to such matters as incorporation, registration 
and liability. The fact that there are three alternative connection criteria, placed on 
equal footing, reflects that there is a disparity in what MSs consider to be the 
relevant connection criteria between company and the national territory.511 
 
508 See Case C-369/90, “Micheletti v. Delegación del Gobierno en Cantabria”, (1992), ECR I-4239. 
509 See Art. 49 I, 54 I. 
510 According to Art. 49 self-employed have the right to establish themselves in another MS. Being 
“self-employed” was been defined by the ECJ in Case “Jany” as a person that “unlike workers … 
work outside a relationship of subordination, they bear the risk for the success of their employment 
or failure of their employment, and they are paid directly in full” (see Case C-268/99, “Aldona 
Malgorzlata Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie”, (2001), ECR I-8615, para 34 and 70-
71). 
511 See Dyrberg (2003), pp. 528/529. 
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Therefore, beside the test for company and the fulfilment with its connection 
criteria, the “test of recognition” has to be made in order to determine whether a 
company may claim the freedom of establishment in the EU. MSs use different 
rules within their private laws to determine whether recognition is to be given to 
companies that are notionally formed under the legislation of a foreign state 
still.512 Here, the question of the conflict of laws will then come into play according 
to the situation specific at issue. These conflicts have been subject to decisions by 
the ECJ since long. Hereto, the ECJ has recently decided that what is nationality 
for natural persons is the real seat for companies513 and further details to this 
discussion, however, are subject to further evaluation in the following chapter.514  
 
3.1.6 Implied warranty and prohibition of discrimination or restriction 
Having so established themselves, the companies have the right not to be 
discriminated against and must be treated under the same conditions as those laid 
down by the MS for its own nationals. Therefore, where a company establishes 
itself with its activities in another MS, either by way of primary or secondary 
establishment, and being hindered with its establishment or the exercise of its 
business the statute elements of the freedom of establishment are fulfilled. As a 
legal consequence Art. 49 I 1 provide for the prohibition of such discrimination or 
restriction. 
 
Within the context of the following Articles 50 et seqq., however, it has to be noted 
that according to the wording of Art. 49 II the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment is linked to the provisions of law of the other MS. This means that 
the freedom of establishment is actually a specific form of the principle for equal 
treatment of residents. 515  Furthermore, the principle of equal treatment does 
include all types discriminatory or restrictive acts whether openly or hidden simply 
on the basis of nationality.516 This type of discrimination on the basis of nationality 
512 Hereto, discussion of national laws and its conflicts are discussed in more detail in Section 5 
below linked to the application of the international company law. 
513 See Case “Centros”, para 20, Omar (2002), p. 449. 
514 See Chapter IV below. 
515 See Schwarze (2007), p. 69. 
516 See Case C-2/74, “Jean Reyners v Belgian State”, (1974), ECR I-00631, para 24. 
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is called “direct” discrimination whereby those acts that are focused towards non-
residents only are so-called “indirect” discriminatory acts.517 
 
In addition to the prohibition of any discriminatory provisions Art. 49 serve for the 
probation of any restrictive acts as well.518 Where a company through an act of 
national law that are imposed in an “non-discriminatory” way is confronted with 
indirect discrimination and, though, being hindering or making it less attractive to 
make use of its fundamental freedom is lawfully entitled to call upon for the 
freedom of establishment. Consequently, based on this so-called “Gebhard-
Formula”519, any company may not be restricted in its freedom by the application 
of another MS´ national provision. 520  In case, however, any restriction of the 
freedom of establishment is justified only where such restriction is applied in a 
non-discriminatory way and the measure is justified for reasons of the basic 
interests of the society and being proportionate in nature.521 
 
3.1.7 Summary 
The objective of the freedom of establishment is the abolishment of hindrances to 
intra-community trade aiming for a unified market with shared conditions. Thus, 
freedom while having no frontiers as the ECJ clarified with its decision in Case 
“Gaston Schul”. Any measures by MSs that restrict the establishment in another 
MS are, therefore, subject to the freedom of establishment under Art. 49 and 48, 
which include any company fulfilling the statutes element that is being established 
in and under the laws of one MS and acting for pecuniary rewards. In this meaning 
REIT corporations can be classified as legal persons within the meaning of Art. 
48. Provided that a company has been established according to the law of a MS 
and, thus, incorporated according to MS´ law and having its statutory seat in one 
MS fulfils the conditions outlined for the “test of company” validly falls under the 
517 See Geiger (2004), Art. 49, recital 12 et seqq. 
518  See Cases C-340/89, “Vlassopoulou v Ministerium für Justiz, Bundes- und 
Europaangelegenheiten Baden-Würrtemberg”, (1991), ECR I-2357, para 15; C-19/92, “Kraus”, 
(1993), ECR I-01663, para 32; and Case “Gebhard”, para 37 et seqq. 
519 See Schwarze (2007), p. 70. 
520 See Case “Gebhard”, para 37; Schwarze (2007), p. 69/70. 
521  See Case “Gebhard”, para 37, where the ECJ in its decision transferred the principles 
developed for the freedom of movement of goods in the Case “Cassis de Dijon” to the freedom of 
movement of persons. 
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scope of the freedom of establishment either with its primary or secondary 
establishment.522  
 
Hence, a REIT under investment scenario V. moving its business by way of 
moving its “place of management” in another MS (=primary establishment) or 
under investment scenario II. establishing a subsidiary in another MS (=secondary 
establishment) fall under the scope of Art. 49. Provided in cases of secondary 
establishment, however, the local SPV meets the conditions set for “subsidiaries” 
though.523 Furthermore, any activities by shareholders either by participating in 
domestic companies524 (=investment scenario IV.) or shareholdings in a domestic 
REIT (investment scenario III.) and the right to pursue economic activities, through 
a local company, under the conditions laid down by the legislation of the other MS 
for its own resident 525  must be treated equally as nationals of the other MS 
themselves according to Art. 55526, thus, such activities by the foreign REIT fall 
under the freedom of establishment though. 
 
Where, however, a REIT having its registered seat and central place of 
management in one MS and conducts its operational business partly or 
exclusively by i.e. investing direct into real properties in another MS while keeping 
its place of management, thus, without the setting up of an agency, branch or 
subsidiary in the MS of its activities the REIT cannot rely on the freedom of 
establishment in the MS of its operational activities (= investment scenario I.).527  
 
In applicable cases the REIT operating its business in another MS benefit from the 
principle for equal treatment of residents. Thus, any discriminatory measures on 
grounds of nationality (=direct discrimination) and those towards non-residents 
522 See Case “Cassis de Dijon”. Hereto, the “test of recognition” must not lead to a different result. 
Otherwise, the result may be discriminatory again and, thus, again a violation of the freedom of 
establishment as outlined by the ECJ already (see Cases “Centros” and “Überseering”). Further 
discussion on this case law will be given in more detail Chapter IV below. 
523  The qualification of the local SPV depends on the (other) MS´ corporate law and i.e. its 
acknowledgement of a transparent partnership structure as “subsidiary” in terms of secondary 
establishment as well as local requirements set for companies to qualify for “subsidiary” though. 
524 As well as the free movement of capital (see Case “Daily Mail”, p. 5511). 
525 See Case C-246/89R, “Commission v. United Kingdom”, (1989), ECR I-3125, p. 3133. 
526 Formerly Article 294 pre-Lisbon. 
527 Any cross-border activity of this type by a REIT i.e. the acquisition of real property in another 
MS may be subject to the freedom of movement of services and/or the freedom of capital though 
(see Case C-302/97, “Klaus Konle v. Republic Österreich” (Case “Kohnle”), (1999), ECR I-3099). 
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only (=indirect discrimination) violating the freedom of establishment under Art. 49. 
According to the “Gebhard-Formula” indirect discrimination, however, include 
measures that are not precluding rather hindering only or just making activities by 
a non-resident less attractive as well. Those restrictions, however, may be 
justified, though. According to Case “Gebhard” the ECJ has limited possible cases 
for justification. The ECJ stated with reference to Case “Cassis de Dijon”528 that 
measures might be justified only provided they are applied in a non-discriminatory 
way (neither direct nor indirect) and evidence for justification is given on the basic 
interest of society and the measure taken being proportionate. 
 
Thus, the suspect provisions identified in MSs REIT regimes especially those 
relating to conditions to the legal requirements as well as the relevant tax 
treatment fall under the freedoms scope. The suspected cases outlined in MSs 
REIT regimes violate the freedom of establishment while discriminating on 
grounds of nationality purely. This is seen with the legal requirements with respect 
to legal form, residence, listing and shareholder requirements may apply to all 
REITs either domestic or non-domestic but with respect to non-resident (REIT) 
corporations it constitute an indirect discrimination that hinder its establishment in 
another country since they are already legally established in another MS. This 
holds true for imposing withholding tax on the distributions to non-resident 
shareholders of the domestic REIT equally. Furthermore, this expressively 
breaches the prohibition made in Art. 55 as well.  
 
Table III.3.1-1: Investment scenarios in scope of the freedom of establishment - summary 
Investment 
Scenario 
Scope of freedom of 
establishment Source 
     
I no n/A 
II yes Article 49 II (“primary establishment”) 
III yes Article 55 
IV yes Article 56 
V yes Article 49 I (“secondary establishment”) 
      
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
In addition to the violation of the freedom of establishment it is to consider whether 
suspect provisions violate the freedom of movement of capital too. Hence, 
528 See Case “Gebhard”, para 37. 
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question arises whether there is a ranking in between the freedoms whereby one 
precedes the other. Hereto, the ECJ outlined that the freedom to move capital is a 
precondition for the effective exercise of the freedom of establishment.529 The 
ECJ, however, provided a tendency to favouring deciding the cases under the 
capital provisions rather the establishment rules.530 The consequence laying with 
this differentiation and favouring of the freedom of establishment is that the 
freedoms other than for capital do not provide for such an extensive list of express 
derogations. Thus, the existence of potential justifications shall be subject for 
further evaluation in the context of the ECJ decisions below.531 
 
3.2  Freedom of Movement of capital 
With the freedom of movement of capital the Treaty goes “deep”.532 Hereto, it 
states in Art. 63 I that all restrictions on capital flows (e.g. cross-border 
investments in stocks and bonds, and direct investment in productive assets by 
multinationals) shall be abolished. It applies the same to current payments related 
capital flows (e.g. the payment of interest and repatriation of profits). Very little 
capital-market liberalisation, however, was undertaken533 until the 1980s since the 
Treaty provided an important loophole. It allowed capital market restrictions when 
capital movements create disturbances in the functioning of a MSs capital 
market.534 Moreover, it did not set a timetable for this liberalisation since there was 
no specific timeframe set for the so-called “transitional period”.535 However, direct 
investments in another MS have been addressed already before. Under the 
original Art. 67 of the EEC Treaty the Council enacted Directives during the first 
stage of the “transitional period” on i.e. capital movements already. In order to 
specify the “freedom” and the broad terms in which the Treaty drafted the freedom 
on capital movement the Directives have set out lists to categorise different 
degrees of liberalisation.536 Here, direct investments in real estate were to be 
529 See Case C-203/80, “Criminal Proceedings against Guerrino Casati” (Case “Casati”), (1981), 
ECR-2595, para 8. 
530 See Barnard (2004), p. 481. 
531 See Barnard (2004), p. 482. 
532 See Baldwin/Wyplosz (2009), p. 54. 
533 See Barnard (2004), p. 461. 
534 See Case “Casati”, para 9. 
535 See Usher (1992). 
536 See Council Directives JO 921/60 and JO 62/63 as well as finally Directive 88/361 (OJ 1988, 
L178/5), which finally established the basic principle of free movement of capital and explicitly 
mentioned in its headings of the nomenclature i.e. investments in real estate. 
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found in “List A” which contained areas of full liberalization without any 
authorization requirements already. 537  But true capital market liberalisation 
became a reality over 30 years later only with the Single European Act and the 
Maastricht Treaty. 538 Thus the freedom of movement of capital is essential part of 
the internal market in the meaning of Art. 3 and its elements of an “…open market 
economy with free competition…” as provided by Art. 120.539 It took, however, 
until the Treaty of Maastricht, which “upgraded” the freedom of movement of 
capital from an ancillary freedom to a substantial and direct applicable Freedom540 
and, thus, was the only freedom to be substantially amended.541 
 
3.2.1 Scope and statute elements 
The freedom of movement of capital is the fourth freedom.542 The Treaty provide 
or this freedom in its Art. 63 I by stating that: 
 
“… all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member States … shall be 
prohibited …”. 
 
Hereto, the Treaty in its Art. 64 make explicit reference to and explicitly include 
investment in real estate under the scope of the freedom of movement of capital 
as it was prior confirmed by the ECJ i.e. in Case “Kohnle” already. 543 In this 
context importance was given already to applicable provisions of MSs tax laws 
that must not distinguish between resident and non-resident taxpayers.544 
 
3.2.2 The definition of “capital” 
Capital movements are not defined by the Treaty but include in essence direct 
investments in another MS.545 “Capital transfers” in this context comprise of the 
investment related transfer of assets by way of real or monetary capital from one 
537 See Usher (2000), p. 17. 
538 See Baldwin/Wyplosz (2009), p. 54. 
539 See Barnard (2004), p. 461; Schwarze (2007), p. 92. 
540  See Schwarze (2007), p. 94; Joint Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 and C-250/94, “Criminal 
Proceedings against Sanz de Lera and Others” (Joint Cases “Sanz”), (1995), ECR I-4830, para 41; 
Joint Cases C-358/93 and C-416/93, “Criminal Proceedings against Aldo Bordessa and Others”, 
(1995), ECR I-361, para 33. 
541 See Usher (2000), p. 1. 
542 See Case C-463/00, “Commission v Spain” (Case “Spain 2003”), (2003), ECR I-4581, para 68. 
543 See Case “Kohnle”. 
544 See Art. 65 I lit. a) and b). 
545 See Joint Cases “Sanz”, para 33. 
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MS into another MS.546 Examples for such capital transfers are beside other i.e. 
investments in real property547 as well as investment in a company by means of 
shareholding.548 Therefore, transferring capital cross-border either for the purpose 
of the direct acquisition of real estate to pay off the purchase price549 (=investment 
scenario I.) or the subscription of a participation in the capital of a domestic 
company550 (=investment scenario II – IV.) falls under the scope of the freedom of 
movement of capital. 
 
3.2.3 Restrictions and Discriminations 
Since the Maastricht Treaty, Art. 65 refer to “restrictions” towards other MS and its 
residents in general whereas the ECJ is referring to “discriminations” as well in 
order to consider MSs regulations of being prohibitive as this was the concept of 
Art. 63 in its pre-Maastricht wording having been Art. 67 at that time.551 Measures 
that constitute restrictions are to be interpreted widely since in the aftermath of the 
changes following the Treaty of Maastricht there are no expressed restrictions 
mentioned in Art. 63 anymore. Rather, it is outlined that any measure that restrict 
the free movement of capital is at issue and viewed to be prohibitive. Therefore, 
Art. 63 include measures that directly552 and indirectly553 interferes cross-border 
capital movements. This includes especially measures by way of introducing 
regulations in i.e. domestic tax laws that restrict the freedom indirectly 554 but, 
consequently, those measures that are considered to be non-discriminatory but 
substantially impede the free movement of capital as well.  
 
As outlined by Barnard555 there are two different formula used to identify a breach 
of Art. 63, which are the “discrimination model” and the “model based on 
546 See joint Cases C-286/82 and C-26/83, “Liusi and Carbone v Ministero del Tresoro” (Case 
“Luisi and Carbone”) (1984), ECR 377, para 21. 
547  See Directive 88/361/EEC, Annex 1, point II of the nomenclature (Directive on capital 
movements, (1988), OJ L178/5)). 
548 See Case C-367/98, “Commission v. Portugal” (Case “Golden Share”), (2002), ECR I-4731, 
para 38; Case C-35/98, “Staatssecretaris van Financien v. Verkooijen” (Case “Verkooijen”), (2000), 
ECR I-4071, paras 28-29. 
549 See Case “Kohnle”. 
550 See Case “Verkooijen”, para 29. 
551 See Barnard (2004), p. 465. 
552 See i.e. Cases “Konle” and “Golden Share”, para 40. 
553 See i.e. Case “Spain 2003”; C-98/01, “Commission v. UK”, (2003), ECR I-4641; Case C-384/93, 
“Alpine Investments, (1995), ECR I-1141. 
554 See Schwarze (2007), p. 95. 
555 See Barnard (2004), p. 466-472. 
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restrictions”. According to the so-called “restriction based model” measures are 
differentiated in between direct discriminatory and just being liable to prevent or 
(substantially) impede free movement of capital. Here, any measure may not be in 
breach of Art. 63 unless justified by overriding requirements of general interest or 
express derogations in Art. 65 and where proportional. Otherwise, any measure 
which is in breach in general but the breach is not substantial or is too remote 
from affecting inter-state capital movements would be not in breach of Art. 63.556 
Different, the ECJ applies with its so-called “discrimination–model” grounds on 
which discrimination is prohibited that are coming out of the express listings in the 
Annex of Art. 67 pre-Maastricht, which are especially: nationality, residence and 
place of investment. The main difference is that the discrimination model 
differentiate measures as to whether they are direct, indirect or non-discriminatory 
versus the restriction model under which differentiation is made between 
measures that are direct discriminatory or liable to prevent or (substantially) 
impede free movement of capital. There is, however, no clear differentiation in 
between the models since the ECJ is not consistent in its terminology557 and 
include any measure that can be called an “obstacle” 558 , that is “liable to 
dissuade”559 or “likely to deter”560 as those of creating a prohibition of the free 
movement of capital though.  
 
3.2.4 Justification  
Whichever formula is used, where the Court finds a measure, in principle, in 
breach of Art. 63 there may be justification of a direct discriminatory measure by 
express derogations under Art. 65 provided they are proportional and legally 
certain and other, indirect or non-discriminatory measures may be justified and 
steps taken are proportionate.561 
 
556 See Barnard (2004), p. 471. 
557 See Barnard (2004), p. 471. 
558 See Case C-439/97, “Sandoz GmbH v. Finanzlandesdirektion für Wien, Niederösterreich und 
Burgenland”, (1999), ECR I-7041, para 20. 
559 See Case C-222/97, “Manfred Trummer and Peter Mayer”, (1999), ECR I-1661, para 26 and 
the “dissuasion test” used in Case “Verkoijen”, para 34-36. 
560 See Cases C-478/98, “Commission v. Belgium”, (2000). ECR I-7587, para 18; Case C-484/93, 
“Svensson and Gustavsson v Ministre du logement et de l’urbanisme” (Case “Svensson and 
Gustavsson”), (1995), ECR I-3955, para 5; Case “UK 2003”, para 61. 
561 See Barnard (2004), p. 472. 
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Qualified measures to restrict the free movement of capital are limited to the 
situations explicitly listed in Art. 64 – 66. While Art. 64 and 66 focus on restrictions 
towards third countries outside the EU and, thus, being outside of scope of this 
analysis, Art. 65 comprise express derogations in relation towards other MS. 
Hereto, Art. 65 I provide a general 562 and a specific derogation. The general 
derogation include measures to prevent infringements of national laws especially 
in the fields of taxation and financial supervision or measures which are justified 
on grounds of public policy or security (Art. 65 I lit. b)), where the specific 
derogation include different treatment of taxpayers on the ground of their 
residence (Art. 65 I lit a)). These derogations seem to provide MSs with the 
“authorisation to discriminate in the tax system between resident and non-
residents” as Usher563 outlines. However, these provisions have to be set into and 
seen in the context of the Treaty provisions according to which the freedoms 
cannot be overridden. Thus, the express derogations have to be interpreted 
restrictive 564  and must not be misapplied i.e. to serve for purely economic 
purposes565 and do not provide a “carte blanche” for discrimination on grounds of 
nationality566 or make it acceptable as State Aid.567 Further, any measure/rule 
must be proportionate568, subject to the principle of legal certainty569, and not be 
attained by less restrictive measure.570 
 
3.2.5 Summary 
According to Art. 63 et seqq. the freedom of movement of capital include, beside 
other discriminations, the abolishment of restrictions as to i.e. investments in real 
estate (Art. 64). Thus, REITs resident in the EU may rely on this freedom when 
562 The general derogation in Art. 65 I (b) replicate Art. 4 of the Directive 88/361. 
563 See Usher (2000), p. 32 and 39. 
564 See Case C-54/99, “Association Eglise de Scientologie de Paris v. Premier Ministre” (Case 
“Scientologie”), (2000), ECR I-1335, paras 17-18. 
565 See Case “Rutili”, para 30 and Case C-367/98, “Commission v. Portugal”, (2002), ECR I-4731, 
para 52. 
566 See Usher (2000), p. 33. 
567 Ibid, p. 40. 
568 see Schwarze (2007), p. 98. 
569 The “principle of legal certainty”, even though a general principle of law, was stated clearly as a 
requirement by the ECJ in Case C-222/86, “Union nationale des entrainers et cadres techniques 
professionelles du football (Unectef) v. Georges Heylens and Others”, (1987), ECR 4097, para 22. 
See also in case of foreign direct investments Case “Eglise de Scientologie”, paras 19-22 and 
Case C-423/98, “Alfredo Albore” (Case “Albore”), (2000), ECR I-5965, para 21 where that was 
found missing in cases of MSs requesting prior authorisation for an activity by non-residents. 
570 See Case “Eglise de Scientologie”, para 18. 
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actively being engaged in real estate investments cross-border in another MS 
through direct investments in real property without setting up a subsidiary 
(=Investment scenario I.) or through a capital participation as shareholder in a 
domestic entity (=Investment scenarios II. – IV.) either in full or with a participation 
only.571 Additionally, moving the place of management cross-border into another 
MS (=investment scenario V.) fall under the freedom of movement of capital as 
well.  
 
Table III.3.2-2: Investment scenarios in scope of the freedom of movement of capital  
Investment 
Scenario 
Scope of freedom of 
movement of capital Source Derogation 
      
I - V yes Article 63 Article 65 I (“tax law”) 
        
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Though, financial interests are laid down by MS, i.e. in tax provisions, Art. 65 
reflect the acknowledgement of existing tax laws in MS572 and provide for specific 
tax derogation. These provisions are the focus of the specific derogation in Art. 65 
I lit. a), allowing MS in their tax laws to distinguish between resident and non-
resident taxpayers or the place where their capital is invested573 provided that the 
situations are not objectively comparable.574 Furthermore, measures in the field of 
taxation may not be considered a breach of Art. 63 that can be subsumed under 
the general derogation in Art. 65 I lit. b). Herewith, the Treaty provides MS with a 
mean to combat illegal activities such as tax evasion.575 Provided, however, that 
the fiscal measure does not consists in “… an outright prohibition on the exercise 
of a fundamental freedom …” which is guaranteed under Art. 63.576  
 
571  The case, however, where the foreign REIT is moving its entire business (place of 
management) or where the foreign REIT is setting up a subsidiary cross-border into another MS 
the freedom of establishment is engaged (see Section (1) above). 
572 See Declaration on Art 73d (now Article 65) of the Treaty of the European Community. 
573 See Case “Verkooijen”, para 38. 
574 Here, the Treaty effectively codified the ECJs case law of Case “Schumacker”, para 32 and 
Case C-204/90, “Bachmann v. Belgium” (Case “Bachmann”), (1992), ECR I-249. 
575 See Case C-478/98, “Commission v. Belgium” (Case “Eurobond”), (2000), ECR I-7587, para 
38. 
576 See Case “Eurobond”, para 45. 
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It seems that the Treaty with the express derogations set the framework for 
measures by MS to legally restrict the free movement of capital provided, 
however, the measure does not constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination 
according to Art. 65 III though. Therefore, where a rule applies equally to residents 
and non-residents the measure underlying may be justified still. This seems to 
hold true for the legal requirements (legal form, residence and listing) by MS REIT 
regimes that apply equally to all REITs and do not distinct as to nationality. 
Whereas, suspect provisions identified such as MS regime limitations to 
shareholder and domestic assets quota are direct restrictive measures neither 
justified on grounds of express derogations nor can they considered to be non-
discriminatory though.  
 
Same applies for the case where MS require a foreign REIT to moving itself or 
setting up an entity that qualifies for REIT regime in that MS in order to qualify for 
the domestic REIT regime (=original qualification) or being eligible to opting or the 
domestic REIT regime (=derivative qualification) before benefiting from the 
domestic REIT regime. By not providing for an EU wide accepted REIT regime 
and the conditions under MS REIT regimes differ especially the derivative 
qualification “option” seems disproportionate. The requirements for “opting” 
represent a “licensing” process for foreign REITs though. The discretion MS use 
within their REIT regime in setting the conditions for qualifying to opt for REIT 
status constitute “a serious interference with the movement of capital, and may 
have the effect of excluding all together”. 577  Hereto, justification by express 
derogations does not apply since the underlying situation seem comparable, thus, 
derogation by Art. 65 I is not concerned. 
 
Furthermore, derogations do not apply for the cases identified with the tax 
treatment. Where domestic tax regimes differentiate for REITs and its shareholder 
in between resident and non-resident REITs and shareholders as this is seen with 
most of the regimes levying withholding tax to non-resident REITs and 
shareholders only (indirect) arbitrary discrimination is engaged. Thus, the often 
used argument that domestic “requisite measures” are justified since they are to 
577 See Case C-483/99, “Commission v France” (Case “Elf-Aquitane”), (2002), ECR I-4781, para 
51. 
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secure for the cohesion of the (domestic) tax system is valid provided the measure 
applies equally only. However, it must be shown that effective measures are taken 
at the domestic level in the MS tax system to deal with the perceived problem, 
thus, being proportionate.578 The Treaty, however, is broad in its wording579 of the 
express derogations in Art. 65 I as well as in III, thus leaving room for 
interpretation though. Hence, on the pure basis of the Treaty´ wording in Art. 65 
and its derogations final assessment of a restrictive type of such a measure is not 
possible. It is, therefore, to analyse the content of the express derogations in more 
detail and to identify their reach and limits. Thus, the ranking order in between the 
freedom of establishment versus the freedom of movement of capital becomes 
more important especially with view to the express derogations eligible for MS that 
are not extant for any measures that are subject to assessment of the freedom of 
establishment.580  
 
Therefore, further analysis of primary European law to seek for interpretation 
especially on the kind of justifications and the type of proportionality must be 
considered. Beside the express derogations there are unwritten reasons for 
justification on grounds of the general interests that are developed by the ECJ in 
its case law that builds part of primary European law though will be of further 
detailed discussion later in this chapter.581 
 
3.3  Freedom of Movement of Services 
As seen in Chapter II a REIT invests in real property not for itself rather for its 
shareholders and in case where the REIT is a corporate but of fund type the REIT´ 
management is serving and managing the special real estate fund. Where the 
REIT serves foreign shareholders or more specifically is actively investing in 
578 See Case “Bachmann” and its criteria laid out for what is arbitrary discrimination being relevant 
still. 
579 See Usher (2000), p. 57. 
580 See Section 3.1.7 on the freedom of establishment above. 
581 See i.e. the ECJ carrying forward its possibilities for justification of the Case “Cassis de Dijon” in 
Case C-148/91, “Veronica v. Commissariaat voor de Media”, (1993), ECR I-487. Further 
justifications have been accepted by the ECJ in the field of taxation under Art 65 in Cases “Konle”, 
later Case C-213/04, “Burtscher v. Stauderer”, (2005), ECR I-10309; Case C-9/02, “de Lasteyrie 
du Saillant v. Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie” (Case “Lasteyrie”), (2004), 
ECR I-2409 and Case C-446/03, “Marks & Spencer v. David Halsley” (Case “Marks & Spencer”), 
(2005), ECR I-10837. 
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another MS and thus serving shareholders in that MS as well the freedom of 
movement of services may be concerned.  
 
3.3.1 Catchall clause 
The freedom of movement of services according to Art. 56 set out provisions to 
prohibit MS from introducing “… restrictions on freedom to provide services …. in 
respect of nationals of MS …” established in the EU. “Services” in the meaning of 
Art. 57 I are activities that are provided for remuneration i.e. activities of a 
commercial character (Art. 57 I lit. b)). Restrictions to be prohibited are with 
regards to the entry into and residence in the territory of the MS and as regards 
the application of the prohibition of all discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality.582 
 
3.3.2 Ancillary services by REITs 
However, the freedom of services is designed to serve as a catchall element. The 
concept of the freedom of service, therefore, will come into play in situations 
where the freedom of movement for goods, capital and persons cannot be called 
upon as expressively outlined in Art. 57 I. Thus, where the services of REITs are 
covered under another type of the freedom of movement there is no room for the 
application of the freedom for services.  
 
Where, however, the foreign REIT provide service to the management of the 
assets in the other MS the question arise whether this activity may be covered by 
the freedom of movement for services or already covered with the freedom of 
movement of capital. To make the distinction in between the freedoms is not an 
easy undertaking. The payment of remuneration in return for services was 
determined by the ECJ to be an activity falling under the freedom of movement for 
Service in contrast to the investment into real property that is subject to the 
freedom of movement of capital as already outlined.583 In another decision the 
ECJ ruled that the investment in real property falls under the scope of the freedom 
of establishment as well as the freedom of movement of capital.584 Thus, no clear 
picture and delimitation of scope is possible since the application of freedoms in 
582 See Case C-107/94, “Asscher v. Staatssecretaris van Financien”, (1996), ECR I-3089., para 39 
583 See Case “Luisi and Carbone”, para 21. 
584 See Case “Konle”, para 22. 
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parallel is eligible.585 However, what becomes clear is that anyway which freedom 
is in scope the ECJ applies first and before all one of the main freedoms such as 
to the establishment and capital for situations in which investment in real property 
is concerned. Thus, the freedom of movement of services is residual. 586 
Therefore, the freedom of movement for services may comes into play as it is 
designed for where no other freedom can be evoked and Art. 56 is subordinate to 
and may be applied in order to safeguard the Treaty´ objectives for a certain 
cross-border situation only.587 As long as the “Service”, however, is not the main 
activity rather being itself part of the activity such as i.e. an ancillary service that 
comes with the application of the freedom is assessed on grounds of the main 
activity. With investments in real property by a REIT the investment as such is the 
main activity at issue but not the management of the property itself that is, hereto, 
of ancillary nature only. Additionally, the management service by the REIT for its 
cross-border investment is usually not a service that is offered on the foreign 
market as such and as a separate business that the primary focus of the activity is 
the capital transfers rather the service offering.  
 
Taking the above conclusion is to make that the ancillary services of a REIT for its 
cross-border investments into real property may be covered by the freedom of 
movement for services only where no other freedom can be called. Since this 
seem the case with the freedom of establishment and of movement of capital the 
freedom of movement for service stays subordinate.588 Thus, no closer analysis of 
the statute elements of the freedom of movement for services must be 
undertaken. 
 
 
 
585 See ECJ in Case “Svensson and Gustavsson”, para 7 et seqq.; Case C-222/95, “Parodi v 
Banque H. Albert de Bary et Cie.”, (1997), ECR I-3899; Case C-410/96, “Criminal Proceedings 
against Ambry”, (1998), ECR I-7875; Case “Portugal 2002”. 
586  See i.e. Case C-1/93, “Halliburton Services BV v Staatssecretaris van Financien” (Case 
“Halliburton”), (1994), ECR I-1137. Different case, however, was provided with Case C-296/12, 
“Commissison v Belgium”, (2014), not yet published, 23.01.2014, para 51; “… since the freedom of 
service preclude the rule at issue … there is no need to examine them separately in light of Art. 63, 
freedom of movement of capital …” (see C-383/10, “Commission v Belgium”, para 74). 
587 See Barnard (2004), p. 330; Case “Gebhard”, para 22. 
588 See Barnard (2004), p. 481 (with reference to i.e. Case “Halliburton”). 
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3.4  Other Treaty connecting factors – Fiscal State Aid  
Beside the fundamental freedoms the Treaty provide with its State Aid provisions 
for additional rules, which governments have to take into consideration while 
establishing regimes and treatments that focus on domestic business activities. 
Where the view in the above analysis has been more of a view to cross-border 
situations there are limitations set for MS to internally promote its economies. 
Such types of selective aid tax measures may be viewed as “state aid” and, thus, 
may fall under the so-called State Aid rules contained in Art 107 I, which qualifies 
state aid incompatible with the internal market while likely to distort or threatened 
to distort competition “…. as it affects trade between MS...” through “… favouring 
certain undertakings or the production of certain goods …”. A measure confers on 
recipients an advantage when it relieves them of charges that are normally borne 
from their budgets. The advantage may be provided through a reduction in tax 
burden in various ways, including reduction in the tax base589, a total or partial 
reduction in the amount of tax 590 , deferment, cancellation or even special 
rescheduling of tax debt. Furthermore, the advantage is granted by the State or 
through State resources through tax provisions of a legislative, regulatory or 
administrative nature as through the practices of the tax authorities. 591  The 
Commission is to prior authorise measures of state aid and the principles for the 
procedure have been laid down in a Council Regulation.592 Where, however, a 
REIT regime finally does not provide (tax) benefits equally in comparable cases, 
thus, creates an economic advantage to the (domestic) REIT and its shareholders, 
which cannot be justified by the nature or general scheme of the tax system and 
will be considered selective under the State Aid rules. 593  Even the Council 
589 See i.e. such as special deductions, special or accelerated depreciation arrangements or the 
entering of reserves on the balance sheet. 
590 See i.e. such as exemption or a tax credit. 
591 Where i.e. a loss of tax revenue is equivalent to consumption of State resources in the form of 
fiscal expenditure. This criterion also applies to aid granted by regional or local bodies in the 
Member States (see Case C-248/84, “Germany v. Commission”, (1987), ECR 4013). 
592 A measure in this respect crossing the line to what shall and may be compatible with the 
internal market is listed in Art. 107 II and III. The listed criteria are of very broad nature only (see 
Council Regulation (1999)). 
593 See the “Finish REIT” case, where the Commission held the selective tax benefits provided 
under MSs REIT regimes with its tax transparency in general and the levy of withholding taxes to 
distribution of dividend payments by MSs subject to the State Aid rules of the Treaty. With the 
decision to authorise the Finnish REIT regime, the Commission indicated its willingness to accept 
regimes that provide full transparency for indirect investment, provided that the regimes do not 
lead to any delay in taxation such as the creation of a special tax reserve that might benefit 
specialised investment as in real estate (see Stoschek/Kröger (2010), p. 19). 
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Regulation, however, focus on the approval process rather to giving an answer as 
to the quality of a measure such as the tax exception for REITs under a MS 
regime and its compatibility with the state aid rules. 594 
 
However, the research focus on cross-border situations and the direct tax 
treatment applied to non-domestic actors in the Host State. Thus, activities by MS 
that are not directly focused to foreign residents operating domestic, rather those 
measures focus on domestic residents to assist its (domestic) activities and, thus, 
indirectly influence markets and discriminate foreign resident companies that are 
acting in the same markets whether they are domestic or non-domestic are not of 
scope for this thesis and are not further evaluated in detail though.  
 
4.  Secondary European law 
Secondary law is primarily based upon Directives. Hereto, the Treaty is providing 
in Art. 50 and Art. 53 authorities for the issuing of a secondary measure i.e. by 
way of a Directive. Especially in the field of the freedom of establishment a 
considerable number of Directives have been enacted i.e. in the harmonisation of 
the corporate law of MS595 and the introduction of “supranational” legal forms for 
companies596. 
 
However, these types for legal forms may be used within the EU but are not 
solving issues of conflict of laws emerging from cross-border activities of 
companies established according to MS national laws. Rather, these legal forms 
provide new types of companies that are acknowledged by the MS but do not 
594 It took until May 2010 when the Commission was to assess a MS REIT regime for the first time. 
Starting in 2009 the Finish government notified the Commission about their plans to introducing the 
Finish REIT regime. The F-REIT was focusing to promote the domestic residential market asking 
the Commission to assess the regime under EU state aid rules. (see State Aid No. N131/2009 – 
Finland Residential Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) Scheme and Commission notice 
published in OJ C 68, 6.3.1996, p. 9). 
595 Examples for the harmonisation of the corporate laws of MSs are i.e. the Merger-Directive or 
the Directive 2009/102/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 in 
the area of company law on single-member private limited liability companies on the creation of a 
legal instrument allowing the limitation of liability of the individual entrepreneur within the European 
Union (EU) and repealing Directive 89/667/EEC. For a more detailed listing see Schwarze (2007), 
pp. 73-75. 
596 Such forms of companies include the introduction of the European Economic Interest Grouping 
(EEIG) with Council Regulation (1985); the European Company (Societas Europaeae, SE) with 
Council Regulation (2001) and the European Cooperative Society (ECS) with Council Regulation 
(2003). 
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solve i.e. situations of different treatment of a REIT established in one MS taking 
operative actions in another MS or even is moving its central place of 
management cross-border in the territory of another MS. These situations are 
dealt with provisions of the international company law. 
 
5.    International Company law 
The recognition of REITs in the EU and by MS is linked to the international 
company law, which builds part of each MS´ domestic law. 597  International 
Company law is answering the question as to which law is applicable to situations 
of a company going cross-border and may be applied to the company by the other 
state. However, in cross-border situations international corporate law applies for 
the determination of the local law to be applied only where this is not subject of 
multilateral international agreements598 or under EU law already. Even though, 
this is not the case for the transfer of a seat of a company from one MS into 
another it is still true question arises whether there is room for the application of 
domestic law even to a limited extent. This question, however, may be relevant 
only, where domestic law is in compliance with EU law since the latter is 
overriding. Domestic law may, therefore, be applicable only to the extent it is 
viewed to being compliant with EU law. Since MS have to comply with direct 
applicable EU law i.e. the freedoms domestic law may only be applicable to a 
limited extent only. Thus, EU law is the overriding law to which domestic law is 
subsidiary. Thus, the question which of two different principles in use in the EU by 
MS domestic corporate laws, which are (i) the “real-seat”-principle599 and (ii) the 
“incorporation”-principle600 is not subject to international corporate law, rather EU 
law and its freedoms though.601 
597 See Hofmeister (2007), 868 et seqq. 
598 An attempt for such a multilateral agreement in 1968 an agreement was signed under the use 
of Art. 293 on the mutual recognition of legal persons and companies. This was envisaged by way 
of establishing a principle that was a combination of the real-seat and the incorporation theory. 
However, the agreement failed due to the missing ratification by the Netherlands government, thus 
was never implemented (see for the text of the Agreement in ZGR 1999, 159 et seqq.). 
599 Other terms for “real seat” in use may be “siège reel”, the “centre of administration” or the 
“centre of control and management”. This principle is applied in the corporate laws of most of the 
MSs e.g. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Belgium (see Wouters (2001), p. 
107). 
600 Other terms for the “incorporation principle” in use are “theory of domicile” or “siège statuaire 
theory”. Currently, there are nine MSs that follow the seat principle while six follow the 
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6.    Conclusion 
The fundamental freedoms analysed above bear significant potential to open the 
door into MS´ domestic legal regime for economic harmonisation. These free 
movement provisions pursue market integration through market deregulation.602 
Additionally, the freedom of movement of services is to mention in this context as 
well but is subordinate. Clearly, the freedom of movement of capital and the 
freedom of establishment setting the conditions MS REIT regimes have to test 
against and to comply with. In exercising their direct taxation powers, MS may not 
discriminate, directly, or indirectly, on the basis of nationality and may not impose 
distinctions or restrictions that could be regarded as an infringement of these 
freedoms. 603 From an Investor point of view all investment scenarios I. – V. fall 
under the scope of the Treaty´ freedoms. Except for the case of direct cross-
border investments into real property all other scenarios fall under the scope of the 
freedom of establishment as well as the freedom of movement of capital. 604 
Whereas, investment scenario I does built case for neither primary nor secondary 
establishment. However, the scenario falls under the capital provisions though. 
 
Table III.6-1: Investment scenarios in scope of the Treaty - summary 
Investment 
Scenario Scope of freedom Source 
Justification / Derogation of 
restrictive measures 
I. 
Freedom of 
Establishment n/A n/A 
  
Freedom of  
Movement of Capital Article 63 Article 65 I (“tax law”) 
        
II. 
Freedom of 
Establishment 
Article 49 II  
(“primary establishment”) 
Article 52  
(“basic interest of society”) 
  
Freedom of  
Movement of Capital Article 63 Article 65 I (“tax law”) 
        
incorporation principle e.g. Netherlands, IK, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Finland (see Drury 
(1998), pp. 168-169, 182). 
601  The discussion regarding Company’s “residence”: real seat vs. incorporation principle is 
therefore not further discussed in this thesis. For further reading see i.e. Siems (2002), p. 48; Roth 
(2003), p. 181 et seqq.; Kersting/Schindler (2003), p. 1284 as well as i.e. ECJ Cases, the trilogy of 
cases: “Überseering”, “Centros”, “Inspire Art” and “Daily Mail”. 
602 See Weatherill (1995), p. 225. 
603  Especially, the State Aid rules that are mostly disregarded in Literature provide additional 
source to conditions for compliancy of national REIT regimes with European law that was 
exemplified shown with the Commission’s decision on the F-REIT though (see i.e. Cornelisse 
(2006 Part 1) and EPRA (2009). 
604 See Table III.6-1. 
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III. 
Freedom of 
Establishment Article 49, 55 
Article 52  
(“basic interest of society”) 
  
Freedom of  
Movement of Capital Article 63 Article 65 I (“tax law”) 
        
IV. 
Freedom of 
Establishment Article 49, 55 
Article 52  
(“basic interest of society”) 
  
Freedom of  
Movement of Capital Article 63 Article 65 I (“tax law”) 
        
V. 
Freedom of 
Establishment 
Article 49 I  
(“secondary establishment”) 
Article 52  
(“basic interest of society”) 
  
Freedom of  
Movement of Capital Article 63 Article 65 I (“tax law”) 
        
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Therefore, a foreign REIT crossing border into another MS can validly rely on the 
freedom of movement of capital and the freedom of establishment for its activities, 
thus, expect and demand not to be restricted and to be treated in a non-
discriminatory way. Here, the difference in between the freedoms relevant 
becomes important. One of the striving differences between the freedom of 
movement of capital and the other freedoms is that there is a more extensive list 
of express derogations available in respect of capital.605 
 
However, the REIT will meet the suspect provisions identified above within s REIT 
regimes though.606 Focusing on the provisions of REIT regimes in other MSs they 
face the freedoms already outlined together with the State Aid rules building the 
provisions that are relevant for the compliant test of MSs REIT regimes. 
Therefore, the rules and provisions identified in MSs REIT regimes that have been 
labelled to being suspect of discrimination should comply with the freedoms 
objective or, otherwise, justified where available. All of the suspected provisions 
are as a result of the analysis of the formal freedom conditions in violation with 
their objectives. The identified provision for legal requirements, here especially 
those relating to the legal form for the domestic REIT, its domestic residence and 
listing requirement apply primarily to domestic and foreign REITs equally. 
However, they constitute an indirect discrimination while ignoring the fact i.e. that 
a foreign REIT was established legally in its MS already, thus, should not be 
subject to additional requirements though. Therefore, these provisions hinder the 
605 See Barnard (2004), p. 482. 
606 See Table III.6-2. 
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establishment of companies in their territory by asking to comply with additional 
conditions and, thereby, not treating the foreign company equally to resident ones. 
This is clearly a violation of the freedom of establishment. Furthermore, setting up 
additional conditions for non-resident companies and shareholders investing in 
domestic companies (i.e. the limitation to non-resident and certain types of 
shareholders) restrict the movement of capital, thus, violates the freedom of 
movement of capital as well. This holds true for the tax treatment of non-residents 
as well. Since almost all MSs levy withholding tax at the level of the REIT for 
distributions made to foreign shareholders but not to its domestic residents, 
discrimination based on residence and, therefore, violation of the freedoms is 
concerned as well. Furthermore, the discriminatory treatment of non-residents may 
violate the freedom of movement of services but is residual to the violation of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom of movement of capital though.607 
 
Table III.6-2: Restrictions to the Treaty – Summary of suspect provisions 
Criteria Condition Requirement Suspect restriction 
      
Legal 
requirements Legal form 
Form under domestic 
(corporate) laws Freedom of establishment 
      Freedom of movement of capital 
  Residence domestic / registered Freedom of establishment 
      Freedom of movement of capital 
  Listing domestic stock Freedom of establishment 
      Freedom of movement of capital 
  
Shareholder 
requirements 
limitation for non-resident 
shareholder Freedom of establishment 
      Freedom of movement of capital 
      State Aid 
  Asset test domestic property only Freedom of movement of capital 
      State Aid 
Tax 
treatment 
Tax 
transparency 
Option used to “license” for 
domestic REIT regime Freedom of establishment 
      Freedom of movement of capital 
  
Legal 
requirements 
Compliance with conditions 
under domestic regime  Freedom of establishment 
    (ex. Residence / Legal Form) Freedom of movement of capital 
  
Withholding 
tax on  non-resident shareholder Freedom of establishment 
  
dividend 
payments  Freedom of movement of capital 
607 See Sec. 3.3 above. 
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     State Aid 
        
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
However, the provisions in MSs REIT regimes are not subject to the freedoms 
only. Rather, the Treaty provide for further ground on which basis hindrances to 
free movement by way of distortions of competition be assessed and must comply 
with. Hereto, the Treaty provides under the State Aid rules for provisions that 
prohibit MSs to granting of aids through state resources that affects trade by 
distorting competition. Hereunder, provisions that limit shareholdings in domestic 
REITs by setting up of maximum quota for non-residents as well as the limitation 
of tax beneficial treatment of investments in domestic property (Asset test) and the 
benefits of tax treatment under the REIT regime in general represent Staid Aid 
under the state aid rules.608 Where tax benefits are granted to residents only the 
flip side is a loss of tax revenue from such activities by residents that lower the 
state resources. Thus, to limit tax beneficial treatment to residents constitutes a 
selective measure under the State Aid rules and distorts trade negatively.609 
 
Applying the freedoms objectives consequently, there is neither need nor any 
conditional requirement under Art. 49 I (secondary establishment) to setting up a 
dependent subsidiary in that other MS before being eligible for the freedom and 
acknowledged610 under another MS´ corporate and tax laws and consequently its 
REIT regime as well. Consequently, a company moving cross-border within the 
EU enjoys the right for equal treatment compared to residents while any 
restrictions may be justified for reasons limited to those of non-discriminatory type 
and with reference to the basic interests of society as well as the principle of 
proportionality is observed. Where, however, a MS does not provide for a (special) 
REIT regime thus does not provide for different (tax) treatment to companies 
operating in the filed of real estate, there is no restriction set by treating the foreign 
(REIT) Company according to the ordinary domestic laws applicable unless 
difference is being made in comparison to domestic companies. In this case, 
again, discrimination on grounds of nationality becomes visible but will not be 
608 See Sec. 3.4 above. 
609 Ibid. 
610 See Case “Centros” with further reference to Case “Cassis de Dijon” and its “Cassis de Dijon” 
principle. 
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further developed since this situation is out of scope of this analysis though. 
Therefore, where MSs REIT regimes do not provide for foreign REITs to opt for 
the domestic REIT regime in order to benefit from beneficial treatment under the 
regime generally discriminates the foreign REIT purely on grounds of nationality. 
This conclusion must not be subject to the fulfilment of the domestic statute 
elements or other conditions whatsoever by the foreign REIT. Where a REIT is 
validly established in one MS going cross-border into another MS it must be 
acknowledged according to the “Cassis de Dijon” principle.611 Thus, any different 
treatment, unless justifiable, violates the freedoms and is subject to further 
analysis in light of the ECJ case law in the following chapter. 
 
 
611 See Micheler (2000), p. 180/181. 
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Chapter IV: MSs REIT Regimes and ECJ Case Law 
 
 
1. Objectives for this Chapter 
In the previous chapter “hard” EU law relevant for MSs REIT regimes with focus to 
their respective rules towards the treatment of cross-border situations was 
discussed. Hereto, the Freedoms and especially the freedom of movement of 
capital and the freedom of establishment impact the MSs and its legal order.612 As 
a result there are requirements of MSs REIT regimes, which are suspicious of 
hindering the freedoms, thus, violating EU law. The provisions suspect of violating 
EU law are found especially with the legal requirements and tax treatment in 
cross-border situations.613 Therefore, assessing the benefits of REITs is no longer 
limited to the MSs specific countries of domicile. 614 However, as seen above, 
reality proof different since REITs are treated differently depending on its 
residency and foreign REITs, even equally legally, the tax treatment is different.615 
The fact that some MSs do not allow foreign legal entities or non-residents to opt 
for it domestic REIT status creates an economic disadvantage in a cross-boarder 
situation. In disallowing such an option, the MSs would seem to be protecting their 
domestic markets. 616 Thus, it becomes visible that rules or parts of MSs REIT 
regimes i.e. conditions to the legal requirements and tax treatment are suspect of 
being not compliant with EU law violating the freedoms being discriminatory on 
grounds of nationality.617 However, since there is neither competence with the EU, 
thus, nor the ECJ, in the field of direct tax, the question is, whether the freedoms 
have any impact on MSs legal order in direct tax though. 
 
Hence, the analysis will focus to cross-border situations of a foreign REIT entering 
into the market of another MS, which provide for a domestic REIT regime meeting 
its conditions set out for companies to legally qualify for treatment according to the 
612 See Table III.6-1. 
613 See Table III.6-2. 
614 Standard & Poor’s (2005), p. 16. 
615 See Hughes/Lewis (2008), p. 95 who conclude that MSs REIT regimes are usually based on 
the idea that a domestic REIT will invest domestically only. 
616 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.1, 5.4; Chapter III, Sec. 3.1, 3.2 and 6. 
617 See especially Art. 18. 
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(domestic) REIT regimes to answering the question whether the foreign REIT 
must comply with the domestic criteria for REIT treatment in full or any other 
(lower) level of “comparability” should suffice. Furthermore, the “compliance test” 
will analyse MSs REIT regimes to identify the existence of “misfit”, thus, impact of 
the EU through the freedoms 618 and potential harmful practices in MSs legal 
order. Notwithstanding, it is out of scope of this thesis to develop discriminatory 
and/or distorting elements in full and in detail, but in particular conditions to opt for 
status under the legal requirements and tax treatment in cross-border situations 
are analysed for being suspect of a harmful practise though. Therefore, this 
chapter will focus on: 
 
• the identification of the basic principles set out by the ECJ with its judgments 
relevant and applicable in direct tax, thus, representing impact of the EU; 
• providing for material that creates basis for the analysis of “misfit” by MSs 
REIT regimes and its respective tax treatment rules; 
• the legal requirements and the situation of foreign legal entities or non-
residents to opt for REIT status analysed with respect to the creation of an 
economic disadvantage in a cross-border situation;  
• testing the “fit” of such a protectionist approach as to whether the “common 
understanding” model of the European REIT infringes the fundamental 
freedoms, thus EU law;  
• identifying adaptational pressure on MSs REIT regimes. 
 
Thus, this chapter is to identify EU “hard” law as it resulted from ECJ judgements 
by which the ECJ interprets EU law and in this context the meaning and reach of 
the freedoms within and for the internal market. Herewith, “misfit” of MSs REIT 
regimes and together with identifying conditions for compliance adaptational 
pressure, thus, the impact of the EU becomes visible. 
 
 
 
618 See Chapter III, Sec. 3 for a detailed discussion on the freedoms relevant to this discussion. 
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2. The ECJ case law 
 
2.1  Additional secondary source of law 
The case law by the ECJ does not constitutionally built part of the EU primary law. 
However, the ECJ has since long repeated that MSs must exercise their 
legislative powers consistently with Community law.619 This includes especially the 
prohibition of discrimination and the freedoms of the Treaty building part of the 
EU´ economic constitutional framework.620 In its role the ECJ provide an additional 
secondary source of law to add to the administrative acts found in Art 249. Hereto, 
there is clear acceptance within the EU that the ECJ provides definitive and 
authoritative judgements that is the interpretation on points of EU law which are 
followed by the courts of the MSs. Especially, in the field of direct taxation, where 
the EU has no significant competences effect is shown by the concept of the ECJ 
to enforce the general principles of EU law in areas, which do not fall under the 
competence of the EU. Hereto, the general principles of EU law to which the ECJ 
refers comprise the fundamental freedoms especially. 621 Consequently, non-
harmonised MSs corporate laws and tax regimes must comply with EU law i.e. the 
fundamental freedoms even though there is no explicit competence for by the EU 
and its institutions. 622  The assessment of national tax laws considering the 
fundamental freedoms is not limited anymore pursuant to Art. 49 and 63 rather 
orients themselves primarily on the case law provided by the ECJ decisions.623 
 
This holds true especially with a view to potential justifications and applicable 
derogations under the freedom of movement of capital. Where, however, research 
is going beyond the case law of the ECJ is analysed as well but limited to the 
judgments on related fields of law i.e. on indirect tax law cases. In addition the 
619 See i.e. Case C-182/08, “Glaxo Welcome GmbH & Co. KG v Finanzamt München II”, (2009), 
ECR-I 8591, para 34 and the case law cited, Case C-155/09, “Commission v Greece”, (2011), ECR 
I-00065, para 39 and recently joined Cases C-338/11 to 347/11, “Santander Asset Management 
SGIIC SA v Directeur des residents à L’etranger et des services genereaux” et al. (Case 
“Santander”), (2012), judgement of 10 May 2012, not yet published, para 14. 
620 Schwarze (2007), p. 28. 
621 See Xenopoulos (2006) for a comparative law overview on the application of the fundamental 
freedoms in the field of direct taxation. 
622 Wunderlich/Albath (2005), p. 549 et seq. 
623  The ECJ becomes involved in direct taxation matters following an infringement procedure 
initiated by the Commission under Art. 258 or by a MS according to Art. 259 as well following the 
request by a national Court of a MS for a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of EU law 
according to Art. 267 et seqq. (see Rettig/Protzen (2003), p. 196). 
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influence by ECJ case law on direct tax is possible to make visible while extending 
the view for analysis to cases in other fields of the law i.e. consumer law and 
corporate law cases. The question, therefore, arise whether there have been 
decisions by the ECJ already determine domestic regimes or its rules being 
prohibitive and discriminatory. 
 
2.2  Scope of Cases 
There have been, however, no cases brought to the ECJ from a national Court 
regarding a REIT established in a MS under its Home State regime, which was 
invested in a REIT in another MS where the Host State does not provide the 
benefits under its domestic RIET regime. This situation proves the author’s thesis 
that there is no sensitiveness on domestic level for cross-border investments 
either by individuals or corporate and not by REITs in another MS. But there are 
cases on which the ECJ had the opportunity to decide on and where MSs can 
apply the findings to the existence of infringements with its REIT regimes. These 
cases are those in the fields of product, company and tax law where the ECJ 
already assessed MSs rules and regulations not being compliant with the Treaty 
i.e. by infringing the freedom of movement.  
 
However, there have been numerous opportunities for the ECJ to analyse MSs tax 
regimes and its compliance with EU Law in recent years. Although the Treaty 
does not provide for any competence on direct taxation 624 , the ECJ had 
opportunities to judge indirectly on regulations within MSs tax regimes suspect of 
violating the freedoms. Where extent case review and academics focus on tax 
cases mainly decisions on other legal topics have to be taken into account and to 
be analysed. The cases coming to the ECJ are predominantly on tax treatments 
and being of discriminating nature. Details on the interpretation of the freedoms 
scope and objectives are given with numerous decisions especially in the fields of 
corporate and tax law, but in other fields and cases as well. These cases are 
being found outside the obvious “tax court”, i.e. from the corporate law or even 
consumer product law. All together, these cases and its decisions have to be set 
into context and to combined to deriving kind of commentary to the framework set 
for European REITs under the regime of the Treaty’s freedoms applicable. 
624 See Chapter III, Sec. 2.2. 
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However, according to the scope of this thesis focus is given to cross-border 
activities of a REIT. Besides focusing to prominent cases, which are presented 
and analysed in detail, broad overview on the case law relevant is provided 
though. 
 
3.   Leading ECJ Cases 
Starting point for the analysis of the ECJ case law and its impetus towards 
harmonisation of MSs corporate and tax laws is the analysis of early decisions by 
the ECJ outside the corporate and tax court. These basis of decisions have 
resulted in somewhat guiding principles for the jurisdiction by the ECJ in the 
following years. Thus, taking a closer look at those cases and its general 
principles developed by the ECJ starts the puzzle to build the case for the 
applicable case law to REITs in the EU and the impacts for MSs REIT regimes. 
 
3.1  Case “Dassonville” 
In the early years of the EU and the time of the activities towards the internal 
market cases coming to the ECJ have been in the context of the freedom of 
movements of goods as goods play the dominant role in trade between countries 
traditionally. In its Case “Dassonville”625 the ECJ had the opportunity to giving a 
“… radical interpretation of the internal market …”626 by stating:  
 
“All trading rules enacted by the MS which are capable of hindering, directly 
or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra Community trade are to be 
considered as measures having effect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions.”627  
 
Even Case “Dassonville” was on the free movement of goods and on the 
interpretation of measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions a 
625  Case C-8/74, “Procureur du Roi v Benoit and Gustave Dassonville” (Case “Dassonville”), 
(1974), ECR 837. In this case the ECJ indicated that a Belgium requirement that importers of 
Scottish whisky possess a British certificate of authentication was incompatible with Article 30 EC 
Treaty (now, post-Lisbon Treaty, Article 34). The rule favoured direct importers over traders 
importing Scotch whisky into Belgium form another MS in which the goods were already in free 
circulation. Thus, the ECJ found that the rule “channelled” trade (see Weatherill (2003), p. 344) 
and distorted the market (see Case “Dassonville”, para 9). 
626 Richardson (2001), p. 188. 
627 See Case “Dassonville” for the so-called “Dassonville-Formula”, para 5. 
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concept under the freedom of movement of goods it should be considered 
elsewhere as well. The principles developed around the freedom of goods are 
regularly applied by the ECJ to cases not limited to those related to goods only,628 
thus, they are relevant for the analysis of any restrictions to REITs as well.  
 
The importance of the definition on the internal market given by the ECJ in Case 
“Dassonville” was not on the conditions to the internal market as a framework itself 
rather on the conditions according to which national measures have to be 
assessed towards their compliancy with EU law, especially the freedoms of the 
Treaty. According to the definition above, known as the “Dassonville-Formula”, it is 
not necessary to actual effect on trade between MSs as long as the measure is 
capable of such effects.629 With this wide interpretation, in effect, the Dassonville-
Formula include both type of measures distinct and indistinct ones but 
discriminatory intend is not required. However, Art. 34 is in breach if and when a 
measure effecting import is too far “uncertain and indirect”. 630  But, in turn, a 
measure may be lawfully if the action seeks to prevent unfair practices in a 
manner which conformed with Community law, if the measures used were 
“reasonable” and not affecting intra-Community trade. 631  
 
The development with the Case “Dassonville” by the ECJ was to state a 
somewhat “rule of reason” referring directly to Art. 36 and, herewith, required the 
MSs to justify its laws.632 Here, the ECJ has reflected two components in its case 
law: The MSs must show an “end” recognised by Community law which is served 
by the challenged measure and it must show that the “means” chosen to achieve 
that end is “… reasonable …” 633 and, therefore, permissible. Additionally, the 
628 See for example Case “Gebhard”. 
629 See joined Cases C-177 & 178/82, “Criminal Proceedings against Jan van de Haar and Kaveka 
de Meern BV”, (1984), ECR 1797, para 13. 
630 See Case C-379/92, “Criminal proceedings against Matteo Peralta”, (1994), ECR I-3453, para 
24. 
631 The ruling was here broader in scope than suggested by Directive 50/70/EEC, concentrating on 
the effect of national action effectively ignoring its form, and seemed to indicate a determination on 
the part of the ECJ to use Art. 34 to pursue all restrictive national laws that have the effect of 
hindering Intra-Community trade but leaving on the other hand room to the MSs to regulate their 
markets by taking actions as long as the area of action is not regulated by the Community (See 
Weatherill (1995), p. 226; Case C-155/80, “Summary Proceedings against Sergius Oebel”, (1981), 
ECR 1993, para 12). 
632 See i.e. Case C-34/79, “R. v. Henn and Darby”, (1981), ECR 3795, para 12-13. 
633 See Case “Dassonville”, para 6. 
 
140 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
MSs REIT regimes and ECJ case law 
 
“means” are used restrictive by the ECJ and has insisted that measures are 
“reasonable” only where the MS demonstrates that the means to achieve that end 
are the least restrictive for trade.634 Thus, “… discrimination is not the key …”,635 
rather the restrictive effect in inter-State trade is essential.  
 
The jurisdiction by the ECJ in the context of discrimination in intra-Community 
trade started with Case “Dassonville” to construct a body of interpretation, which is 
not blindly linked to Art. 34 rather give more space to cover cases, which are not 
by wording but have to be covered by the objectives of the Treaty´ “market 
integration”. But, the very relevance of the Dassonville-Formula does not give an 
answer to the compliance of MSs restrictions towards non-domestic REITs since 
the Formula was somehow broad still as to the criteria of what may be 
“reasonable” restrictions. The decision just helped the MSs the adoption of Art. 34 
measures, thus, giving guidelines for coming closer to one mutual understanding. 
However, not until the Case “Cassis de Dijon” further clarification on compliant 
restrictive measures by MSs became visible. 
 
3.2  Case “Cassis de Dijon” 
Case “Cassis de Dijon” 636  provided significant impetus to the harmonisation 
process and being of the very basis for the understanding of the freedom of 
movement for companies but on restrictive measures as well. By applying the 
Dasonville-Formula the ECJ added:  
 
“Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities 
between the national laws relating to the marketing of the products in 
question must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognised 
as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in 
particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public 
634  See Case C-42/82, „Commission v. France, (1983), ECR 1013 and Case C-40/82, 
“Commission v. United Kingdom”, (1982), ECR 2793. 
635 See Weatherill (2003), p. 344. 
636  Case “Cassis de Dijon” was a straightforward product requirement case concerning the 
composition of fruit liqueurs. The German law required fruit liqueurs to have a minimum alcohol 
content of 25%, whereas, the French Cassis had an alcohol content of only 15 – 20%. The ECJ 
said, that “in the absence of common rules (i.e. harmonisation) it is for the MSs to regulate all 
matters relating to the production and marketing of alcohol and alcoholic beverages on their own 
territory” (para 8). 
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health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence of the 
consumer.”637 
 
3.2.1 “Rule of Reason” 
This statement became further known as the “rule for reason”, the first Cassis 
principle. Herewith, the ECJ further developed the application of Art. 34 to non-
discriminatory technical standards. The ECJ displaced the Dassonville assumption 
that Art. 34 does not apply to a national measure, which makes no distinction, but 
may nevertheless hinder trade (indistinctly applicable measure), unless it could be 
shown that the measure discriminated between imports and domestic products or 
between different forms of intra-Community trade. Instead, the ECJ stated that the 
rule of reason might apply and save the measure from Art. 34 if it is necessary to 
meet the mandatory requirements. This is significant; since the mandatory 
requirements permitted under Case “Cassis de Dijon” are wider than the grounds 
provided under Art. 36.  
 
The approach the ECJ has taken was the same emphasis on effect in common 
with Case “Dassonville” to abuse measures by MSs, which have restrictive effect 
on intra-Community trade. The application of Art. 34 in this field as corrective is, 
therefore, important. Under this rule MSs measures are “necessary” as long there 
is a lack of Community rules and they are insofar inadequate for “ends”. In order 
to define what is “necessary” to meet a mandatory requirement the ECJ referred 
to the principle of “proportionality”638 where it has to be proofed by the MSs that 
the measure in question is of less of a hindrance to trade.639 Still, Art. 34 is 
leading, while Art. 36 provide exceptions only “… although the extension of the 
available grounds of justification with Case “Cassis de Dijon” constitutes and 
extensive interpretation of the exceptions …” as Cruz 640 concludes. However, 
637 Ibid. 
638 See Case “Cassis de Dijon”, para 44. 
639 See for example product related cases i.e. Case C-178/84, “Commission v. Germany (German 
Beer Tax Act)”, (1987), ECR 1227, (1988) 1 CLMR 780 and Case C-407/85, “Drei Glocken GmbH 
and Kitzinger v. USL Centro-Sud and Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano”, (1988), ECR 4233: In both 
Cases found the ECJ a labelling clearly indicating the ingredients of the products sufficient to 
protect consumers and, therefore, ruled the measures in breach of Art. 34.  
640 See Cruz (2002), p. 79. 
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states Hilson 641, “Case “Cassis de Dijon” left the precise scope of Art. 34 642 
unclear …” still. 
 
3.2.2 “Rule of mutual recognition” 
In this respect the second principle introduced by the ECJ with its decision in Case 
“Cassis de Dijon” is of much more importance creating the basis for judging 
discriminatory rules and measures by MSs. The second principle in order to “… 
judge the permissibility of regulatory diversity between MSs …” 643  was by 
suggesting that  
 
“… there is no valid reason why goods which have been produced and 
marketed in one MS should not be introduced into any other MS …”.644  
 
These goods once lawfully produced and marketed in one MS should be free to 
be marketed in any other MS and will, therefore, prima facie comply with 
mandatory requirements of the MSs into which they are being imported. This can 
be rebutted by evidence that further measures are necessary to protect the 
interest concerned. Than, a national rule must not only pursue a legitimate 
objective but must be necessary and proportionate for the attainment of that 
objective. This rule has become known as the “rule of mutual recognition” which 
has according to Ward645 “… established a principle of de facto harmonisation …”. 
 
The principles established in Case “Cassis de Dijon” are “… strongly deregulatory 
…” 646  and mirror the Treaty´ impetus of integrating the market but does not 
condemn all obstructive national rules and, therefore, “… fills out the gaps …”647 in 
Community law. As the very result Barnard648 concludes “dual regulation” (in the 
home and host state) is replaced with single regulation (of the home state) is to be 
respected by the host state under the principle of mutual recognition. In order not 
to creating the ground for a “race to the bottom” of standards or legal requirements 
641 See Hilson (1999), p. 446. 
642 Art. 34 that were Art 28 at that time pre-Lisbon. 
643 See Weatherill (2003), p. 385. 
644 See Case “Cassis de Dijon”, para 14. 
645 See Ward (1996), p. 121. 
646 See Weatherill (1999), p. 52. 
647 See Weatherill (2003), p. 236. 
648 Barnard (2004), p. 106. 
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set for products the ECJ recognized the mandatory requirements that are intended 
to place a brake to such developments.649 
 
3.2.3 Excursus – Case “Keck” 
The ECJ acknowledges that there are interests of the host state to be respected 
and fields not mentioned in Art. 36. Therefore, the ECJ established his closed list 
of restrictive measures, which may be respected without being contra legem to the 
Treaty´ impetus to free trade. However, by introduction of the “rule of reason” the 
ECJ tried to balance the need of applying Art. 34 with the need to respect the 
mandatory requirements justified under Art. 36. The balance, however, was later 
more clarified with the decision in Case “Keck”.650 While Case “Keck” was on 
“selling arrangements” rather on “product requirements” 651  and, therefore, not 
focusing on the issue in the context of this thesis, the new “rule”652 in Case “Keck” 
“… was a step towards a rule-based approach and a step away from using only 
the doctrine of mandatory requirements and proportionality to police over-zealous 
application of Art. 36…”.653 In effect the ECJ has not changed the second principle 
of Case “Cassis de Dijon” rather it has limited the “unreasonable rigorous 
application of Art. 34”654 and “opened” the mandatory requirements list from an 
“effects-based”655 approach to an “intention-based”656 test saying that a measure 
is in breach while being discriminatory unless justified.  
 
The approach taken by the ECJ in Case “Keck”, however, may be interpreted as 
being of “… consolidation rather confrontation …”657 and expresses the strong 
view for a “… preference for private autonomy ... in the market over public 
649 Ibid. 
650 See joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91, “Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and 
Daniel Mithouard” (Case “Keck”), (1993), ECR I-6097. The case was on the reselling of goods at a 
loss for the Seller. This violated French law forbidding such practices. The defendant submitted 
that the law restricted the volume of sales of imported goods by depriving them of a method of 
sales promotion and that it was therefore incompatible with Article 30 EEC Treaty (now, post-
Lisbon Treaty) Article 34. Any restrictive effect on trade plainly affected all goods, not just imports. 
651 “Product requirements” should be understood as measures relating to the extrinsic or intrinsic 
characteristics of the “goods”. 
652 See Wils (1993), p. 475. 
653 See Moore (1994), p. 201. 
654 See Ward (1996), p. 122. 
655 See Weatherill (1995), p. 226. 
656 See Hilson (1999), p. 447. 
657 See Chalmers (1994), p. 401. 
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regulation …”658 as well as it “… reflects the Courts unwillingness to exercise 
power of review over local regulatory choices that do not damage the realization of 
economies of scale and wider consumer choice in an integrated market …”.659 
This type of “home state control”660 principle in Case “Keck” was, however, not 
without critics. But, the ECJ did not change the basic concept of mutual 
recognition allowing restrictions upon the basis of the rules of reason only still. 
Thus, focus shall be given to the reasoning for justification though. 
 
3.2.4 The “Cassis de Dijon” - principle 
The decision and principles established with Case “Cassis de Dijon”, however, are 
not limited to goods and products in terms of tangible assets. Rather, the term 
“product” in the meaning of Case “Cassis de Dijon” has a wider meaning using the 
term synonym for any kind of “product” that is subject to cross-border market 
activities. This include companies as well that is any company using either 
domestic legal form for its incorporation and must be acknowledged in any other 
MS as a company legally established, thus, has to be recognised under the other 
MS company laws as well. There is no such rule compared to Art. 54 I that extend 
the coverage of the freedom of establishment for persons with Art. 49 to 
companies though. However, ECJ’s case law provide proof for the thesis of the 
same application of the intentions of Art. 28 for “goods” to companies and both are 
summed up within the meaning of “products” under Art. 28 et seqq. to which 
evidence will be given further below with the detailed analysis of the relevant case 
law towards companies.661  
 
3.3  Case “Avoir fiscal” 
With another leading Case “Avoir fiscal” 662 the ECJ later was to set the level 
playing field for any justification of measures restricting i.e. the second principle of 
658 See Weatherill (2002), p. 47. 
659 See Weatherill (1996), p. 885. 
660 See Chalmers (1994), p. 403. 
661 See Sec. 4 below. 
662 In Case “Avoir fiscal” the situation in question was about the French branch of a non-French 
(but EU resident) company that was subject to French corporate tax and, thus, comparable to a 
Company resident in France. France, however, granted tax credits to companies with their 
registered offices in France but not to those with only a branch or agency in France (and a 
registered office in another MS). Accordingly, the denial of an imputation credit to that branch in 
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Case “Cassis de Dijon” and has set out some of the basic understandings if not to 
say “principles” in “European” Company Law. The ECJ at that time stated already 
that the basis under which it considers potential harmful regulations are the four 
freedoms,663 which the ECJ in general understands under the meaning of the 
prohibition of discrimination.664 This case is the basis, although direct taxation falls 
within the sole competence of the MSs, they must nonetheless exercise that 
competence in accordance with the Treaty’s principles. The principles are laid 
down i.e. with the freedoms in the Treaty, thus, having priority.665 
 
Developing its argumentation from Case “Cassis de Dijon” the ECJ followed, that 
while the company’s seat serves as the connecting factor with the legal system of 
a MS as it does nationality for individuals a company within the EU is free to 
choose its appropriate legal form in which to pursue activities in another MS.666 
Consequently, referring to the “Cassis de Dijon”-principle the company legally 
established according to the law of a MS has to be acknowledged as such in 
another MS as well. Like with any product legally produced according to the law of 
one MS and transferred in another MS a company as well must not be excluded 
form legally operating within the territory of another MS. 
 
3.4  Fundamentals of leading cases 
Applying the second principle consequently to the situation of REITs in Europe 
which by way of either primary or secondary establishment move to another MS, 
different form their country of incorporation, MSs must not impose additional 
requirements for the non-domestic REIT to comply with. Rather, any MS must 
acknowledge the foreign REIT as a “product” legally established and, thus, being 
“legal” in any MS under its domestic laws as well without further restriction. In 
effect, any MS must recognise the standards of any other MS as equivalent to its 
respect of dividends received from French companies when such credits would have been 
available to a French resident company breached what is now Art. 49. 
663 See Case “Avoir fiscal”, para 24. 
664 Thus, any measure will, therefore, regularly be confronted with the rule of proportionality. This 
holds true for the so-called “inbound”-case as well as for the so-called “outbound”-case. An 
inbound-case is given where the question is: Will a comparable resident being taxed more 
favourable towards the non-resident (but EU resident) taxpayer with his domestic activities? A so-
called outbound-case is given where it is asked: Will a comparable domestic activity be taxed more 
favourable as the foreign comp (meaning in another MS) activity? 
665 See Case “Avoir fiscal”, para 107. 
666 See Case “Avoir fiscal”, para 18, 22. 
 
146 
                                                                                                                                                        
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
MSs REIT regimes and ECJ case law 
 
own. 667  Thus, when REITs crossing border direct discrimination is concerned 
where MSs REIT regimes require any REIT benefiting from the domestic regime 
to be resident domestically, thus, discrimination on grounds of the company’s seat 
is involved. Whereas, indirect discrimination is at issue in cases additional criteria 
of differentiation are applied that lead to the same result.668 According to Case 
“Avoir fiscal” neither cases of direct nor indirect discrimination in the context of 
discrimination on grounds of a company’s seat shall be justified under Art. 52669. 
Thus, equal treatment is also required in the field of taxation.670 
 
Table IV.3.4-1: ECJ – Leading cases - overview 
# 
Date 
(Year of 
decision) 
Reference 
(ECJ 
decision) 
Case 
(“[Name]”) MS 
Freedom of 
Treaty 
Source 
(Thesis 
page #) Tax 
  Leading  Cases           
1 1974 8/74 Dassonville BEL 
Free 
movement of 
goods 83 
Trading rules shall not 
hinder intra Community 
trade. 
2 1979 120/78 
Cassis de 
Dijon D 
Free 
movement of 
goods 89 
MSs must recognise the 
standards of any other 
MS as equivalent to its 
own (“Rule of mutual 
recognition” from Cassis 
de Dijon principle). 
3 1986 270/83 Avoir fiscal F 
Right of 
Establishment 
89, 92, 
109, 
117 
Companies are free to 
choose the appropriate 
legal form in which to 
pursue its activities in 
another MS (Host State) 
that freedom could not 
be limited by any type 
and measures of 
discriminatory tax 
provisions.  
                
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
 
667 See Barnard (2004), p. 105. 
668 See Case C-330/91, “The Queen v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Commerzbank AG” (Case 
“Commerzbank”), (1993), ECR I-4017, para 14. 
669 Even though Case “Avoir fiscal” was on the freedom of establishment the argumentation by the 
ECJ is with direct relevance for the interpretation of the express derogations under Art. 65 for the 
freedom of movement of capital too. Hence, it follows from the Case “Avoir fiscal” that the 
argument of defending the internal cohesion of one MS’ tax system shall not constitute a case 
under the express derogations of Art. 65. 
670 See Wouters (1994), p. 73 
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4.   Cases on Company/Corporate Law 
 
4.1  Scope of analysis 
As seen form the discussion in the previous section the freedoms have direct 
effect on the laws of companies and its establishment though. Especially with the 
freedom of establishment involved often companies and corporations are subject 
to the case at issue. Hereto, the ECJ was to decide most of its cases in the past 
years with its decisions in the last decade have become known and prominent. 
The milestones in the development of the freedom of establishment with the ECJ 
case law started with the decision in Case “Avoir fiscal”671 where the ECJ clarified 
that Art. 54 leave companies free to choose the appropriate legal form in which to 
pursue its activities in another MS672 leading to the result that ones the connection 
criteria673 are met and the company’ seat has to be considered as being formed in 
accordance with the law of a MS that “seat” serves for the company as the 
connecting factor with the legal system of a particular MS674 and has, therefore, 
the same function for companies as nationality has for individuals.675 Thus, with 
the freedoms directly applicable and downloaded to the MSs the ECJ adds further 
interpretation, which should have and further is about to influence MSs domestic 
company laws. 
 
4.2  Basic principles for companies  
This concept was later confirmed in Case “Segers”676 where the ECJ took an 
extensive view of the right of establishment accepting the incorporation 
principle677 and held, that a company may “…and pursues its activity only … (in a 
671 See Case “Avoir fiscal”. 
672 See Case “Avoir fiscal”, para 22. 
673 See Sec. 4.2 below. 
674 See “Avoir fiscal”, para 18. This decision gives clarification in cases where the rule at issue is 
considered based on the location of the company’s registered office, thus its seat under the real 
seat doctrine. Based on the case presented the ECJ decided the case presented was of indirect 
discrimination that might be saved by objective justification and express derogations that did not 
appear according to the facts. 
675 See Barnard (2004), p. 324. 
676  See Case C-79/85, “Segers v. Bedrijfsvereniging voor Bank-en Verzekeringswegen, 
Groothandel en Vrije Beroepen” (Case “Segers”), (1986), ECR 2375. The case was about a 
company having its registered office in another MS, even though it did not conduct its operational 
business there. However, the director of that company was excluded form the national sickness 
scheme in the MS where the company did conduct its operational activities. 
677 See Cerioni (1999), p. 64. 
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MS different from) … the MS where its branch is established…”.678 A MS treating 
that company different solely because its registered office was in another MS 
renders Art. 54 valueless.679 Having made this conclusion the ECJ seemed to 
consider the mere incorporation in a MS as amounting to “establishment”, with the 
result of including, among the beneficiaries of the right granted by Art. 49 and 54, 
“de facto” pseudo-foreign companies as well.680 
 
However, the following decision in Case “Daily Mail”681 seemed to be a break up 
from the former lines of the ECJ’s jurisdiction,682 the ECJ ruled that the provisions 
on freedom of establishment conferred no right on a company incorporated in MS 
“A” and having its registered office there to transfer its central management and 
control to another MS “B” while retaining its status as a company incorporated 
under the legislation of MS “A”.683 Since there had not been any harmonisation, 
the ECJ remarked that companies are creatures of national law, i.e. they exist only 
by virtue of the national legislation that determines their incorporation and 
functioning.684 Thus, transfer of a company’s seat was considered to be outside 
the remit of the freedom of establishment in relation to both the Host State and the 
Home State.685 
678 The ECJ, hereto, stated that: “…the fact that a company does not conduct any business in the 
MS in which it has its registered office and pursues its activity only in the MS where its branch is 
established is not sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent conduct which would 
entitle the latter MS to deny that company the benefit of the provisions of Community law relating 
to the right of establishment.” (see Case “Segers”, para 16). 
679 The ECJ ruled that Art 49 and 54 prohibited a MS from excluding the director of a company 
from a national sickness insurance scheme on the ground that the company had its registered 
office in another MS, even though it did not conduct any business there. The court said that 
discrimination against employees in connection with social security protection “indirectly restricts 
the freedom of companies of another MS to establish themselves through an agency, branch or 
subsidiary in the MS concerned” (ibid para 15). 
680 See Timmermanns (1991), p. 136. 
681 See Case “Daily Mail”.  
682 The former decisions have mainly dealt with individuals and their right to leave their home state 
granted on the basis of Art. 49 and Directive 73/148682 without restriction, the Court in Case “Daily 
Mail” had to examine for the first time the application of the Treaty’s rules to the case of primary 
establishment of companies (see Directive 73/148/EEC). 
683 See Case “Daily Mail”, para 24. 
684 Ibid. The ruling in Case “Daily Mail” was in many quarters held to imply that then Treaty 
provisions on freedom of establishment could not successful invoked in order to set aside national 
rules on primary establishment. 
685 See Dyrberg (2003), p. 532. The allowance by the ECJ to take priority over Community law by 
national law is not part of Art. 54. Furthermore, Art. 54 is a direct applicable provision of the Treaty 
that means there is no need for any transformation into national law. Therefore, it seems likely that 
if the parties involved would have intended to establish a branch, subsidiary or agency only they 
could have successfully relied on Art. 49 exercising the freedom of (secondary) establishment in 
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The ruling was applauded in some MSs as “… a blessing of the real seat principle 
…”, 686  but the ECJ clarified later that non-equal treatment to comparable 
situations such as on the basis of different treatment of fiscal residence represents 
covert discrimination contrary to and a breach of Art. 49 and 54. 687 Furthermore, 
in Case “Centros” the ECJ confirmed this jurisdiction stating that a company 
lawfully established under the laws of a its Home State transferring its seat to a 
Host State does not represent a case of fraudulently circumventing the laws of the 
Host State though. 688The ECJ argued that different legal conditions i.e. minimum 
capital requirements in the Home State of incorporation (UK) and the Host State 
(DK), does not entitle the Host State to refuse to register that foreign 
establishment. 689 Case “Centros” marked a milestone in the ECJ’s jurisprudence 
on freedom of establishment while using the reasoning from Case “Cassis de 
Dijon” extending its principle of mutual recognition for goods “… to company’s …” 
freedom of establishment.690 It suffices that a company complies with the laws of 
any MS once it has been lawfully established somewhere in the Community and, 
thus, may carry out its business anywhere else.691 
 
This understanding already known as the “mutual recognition doctrine following 
from Case “Cassis de Dijon” was found confirmation in the following case law. In 
Case “X and Y” the ECJ said Article 49 prohibited the State of origin 
 
another MS. This was later confirmed by the ECJ itself in Case C-200/98, “X AB v. 
Riksskatteverket” (Case “X and Y”), (1999), ECR I-8261. 
686 The MSs applauded, however, the legal concept of the “real-seat” principle under their national 
laws (v. the “incorporation” principle) though (see Dyrberg (2003), p. 532). 
687 In light of its case law in other areas of free movement, by which the rules on equality of 
treatment forbid all “covert” forms of discrimination leading, by means of other criteria of 
differentiation, to the same result as overt discrimination on grounds of nationality (see i.e. Case C-
71/1976, “Jean Thieffry v Conseil de l’ordre des Avocats à la Cour de Paris”, (1977), ECR I-00756, 
Case C-3/1988, “Commission v. Italy”, (1989), ECR I-04035, Case “Commerzbank” and Case 
“Halliburton” where the ECJ confirmed that was in breach of Art. 49 and, herewith, impliedly 
extended the prohibition of restrictions to the de-establishment. (see Cerioni (1999), p. 70)). 
688 See Case “Centros”, para 24. 
689 See Case “Centros”, para 35. 
690 See Opinion of Advocate-General La Pergola in Case “Centros”, para 20. 
691 See Micheler (2000), p. 180/181. The decision has led to enormous commentaries in literature 
varying from the question of the validity of the real seat principle to the opening of a door of legally 
circumventing national laws being more restrictive. However, this discussion is out of scope of this 
thesis and, thus, not further evaluated (see for Literature to this discussion i.e. Dyrberg (2003), p. 
532, Micheler (2003), p. 522, Barnard (2004), p. 323, Siems (2002), p. 50/51, Austrian Supreme 
Court (2000), p. 49 and Rappaport (2000), p. 631). 
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“… from hindering the establishment in another MS of … a company 
incorporated under its legislation”,692 
 
therefore, granting certain tax benefits to domestically operating company’s only 
breaches Art. 49 as well as burdening of taxes hindering or precluding companies 
to move cross-border violate the freedom of establishment outlined in Case 
“Lasteyrie”. 693 Therefore, any measures by MSs, which are linked with moving a 
company and potentially hinder the exercise of the freedom of establishment694, 
even simply from an economic point of view only. 695 With the decision in Case 
“Inspire Art” 696 the ECJ extended this understanding applicable not only obligating 
MSs to fully acknowledge that legal entities formed abroad may be subject to 
different rules than domestic entities, but to acknowledge the entire legal system 
of the state of incorporation.697  
 
With the decision in Case “Inspire Art” the ECJ has widely opened the door for 
corporate restructuring within European Company Law and “… has torn down the 
last legal barriers for the unrestricted cross-border use of legal forms …”698 for 
companies existing in the EU.699 This was seen in the following Case “SEVIC”700 
692 See Case “X and Y”, para 26. 
693 See Case “Lasteyrie”; Kälin/Rödl (2004), p. 16. 
694 As a consequence, it might be clear that there is no need to differentiate between cases of 
“inbound” (immigration) or “outbound” (emigration) relevance. Indeed, there are no good reasons 
why regulations of the MSs concerning the moving out of companies should not be covered by the 
freedom of establishment, whereas, regulations dealing with the moving in should be (see Roth 
(2003), p. 189). 
695 Hereto, reference shall be made to Case “National Grid” where the ECJ held a national rule 
disproportionate, which provided for the immediate recovery of tax for unrealised capital gains at 
the very time of transfer of the place of management of the company as it was in the case of the 
main proceedings, whereas capital gains on the case of a transfer of the place of management 
within the Home State was subject to tax at the same time of the realisation of capital gains only. 
Such an immediate tax create a cash-flow disadvantage that is viewed not to be proportionate, 
thus, hinder the freedom of establishment (see Case C-371/10, “National Grid Indus BV v 
Inspecteur van de Belastingsdienst Rijnmond / Kantoor Rotterdam” (Case “National Grid”), not yet 
published, para 37). 
696 See Case C-167/01, “Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd” 
(Case “Inspire Art”), (2003), ECR I-10155, para 101.  
697 See Kersting/Schindler (2003), p. 1290. 
698 See Müller, (2009), p. 196. 
699 MSs may still restrict the freedom of establishment provided the restriction is covered by Art. 52 
or meets the criteria for being justified. Thus, it would be fair to state that the analysed jurisdiction 
cannot be viewed as an abolition oft he real seat principle (see Xanthaki (2000), p. 7) but is has to 
be admitted that the effect of these judgements “... may be to erode the real seat principle still 
further ...” (see Barnard (2004), p. 324) to an extent of a de-facto dismissal (see Omar (2002), p. 
454). 
700 Case C-411/03, “SEVIC Systems AG” (Case “SEVIC”), (2005) ECR I-10805. 
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where the ECJ while dealing with extending the cross-border mobility of 
companies by applying the principle of freedom of establishment to cross-border 
mergers 701  built case beyond cross-border mergers, namely with respect 
especially i.e. to seat transfers.702 It has built the way that the seeking of the “… 
most fitting corporate forms and corporate law rules …” has been acknowledged 
to be the rationale underlying Art. 49 and 54.703 
 
Recently, however, the ECJ presented with its judgments in Case “Cadbury-
Schweppes” 704 and Case “Cartesio”705 decisions providing for some shaping to 
the freedom of establishment, which can be seen as limiting company’s mobility to 
cross-borders for which previous case law has opened the door widely. In Case 
“Cadbury Schweppes” reliance to the freedom was provided only to companies 
that do not only look like a “company” but are not taking part in economic activities 
though. Only, where the incorporation “… reflects economic reality…” 706  that 
company shall be recognised and, thus, eligible for protection under the scope of 
the freedom of establishment. Therefore, the “… incorporation must correspond 
with an actual establishment intended to carry on genuine economic activities in 
the Host State…”.707 However, a valid “establishment” requires the presence of a 
structure consisting of a minimum level of organisation and a degree of stability 
necessary for the purpose of pursuing an economic activity. Thus, presence alone 
of goods, i.e. real property in isolation or bank accounts does not, in principle, 
meet that definition.708 Otherwise, such establishment may be viewed as being a 
“wholly artificial arrangement”.709 That could be so in particular in the case of 
701 In Case SEVIC, the ECJ held that cross-border mergers “… constitute particular methods of 
exercise of the freedom of establishment, important for the proper functioning of the internal 
market …” (see Case “SEVIC”, para 19). However, the Merger Directive (Directive 2005/56/EC) 
has not made the decision in Case “SEVIC” superfluous, rather the statements made by the ECJ in 
this case will serve as a significant guideline for open issues and the interpretation of cross-border 
situations including those related tot he Merger Directive since the latter provides for a simple, 
standardised tool to implement a cross-border merger within the EU (see Evers (2010), p. 19). 
702 Siems (2007), pp 307 et seqq. 
703 See Vaccaro (2005), p. 1356. 
704 Case C-196/04, “Cadbury Schweppes plc, Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Commissioners 
of Inland Revenue” (Case “Cadbury-Schweppes”), (2006), ECR I-4585. 
705 Case C-210/06, “Cartesio Oktató és Szoláltató bt” (Case “Cartesio”), (2008), ECR I-09641. 
706 See Case “Cadbury Schweppes”, para 65. 
707 See Case “Cadbury Schweppes”, para 66. 
708 See Case C-396/09, “Interdil Srl in liquidation v Fallimento Interdil Srl, Intesa Gestione Crediti, 
SpA”, (2011), ECR I-09915, para 64. 
709 Ibid, para 68 
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“letterbox” or “front” subsidiary.710 However, the sole use of tax efficient structures 
or tax benefits itself does not create an issue in general, that measures by MSs 
aimed at removing such advantages are a violation of Community law, except in 
situations where such advantages are themselves an abuse of Community law.711 
 
In Case “Cartesio” 712  the latest judgment on companies' mobility, the ECJ 
delivered a decision pointing out that a MS is not precluded to determine the 
connecting factor for a company incorporated under its national laws that MS is 
allowed to enact rules under its national law to define criteria for companies under 
which they may retain its status as a company holding legal personality under its 
national law though.713 However, the ECJ made clear that this competence is 
limited to the extent national law completely forbids any kind of transfer of seat to 
another MS or requires the winding-up or liquidation prior to such a conversion.714 
Otherwise, the obiter dictum is confirming settled case law by stating that the 
freedom of establishment also covers the possibility of a company converting itself 
into a company governed by the laws of another MS – which is de facto the 
710 Ibid, with reference to Case C-341/04, “Eurofood IFSC”, (2006), ECR I-3813, paras 34/35. 
711  See Case “Cadbury Schweppes”, para 75. In the parent-subsidiary scenario, the CFC 
legislation applies to attribute to the UK parent the profits of the overseas subsidiary if it is located 
in a low tax jurisdiction. There are specific exemptions from the application of the CFC attribution of 
profits as well as a more general “motive” test under which the legislation will not apply in 
circumstances where the “main” purpose or reason for the arrangements was not to achieve a 
reduction in UK tax or diversion of taxable profits from the UK. The ECJ said it was for the national 
court to determine whether the “motive” exclusion was wide enough to ensure that the CFC 
legislation was applicable to only “wholly artificial arrangements” (see para 72). 
712 Case “Cartesio” was about a limited partnership established and registered in Hungary. Under 
Hungarian law this form of firms requires that there is at least one general (unlimited) partner and 
one limited partner (See Hungarian Investment and trade Development Agency, “Corporate 
Legislation”; available on: http://www.itdh.com/engine.aspx?page=Itdh_corporate). Therefore, this 
form of company is comparable to the French “Societé en Commandite simple” (SCS), the German 
“Kommanditgesellschaft” (KG) and the UK “Limited Partnership” (Ltd.) (see Dorresteijn (1994), pp. 
26-27). The limited partnership wanted to transfer its central place of administration from Hungary 
a MS adhering to the real seat doctrine to another MS, Italy, adhering to the real seat doctrine as 
well. However, Italy refused the application of “Cartesio” for registration in the Commercial register 
of the transfer of its company seat to Italy. Although “Cartesio” lacked legal personality according 
to Hungarian corporate law since the law did not provided for a company to transfer its seat abroad 
while continuing to be subject to Hungarian law as its personal law, the ECJ referred to “Cartesio” 
as a company and treated as such. 
713 See Valk (2010), p. 157; The ECJ held: “As Community law now stands, Articles 43 EC and 48 
EC (Comment: Reference made to the Articles of the Treaty pre-Lisbon numbering which are today 
Articles 49 and 54) are to be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State under 
which a company incorporated under the law of that Member State may not transfer its seat to 
another Member State whilst retaining its status as a company governed by the law of the Member 
State of incorporation.” (see Case “Cartesio”, para 124).  
714 See Case “Cartesio”, para 112/113. 
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transfer of the registered office. 715  Therefore, once the connecting factor is 
established and as long as the connecting factor is maintained according to the 
national laws, a company is entitled to rely on the freedom of establishment.716 
Furthermore, with Case “National Grid”717 the discussion became a spin back to 
the understanding that a company’s transfer of its registered seat does not affect 
its status as company under the laws of its Home State of incorporation. It shall, 
however, be noted that Case “Cartesio” was about a case of immigration into 
another MS, whereas Case “National Grid” was a case of emigration, viewed from 
the Home State of incorporation. Thus, the question is open for further 
interpretation from the ECJ following Case “Cartesio” to clarify cases from the 
view of the immigrating MS though. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that there is 
no difference with inbound or outbound cases as long as there is a simultaneous 
change of national law since companies are creatures of national law.718 
 
4.3   Summary on Company mobility in the EU 
According to settled case law by the ECJ companies legally established according 
to the laws of a MS benefit from mutual recognition according to the “Cassis de 
Dijon” principle. 719  Especially with the trilogy of the Cases “Centros”, 
“Überseering” and “inspire Art” the ECJ opened the door to the market of any MS 
for legal entities formed abroad.720 This holds true, even such companies have 
been established under conditions different, even lower, to those in the Host 
State: Moreover, they may not engage in business in their Home State since that 
country follows the incorporation principle and, therefore, my be viewed in another 
MS i.e. in a MS following the real seat principle not existing since the company 
may not legally established while not meeting the MS’ conditions though.721 
 
715 See Case “Cartesio”, para 111-113. 
716 See Case “Cartesio”, para 110. 
717  See Case C-371/10, “National Grid Indus BV gegen Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst 
Rijnmond/kantoor Rotterdam” (“National Grid”), (2011), ECR I-12273. 
718 See Cases “Daily Mail”, para 19; “Überseering”, para 67 and “Cartesio”, para 104. 
719 This holds true for cases of primary establishment that are inherent to Art. 49 I already, but as 
well for secondary establishment by implied recognition according to Case “Centros” too. This view 
has been confirmed with the decision in Case “Überseering” though. Furthermore, there is neither 
difference in view whether the company is assessed from the MS where the company is 
immigrating into, nor from the view of the MS of moving out (emigration) as the ECJ held in its case 
“Lasteyrie”. 
720 See Müller (2009), p. 196. 
721 See Exhibit IV.4-1: Cases on company/corporate law – overview. 
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Thus, freedom of establishment for companies as a legally established “product” 
of the EU must not be restricted while “moving” within the territories of the MS and 
must be recognised as such by any other MS. Hence, the differences in MSs 
domestic laws towards conditions for the legal incorporation of companies i.e. the 
application of the real seat or the incorporation theory is not of relevance for 
companies to rely on the freedom of establishment. Hereto, the ECJ clarified with 
its decision in Case “Inspire Art” that the connecting factor for companies is the 
legal situation in its MS of incorporation. Either theory that MSs company law is 
subject to the company is to be recognised as such in other MSs even where the 
other MS might follow a different theory for a company’s establishment though. 722  
 
Thereby, the ECJ with its decisions changed considerably the possibility for 
national laws to restrict access to foreign companies to their national legal order 
and mobility is allowed723 granting foreign companies the right of transfer its seat 
into another MS while keeping their respective corporate form under which they 
have been established in their Home State. Each company shall, thus, be entitled 
to this right provided: 
 
- the company has legally been formed and established under the law of one of 
the MSs724; 
- having its residence in the EU725; 
- holding legal personality under its Home State;  
- having not been deprived of its legal personality at transfer under the Home 
State´ laws;726 and  
- it does not represent a wholly artificial arrangement, but carries out genuine 
economic activity.727 
 
722 Ibid. 
723 See Evers (2010), p. 6. 
724 See Case “Cassis de Dijon” for the Cassis-de Dijon principle (see Sec. 3.2.4 above). 
725 See Case “Dassonville” and Case “Avoir fiscal” (see Sec. 3.1 and 3.3 above). 
726 See Valk (2010), p. 152, 159 with reference further to Ringe (2005), pp. 621f, 623-639. 
727  A corporation is eligible for protection under the scope of the freedom of establishment. 
Therefore, the “… incorporation must correspond with an actual establishment intended to carry on 
genuine economic activities in the Host State…”. Otherwise, such establishment may be viewed as 
being a “wholly artificial arrangement” (see Case “Cadbury-Schweppes”, para 66, 68). 
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While Case “Cadbury Schweppes” provided for clarification on the limits of mutual 
recognition and room to prevent abuse of use, Case “Cartesio” again fuelled the 
discussion whether such distinction creates a case for conflict of laws in between 
MSs following the real seat doctrine v. those following the incorporation doctrine, 
thus, has to lead to a differentiation of future cases where cross-border situations 
may be at issue though.728 However, with Case “National Grid” the discussion 
became spin back to the understanding that a company’s transfer of its registered 
seat does not affect its status as company under the laws of its Home State of 
incorporation729, but the question “… exactly which rules travel with the company 
when it moves within the Community is a topic that still will provoke considerable 
litigation in coming years …”.730 Nevertheless, in case of a MS REIT crossing 
border into another MS must not necessarily transfer its seat to becoming 
recognised.731 Though, the foreign REIT may operate its activities in the Host 
State directly as a foreign REIT.732  
 
5.   The Case Law on (direct) Tax 
 
5.1  Scope of analysis 
The cases and decisions in the field of company/corporate law analysed above 
and further political advancements733 in this field emphasise “hard” policies, which 
are downloaded to the MSs. They seem to provide a picture of “misfit” on MSs 
level with regard to MSs REIT regimes, but even though MSs REIT regimes may 
not “fit” with its legal requirements this must not uphold for its direct tax treatment. 
However, there has been extended jurisdiction by the ECJ in the field of tax law 
though.734 It is settled case law already that although direct taxation falls within the 
728 It is out of scope of this thesis to evaluate on this subject further, thus, reference for this 
discussion shall be made to i.e. Valk (2010), pp. 161-165 with further references though. 
729 See Case “National Grid”. 
730 See Micheler (2003), p. 529. 
731 Since the focus of this thesis is given to cross-border activities not necessarily involving a 
transfer of seat of the company from its MS of incorporation to another MS for its new domiciliation, 
this case shall not be of focus for discussion further, rather focus is given to cases reflecting 
Investment Scenarios I. – IV. though (see Chapter II., Sec. 5.4.1). 
732 See Table II.5.4-1: Cross-Border investments – overview of scenarios. 
733 Political activities are more detailed discussed in Chapter VII, Sec. 3 below. 
734 A Commissions Report on ECJ cases on direct taxation (the “Commissions 2001 Report”) lists 
only 5 decisions before 1990, around 40 over the course of the 1990th and more than 35 cases 
between 2000 and 2005 alone (see: http://europe.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/publications/ 
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sole competences of the MSs they must nonetheless exercise that competence in 
a manner consistent with EU law.735 As a consequence MSs national tax laws 
have been heavily influenced by the interpretation of the Treaty’s freedoms 
provisions i.e. the freedom of establishment as well as the freedom of movement 
of capital. The Commissions 2001 Report 736  already suggested orientation 
guidelines for uniform implementation of decisions by the ECJ concerning already 
existing verdicts but to call up the ECJ by using the back door for assistance and 
asking for interpretation of harmful tax regulations in MSs with respect of the 
political goal for tax harmonisation. Following the competences limited in taxation 
issues the “overwhelming majority of the cases decided by the ECJ deal with the 
compatibility of direct tax provisions of the MSs with the Treaty freedoms, in 
particular i.e. the freedom of movement of persons and companies and the 
freedom of movement of capital”.737 
 
According to the scope of this thesis’ analysis the following focus on REITs in the 
scenario of cross-border activities and the tax treatment faced from its perspective 
as corporate and corporate shareholders. 738  Hence, the case law concerning 
three types of activities are analysed that are direct activities in the Host State, 
those as shareholder in a corporate (REIT) in the Host State and it shall be 
identified the relevant ECJ case law to give information on the gaps left behind by 
the Treaty and its wording related to the freedoms. This will provide the 
understanding of the framework to cross-border situations and the conditions to 
MSs national REIT regimes to comply and “fit” with applicable EU law. In 
identifying these conditions the impact of EU “hard” policies becomes visible with 
situations of MSs having adopted such conditions already as a result of 
taxation/document/court_cases_ direct_Taxation_en.pdf). For further cases listed see Malherbe 
(2008) and its annexes at the end of the study. 
735  See Sec. 3 and 4 above as well as settled case law by the ECJ i.e. Case C-387/11, 
“Commission v Belgium”, (2012), judgement of 25 October 2012, not yet published, which was 
most recently confirmed with Cases C-383/10, “European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium”, 
judgement of 6 June 2013, not yet published para 40, and Case C-296/12, “Commission v 
Belgium”, (2014), Judgement of 23 January 2014, not yet published, para 27. 
736 See Commissions 2001 Report. 
737 See Malherbe (2008), p. 10. 
738  See the potential “investment scenarios” in Chapter II, Sec. 5.4.1. therefore, the case 
considering taxation of individuals and those decisions on companies and shareholders in 
“inbound cases” will not be further evaluated except for those cases of cross-border situations that 
are of relevance for REIT activities in “outbound cases”. 
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downloading or where MSs REIT regimes “misfit” with some of their criteria i.e. 
direct tax rules resulting in adaptational pressure though. 
 
5.2  Principle of “equal treatment” 
The basic “principle” to direct taxation was provided by the ECJ with Case 
“Schumacker”.739 Even though, the case was about an Individual and its eligibility 
for benefits under personal income tax regulations, the decision is of wider impact 
for the general understanding of the conditions for the compliancy of national tax 
regimes with EU law. In its decision, the ECJ accepted differential treatment in 
cases where MSs apply different tax rules or tax systems to resident and non-
resident since these two categories of persons are generally not comparable.740 
However, any differentiation might, depending on the circumstances, constitute 
discrimination if  
 
“there is no objective difference between the situations of the two such 
as to justify different treatment in that regard”.741  
 
This concept of justifying differential treatment based on residency became known 
as the “Schumacker doctrine”. 742  The “principle of equal treatment” 743 builds 
ground to limit differential treatment in the field of taxation744 provided, however, 
non-residents undertake significant economic activity in the Host-State that the “… 
two situations be comparable …”. 745  According to Case “Wielockx” 746  a 
739 See Case C-279/93, “Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Schumacker” (Case “Schumacker”), (1995), 
ECR I-225. The case concerns a Belgian resident employed in Germany. Because of his non-
resident status, Mr. Schumacker was denied in Germany the “splitting regime”, an income tax 
regime allowing couples to benefit from a lower progression, and the procedural advantage of an 
overall tax assessment at the end of the year, as both advantages were only granted to German 
residents. 
740  See Case “Schumacker”, paras 31-34 where the Court stated, that “there are objective 
differences between them, both from the point of view of the source of the income and form the 
point of view of their ability to pay tax or the possibility of taking account of their personal and 
family circumstances”. 
741 See Case “Schumacker”, para 36-38. 
742  Malherbe points out that the decision in Case “Schumacker” followed the Commissions 
unsuccessful attempts to harmonize the income tax systems of the MS in this respect, first through 
the 1979 Commission proposal for a directive concerning the harmonization of income taxation 
provisions with respect to freedom of movement for workers within the EU, which was withdrawn in 
1993, and then trough “soft law”, with the Tax Recommendation (1994), Ibid para 153, pp. 22-28, 
see Malherbe (2008), p. 16. 
743 See Barnard (2004), p.326. 
744 See Barnard (2004), p.326 with reference generally to Wouters (1994). 
745 See Case “Schumacker”, para 31 et seq. 
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“objectively comparable situation” under the Schumacker-doctrine is given where 
a non-resident derives its income entirely or almost exclusively from economic 
activities in the Host State. 747 Furthermore, following Case “Wielockx” the ECJ 
extended the Schumacker-doctrine with its decision in Case “Gschwind” 748  to 
cases where a non-resident receives only such a small portion of its income in its 
Home State that is subject to little or no tax there749 taking opportunity to define a 
“significant economic activity”. Even though the ECJ did not express a threshold 
by number, it confirmed existence in general that shall be at a minimum of 50%750, 
but a threshold at 90% may not be discriminatory though. 751 Besides, the income 
must be taken into account by either the home or the Host State otherwise 
discrimination arises752 as outlined in Case “Wallentin” 753 and Case “Estonia” 754. 
 
However, the ECJ discussed the reference made in the case to the Commissions 
“Tax Recommendation 1994”755 limiting the equal treatment of non-residents by 
defining a “significant economic activity”:  
 
746 Case C-80/94, “G.H.E.J. Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe Belastingen” (Case “Wielockx”), 
(1995), ECR-I 2493. 
747 Thus, a non-resident in a “comparable” situation must be eligible for the same benefits as 
resident taxpayers are and not be excluded from favourable treatment though (see case 
“Wielockx”, para 21). Otherwise, discrimination is involved (see Case “Wielockx”, para 22). 
Malherbe points out, hereto, that, “interestingly, the ECJ decision of 1995 followed the 
Commissions unsuccessful attempts to harmonize the income tax systems of the MS in this 
respect, first through the 1979 Commission proposal for a directive concerning the harmonization 
of income taxation provisions with respect to freedom of movement for workers within the 
Community, which was withdrawn in 1993, and then through a “soft law”, with the Commission 
Recommendation 94//79/EC of 21 December 1993 (“Tax Recommendation 1994”) on the taxation 
of certain items of income received by non-residents in a MS other than that in which they are 
resident”. (See Malherbe (2008), p. 16). 
748 See Case C-391/97; “Gschwind v Finanzamt Aachen-Aussenstadt” (Case “Gschwind”), (1999), 
ECR I-5451.  
749 See hereto the “Trilogy” of cases which are Case “Gschwind”; Case C-169/03, “Florian W. 
Wallentin v Riksskatteverket” (Case “Wallentin”, (2004), ECR I-6443, and Case C-39/10, 
“Commission v Republic of Estonia”, judgement of 10 May 2012, not yet published; See Exhibit 
IV.5.2-1: Case law on (direct) tax – “Equal treatment”. 
750 See Case “Gschwind”, para 29.  
751 See Case “Gschwind”, para 6, 32. This threshold was set by the German tax law in Case 
“Gschwind”.  
752 See Case C-169/03, “Florian W. Wallentin v Riksskatteverket” (Case “Wallentin”), (2004), ECR 
I-6443, para, 20, which confirmed the ruling of the ECJ in Case “Gschwind” as followed from Case 
“Schumacker”. 
753 Ibid. 
754 See Case “Estonia”, paras 60-65. 
755 The Tax Recommendation 1994 in Art 2(1) specified: “MS do not subject the items of income 
specified ... in the MS of taxation, to any heavier taxation than if the taxpayer ... were resident in 
that MS.” 
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“… subject to the condition that the items of income … which are 
taxable in the MS in which the … person is not resident constitute at 
least 75% of that person’s total taxable income during the tax year”.756  
 
Even though the ECJ did again not expressly confirm a threshold and an activity 
to be significant when comprising of at least 75% of the taxable income757 it may 
now together with the threshold of 90% subject to Case “Gschwind” serve as a 
valid range for the assessment of what significance any activity in a Host State as 
well as in a Home State shall be in order to benefit from allowances in a Host 
State though.758 The range of relevant income received in a Host State may be 
required in a range of at least 75%759 to 90%760 likely to serve for a maximum 
threshold. Whereas, any income in the Home State may not exceed 50% rather 
being smaller than representing 25% of the income received in the Home State 
though.761 
 
Thus, it follows from the Schumacker-principle a difference in tax treatment 
between residents and non-residents must not constitute a difference where the 
non-resident taxpayer is in a comparable situation. 762 Equal treatment, however, 
is required where the taxpayer receives the most substantial part of its income not 
in the country of residence but in the Host State. In that case the latter State 
cannot apply to non-residents a different tax treatment from that applied to 
residents.763 Consequently, as regards the tax treatment, the non-resident must 
be treated as resident in the MS in which he receives its most significant part of 
756 The threshold was taken from the Tax Recommendation 1994, which in its Article 2(2) limited 
the equal treatment of non-residents. 
757 The Commission, however, has asserted that the Recommendation given was not binding and 
not intended to supplement the rules of primary law on the freedom of movement. The 
Recommendation merely had proposed the adoption of national measures to implement EU law. 
But, finally, the Recommendation was adopted before the judgment in Case “Schumacker” was 
delivered by the ECJ, it has “in fact lost its raison d´ètre” (see Case C-39/10, “Commission v 
Republic of Estonia” (Case “Estonia”), (2012), ECR I-0000, para 46). 
758 See Case “Estonia”, para 61. 
759 See Tax Recommendation 1994, Art 2(2). 
760 See Case “Gschwind”, para 6. The ECJ furthermore provided that in order to calculate the 90% 
fraction, the MS of activity could not take into consideration income of one of the spouses that was 
not considered taxable by the MS of such spouses’ residence (See Case C-329/05, “Finanzamt 
Dinslaken v Meindl”, (2007), ECR I-1107, where the ECJ furthermore “approved” the German 
threshold of 90%). 
761 See Case “Gschwind”, para 29 and Case “Estonia”, para 54. 
762 See Case “Gschwind”, para 26. 
763 See Case “Schumacker”, para 30, Case “Gschwind”, para 21 as well as more recently Case C-
383/05, “Raffaele Talotta v État Belge”, (2007), ECR I-2555, para 18. 
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the income, and that State must grant the tax advantages it allows to residents 
though.764 Furthermore, a non-resident must not be placed in a disadvantageous 
situation as the person would had not take advantage of the freedom of movement 
i.e. that he would be taxed in the Host State while he would not be subject to tax in 
his Home State with the same income though. Any different treatment would, 
therefore, be “… incompatible with the requirements of the Treaties as they follow 
form Art. 45”.765 
 
5.3   Tax treatment of non-resident companies 
According to the Treaty766 companies shall “… be treated in the same way as 
(resident) natural persons …”.767 In this way, the Treaty aims to assimilate the 
position of companies with that of individuals.768 In this context, it is the company’s 
seat that serves as the connecting factor as it does nationality for individuals as it 
was seen already above 769 leading to equal treatment in the field of taxation 
provided the two situations are comparable.770 The “principle of equal treatment” 
builds the basis for analysing access to tax benefits for non-resident companies. 
Where, however, access to the tax regime of a Host State and its benefits is 
subject to nationality of the company (direct)771 discrimination generally starts at 
company law level already. Beside the general case law analysed above on the 
recognition of the foreign company in the following case law extant is analysed 
with regard to access to equal treatment in general as well as to specific benefits 
and burdensome or less beneficial treatment of a company in the Host State.772 
 
764 See Case “Gschwind”, para 27. See Exhibit IV.5.2-1. 
765 See Case “Estonia”, para 58. 
766 Art. 49 applies not only to individuals but to companies (legal persons) too by way of primary 
(“… set up and manage undertakings … companies ….” (Art. 49 II)) or secondary (“… setting up of 
agencies, branches or subsidiaries …”, Art. 49 I)) establishment766 provided the company comply 
with the conditions set out in Art. 54. 
767 See Art. 54 I. 
768 Barnard (2004), p. 310. 
769 See Section 2.3 with sub-section 2.3.3 referring to Case “Avoir Fiscal”, paras 18 and 22. 
770 As outlined in Case “Schumacker”, para 30. See section 2.5.3 above. 
771 For definition and differentiation of direct vs. indirect discrimination see Chapter III section 3.1.6 
above. 
772 Taxation in the Home State is not in scope for this analysis since the cross-border situation 
faced by company’s in the Host State are of issue and situations relevant to the Home State shall 
be discussed with the cases in the field of company law already to the extent relevant for the 
objective of this thesis (see Sec. 2). 
 
161 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
MSs REIT regimes and ECJ case law 
 
 
5.3.1  Equal treatment 
The situation of either a non-resident or a permanent establishment in a cross-
border situation is viewed distinct by Host States since the permanent 
establishment itself does not constitute a legal personality by itself. Rather, it is 
part of the legal entity identified as the company. As such the permanent 
establishment constitute an activity of the non-resident company in the Host State. 
In this respect the permanent establishment shall be viewed in the Host State in 
the same way as the non-resident company that is to be treated in the same way 
as a domestic company under EU law. Following from the analysis´ above773 any 
denial of access on grounds of nationality is discriminatory. Consequently, any 
company formed according to the laws of a MS shall be entitled to access any 
other MSs tax regime and its tax benefits.  
 
(1)   Case “Stauffer” 
In the context of direct taxation this situation may be subject to an analysis under 
Art. 63 ff. since the taxation is linked to the free movement of capital as it was the 
subject situation in Case “Stauffer”. 774  The ECJ ruled that that the differential 
treatment of resident and non-resident entity775 constitutes an unjustified breach 
on the free movement of capital. Provided that the non-resident entity is 
comparable to a resident entity776 it is in a “comparable situation” with a resident 
entity. The ECJ held that the entity comparable in its essential criteria for the tax 
treatment of such type of entities under the laws of the Host State has to be 
equally treated in the Host State to the resident ones. Thus, the location of an 
entity within the EU cannot be decisive for the question of taxation. Consequently, 
773 See Sec. 5.2 above. 
774 See Case C-386/04, “Centro di Musicologia Walter Stauffer v Finanzamt München für 
Körperschaften” (Case “Stauffer”), (2006), ECR-I-8203. Subject to Case Stauffer was an Italian 
resident foundation deriving rental income from German real estate in 1997, which was subject to 
German corporate tax. Since the German law stipulates that exemption from corporate tax only 
applies to resident entities, i.e. entities that have their registered office and/or governance structure 
in Germany, the German tax authorities refused to grant that exemption to the Stauffer foundation 
as well since it was not a foundation resident under German law. Hence, the same tax advantages 
must be provided to a permanent establishment and resident companies equally. 
775 The entity in the main proceedings of this case involved a charitable foundation incorporated 
and established under Italian law (see Case “Stauffer”). 
776 Since the referring Court had already recognised the charitable status of Stauffer, the ECJ 
considered Stauffer to be comparable, thus being in a “comparable situation” with a German 
charitable foundation (see Case “Stauffer”). 
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according to the Schumacker doctrine777 it decided that the non-resident entity 
was to exempted from real estate tax in the Host State. Therefore, “Stauffer” was 
able to claim tax benefits originally designed by the German government for its 
domestic foundations only. 
 
The ECJ went on later to confirm the decision taken in Case “Stauffer” when it had 
to decide on the eligibility of a non-resident non-profit making body to claim for a 
reduced rate of tax applicable to a legacy received by a resident of that MS. The 
situation was at issue in the main proceedings in Case “Missionswerk”.778 In this 
case the ECJ held that a MS is prohibited from establishing rules that take as its 
criterion the location of operations to benefit from (lower) domestic tax rates. 
Accordingly, a MS cannot refuse the non-resident the right to equal treatment.779 
 
(2)   Case “Prunus” 
France provided with Case “Prunus” for another case within the context of foreign 
direct investment.780 According to the French GTC non-resident owners holding 
direct real property in France were subject to a 3% tax on the market value of the 
property unless the Home State of the foreign company had entered into a 
convention on administrative assistance to combat tax evasion with France.781 
 
Thus, resident owners of real property as well as such owner without having a 
permanent establishment in France and resident in a MS or country without 
having entered into such convention were subject to the 3% tax on the market 
value of their direct property holdings in France. Since the ECJ already held that 
cross-border investments into immovable property such as that in this case 
constitute a movement of capital within the meaning of Art. 63782 it held the 3% tax 
rule to constitute a restriction on the free movement of capital though.783 
 
777 See Case “Schumacker”. 
778 See Case “Missionswerk”. 
779 Ibid, para 34 (Case “Missionswerk”). 
780 See Case C-384/09, “Prunus SARL, Polonium SA v Directeur des services fiscaux” (Case 
“Prunus”), judgement of 5 May 2011, not yet published. 
781 Ibid, para 23. 
782  Ibid, para 22 with reference to Case C-451/05, “Européenne et Luxembourgeoise 
d’investissements SA (ELISA) v Directeur général des impôts and Ministère public”, (Case 
“ELISA”), (2007), ECR I-8251. 
783 Ibid, para 25. 
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The ECJ therefore decided that the additional condition of the existence of the 
said convention between the Host State and the Home State may entail, for that 
category of legal persons, a de facto permanent regime of non-exemption from 
that tax, making investment in immovable property in France less attractive for 
such non-resident companies.784 
 
 (3)   Summary 
From the case law it results that a company’s activity in the Host State either 
through the creation of a permanent establishment or a subsidiary shall not be 
treated differently as a resident company under the tax laws of the Host State 
being the Home State of the resident company. With respect to access the tax 
regime and its benefits a branch of non-resident companies must be treated in the 
same way as the Host State would treat branches of its resident companies 
domestically or equally in case of a subsidiary to those of resident parent 
companies.785 Thus, in any case the treatment shall be related as if they were 
related to resident companies.786 
 
The ruling of the ECJ in Case “Stauffer”, however, was a significant step for the 
income tax treatment of companies operating in other European countries. 787 
Furthermore, the ECJ developed in this case its case law established in the 
context of corporate and company law applying the freedom of establishment that 
has led finally in the decision in Case “Inspire Art”.788 However, in Cases “Stauffer” 
and “Missionswerk”, the equal treatment principle was applied especially in the 
context of direct tax law referring to the free movement of capital.789 
 
784 Ibid, para 23. 
785 See Malherbe (2008), p. 26. 
786 Ibid, p.32. 
787 This was especially true for non-profit organisations for which the judgement was originally 
relevant since much national legislation did not grant exemptions to foreign organisations operating 
on their territory. This judgement also had a favourable impact on inheritance or gift taxes on 
cross-border giving to charities located in other MS. The court referred to Annex I of the Council 
Directive 88/361/EEC, of June 24, 1988, which provides for a community definition of “capital 
movements”. It should be stressed that cross-border gifts or legacies are also explicitly described 
as capital movements in the Annex I of the abovementioned Directive. This means that legislations 
which restrict privileges on inheritance or gift taxes on cross-border gifts to charities located in 
another Member State are in conflict with article 56 of the Treaty of Rome (see King Baudouin 
Foundation (2012).  
788 See Case “Inspire Art”. 
789 See Cases “Stauffer”, para 37 and Case “Missionswerk”, para 26. 
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5.3.2  Prior authorisation 
Access to the Host State on activities involving immovable property, like this is the 
case with access to MSs REIT regimes, sometime is made conditional to a prior 
authorisation by the Host State to apply from the taxpayer. Even though those 
cases do not comprise the direct tax area any type of authorisation might be a first 
hindrance to get access to the market of the Host State that is conditional to 
conduct activities, which are then subject to tax. In this respect any condition for 
authorisation can be seen as a mean of discrimination though. 
 
(1)   Cases “Konle”, “Albore” and “VBV” 
Such kind of authorisation was subject to the decision in Case “Konle”790 and 
Case “Albore”.791 Both of the cases involved a rule according to which any non-
domestic buyer of real property in the Host State was to obtain authorisation prior 
to the acquisition of a property.792 The ECJ found such a rule to creating a (direct) 
discriminatory restriction against foreign nationals and a violation of the free 
movement of capital though.793  
 
Same situation, however, applies where a non-resident investment fund is to seek 
for prior authorisation in the Host State before legally distributing its units to 
residents of that Host State.794 Case “VBV” was not about the fund failure to seek 
authorisation but a resident pension fund that shall have violated its regulatory 
applicable restriction, which is to invest in authorised products only. 
 
The ECJ held that such legislation requiring an authorisation of foreign investment 
funds prior to being marketed is:  
 
790 See Case “Konle”. 
791 See Case “Albore”. 
792 Case “Konle” involved a Austrian rule according to which a non-domestic buyer of a plot of land 
located in Austria was subject to the condition to having obtained a prior authorisation for the 
acquisition and having to demonstrate that the planned purchase would not be used to establish a 
secondary residence (para 23), whereas Case “Albore” was about a similar Italian rule according to 
which only Italians were exempted from the requirement of obtaining authorisation before buying a 
property in areas designated as being of military importance (para 16). 
793 See Case “Konle”, para 23; Case “Albore”, para 16. 
794 See Case C-39/11, “VBV – Vorsorgekasse AG v Finanzmarktaufsichtsbehörde (FMA)” (Case 
“VBV”), (2012), judgement of 7 June 2012, not yet published. 
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“… likely to deter and, in fact, prevent, by reason of the financial penalty 
provided for, severance funds from investing their assets in the 
investment funds established in another MS and must therefore be 
classified as a restriction on the movement of capital.”795 
 
Furthermore, the ECJ stated that such legislation has restrictive effects to foreign 
investment funds as they have to undergo the procedure of authorisation 
conditionally to sell its units796 irrespective of the fact that  
 
“… those funds have been lawfully established and approved in the MS 
in which the have their seat”797  
 
while seeking legitimately to attracting capital from other MSs, which under this 
legislations obviously hinder cross-border movement of capital. 
 
(2)   Case “Scientologie” 
Following its case law with which the ECJ often finds that systems of prior 
authorisation are discriminatory, thus, violating the Treaty’s freedoms798, the ECJ 
specified is case law and set out requirements for such authorisations possibly to 
be lawful though. This specification came with Case “Scientologie” where the ECJ 
held any requirement for authorisation to breach Art. 63 I but only where the 
authorisation does not meet certain requirements. 799  Case “Scientologie” was 
about a rule of the Host State making foreign direct investment subject to prior 
authorisation. Here, the ECJ did not found the requirement as such discriminatory 
rather the rule at issue did not made a difference in the cases requiring 
authorisation, thus, lacked a detailed definition of the specific direct investment 
subject to the requirement. 800 Any rule of authorisation may be lawful though 
where investors subject to the authorisation are given indication as to the specific 
circumstances in which the authorisation is required, otherwise a rule contravene 
the principle of legal certainty. 
795 See Case “VBV”, para 25. 
796 Ibid, para 26 
797 Ibid, para 27. 
798 See Case “Scientologie”, para 18. 
799 See Case “Scientologie”, para 22. 
800 See Case “Scientologie”, para 21. 
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(3)   Case “Belgium 2011” 
The same applies in case where a national rule creates a limitation of tax benefits 
to the fact having paid registration duty in the MS before being eligible for such 
beneficial treatment. Hereto, the ECJ decided in Case “Belgium 2011” this 
constitutes a restriction of the free movement of capital.801 
 
(4)   Summary 
Furthermore, the freedom of establishment must not be blocked to assist the local 
community by way of setting up any type of authorisation prior the access to the 
market of the Host State 802  or in making an authorisation of a foreign direct 
investment that is conditional to conduct activities.803 Where, however, a REIT 
must be recognised in the Host State and the Host State recognises the foreign 
REIT but sets out such national legislation which makes the establishment of an 
undertaking or the conduct of an investment from another MS conditional upon the 
issue of prior authorisation that prerequisite for prior (additional) authorisation is 
capable of hindering the exercise by i.e. a undertaking of freedom of 
establishment, by preventing the undertaking from freely pursuing its activities 
through a fixed place of business.804 Thus, any requirement for prior authorisation 
upon entering a MS market is purely (indirect) discriminatory while creating a 
precondition to get access to the domestic tax regime in the Host State, thus, 
clearly hinders the free movement of capital.805 It is, therefore, to observe that the 
right to acquire, use or dispose of immovable property on the territory of another 
MS is the corollary of the freedom of establishment806; and capital movements 
include investments in such property in the territory of a MS by non-residents.807 
801 See Case C-250/08, “Commission v Belgium” (Case “Belgium 2011”), (2011), judgement of the 
Court of 1 December 2011, not yet published. 
802 See Case “Konle”. 
803 See Case “Scientologie”. 
804 See Joint Cases C-570/07 and C-571/07, “Blanco Pérez and Chao Gómez”, (2010), ECR I-
04629, para 54. 
805 See Case C-400/08, “Commission v Kingdom of Spain”, (2011), ECR I-01915, para 65, 72. 
806  See Case “Konle”, para 22, Case C-512/03, “J. E. J. Blanckaert v Inspecteur van de 
Belastingdienst/Particulieren/Ondernemingen buitenland te Heerlen” (Case “Blanckeart”), (2005), 
ECR I-7685, para 35 and more recently Advocate General Sharpston’s opinion in Case C-250/08, 
“Commission v Belgium”, (2011), judgement of 1 December 2011, not yet published, para 27. 
807 Advocate General Sharpston’s opinion in Case C-250/08, Ibid, with reference to “Case C-
203/80, “Criminal proceedings against Guerrino Casati” (Case “Casati”), (1981), ECR I-2595, para 
8 where the ECJ stated that freedom to move certain types of capital (i.e. in order to purchase 
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5.3.3  Tax benefits 
Any kind of benefits or tax advantages must be granted to companies irrelevant of 
their residence. The ECJ developed this understanding in several cases where a 
national measure hindered the non-resident company or its permanent 
establishment to benefit from domestic tax treatment applied to resident 
companies in comparable situations though. Benefits dealt with by the ECJ case 
la comprise the granting of tax credits808 in respect of foreign dividends809, the 
application of higher taxes (i) where a company had its seat in a MS different to 
the MS of taxation,810 (ii) as a result of not taking trade-offs i.e. social benefits into 
account811 and (iii) in case of higher taxes applied to a branch of a non-resident 
company compared as the non-resident company would have established a 
subsidiary under German law which could have (directly) benefited from lower 
taxes812 as well in case (iv) of a difference in the tax rate on foreign and domestic 
dividends 813  or the residence of the property owner and the location of the 
property814.  
 
immovable property) is, in practise a pre-condition for the effective exercise of other freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty, in particular the right of establishment.”, see footnote 25. 
808 See Case “Avoir fiscal”, para 18. 
809  See Case C-319/02, “Petri Manninen” (Case “Manninen”), (2004), ECR I-7215 where in 
Finland, the shareholder of a Finish company was granted a tax credit, corresponding to the Finish 
corporation tax rate to avoid double taxation on dividends received from domestic companies and 
did not apply in respect to foreign dividends and Case C-292/04, “Meilicke, Weyde, Stöffler v 
Finanzamt Bonn-Innenstadt” (Case “Meilicke”), (2007), ECR I-1835 in respect of a German tax 
credit granted to shareholders of domestic corporations, corresponding to the (lower) corporation 
tax rate on distributed profits (30%). 
810 See Case “RBS” where the Court ruled a provision under an MS’ tax regime to be in breach of 
Art. 49 where company profits are taxed at higher rates if its seat is in another MS (Home State) 
than if its seat were in the MS of taxation (Host State). In this case national law of Greece taxed 
profits earned by non-resident companies at a higher rate compared to the rate on profits earned 
by a resident company (see Case “RBS”, paras 27-29). This was a direct application of the 
Schumacker doctrine established in Case “Schumacker”810 relating to the taxation of income of 
individuals to the corporate area (see Case “Schumacker” and Case “Wielockx”). 
811 Asscher was a Dutch national who worked in Belgium while residing in the Netherlands and the 
moved to Belgium. Although he worked as a self-employed person in both States, he was treated 
as a non-resident in the Netherlands and taxed at a higher rate than residents (see Case 
“Asscher”, para 49). 
812 See Case C-253/03, “CLT-UFA v Finanzamt Köln-West”, (2006), ECR I-1831. 
813 See Case C-315/02, “Lenz v Finanzlandesdirektion für Tirol” (Case “Lenz”), (2004), ECR I-763. 
The case concerned Austrian legislation, which provided that dividends from domestic corporations 
were taxed at a reduced rate while dividends from foreign shares were taxed at the ordinary rate of 
income tax. 
814 See Case C-443/06, “Erika Waltraud Ilse Hollmann v Fazenda Publica” (Case “Hollmann”), 
(2007), ECR I-8491. 
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Further cases of the violation of the freedom of capital are found, where a DTT 
does not apply irrelevant of residence of the taxpayer815, procedural rules limit the 
repayment of overpaid tax to companies with “fiscal residence” only816, a company 
in a Host State is subject to tax payments upfront, thus creating a cash-flow 
advantages to domestic companies817 and the deduction of cost and/or expenses 
is limited if possible at all. 818 
 
5.3.4  Withholding tax 
The taxation of outbound dividends is likely to create the risk of double taxation 
since the Host State regime may impose withholding tax on dividends paid to its 
foreign shareholder.819 The risk of dividends to be double taxed is not always 
mitigated through DTTs extant between Home State and Host State that a 
discrimination and, thus, breach of EU law can be identified.820 
 
With Case “Aberdeen Alpha”821 the ECJ provided another ruling out in a series of 
rulings about a fundamental change in the taxation of company profits and 
dividend distributions. The ECJ ruled the levy of a withholding tax on dividends 
815 See Case “Saint-Gobain”. 
816 The tax provision in question was liable to work “more particularly to the disadvantage” of those 
companies having their seat in another MS (Home State), see Case “Commerzbank”, para 15. 
817 See joined Cases C-397 & 410/98, “Metallgesellschaft Ltd and Hoechst v. Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue” (Case “Metallgesellschaft”), (2001), ECR I-1727, para 87. 
818  See for “deduction of interest”: Case C-324/00, “Lankhorst-Hohorst v Finanzamt Steinfurt” 
(Case “Lankhorst”), (2002), ECR I-11779. Case “Lankhorst” was on thin capitalisation rules where 
the deduction of interest paid on the loan provided by the parent company as a substitute for equity 
was treated as dividend payment and thus subject to withholding tax in Germany; “deduction for 
cost of foreign shareholding”: Case C-168/01, “Bosal Holding v Staatssecretarien van Financien” 
(Case “Bosal”), (2003), ECR I-9401 (Under Dutch legislation interest and cost linked to 
participations could be deducted only if they were incurred in connection with profits taxable in the 
Netherlands (Art. 13(1) Dutch Law on Corporation tax 1969)) and Case C-471/04, “Keller Holding” 
(Case “Keller”), (2006), ECR I-2107 (German law denied the deduction of expenditure linked to 
dividends received from a subsidiary located abroad and exempt tax under a DTT (See Sec. 8b (1) 
German Corporation Tax Law 1991) and “Keller” was barred from deduction the fraction of its 
financing costs corresponding to its Austrian subsidiary (See Sec. 36(2) (3) German Income Tax 
Law 1990)); “deduction of rental income losses”: Case C-152/03, “Ritter-Coulais v Finanzamt 
Germersheim” (Case “Ritter-Coulais”), (2006), ECR I-1711, para 44, and Case C-182/06, 
“Luxembourg v Lakebrink” (Case “Lakebrink”), (2007), ECR I-6705, para 26; “deduction of debts”: 
Case C-364/01, “Heirs of Barbier v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst” (Case “Heirs of Barbier”), 
(2003), ECR I-15013, and on the “deduction of business expenses”: Case “Gerritse”. 
819 Traditionally, the State of the company paying the dividend will impose a withholding tax. The 
withholding tax is sometimes waived in favour of domestic shareholders, especially parent 
companies or reduced in case of a DTT. Where a DTT is established along the lines of the OECD-
Model convention the DTT shall provide for a reduction of the withholding tax from 25% to 15% or 
even 5% to 0% in favour of parent companies.  
820 See Malherbe (2008), p. 46. 
821 See Case C-303/07, “Proceedings brought by Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha Oy” (Case 
“Aberdeen Alpha”), (2009), ECR I-5145. 
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distributed from a Finish company to a Luxembourg tax exempt SICAV a 
discrimination of the foreign shareholder since if the dividend would have been 
made to a domestic shareholder the payment would have not been subject to any 
withholding tax.822  
 
What made the decision in Case “Aberdeen Alpha” special was the clear 
statement of the ECJ that the involvement of a foreign entity, which may or may 
not be extant in the MS applying withholding tax does not constitute a situation 
that is not comparable in the meaning of the Schumacker-Doctrine. The ECJ 
made clear that whatever the differences between domestic and foreign taxpayers 
are it does not render the foreign entity incomparable to a domestic company. 
Simply the existence of a special tax regime and different corporate characteristics 
do not per se exclude comparability.823 Therefore, the application of withholding 
tax on the distribution to the non-resident company was held to constitute 
discrimination between domestic and foreign shareholders, thus a barrier to cross-
border investment within the EU, thus, a breach of EU law.824 
 
In Case “Commission v Germany”825 the ECJ was about to take decision about 
the tax treatment of dividend payments. The subject issue in the main proceedings 
was about resident shareholders, which benefit from the setting off of withholding 
tax against domestic corporation tax whereas, for non-resident companies 
established in another MS, the withholding tax had a discharging effect, while 
those companies were subject to a greater tax burden on dividends.826 Though, 
the ECJ concluded in this case that the different treatment of dividends distributed 
depending on the residency of the company is liable to deter companies 
established in other MS (Home State) from making investments in the Host State. 
822  The case was about a Finish company, Aberdeen Property Fininvest Alpha Oy, which 
distributed a dividend to its sole shareholder, Aberdeen Property Nordic Fund I SICAV, a tax 
exempt investment fund in Luxembourg. Had the shareholder been a Finish company, the dividend 
would have been paid free of withholding tax, but foreign shareholders are subject to a withholding 
tax (see Case “Aberdeen Alpha”, para 39). 
823 See Case “Aberdeen Alpha”, para 55. 
824 Ibid, para 56. 
825 Case C-284/09, “European Commission v Federal Republic of Germany” (Case “Commission v 
Germany”), (2011), ECR I-09879. 
826  See Case “Commission v Germany”, para 21. This holds true for situations of dividend 
payments to companies established in another MS, where the parent company’s holding in the 
capital of the subsidiary does not reach the threshold provided for in Art. 3(1)(a) of the “Parent-
Subsidiary Directive”, para 50. 
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Furthermore the ECJ found that it also “… constitutes an obstacle to the raising of 
capital by resident companies from companies established in other MS …”.827 
Because resident corporate shareholders receive a tax credit or tax rebate in the 
amount of the withholding tax paid but did not apply retrospectively to non-resident 
corporate shareholders the respective German tax rule828 constitute a restriction 
of the free movement of capital.829  
 
Furthermore, the ECJ made clear that there shall be no difference as to the 
taxation of shareholders based on company residence. In Case “Verkoijen”830 a 
rule exempting dividends from tax received from a domestic company only was 
found to be contrary to the free movement of capital. 
 
The landmark judgment in Case “Santander” 831 had major impact on dividend 
withholding taxes in MSs. 832  The ECJ ruled that the difference in treatment 
between resident and non-resident investment funds discourages non-residents 
from investing in companies established in France and, vice-versa, French 
investors from acquiring shares in non-resident companies. 833  This situation 
constitutes a restriction of the free movement of capital under Art 63 in 
circumstances where the funds are comparable and there is no justification for the 
different treatment of non-resident investment funds. In respect of comparability, 
the ECJ stated that the French rule is based on the residence of the funds and, 
thus, the comparability is to be assessed solely at the fund level.834 
827 See Case “Commission v Germany”, para 72, 
828 See German Law on Income Tax Paragraph 20(1)(1), 43a(1)(1) and 36(2)(2) EStG. 
829 Ibid, para 73. 
830  See Case “Verkoijen” where a Dutch rule introduced a distinction in the tax treatment of 
resident shareholders as concerns the State of residence of the company in which its shareholders 
have their holding. Under this rule an exemption of tax was only available for dividends received 
from a domestic company. 
831 See joint Cases “Santander”. 
832 In Case “Santander” Spanish, German, Belgian UCITS funds and US regulated investment 
funds argued that the levy of 25% withholding tax on French source dividends is in breach of the 
free movement of capital under EU law, as such French dividends received by comparable French 
funds are fully exempt from French tax. The ECJ ruled that certain non-French mutual investment 
funds were entitled to a full refund of the French dividend withholding tax on their French source 
portfolio dividends. 
833 See Case “Santander”, para 17/18. Companies in the main proceedings at issue have been 
UCITS (undertakings for collective investments in transferable securities (see para 2).  
834 See Case “Santander”. The arguments presented by the French government relating to the 
balanced allocation of taxing right and far reaching budgetary consequences were set aside by the 
ECJ. The judgment by the ECJ further strengthened the position of foreign investors to claim a 
refund of withholding taxes suffered in MSs. The opportunity exists not only for investment funds 
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5.3.5  Capital gains 
Furthermore, the ECJ held provisions in MSs tax regimes contrary to the free 
movement of capital where the sale of a shareholding was exempt from domestic 
capital gains tax in cases the sale was effected to a domestic company whilst 
being taxed when sold to a foreign company as this was the situation in Case “De 
Baeck”835.  
 
Same situation applies to the cases where capital gains are taxed at the situation 
of the transfer of residence into another country. According to the decision in Case 
“Lasteyrie”836 the taxation of unrealised capital gains at the time of transfer of the 
residence i.e. of the company that taxation is contrary to Art. 49. The ECJ 
explicitly stated that there is no difference whether such exit tax is due at the time 
of the transfer fix or deferred since it is of issue only that the taxpayer wouldn’t 
have been subject to such exit tax in case he’d not transferred its residence 
though.837 
 
Furthermore, the hindrance of the free movement or likewise the freedom of 
establishment must not be evoked by granting tax incentives i.e. on capital gains 
at the reinvestment of sales proceeds for the acquisition of immovable property in 
the MS granting the incentive in an attempt to promote the domestic housing 
market. This was the case for Portugal838 and Sweden839 where the ECJ held that 
the MS could not subject a deferral of capital gains tax arising from the sale of a 
property to the condition that the reinvestment in real property is made on the 
territory of that MS, thus excluding investments in other MSs. 
within the EU or third countries, but also for companies and other investors irrespective of their 
jurisdiction. The ECJ judgment supports the position of foreign investors in claiming a refund of 
dividend withholding taxes paid in cases where a domestic investor in a comparable situation 
would have benefited from a tax relief. 
835 See Case C-268/03, “De Beack v Belgische Staat (Order)” (Case “De Beack”), (2004), ECR I-
5961 where the ECJ found Belgian rule contrary to the free movement of capital under which 
capital gains were taxed when they were realised by individuals selling a substantial holding to a 
foreign company, whilst they were not taxed when selling to a Belgian company (Art. 67 (8) of the 
Belgian Income Tax Code 1964, now Art. 90 (9) of the Income Tax Code 1992). 
836 See Case “Lasteyrie” where a French law held to be contrary to Art 49 under which unrealised 
capital gains on important shareholdings were taxable at the time of transfer of the taxpayer’s 
residence. 
837 See Case “Lasteyrie”. 
838 See Case C-345/05, “Commission v Portugal” (Case “Portugal”), (2006), ECR I-10633. 
839 See Case C-104/06, “Commission v Sweden” (Case “Sweden”), (2007), ECR I-671. 
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5.3.6 Summary 
The principal of equal treatment require MSs to treat non-residents not different 
compared to residents, hence, must provide access to tax benefits under its 
domestic regime as for resident ones. Case law shows, however, that there is a 
widely used practice by MSs to treat foreign companies and shareholders in 
domestic companies different to resident ones.840 Here, discriminatory rules are 
found in MSs regimes where the foreign company or foreign shareholder is 
directly burdened with the levy of higher taxes on its profits, dividends received or 
capital gains, whereas payments and gains to resident shareholders are not 
subject to tax or in cases where the deduction of cost involved with the holding of 
real property or shares is not permitted for the non-resident. Consequently, the 
ECJ held the question of time when the capital gains are realised irrelevant for this 
assessment as held in Case “Lasteyrie”.841 
 
Furthermore, different treatment may be lawfully only where compensation is 
provided by granting of tax credits for the foreign tax paid or under a DTT. Where 
however, no such compensation provided not only discriminatory treatment might 
be at issue, but economic double taxation is involved too. However, the pure fact 
that there may be other advantages under a DTT is extant cannot lead to the 
result of the assessment of a national rule not to be an unfavourable tax treatment 
contrary to a fundamental freedom.842 Thus, the economic outcome of the taxation 
in the Host State and its implications for the taxation in the Home State must be 
focused for assessing discriminatory rules.843 Thus, there must not be a different 
treatment under national legislation as to domestic or foreign sourced dividends 
that would make shareholdings in a Host State less favourable versus those in the 
Home State.844 Wirth reference to the decisions in Cases “Portugal” and “Sweden” 
840  See Exhibit IV.5.3: Case law on (direct) tax – Access to tax of non-resident companies 
(overview). 
841 See Case “Lasteyrie”. 
842 See Case “Commission v Belgium”, para 53. 
843 See Case “Amurta” where the ECJ held that a MS cannot deny a foreign company to benefit 
from tax benefits granted under a DTT even though the Shareholder may not be resident of the 
contracting parties to the DTT. As regards the application of either of the freedoms in question the 
purpose of the national legislation concerned must be taken into consideration (see Case “Test 
Claimants II”, para 89ff. with further references). 
844 However, even though the Home State situation is not in scope of this thesis, it shall not be 
missed that the same situation in the Home State must not be discriminatory to resident companies 
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the ECJ extended its case law set to situations where there shall not be a direct 
discrimination rather another “…covert form of discrimination which … lead in fact 
to the same result…”.845 A national rule that limits the eligibility of a tax incentive 
to persons, which are residents of that MS “… has a deterrent effect …”846 and is 
“… liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty …”.847 
 
It is obvious from the above and confirmed i.e. in Case “Stauffer” all treatment in 
the Host State denying a foreign REIT’s qualification for treatment under the Host 
State REIT regime is in breach of EU law. In this situation any taxation of the 
foreign REIT is prima facie in breach as well. However, such situation arises 
where a MS REIT regime grants a deferral of taxation of capital gains to the 
extend the gain is reinvested in domestic immovable property, thus excluding real 
property investments in other MSs.848 Hence, these situations create a “double” 
discrimination to foreign REITs with their non-recognition to qualify for domestic 
REIT status and the ignorance of their operating activities in MSs other than those 
in the Host State. 
 
5.4  Equal treatment in direct taxation (?) 
The question of this analysis whether there is equal treatment in direct taxation is 
two folded. First, it is to state that the case law analysed provide for numerous 
situations under MSs tax regimes for discrimination of non-residents. 849 
Discrimination in this context is neither limited to foreign nationals that provide for 
though. In treating resident companies less favourable to non-resident companies with no 
permanent establishment in Belgium “… is liable to deter companies established in other MS from 
making investments in Belgium …”, 844  thus constitutes an obstacle to the freedom of 
establishment844 as well as to the freedom of movement of capital (see Case C-387/11, “European 
Commission v Kingdom of Belgium” (Case “Commission v Belgium”), Judgement of 25 October 
2012, OJ C 305 from 15.10.2011, p.4). 
845 See Case “Greece”, para 45 with reference to Case “Commerzbank”, para 14. In this case 
Greece law on transfer tax provided for the exemption from the tax on the transfer of immovable 
property solely to persons permanently resident in Greece prior to the purchase and not to non-
residents who intended to settle in Greece after the acquisition of the property. Additionally, that 
grant was limited solely to Greek nationals on the purchase of a first home in Greece, expressly 
discriminating against persons resident abroad who are not Greek nationals. 
846 Ibid, para 49. 
847 Ibid, para 51. 
848  See Cases C-345/05, “Commission v Portugal”, (2006, ECR I-10633 and C-104/06, 
“Commission v Sweden”, (2007), ECR I-671. 
849 See Exhibit IV.5.3: Case law on (direct) tax – Access to tax of non-resident companies. 
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an (additional)850 establishment (residency) in the Home State or to shareholders 
with holdings in real property or real estate companies, nor to companies 
operating cross-border from time to time only without setting up a subsidiary in 
another MS (Host State). 
 
From the case law analysed it is to conclude that extant MSs direct tax regimes 
often does not comply with EU law in full, rather treating non-residents different to 
its residents even though being in a comparable situation. Such non-equal 
treatment of residents and non-residents results in the discrimination on grounds 
of nationality. Herewith, MSs direct tax regimes are in violation of the freedoms of 
movement of capital and the freedom of establishment. The transfer of these 
findings to MSs REIT regimes shall assist the identification of suspect criteria, 
thus, potential “misfit” of MSs REIT regimes. However, this analysis is subject to 
Section 7 below since question is to answer as to whether the findings made 
above can be justified on grounds of the Treaty though. Therefore, this discussion 
is done in the following section first. 
 
6.  Justification or Justi-fiction? 
As the ECJ case law emerged finding MSs tax rules in violation to the freedoms 
and MSs REIT regimes are suspect of non-compliancy with EU law, question 
remains as to whether MSs may rely on possible means for justification of its 
national rules though. The Treaty provide for grounds of justification with a view to 
national measures i.e. with Art. 36, 45 III and 52 I, especially with a view to 
“measures …on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.” At least, 
since the Maastricht revision the Treaty includes rules for justification to those 
having tax relevance i.e. 65, I lit. a) and b). However, that ECJ provided for 
“imperative reasons” in the public interest that are not provided for in the Treaty 
though. 
 
Established case law, therefore, provides that the measures prohibited by Art. 63 
as restrictions on the movement of capital, include those which are such as to 
850 Since the thesis focused limited to cross-border situations of companies in a Host State the 
“establishment” in the Host State is “additional” to the residence of the company in the Home State 
though. 
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discourage non-residents from making investments in a MS or to discourage that 
MSs residents from doing so in other MSs.851 Thus, according to the ECJ overt 
discrimination may be justified either by those grounds set out explicitly in the 
Treaty whereas a restrictive measure is permissible 
 
“… only if it pursues a legitimate objective compatible with the Treaty 
and is justified by imperative reasons in the public interest … and must 
not go beyond what is necessary to attain the objective pursued”.852 
 
6.1  Justification 
Beside the acceptance of general reasons for justification the ECJ further 
developed its principles developed with Case “Cassis de Dijon”.853 According to 
the ECJ’s case law any restriction of the freedoms may only be permissible, thus 
justified by overriding reasons in the “public interest”854 under the “principle of 
territoriality”. 855  That is more particular, however, where measures aiming to 
safeguard (i) fiscal supervision,856 to prevent and fight against tax fraud857 or tax 
avoidance 858  and where is need to maintain fiscal cohesion. 859  Furthermore, 
possible reasons for justification are (ii) the coherence of the tax system860 as well 
as (iii) a balanced authority for taxation between MSs.861  
 
6.1.1  Fiscal supervision 
The ECJ has held that the need to guarantee the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision could, in general, justify a restriction on the fundamental freedoms862 
851 See Case C-370/05, “Criminal proceedings against Uwe Kay Festersen”, (2007), ECR I-1129, 
para 24; Case C-101/05 “Skatteverket v A”, (2007), ECR I-11531, para 40 and joined Case 
“Haribo”, para 50. 
852 See i.e. Case “Lasteyrie”, para 49; Case “Greece”, para 51. 
853 See Schwarze (2007), Recital 156. 
854  See Case C-442/02, “Caixa-Bank France v Ministère de l´Économie, des Finances et de 
l´Industrie” (Case “Caixa Bank”), (2004), ECR I-08961, para 17 and recently Case “Commission v 
Belgium”, paras 89-92. 
855 Case “Hungary”. 
856  See i.e. Case C-254/97, “Futura Participations SA and Singer v Administration des 
Contributions”, (1999), ECR I-4811, para 31. 
857 See Case “Konle” and later Case C-213/04, “Burtscher v. Stauderer”, (2005), ECR I-10309. 
858 See Case “Aberdeen”, para 58. 
859 See Case C-204/90, “Bachmann v Belgium State” (Case “Bachmann”), (1992), ECR I-249;  
860 See i.e. Case “Bachmann”, para 21; Case “Manninen”, para 42. 
861 See Case “Marks & Spencer”, Case “Belgium 2011”, paras 80-88. 
862 See Case C-155/08 “X and E. H. A. Passenheim-van Schoot (C-157/08) v Staatssecretaris van 
Financiën” (Case “Passenheim”), (2009), ECR I-05093, para 45. 
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and, thus, constitutes an overriding reason in the public interest. 863  However, 
established case law requires for the justification of a measure for the prevention 
of tax evasion and avoidance that the legislation in question specifically targets 
wholly artificial arrangements designed to circumvent the tax laws. 864  Wholly 
artificial arrangement in this respect shall be seen only where the activity does not 
reflect economic reality with a view to escaping the tax normality due on the profits 
generated by activities carried out on national territory.865 
 
Thus, the case law precludes any general presumption of tax evasion and cannot 
justify as such a fiscal measure, which comprises the objectives of the Treaty.866 
Moreover, the ECJ pointed out clearly on the basis of the single market concept 
that so long a taxpayer pays tax in any MS this is sufficient to overcome any 
argument of fiscal cohesion and tax avoidance that is to say in this kind of 
situation there is no adversely affect or undermined situation.867 With respect to 
cross-border situations the ECJ went on in Case “Santander” to indicate that  
 
“… the effectiveness of fiscal supervision cannot justify taxation which 
affects solely and specifically non-residents.”868 
 
This statement goes back to settled case law 869  with which the ECJ has 
developed the so-called “Barriers”-Doctrine as a further way of circumventing the 
863 See Case C-233/09, “Gerhard Dijkman and Maria Dijkman-Lavaleije v Belgische Staat”, (2010), 
ECR I-06649, para 58. 
864 See i.e. Case C-264/96, Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her 
Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) (Case “ICI”), (1998), ECR I-4695, para 26; Case “Marks & Spencer”, 
para 57; Case “Cadbury-Schweppes”, para 51; Case “Test Claimants”, para 72 and Case 
“Aberdeen”, para 63. 
865  See Case “Cadbury-Schweppes”, para 55 and Case “Test Claimants”, para 74 and Case 
“Aberdeen”, para 64. 
866 See Case C-72/09, “Établissements Rimbaud SA v Directeur général des impôts and Directeur 
des services fiscaux d’Aix-en-Provence”, (2010), ECR I-10659, para 34 and cited case law. 
867 See Case “Avoir Fiscal”, para 24; Case “Lankhorst”, para 24 (In effect sec. 8a CIT was in 
breach of Art. 49 (Art. 43 at the time) as an obstacle to the freedom of establishment.); Case C-
152/03, “Hans-Jürgen Ritter-Coulais and Monique Ritter-Coulais v Finanzamt Germersheim” (Case 
“Ritter Coulais”), (2006), ECR I-01711, para 100. 
868 See Case “Santander”, para 49; Case “Belgium 2011”, para 81. The fiscal cohesion argument 
was rejected as well in the case “Ritter-Coulais” where the ECJ found the German rule of cross-
border relief taxation (see Sec. 2a I ITA.) in breach of Art. 48 while not accepting losses by a 
taxpayer subject to unlimited tax liability in Germany. This even though, where the taxpayer had 
realised those losses in another MS where the taxpayer is not subject to any tax liability in this 
respect and, therefore, is not able to apply for tax credit (see Case “Ritter-Coulais”, para 100). 
869 See i.e. Case “Ritter-Coulais”, para 100; Case “Schumacker”, paras 36-38; Case “Verkoijen”, 
para 41. 
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tax principle that residents and non-residents are not generally in a comparable 
position. Where national legislation makes cross-border transactions less 
attractive than purely domestic business, that rule is a barrier to cross-border 
trade within the sphere of the single market and, therefore, prima facie a breach of 
the Treaty.870  
 
Even the argument based on insufficient effectiveness of the instrument of 
cooperation871 was rejected by the ECJ in Case “Belgium 2013” stating that  
 
“… even on the assumption that … national legislation … is 
appropriate for ensuring the attainment of the objective of ensuring the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision and, in particular, the prevention of 
tax avoidance and evasion, … that legislation goes beyond what is 
necessary to attain the objective pursued.”872 
 
6.1.2 Coherence of the tax system 
The ECJ has acknowledged several times that the need to preserve the 
coherence of tax system of a MS may justify rules that are liable to restrict the 
exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.873 However, for 
an argument based on the justification for the coherence of the tax system the 
ECJ requires a direct link between the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting 
870 See Persoff (2004). This Doctrine was the basis of the taxpayer’s argumentation in Case 
“Marks and Spencer” as well. The ECJ has to decide whether the restriction under UK taxation of 
“Group relief” 870 to domestic subsidiaries is lawful or the UK must have to extend his relief to 
foreign subsidiaries of a UK company as well (see Case “Marks & Spencer”). The legal basis for 
group relief under UK tax regulation is outlined in Sections 402 (3A) and (3B), 403 Income and 
Corporations Taxes Act 1988. 
871 See i.e. Case “Passenheim”, para 45. 
872 See Case “Belgium 2013”, para 63. Thus, difficulties in cooperation may not justify a restriction 
of the freedoms rather, the MS shall request from the taxpayer the evidence that they consider 
they need to effect a correct assessment of the taxes concerned (See Case “ELISA”, para 95) i.e. 
by making use of Directive 2003/48 on the exchange of information on foreign savings accounts 
(See Case “Belgium 2013”, para 58 and “Taxation of Savings Income Directive”). Herewith, the 
ECJ further developed its “Dassonville-Formula” which already required the rule in question of 
being “reasonable” in order for MSs to justify its laws. Since the decision in 1974 the case law i.e. 
with Case “Belgium 2013” now clearly specifies the conditions and criteria for a “reasonable” 
restriction that may be justified though. 
873  See Case “Bachmann”, para 28; Case C-300/90, “European Commission v Kingdom of 
Belgium”, (1992), ECR I-305, para 21; Case C-471/04, “Finanzamt Offenbach am Main-Land v 
Keller Holding GmbH”, (Case “Keller”), (2006), ECR I-2107, para 40; Case “Amurta”, para 46; 
Case “Belgium 2011, para 70 and Case “Commission v Germany”, para 85; Case “Aberdeen”, 
para 71 and Case “Santander”, para 50. 
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of that advantage by a particular tax levy874 with the direct nature of that link failing 
to be examined in the light of the objective pursued by the rule in question.875 
However, in its recent decisions the ECJ on cross-border activities by the 
taxpayers that direct link has been denied though. 876  
 
Different and rare example was given, however, by the ECJ with Case “Belgium 
2011”. 877  The ECJ found the two situations under Belgium legislation directly 
linked since the tax advantage concerned and the offsetting of that concession by 
the particular tax levy is because the same taxpayer and the same taxation is 
concerned.878 Furthermore, the ECJ confirmed the proportionality of the rule and 
the restriction appropriate to achieve the objective to safeguard for the cohesion of 
the tax system by operating in a symmetrical manner879.  
 
While the amount to be possibly set off was limited to a maximum amount the ECJ 
found the legislation proportionate because “… the system retained its character 
as a tax advantage and is not in the nature of a disguised exemption.”880 
 
6.1.3 Balanced authority for taxation between MSs 
The ECJ has, furthermore, developed and accepted justification of in general 
restrictive measures where the system in question is designed to prevent conduct 
874 Case “ICI”, para 29, Case “Verkoijen”, para 57; Case “Bosal”, para 29; Case “Manninen”, para 
42, Case “Keller”, para 40, Case “Belgium 2011”, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, 
delivered on 21 July 2011, para 80 and Case “Belgium 2011”, para 71. 
875 See Case “Manninen”, para 43 and “Aberdeen”, para 70. 
876 See i.e. Case “Aberdeen”, para 73 (regarding a difference in tax treatment of dividends between 
parent companies based on the place where they have their seat); Case “Commission v Germany”, 
para 92 (no direct link between the withholding taxation of dividends to residents or non-residents 
(see O´Shea (2012), p249)); and Case “Santander”, para 52 (missing link for withholding taxation). 
877 Case “Belgium 2011”, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, delivered on 21 July 2011, para 
81. The case was about Belgian legislation providing for levying of registration duty (or an 
equivalent tax) on the acquisition of one principal residence and a reduction of the amount levied 
on the acquisition of a subsequent principal residence to replace the first (where both properties 
are situated in the same MS that was Belgium). 
878 See Case “Belgium 2011”, para 76. One might argue that these two situations are directly linked 
and as Advocate Sharpston advocated at least in the mind of the purchaser but found the 
situations actually “… quite independent of each other as taxable events” (see para 81) since there 
is no offset possible once a certain period has elapsed between the sale of the preceding property 
and the purchase of the subsequent property otherwise it would not disappear in that way (see 
para 87). 
879 Ibid, para 80. While the amount to be possibly set off was limited to a maximum amount the ECJ 
found the legislation proportionate because “… the system retained its character as a tax 
advantage and is not in the nature of a disguised exemption.” (see para 81). 
880 Ibid, para 81. 
 
179 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
MSs REIT regimes and ECJ case law 
 
capable of jeopardising the right of a MS to exercise its powers of taxation in 
relation to activities carried out in its territory.881 
 
In its settled case law the ECJ found for such situations that, where a MS has 
chosen not to tax resident companies in receipt of nationally-sourced dividends, it 
cannot rely on the argument that there is a need to ensure a balanced allocation 
between MSs of the power to tax in order to justify the taxation of non-resident 
companies in receipt of such income.882 
 
A reduction of the national tax revenue may be seen in such cases only, where 
the exemption from withholding tax or the grant of a tax advantage corresponds to 
the withholding tax deducted by the MS. However, the ECJ does not accept a 
reduction in tax revenue to be regarded as an overriding reason in the public 
interest to justify a restriction of a fundamental freedom.883 
 
6.2  “Justi-fiction”? 
Generally, each form or type of discrimination may be subject to justification by 
overriding reasons in the public interest. As already outlined 884 , the ECJ 
understands the freedoms as a means to prevent discrimination. Condition for 
application of the freedoms is, therefore, that the activity at issue provides some 
link of a cross-border character. This cross-border link may be given where the 
situation at issue is of inbound or outbound relevance.885However, the opportunity 
for being successful is limited. With regard to its case law the ECJ is reluctant to 
accept the arguments that have been brought forward by MSs so far. Measures of 
“discriminatory” effect, though, have not been accepted as “proportional”.886 Even 
though, direct taxes have not been harmonised still, the freedoms have unlimited 
priority without direct taxes being harmonised. Rather, as outlined, although direct 
881 See Case “Cassis de Dijon”, para 42; Case “Amurta”, para 58; Case “Aberdeen”, para 66, Case 
“Commissione v Germany”, para 77; Case “Santander”, para 47 and Case “Belgium 2012”, para 
75. 
882 See Case “Amurta”, para 59; Case “Aberdeen”, para 67, Case “Commission v Germany”, para 
78; Case “Santander”, para 48 and Case “Belgium 2012”, para 76. 
883 See settled case law i.e. Case “Manninen”, para 49 and cited case law as confirmed with Case 
“Commission v Germany”, para 83 though. 
884 See Sec. 3 above. 
885 See Rödder (2004), p 1630. 
886 See Cordewener (2002), p. 926. 
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taxation falls within the sole competence of the MS thy must, nonetheless exercise 
that competence in accordance with the Treaty’s principles.887  
 
The ECJ rarely accepted justification on the basis of the prevention of tax evasion 
and avoidance in limited cases since it does not accept any presumption for 
activities being of tax avoidance nature or leading to a tax evasion.888 This view is 
in line with the decision in Case “Avoir-fiscal” of 1986 still where the ECJ has 
pointed out that so long a taxpayer pays tax in any MS this is sufficient to 
overcome any argument of fiscal cohesion / tax avoidance that is to say that in this 
kind of situation there is no adversely affect or undermined situation.889 
 
Furthermore, even though “overriding reasons in the public interest” have been 
accepted for justification in general, such measures must be “proportional” and do 
not go “beyond what is necessary”. Generally, the ECJ found means with less 
restrictive effect to safeguard for the public interest,890 which is given i.e. with the 
Directive on administrative cooperation though.891 The ECJ did neither accepted 
“justifications” for measures by MSs, which was based on grounds of loss of tax 
revenue, nor those argumentations based on the lack of harmonisation of direct 
taxes within the EU.892 Additionally, the allocations of the right to tax from a MS to 
another MS provide now valid ground for the limitation of the freedoms though. 
Thus, a MS by taxing a cross-border situation is not allowed to treat the non-
resident disadvantageous only because the DTT may not provide for a carve-out 
of such parts of the profit from cross-border activities.893  
 
887 See Chapter V, Sec. 2.3.3 above with reference to Case “Avoir fiscal”, para 107. 
888 See Sec. (6.1) above and i.e. Case “Lasteyrie” as well as recently Case “Aberdeen”, para 63. 
889 See Case “Avoir fiscal”, para 24. In effect Sec. 8 CIT was in breach of Art. 49 as being an 
obstacle to the freedom of establishment (see para 32) with reference to Case “Eurowings”, para 
42. 
890 See Sec. (6.1) above and i.e. Case “Belgium 2013”, para 63. 
891 See “AEOID”. This Directive is based on a proposal presented by the European Commission on 
2 February 2009 to replace Council Directive 77/799/EEC concerning mutual assistance by the 
competent authorities of Member States in the field of direct taxation and taxation of insurance 
premiums. The previous Directive on mutual assistance – 77/799/EEC was repealed and a new 
Directive introduced. On 12th June, 2013 the Commission proposed extending the automatic 
exchange of information between EU tax administrations, as part of the intensified fight against tax 
evasion (see proposal COM/2013/348) (see Chapter VII, Sec. 4.7 below). Thus, same result may 
be seen under the Directive 2010/24/EC, “Mutual Assistance Directive on taxes”, concerning 
mutual assistance. 
892 See i.e. Case “Wielockx” and Case “Lasteyrie”. 
893 See Case “X and Y”. 
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Analysing the ECJ case law as to the assessment of arguments for the 
justification of measures by MSs it becomes visible that the ECJ is trying to 
identify for internal inconsistencies within MSs tax regimes and to invalidate 
arguments for defence by making reference for the MSs to comparable situations 
where they have already established a lawful situation in accordance with EU 
law.894  
 
7.   Suspect elements in MSs REIT regimes 
Taking the level playing field provided by EU law of primary and secondary source 
suspect regulations in MSs REIT regimes can be discovered. Having elaborated 
the extant REIT regimes in MSs with their respective regime criteria and 
characteristics895 as well as identified the legal basics to analyse the regimes with 
respect to its compliance with the EU legal order896 the platform is now set to 
identify suspect elements in MSs REIT regimes. According to ECJ case law, the 
legal requirements and tax treatments under MSs REIT regimes seem not to 
comply with EU law fully. 897 Therefore, in the following suspects elements in MSs 
REIT regimes with focus to the legal requirements and tax treatment regimes shall 
be identified and discussed using the “common understanding” version of MSs 
REIT regimes identified as a benchmark for “fit”. 898 
 
7.1  Legal requirements 
Legal requirements are set under all MSs REIT regimes in order to determine 
whether a company qualifies for domestic REIT status and, thus, benefit from its 
regime. Therefore, discriminations refer to measures in relation to the conditions 
imposed on a company to be eligible for a treatment as a (domestic) REIT.  
 
Almost all MSs require the REIT-company being organised and incorporated 
under domestic (corporate) laws.899 This means that companies, which are formed 
894 See Cordewener (2002), p.395, 498 et seqq., 530 et seqq., 948 et seq., 967 and 970 et seq. 
895 See Chapter II, Sec. 5 above. 
896 See Chapter III above. 
897 See Sections 3-6 above. 
898 See Chapter II, Sec. 6 above. 
899 Domestic laws may not only provide any legal corporate form but also may be subject to fund or 
trust type forms (see Chapter II., Sec. 5 above). Exception is with the FBI regime only that is a pure 
tax regime and, therefore, requires the company to comply with the regime´ conditions though.  
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under foreign law, are generally excluded from the domestic REIT regime even in 
case of comparability with corporations under domestic law.900 This requirement 
is, however, two folded. The criteria for “legal form” require the use of a legal form 
available under domestic laws. Where MSs allow for a legal form of a Fund 
though,901 REITs incorporated under the laws of such MS may not be recognised 
in other MS, thus, the requirement for a legal form representing a stock listed 
corporation is suspect in light of the case law.902 Herewith, MSs REIT regimes do 
not comply with the mutual recognition doctrine following the “Cassis de Dijon”-
principle. 903 Therefore, any domestic requirements where the use of domestic 
legal forms qualifying for the domestic REIT regime only are suspect of being a 
direct discrimination on the grounds of nationality as forbidden under Art. 12 and, 
thus, harmful to the freedoms of the Treaty too.904 
 
Linked to the requirements for the legal form is the condition to the residency of 
the REIT. MSs regimes require a REIT to be (at least) a domestic resident having 
its registered seat or (at least) a permanent establishment in the certain MS of 
which the regimes will be made use. Thus, a non-resident company is not eligible 
for the domestic REIT regime.905 A rule making a distinction between a resident 
and a non-resident company, however, is suspect of being an indirect 
discrimination against nationality.906 However, according to settled case law the 
non-resident REIT shall be eligible for domestic REIT regime though.  
 
900 See i.e. in the case of the Spanish REIT regime (Cornelisse (2006 Part 1), Recital 2.3.2.1., p. 
5). 
901 See i.e. in the case of the FBI the Netherlands allowing for the FGR and in case of the L-REIT 
allowing Investment Funds as well (see Chapter II, Sec. 5.1.1 above). 
902 See for summary of case law on company/corporate law Exhibit IV.4-1. 
903 See Sec. 3-4 above and Exhibit IV.4-1: Cases on company/corporate law – overview. 
904 This seems to be the case especially with a view to the freedom of establishment (Art. 49 and 
50) and for the freedom of movement of capital (Art. 63) as well (see i.e. Cases “Cassis de Dijon” 
and “Stauffer”, (see Sec. 3.2 and Sec. 5.3 above). 
905 See Chapter II, Sec. 5 above. Exception, however, is with the French SIIC under which foreign 
REITs are eligible for REIT treatment with respect to its domestic (French) Portfolio (see 
Cornelisse (2006 Part 1), Recital 2.32.2., p. 6). 
906  See, for instance, Case “Avoir-fiscal” and “Commerzbank” and Exhibit IV.4-1: Cases on 
company/corporate law – overview. However, there are 4 (i.e. NL “FBI”, GR “REIC”, French “SIIC” 
and Spanish “SOCIMI”) out of 13 regimes in MSs, which allow for residency in either of the MS 
(See for details of the identity of the 4 regimes in Chapter II sec. 5.2(1) above, Table II.5.2-1) 
diminishing discrimination in a EU context in between MSs’ REIT-Companies. Whether this 
represents discrimination for non-EU companies and, thus, being an infringement of the freedoms 
of the Treaty, will not be evaluated further since the focus of this chapter is the situation within the 
EU in between its MS only. 
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Even where the foreign REIT was established according to (legal) conditions 
different to the ones required under the REIT regime of the Host State does not 
entitle the Host State to refuse mutual recognition.907 This holds true not only 
where the foreign REIT is operating in the Host State by way of direct investment 
while keeping its residency in its Home State, but in situations of transfer of the 
seat in another MS as well that does not affect its status.908 The incoming REIT 
must not be hindered to move cross-border, 909  but is to recognise under the 
domestic regime without setting conditions like prior authorisation or measures 
having similar effect.910  
 
Furthermore, this is valid for the requirements to setting minimum amounts for 
statutory or share capital and with regard to shareholder conditions. Even though, 
these requirements are not considered to be suspect per se, but where in certain 
situations the Host MS holds up for i.e. higher amounts of share capital and/or 
different requirements with regards to minimum or maximum shareholder 
thresholds these criteria are potentially suspect to hindering cross-border activity 
and, thus, movement of REITs within the EU. 
 
Table IV.7-1: Legal requirements for REITs - Suspect criteria 
Requirement Criteria 
MSs Regimes* Potentially Suspect 
(y/n) 
Legal  Legal form 
Corporation / Stock 
Company yes 
  Share Capital EURO 15m yes 
  Registered Seat domestic yes 
  Listing obligatory no 
  Stock Exchange 
regulated stock in either 
MS/EEA no 
  Shareholder conditions various911 yes 
   
 * Based on “common 
understanding” for criteria  
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Other criteria in the area of the legal requirements in the context of listing, 
however, are not suspect. Even though the listing is generally obligatory, all MSs 
907 See “trilogy” of cases “Centros”, “Überseering” and “Inspire Art”, Sec. 4 above (see Exhibit IV.4-
1: Cases on company/corporate law – overview). 
908 See Case “National Grid”. 
909 See Case “Lasteyrie”. 
910 See Cases “Konle”, “Albore”, “VBV”, “Scientologie” et al. (see Sec. 5.3.2 above and Exhibit 
V.5.2-1 Case law on (direct) tax – “Equal treatment”.) 
911 See for details Table II.5.1-3 above. 
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allow for listing at regulated stock exchanges at least at any stock of either MS 
though.912 
 
In summary there are several requirements and conditions set by certain MSs 
REIT regimes that are suspect if not already and obviously of discriminatory and 
restrictive in nature. These measures are suspect to violating the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom of movement of capital. With respect to the 
findings of the ECJ case law analysis it seem obviously extant a violation of EU 
law where MSs REIT regimes do not recognise a duly established REIT from 
another MS without imposing additional requirements from those being of prior 
authorisation or licensing that is represented by the requirement of filing local 
application to joining the regime. This latter topic, however, is dealt with usually in 
the context of opting for treatment under a domestic REIT regime, which is 
discussed in the context of the tax treatment subject to the following Subsection 
though. 
 
7.2  Tax treatment  
Whereas in the field of corporate law the Treaty gives EU competence there is 
none towards direct taxation though. However, case law is having an indirect 
effect that is driving MSs to revise their regimes in a way to comply with EU law. 
The latter is emerging in the field of direct taxation since “… national direct tax 
regimes must be formed in accordance with the requirements set by EU law as 
interpreted by the ECJ…” as Malherbe points out.913 
 
In this context a foreign company shall benefit from the same treatment under the 
Host State tax regime that is being equally treated though. 914 Thus, where a 
certain portion of income cannot be deducted for the computation of the taxable 
base of the foreign company or certain kinds of benefits or tax advantages such 
as tax credits, deductibility of interest or repayment of overpaid taxes whilst it is 
eligible for resident companies and may resulting in higher taxes to income 
generated by foreign companies and might even in effect lead to cash flow 
912 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.1.2 above.  
913 See Malherbe (2008), Recital 131, p. 57. 
914 See Exhibit IV.5.2-1 Case law on (direct) tax – “Equal treatment” and i.e. Case “Stauffer” and 
recently Case “Belgium 2012”. 
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disadvantages only, is in breach of Art. 63.915 Furthermore, shareholders investing 
indirectly into real property in the Host State shall not experience possible 
inconsistencies concerning withholding taxation with the Treaty whereas domestic 
shareholders do not. According the case law established by the ECJ foreign 
taxpayers in a comparable position cannot be treated worse than local 
taxpayers. 916  Hence, foreign taxpayers should be entitled to a refund of the 
discriminatory withholding. Following the recent Case “Aberdeen” judgement917, 
the ECJ believes that foreign investment funds (UCITS-type) should be taxed in a 
similar manner to the local UCITS vehicles.918  
 
Moreover, the decision in Case “Stauffer” suggests that where a tax exemption is 
granted to a domestic entity, if it has specific characteristics, the same exemption 
shall be granted to a non-resident entity if that entity meets the applicable 
domestic requirements (except for the residence requirement). 919 Thus, Case 
“Stauffer” applied in the case of a legally established REIT of one MS another MS 
providing for a domestic REIT regime as well has to grant the same exemptions 
considering the tax treatment of the domestic REIT under the domestic regime to 
the non-resident REIT. Since both REIT companies are of tax-exempt status 
under their respective regimes and meeting the various legal requirements laid 
down by its relevant legislation the two entities are in a substantially comparable 
situation. Different treatment of the foreign REIT would, thus, contravene the 
fundamental freedoms (free movement of capital or freedom of establishment).  
 
As it was seen above920 income generated by a foreign corporate either from its 
direct investments in real property or from shareholdings a domestic REIT, both in 
a Host State situation, will be levied with withholding taxes.921 MSs tax regimes 
usually treat these two situations differently. From a MSs tax revenue perspective 
the foreign REIT may be viewed to just be a foreign ordinary corporation and 
taxed according to the treatment applicable to foreign corporations in general 
915 Ibid. 
916 Ibid. 
917 See Case “Aberdeen Alpha”, para 51-54. 
918 See this Chapter above and Case “Aberdeen Alpha”, paras 51-54. 
919 See Sec. 5.3.1(7) above. 
920 See above Chapter II, Sec. 5.4. 
921 See Exhibit II.5.4-1 Taxation of REIT – overview. 
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which holds real estate investments and deriving income there from.922 But from a 
EU law perspective MSs view should be towards the foreign REIT and its 
domestic activities equally as to activities of domestic REITs in order to prevent 
discrimination on grounds of nationality though according to settled case law 
according to the Schumacker-doctrine of equal treatment.923  
 
This requires the domestic regime generally to being eligible and to providing the 
possibility for the foreign REIT to opt and to comply with the conditions under the 
domestic REIT regime respectively though, but is usually ignored as the example 
of the FBI illustrates. It shall be made clear that the FBI regime offers any foreign 
corporation and REIT to opt for FBI status, even though subject to comply with the 
conditions set under the domestic FBI regime, including i.e. transfer of seat, 
changing legal form and/or meeting other conditions though. 924  However, the 
obvious that any corporation meeting domestic requirements, thus, becoming a 
domestic corporation is eligible for treatment under the domestic regime shall not 
be questioned in this context. Other regimes generally refusing foreign REITs to 
opt for status of the domestic regime provide further discriminating rules in detail 
such as in connection with the residence of shareholders 925 or their residence.926 
922 This ordinary taxation of foreign corporate´ income from its domestic activities is out of scope of 
this analysis and, therefore, not further is evaluated. 
923  See above with reference i.e., but not limited to, Cases “Avoir-fiscal”, “Commerzbank”, 
“Centros”, “Überseering”, “Inspire Art”, “Schumacker” and “Stauffer”. 
924 In this respect, the foreign REIT, even though it might comply with the conditions (except for 
residence and legal form (see Cornelisse (2006 Part 1), recital 3, p. 7 et seq.) for FBI treatment, is 
not eligible for tax-exempt treatment under the FBI regime though. Even where a foreign REIT 
invests in the Netherlands and is generally eligible to opt for status of FBI and being treated equal 
to a domestic FBI will not receive its income derived from local property tax exempt, neither in case 
of a direct nor indirect investment. Under the FBI regime certain categories of domestic taxpayer 
are entitled to an exemption from withholding tax, whereas foreign shareholders generally are not. 
The FBI is entitled to a cash payment in connection with foreign withholding tax imposed on 
income received. As the FBI is not able to credit the foreign withholding tax and such withholding 
tax cannot be used by its shareholders upon redistribution of the foreign-source income to its 
shareholders, the FBI is entitled to a cash payment to the shareholder in lieu of a tax credit. Such a 
payment is only available to the pro rata part of the foreign withholding tax that relates to the 
percentage of Dutch-resident taxable shareholders of the FBI. That is to say, no payment is made 
if the REIT shares are owned by (foreign) non-resident shareholders or Dutch shareholders that 
are not subject to tax (i.e. as in case of pension funds or life insurance). 
925  Example hereto is given under the Italian SIIQ regime where exemption from the levy of 
withholding tax on distribution is granted in case of shareholders resident in a “white list” country 
only. This “most favoured nation treatment”, however, may be in line with the Treaty according to 
Cornelisse (2006 Part 1), p. 7 with reference to the ECJ and its decision in Case C-376/03, “D v 
Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst / Particullieren / Ondememingen buitenland te Heerlen”, (2005), 
ECR I-5821. 
926  Such suspect treatment is found under the Belgian SICAFI regime. Under this regime 
exemption from withholding tax on distributions made by a SICAFI is provided under the condition 
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Rather, according to settled case law and the result of the analysis regarding case 
law on company law the rule mutual recognition require MSs to mandatory provide 
foreign REITs access, thus, the option for beneficial tax treatment under their 
respective domestic regime.927  
 
In this category of factually eliminating the possibility foreign REITs to opt for 
Status of the Host State REIT regime fall the cases of prior authorisation or 
measures having similar effect too. ECJ case law is clearly driving off any 
conditions that seek for prior authorisation in the Host State prior to the conduct of 
activities928, prior to the acquisition of real property by the foreign REIT929 or even 
prior to marketing of its shares to domestic shareholders.930 Such authorisations 
may be lawful though where such rules i.e. provide for a detailed definition of the 
specific subject to the requirement, thus, being legally certain only.931 Thus, such 
requirements are suspect of violation the freedoms though unless proven 
differently. 
 
Table IV.7-2: Tax treatment for REITs - Suspect criteria 
Requirement Criteria 
Domestic REIT* Foreign REIT Potentially 
Suspect (y/n) 
Tax treatment  REIT regime option eligible not eligible yes 
 Direct investment    
 income tax tax exempt 
ordinary treatment 
for non-resident 
corporate yes 
  capital gains tax tax exempt ordinary treatment yes 
  Indirect investment 
tax exempt, 
unless not 
qualified 
max. 20% 
withholding tax 
yes 
  
* Based on “common 
understanding” for 
criteria 
  
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Finally, where a foreign REIT invests directly or indirectly in domestic property 
discrimination arises. In these cases income and capital gains from direct 
investment is generally taxed according to ordinary rules for non-resident 
that the SICAFI invests more than 60% of its assets in real estate located in Belgium. Thus, 
investments by a SICAFI in domestic qualifying assets are treated favourable compared to cross-
border investments. (See above Chapter II, Sec. 5.1.3). 
927 See Sec. 4 and 7.1 above 
928 See Case “Scientologie”, para 18. 
929 See Case “Albore”, para 16 and Case “Konle”, para 23. 
930 See Case “VBV”, para, 25. 
931 See Case “Scientologie”, para 21. 
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corporations as well as any income from indirect investments is generally levied 
with withholding tax before its distribution though. 932  With a view to the tax 
treatment rules it is, thus, to conclude that all of the criteria set in MSs REIT 
regimes are suspect of “misfit” to the freedoms. 
 
7.3  Summary of conflicts 
According to settled case law MSs are to recognise a REIT duly established in its 
Home State accepting it operating in the territory of a Host State though without 
imposing any additional requirements irrelevant of its compliance with any 
conditions set for the domestic REIT though. With respect to the legal form there 
are a few regimes only that are expressively open for a “foreign legal form” similar 
to the domestic ones that qualify.933 Almost all MSs regimes do not recognise the 
foreign REIT even legally established in one MS, but must furthermore comply 
with the conditions by the domestic REIT regime of another MS REIT regime 
still.934 In the absence of mutual recognition and bilateral contracts in between 
MSs providing i.e. for “a most favoured nation” treatment, the foreign REIT is 
treated according to the ordinary domestic applicable tax regime. Hence, the 
foreign REIT is treated as a foreign corporate generating directly or through a 
domestic subsidiary income from real property. Similar situation is where 
withholding taxes are levied on distributions made by the domestic REIT to its 
foreign corporate shareholder. 935  
932 Similar case is provided under the German tax regime under which withholding tax is levied on 
dividends distributed to non-resident corporate shareholders while resident shareholders receive a 
tax credit or tax rebate in the amount of such withholding tax though. However, in light of EU law 
the foreign REIT or shareholder should be entitled to claim refund of foreign withholding tax on its 
dividends received form the domestic REIT equally (see Case C-284/09, “Commission v 
Germany”, (2011) of 20 October 2011; Cornelisse (2006 Part 1), recital 3.1, p. 7). 
933 See Chapter III, Sec. 2.2 above with reference i.e. but may not be limited to the FBI and the 
SIIC, whereas for other MSs it is to analyse in more detail, even though, out of scope of this thesis 
though, to identify whether other MSs regimes allow for foreign legal forms as well or, in light of the 
relevant case law, the certain MSs recognises foreign legal forms for its domestic REIT regime as 
well. This shall, however, be subject to the analysis in the cases studies though but should be not 
of issue anymore after the Cases “Cassis de Dijon” and “Stauffer” especially (see Chapter IV, Sec. 
3 and 5 above). 
934 Hereto, reference will be made and discussion will be given to the ECJ Case “Cassis de Dijon”, 
(see Chapter IV, Sec. 3.2 above). 
935  It was found that i.e. corporate shareholders are generally treated equally, even though 
economically only. Here, the foreign corporate shareholder may be levied with higher tax rates 
compared to the domestic one might be eligible to call for relief under an applicable DTT and may 
also benefit from the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Thus, conclusion is drawn that the corporate 
shareholder may be even treated advantageous compared to the domestic corporate shareholder. 
Therefore, where the case of a foreign REIT investing in another MS REIT is treated like any other 
(domestic?) corporate shareholder this situation may not be suspect for any discrimination on 
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Overall, the differential treatment under domestic regimes towards foreign REITs 
either with regard to the legal requirements or the tax treatment is suspect of 
violating EU law. Setting legal requirements, thus, limiting of options to apply for 
the domestic REIT regime or, thereby, setting prior conditions for authorisation, is 
a ring-fencing for domestically established REITs. This treatment and its 
respective rules in MSs REIT regimes are, therefore, suspect of discrimination on 
grounds of nationality.  
 
Table IV.7-3: Summary of suspect elements in MSs REIT regimes - overview 
Criteria Condition Requirement/Limitation Suspect  
      
Legal 
requirements Legal form Domestic (corporate) laws 
discrimination on grounds 
of nationality 
  Residence 
Domestic, at least through a 
PE 
discrimination on grounds 
of nationality 
  
Recognition of foreign 
REIT Licensing / Authorisation 
discrimination on grounds 
of nationality 
      
violation of freedom of 
movement of capital 
Tax 
treatment REIT status 
License / Authorisation to 
benefit form tax treatment 
under domestic REIT regime 
violation of freedom of 
movement of capital 
    
violation of freedom of 
establishment 
  
Application of 
domestic REIT regime 
Income from domestic 
investments 
violation of freedom of 
movement of capital 
    
violation of freedom of 
establishment 
  
Distribution of 
dividends to 
shareholder  Qualifying resident taxpayer  
violation of freedom of 
establishment 
  
w/o withholding tax 
levied at source  
violation of freedom of 
movement of capital 
    
discrimination on grounds 
of nationality 
        
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
 
 
 
grounds of nationality from a pure corporate shareholders perspective though (see Chapter II, Sec. 
5.4.3 above). 
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8.   Conclusion 
According to the decision by the ECJ, although direct taxation falls within the sole 
competence of the MSs, they must nonetheless exercise that competence 
consistently with EU law936, thus, in accordance with the Treaty’s principles and its 
freedoms enshrined having nearly unlimited priority without the need for tax 
regulations being harmonised.937 In this respect neither the Schumacker-doctrine 
nor the following case law of the ECJ is limited to Individuals rather unfold 
implications on the treatment of companies as well. This statement holds true in 
general since the decision of the ECJ in Case “Avoir fiscal” 938 according to which 
it is the company’s “seat” that serves as the connecting factor with the legal 
system of a particular state. In other words, concludes Barnard939, a company’s 
seat has the same function for companies as nationality does for individuals. 
Therefore, provided that a company in the EU was lawfully established under the 
rules of its Home State it must be recognised with its legal form in the Host State 
irrelevant of the Host State rules even where the Host State provide for a different 
view on the establishment of companies under its domestic laws. 940 
Consequently, income derived from cross-border economic activity must be taken 
into account in the state of source of the relevant income that is either the Home 
State or a Host State.  
 
Furthermore, settled case law has made clear that where there is any type of prior 
authorisation or licensing of a foreign REIT conditional to conduct activities and/or 
benefiting of the domestic regime and its tax treatment such provisions are 
discriminatory and, thus, violating the freedom of movement of capital. 941 
936  See i.e. Case C 374/04, “Test Claimants in Class IV of the ACT Group Litigation v 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue (UK)” (Case “Test Claimants”), (2006), ECR I-11673; Case C-
379/05, “Amurta v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst” (Case “Amurta”), (2007), ECR I-9569; Case 
C-540/07, “Commission v Italy”, (2009), ECR I-10983, para 28 and Case C-284/09, “Commission v 
Germany”, (2011), ECR I-09879, para 44. 
937 See Case “Avoir Fiscal”, para 107 and more recently Case C-287/10, “Tankreederei I SA v 
Directeur de l’administration des contributions directes”, (2010), ECR I-14233, para 14 and case 
law cited as well as Case C-155/09, “Commission v Greece”, (2011), ECR I-00065, para 39, Case 
C-10/10, “Commission v Austria”, (2011), ECR I-05389, para 23 and Case C-9/11, “Waypoint 
Aviation SA v État belge – SPF Finances”, (2011), ECR I-09697, para 19. 
938 See Case “Avoir fiscal”, para 18.  
939 See Barnard (2004), p. 324. 
940 See Sec. 2.3 and 2.4 above with reference to respective case law i.e. Cases “Cassis de Dijon”, 
“Centros”, “Überseering” and “Inspire Art”. 
941 See Sec. 5.3.2 above with references to i.e. Cases “Kohnle”, “Scientologie” and “Belgium 2011” 
(see Exhibit IV.5.3: Case law on (direct) tax – Access to tax of non-resident companies). 
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Considering the rule of mutual recognition in light with the fact that under almost 
all of the MSs REIT regimes the option for status for foreign companies is either 
not eligible at all or subject to meeting specific conditions under the domestic 
regime only there is clear violation of EU law.942 Even though the Treaty provide 
for grounds of justification these grounds have generally not been successfully 
evoked by MS, neither on grounds of fiscal supervision, the coherence of tax 
systems, nor a balanced taxation 943  rendering these grounds rather fictitious 
though.944  
 
Therefore, applying the case law analysed to the case of a REIT corporation that 
is validly established in one MS it follows that it must be recognised having legal 
personality and legally acknowledged as a company legally established without 
the need to meeting neither further requirements nor additional conditions. 945 
Even though ECJ case law builds a secondary source, but is part of EU primary 
law it is as such directly applicable. Thus, downloaded to the MSs must be applied 
to the domestic legal order though. Herewith, the EU is impacting “indirectly” MSs 
sovereignty in direct tax using the ECJ case law and the freedom unlimited 
priority. As a result MSs REIT regimes do not pass the “goodness of fit” test. The 
provisions for legal requirements and especially the tax treatment rules 
discriminate non-resident REITs representing a violation of the freedoms. The 
freedoms under which the ECJ assessed harmful practices have been the 
freedom of movement of capital, Art. 63, and the freedom of establishment, Art. 
49. Consequently, MSs provisions for legal requirements and tax treatment “misfit” 
with EU law. 
 
There is not only impact of the EU downloaded to the MSs, there is, furthermore, 
measurable impact in the case of those MSs having been “Party” to the 
proceedings too. Not all of the MSs providing for domestic REIT regime946 have 
been subject to ECJ judgements with their tax treatment at issue in the main 
942 See Sec. 7.2 above. 
943 See Sec. 6.1 above. 
944 See Sec. 6.2 above. 
945 Whether this lead to an automatic qualification as a REIT in that other MSs obviously depend 
on the existence of a REIT regime in that MS. Where the MS does not provide for a domestic REIT 
regime there is no room for asking for any beneficial (tax) treatment. However, this situation 
changes in MSs that provide for a domestic REIT regime though. 
946 MSs providing for REIT regime domestically are marked “+” in Figure V.8-1. 
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proceedings though. MSs such as Bulgaria, Spain, Ireland and Lithuania for 
example have not been subject to any proceeding under this topic over the term 
analysed. MSs having been subject to proceedings have been primarily four of the 
core MSs, which are Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK responsible 
for 35 of the total 56 cases of the sample analysed, which represents 75% of the 
cases in the MSs Group of MSs providing for domestic REIT regime comprising of 
total 44 cases.947 
 
Figure IV.8-1: MSs subject to main proceedings before ECJ  
 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
These MSs had significantly to adjust their domestic tax regimes as a 
consequence of ECJ judgements, whereas, where the facts of these cases were 
equally or similar in other MSs domestic regimes the regimes might not have been 
adjusted due to the judgements having effect inter partes that is in between the 
parties of the proceedings only. Thus, there is no automatic effect towards MSs 
not having been involved in the proceedings even though sharing the same 
concepts as it was seen as a result of the comparative analysis. In those cases, 
however, adaptational pressure extant is to conclude towards MSs company and 
tax laws though.948 Since, however, the analysis and results of this chapter are 
made on the basis of the “common understanding” model of the MSs REIT 
regimes as defined in Chapter II above 949  and, thus, based on a broad or 
947 Of the 56 Cases the remaining 21 cases are split among a group of 11 MSs of which a quarter 
(5 MSs, which are Greece, Hungary, Finland, Italy and Belgium) each account for max up to 2 
cases in the period of the last almost two decades. 
948 See Sec. 7 above. 
949 See Chapter II, Sec. 6 above. 
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“averaged” model only, the impact of the EU is visible in general, but shall be 
subject to validation in specific “real life” terms though. This validation, however, 
shall be subject to the case studies in the following chapter though. 
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Section 3 – 
“Outcome”: The Impact of the EU 
 
 
Chapter V: REITs in MSs - Case Studies 
 
1.   Objectives for this Chapter 
Following the identification of specific rules in national company laws and 
suspect regulations in MSs REIT regimes, MSs may have reacted and revised 
their national laws for compliancy. The research now presents case studies of 
France, Bulgaria and Spain for an in-depth analysis of their REIT regimes, their 
alignment with the “common understanding”, and domestic environment 
influencing the REIT regime. Findings from the previous chapter give guidelines 
for analysis of suspect provisions and evidence of impact by the EU on REIT as 
proof of Europeanization.  
 
The objectives of this chapter with regard to each of the REIT regime case 
studies are: 
 
•  In-depth analysis to identify specific criteria in regard to legal 
requirements and tax treatment; 
•  Identify “goodness of fit” for provisions suspect of violating EU law; 
•  Investigate adaptational pressure; and 
•  Evaluate processes of Europeanization. 
 
The cases are the REIT regimes established by France, Bulgaria and Spain. 
These countries show variance in their constitutional structure, administrative 
culture, judicial structure and structure of civil society so that it is expected to 
see variance in the form and degree of Europeanization of its REIT regimes. By 
using Bulgaria and Spain additional to France the research contributes to 
Europeanization research as few studies have focused on the relationship 
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between the behaviour of smaller950 MSs in the EU and the degree of 
adaptation to the external environment of the Union, not only the “usual 
suspect”951 cases of MSs such as Germany and France.  
 
All three case studies have established their REIT regimes in the first decade of 
this century, benefited from the experiences of first established REIT regimes 
and the classical US-REIT, and benefited from the ECJ case law that has 
developed. France is a core MSs with an experienced (SIIC) REIT regime 
(established in 2003). Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, and created a EU law 
compliant REIT regime (JSSPIC) from 2004, a regime attractive to FDI and 
competing with other MSs regimes in the EU. Bulgaria thus provides a different 
starting position. The third case is Spain, the 4th largest real estate market in 
Europe (after the German, UK and French), which came late to REITs under 
pressure from the markets in an attempt to assist the failing housing market and 
benefiting from emerging ECJ case law.  
 
2.   The French REIT – SIIC 
 
2.1 The well-established EU Case 
France, one of the “core” countries and promoters of the EU, was the third MS 
to introduce a REIT regime after the Netherlands (1969) and Belgium (1995) in 
2003 only as “Sociétés d´Investissement Immobilier Cotée” (SIIC)952 partly 
inspired by the classical US-REITs.953 The SIIC regime followed tax transparent 
real estate companies and investment fund structures in the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Germany, to make the French real estate market more attractive 
950 See Haverland (2007/2005). Spain may not be considered as a small MS, but a “small(er)” 
economy different by size versus Germany, UK or France and, thus, not part of the “usual 
suspects” group (see Vink/Graziano (2007), p. 17). 
951 See Vink/Graziano (2007), p. 7. 
952 SIICs have been introduced by the Finance Act (Loi de Finance) 2003, Loi. 202-1575 of 
31.12.2002, published at Journal Officiel 31.12.2002. This regime is governed by articles 208 C, 
208 C bis, 208 C ter and 219 IV of the French tax code (FTC). The SIIC regime has been 
amended by the Amended Finance Act for 2004, the Finance Act for 2005, the Amended 
Finance Act for 2006, the Amended Finance Act for 2007, the Finance Act for 2008, the Finance 
Act for 2009, the Amendatory Finance Act for 2009 and the Finance Act for 2012. In addition, 
the French tax authorities (FTA) published administrative tax guidelines on September 25, 2003, 
February 01, 2010, December 27, 2011, March 08, 2012 and on June 15, 2012. 
953 LefèvrePelletier (2005), p. 11 
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for investments in this market954. The French government wanted to vitalize the 
French real estate market and lower its budget deficit through the disclosure 
and taxation of inner reserves of firms transforming to SIIC status. The French 
approach to REITs has been sensible and successful955 especially due to the 
prolongation of tax exemption to promote the dynamic of the market. 
 
France was concerned about loss of tax revenue associated with granting 
French companies tax transparency and, therefore, charged companies an exit 
tax in order to convert.956 The regime helped France to promote the listed 
property sector with SIICs representing the second largest property portfolio by 
assets under management in the EU after the UK.957 The requirements towards 
listed companies and the pressure for transparency along with the tax benefits 
provided liquidity in the market by the SIICs.958 
 
Established in 2003, the SIIC regime is an example of a REIT regime, which has 
shown high compliance with EU law and adjustments according to ECJ case 
954 IFD (2005), p. 75. There is, however reason for, as like in Germany the French market has a 
history of providing for a funds regime since long. The OPCI954 regime is similar i.e. to the 
German OEPF regime that was the first offering to retail investors providing for a means to 
invest capital i.e. small savings funds by private individuals into large scale real property assets 
and schemes and to benefit from professionally managed real estate and its returns. An OPCI 
(“0rganismes de Placement Collectif en Immobilier” (eng.: property funds) is a collective 
investment scheme specialising in real estate and intended for the general public. Its structure 
and legal framework is broadly inspired by those of collective investment schemes. Some 
versions of this product are intended for institutional investors (e.g. leveraged and unleveraged 
OPCIs with streamlined operating rules). OPCIs can take the form of an open-end real estate 
investment company (SPPICAV), which is equivalent to an open-end investment company 
(SICAV), or an unincorporated real estate investment fund (FPI), equivalent to an 
unincorporated investment fund (FCP). OPCI´s are supervised by the securities regulator, the 
AMF, from whom they must obtain authorisation before doing business. 
955 France witnessed its first successful public offering under SIIC regime of “Société de la Tour 
Eiffel” in July 2004. 
956 Given, that all of the major French listed real estate companies have converted, it appears 
that the exit tax was set at a reasonable level. As a result, companies converting to become 
SIICs generated additional tax revenues of approximately €1.5bn in the first years already (see 
Financial Times Deutschland (2004), Nr. 210). 
957 The market capitalisation increased from some Euro 11,1 bn in 2003 to Euro 45,35 by end of 
July 2012, an increase by more than 400% over a period of 10 years (see EPRA (2013b), 
France, p. 2). 
958 Nappi-Choulet (2008), p103. There are currently 40 SIICs listed at the Paris Stock 
Exchange.958 SIICs primary investment focus is mainly on Office (60%), Retail (34%) and 
Industrial (4%) while others represent for a small cap only (2%). However, geographically they 
are almost exclusively investing in the French market where the greater region of Paris (“Ile de 
France”) is of focus. The Top five SIICs represent themselves €31.69bn (rounded) that is almost 
70% of the French SIIC´ total capitalisation already. However, the SIICs reflect 5.91% of the 
global REIT market already and are to be recognised third in the global ranking with its global 
REIT market capitalisation (see EPRA (2013b), France, p. 2). 
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law. France has been directly subject to seven ECJ cases decided in the last 
two decades. Of 57 cases analysed in this thesis, France ranks third after 
Germany and the Netherlands as party to the ECJ France has adjusted its 
domestic regimes, involving negative integration and Europeanization. 
 
2.2  The SIIC regime 
Since France has significant experiences with its REIT regime at a time of 
considerable case law with tax treatment of cross border investments and an 
example of an EU law compliant REIT as a blueprint for the EuroREIT. The 
following analysis will provide a detailed overview of its SIIC regime to test the 
criteria for compliance with EU law as interpreted by ECJ case law. 
 
2.2.1  Legal requirements 
The SIIC regime is available to corporations whose capital is divided into shares 
(“actions”). SIICs are legally based by its legal nature of a SA959 or a SCA960 
with a minimum paid in equity of €15mn.961 To obtain SIIC status corporations 
do not have to operate under French law or be incorporated in France but only 
be subject to French corporate income tax. Any such company may elect, 
provided that it meets the activity test and is directly or indirectly held at 85% or 
more by a listed SIIC parent company.962 That holds true for companies 
incorporated under foreign law and/or resident outside France complying with 
other SIIC conditions.  
 
With the 2009 and recently the 2010 Finance Act, the SIIC regime may also be 
available to EU companies or non-EU companies listed on a regulated stock 
exchange market that meets the requirements of the FIM-Directive.963 
Qualifying foreign entities no longer have to seek a secondary listing in France 
to benefit from the SIIC regime, which also does not impose a residence 
condition. The French tax administration has already accepted that foreign 
959 “Société anonyme”. 
960 “Société en Commandite par Actions”. 
961 See Article 208 C sec. I, II CGI 
962 See Article 208 C CGI 
963 See “FIM-Directive”. 
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companies are eligible for the SIIC regime in respect of their French property 
portfolio, provided other conditions are met.964 
 
Some shareholder conditions have to be met for SIIC status, relating to both, 
the Individual as well as corporate shareholdings limited to maximum of 60% for 
a single shareholding and/or voting rights. Additionally, a SIIC must safeguard 
for a free-float of its shares at a minimum of 15% of the shares/voting rights 
provided that each single shareholding does not represent less then 2% of the 
voting rights. 
 
2.2.2 Tax treatment 
With the SIIC regime France introduced a pure tax regime applicable to listed 
real estate asset investment companies. Any eligible real estate investment 
company listed on a stock exchange may elect for SIIC status within 4 months 
from the beginning of the financial year in which the SIIC regime will apply for 
the first time. An election may also be made by any subsidiary directly or 
indirectly held at 95% at least by the SIIC parent and having qualified activity. If 
companies transform to SIIC status their inner reserves have to be newly valued 
and are taxed with a rate of 16.5% of the unrealized capital gains on the assets 
in the eligible portfolios paid in up to four instalments over four years.965 On 
merger of two SIIC their respective inner reserves can be tax exempt if they will 
be distributed to its shareholders at a rate of 50% within a period of two years 
following the merger.966 
 
SIICs and qualified corporate subsidiaries are not generally exempt from French 
corporate income tax, but income deriving directly or indirectly from qualified 
activities is tax exempt. Additional non-qualifying business is subject to French 
corporate income tax at 33.3%. Dividends of subsidiary-SIICs are taxable at the 
level of the members and tax exempt if such members are themselves exempt 
under the SIIC regime. If the shareholding by the mother income is at a rate of 
964 See EPRA (2013b), France, Recital 2.2, p. 3. 
965 Interestingly, French fiscal authorities have received a total sum of €1,43 bn in 2003 by way 
of this entry tax. The highest amount derived from the company called “Gecina” at €573mn. 
However, in 2004 still €100mn was paid due to entry taxation. 
966 IFD (2005), p. 79 by referring to the French Finance Act of 2005 
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95% and 100% of these dividends are being fully distributed to the shareholders 
of the mother-SIIC. Distributions of dividends from the SIIC to its shareholders 
are subject to different tax treatment depending on whether they are paid out of 
exempt or taxable profits or gains. The conclusion that finally and economically 
there is no taxation at SIIC level is not correct. With the Finance Act for 2010 the 
French government has replaced the local business licence tax with the CET, 
composed of two different taxes: 
 
-  a real property contribution (“CFE”), assessed on the rental value of real 
estate assets (equipment and movable assets, which were subject to 
business tax, are no longer taxed), and 
-  a contribution on the added-value (“CVAE”),assessed on the value added 
produced by the company at a progressive rate ranging from 0% (for 
companies with turnover less than € 500.000) to 1,5% (for companies 
turnover higher than € 50m) of the added value.967 
 
Since real estate property owners/lessors were previously outside the scope of 
application of the TP (the lease or sub-lease of buildings were not considered as 
business activities), they now fall within the scope of the CET. The reform aims 
to catch income and gains of real estate investment vehicles such as SIICs (and 
also OPCIs), their subsidiaries and any company leasing real estate assets. 
This eliminates the discrepancy between furnished leases (previously subject to 
the business licence tax) and unfurnished leases of buildings (previously outside 
the scope of the business tax). Whereas, the CFE will not be an issue at SIIC 
level for the corporation itself as the tenant is liable for such tax, as regards the 
CVAE will be taxed at corporate level and, therefore, fully impact the SIIC at its 
(REIT) level. CVAE does adversely impact French or foreign real estate 
investment funds, who cannot shift the tax burden to the tenant by charging it on 
top of the leasing fees, given that the CVAE is not directly linked to one or 
several buildings but to the overall activity of the lessor. As a transition the 
CVAE will be applied progressively by 10% annually starting at 10% for 2010. 
As a consequence the SIIC is no longer a fully tax-exempt regime. It is different 
for the foreign shareholder in the domestic SIIC. Withholding tax applies to 
967 See Immobilien Zeitung (2009). 
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dividend distributions to the foreign shareholder of the SIIC at a rate of 25% or 
15% respectively in case bilateral tax treaties apply.968 
 
Electing for the SIIC regime does not trigger any taxation at shareholder level, 
either pursuant to a constructive distribution rule or in the latent capital gains on 
shares of the SIIC. Corporate Income Tax does not apply for qualifying income, 
which is excluded from taxable base. A return of capital distribution is for both 
corporate and individuals normally tax-exempt. Dividends received by French 
resident individuals from an SIIC, or a qualifying subsidiary having elected the 
SIIC regime, have been subject to different tax treatment depending on whether 
they are paid out of exempt or taxable profits or gains. For French investors in 
France, the SIIC regime is not especially worthwhile, as most of the tax-free 
profit made by a property company must be distributed to its shareholders who, 
if residents of France, are taxed. 
 
2.3  SIIC findings  
With regard to the “common understanding” model of the European REITs, the 
SIIC seems to provide more flexibility ' allowing entities to be incorporated under 
foreign laws and, thus, does not require for certain minimum thresholds for 
statutory capital though. This flexibility was not part of the regime from its 
establishment, rather a consequence from Case “Avoir fiscal” 969 where France 
was found in breach of the freedom of establishment, a requirement later 
confirmed in Case “Lasteyrie”. The SIIC regime today is not in violation of EU 
law. Like its European peers the SIIC require shareholder conditions, which 
have been identified of being suspect according to ECJ case law.970 
 
968 Article 125 A CGI. According to an uninterrupted series of decisions rendered by the French 
Supreme Tax Court (Conseil d´Etat), foreign companies or entities that rented real estate 
property in France, were subject to corporate income tax in France, irrespective of whether or 
not they had a permanent establishment in France, unless a tax treaty provided otherwise. 
However, a recent decision rendered by the Conseil d´Etat (see Conseil d´Etat, no. 296471, 31 
July 2009, Overseas Thoroughbred Racing Stud Farms), has given rise to diverging 
interpretations and possibly has weakened the legal ground for taxation. The Amended Finance 
Bill 2009 expressly introduced a provision in the French tax code specifying that, as a matter of 
principle, income derived from French-based real estate property or gains realized on the sale or 
transfer of real estate property located in France are subject to French corporate tax unless a 
tax treaty provides otherwise (which is rarely the case). 
969 See Case “Avoir fiscal” and Chapter IV, Sec. 3.3 above. 
970 See Chapter IV, Sec. 7.1 above. 
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Table V.2-1 ECJ cases on France – Summary 
# Year  C- Case MS Freedom  Decision 
       
3 1986 270/83 Avoir fiscal F 
Right of 
Establishment 
Companies are free to choose the 
appropriate legal form in which to 
pursue its activities in another MS 
(Host State) that freedom could not 
be limited by any type and measures 
of discriminatory tax provisions. 
8 2003 9/02 Lasteyrie F 
Right of 
Establishment 
MSs are precluded of measure 
linked with moving of companies 
likely to hinder a company to move 
cross-border breaches the freedom 
of establishment  
 Equal treatment      
21 2011 384/09 Prunus F 
Free movement 
of capital 
A permanent regime of tax levied on 
direct holdings of non-resident 
companies constitutes a restriction 
of the freedom. 
 Prior authorisa tion    
26 2000 54/99 Scientologie F 
Free movement 
of capital 
Any rule of authorisation may be 
lawful though where investors 
subject to the authorisation are 
given indication as to the specific 
circumstances in which the 
authorisation is required, otherwise 
a rule contravene the principle of 
legal certainty 
 Tax benefits     
27 1986 270/83 Avoir fiscal F 
Right of 
Establishment 
Tax credits shall be eligible for non-
resident companies in Host State 
49 2012 338/11 Santander F 
Free movement 
of capital 
Different rules for resident and non-
resident companies with no 
permanent establishment violates 
the freedoms. 
51 2004 9/02 Lasteyrie F 
Right of 
Establishment 
Taxation of unrealised capital gains 
at the time of transfer of the 
residence violates the freedom 
              
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
The tax treatment regime provides the possibility to opt for SIIC status. 
However, a foreign company can benefit from the SIIC exemption regime if 
meeting the applicable conditions. Thus, a foreign REIT listed on a regulated EU 
stock exchange may apply for SIIC regime, not directly itself for its direct or 
indirect qualifying operations. According to French tax regime a company may 
be subject to French corporate tax only if resident in France. Thus, the foreign 
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REIT may elect for SIIC status if it transfers its seat to France becoming a 
French resident REIT or having a permanent establishment in France subject to 
French corporate tax. The foreign company’s French assets and shares of 
qualifying French subsidiaries will be recorded as assets of the branch for 
French tax purposes. As a general rule, foreign REITs are now treated as 
French entities so that they may be assessed for corporate tax in France in 
respect of French-source real estate income and gains. Eligible REITs can be 
exempt from French corporate tax for qualifying real estate income and gains 
under the SIIC regime.  
 
It very quickly became obvious that the SIIC regime was very attractive for 
foreign investors.971 While dividends distributed by the SIIC do not generally 
come under the scope of the parent-subsidiary regime under the EU Parent-
Subsidiary Directive, they are only subject to a withholding tax of 25% and can 
usually benefit from reductions in the tax rate in bilateral tax treaties to 15%. EU 
corporate shareholders owning more than 25% of the capital of an SIIC are not 
eligible for the withholding tax exemption. For these substantial shareholdings 
capital gains realised on the sale of the SIIC shares are taxable instead. 
 
There is differential treatment of domestic and cross-border distributions. 
Dividends paid by a SIIC to the non-resident shareholder are subject to dividend 
withholding tax972, with an exemption if the dividends paid to a resident 
shareholder. Property income of French subsidiaries, benefiting from the SIIC 
regime flow to the foreign EU parent companies/REITs, free of any French tax, 
as the French tax authorities have opened up the SIIC regime to foreign 
companies that meet conditions for SIIC status. Moreover, it is most likely that 
France cannot impose withholding tax on dividends distributed by a SIIC to its 
French resident, as France does not impose a withholding tax on domestic 
971 Consequently, the SIIC regime has attracted a number of foreign companies such as Corio, 
Rodamco Europe and Wereldhave (Netherlands), Hammerson (UK), Cofinimmo and 
Warehouse de Paw - (Belgium) (See EPRA (2013b), France, Recital 1, p. 2). 
972 This regime was already subject to Case “Prunus” and held to constituting a restriction of the 
freedom of movement of capital (see Chapter IV, Sec. 5.3.1 above). 
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dividends.973Conditions to access have been held in violation of the free 
movement of capital in Case “Scientology”.974 The ECJ held France in violation 
of EU law with their tax regime in treating residents different to non-residents in 
Cases “Avoir fiscal”, “Santander” and “Lasteyrie”.975 
 
Where the foreign REIT operating in France may neither apply for SIIC status 
nor benefit from beneficial treatment, the profits (i.e. rental income) from a direct 
investment in French real property by the foreign REIT will be taxed under 
ordinary rules for foreign companies under the FTC. Unless such domestic 
company meet the requirements for subsidiary to the foreign REIT, which in turn 
meets the conditions for SIIC, it will be taxed at ordinary rates. Though the SIIC 
regime was has experienced the development of the case law, France seems 
reluctant to go beyond what is absolutely necessary to comply with judgements, 
this can represent a true case of downloading from the EU level, where France 
has accepted the adaptational pressure from the case law and adjusted 
accordingly.  
 
Table V.2-2: Legal and Tax overview on the French SIIC regime 
Requirement Criteria SIIC European REITs* Suspect* 
Legal 
requirements Legal form 
SA, SCA or any 
legal form on 
shares, incl foreign 
Corporation / Stock 
Company no 
  Registered Seat 
domestic (either 
MS) domestic no 
 Listing 
obligatory (either 
MS) 
obligatory at 
regulated stock in 
either MS no 
 
Shareholder 
Conditions  
 
yes 
 corporate holdings max. 60% single max. 30%  
 
shareholding by 
individuals 
max. 60% single 
min. 25 %  
 free-float 
min. 15% with each 
less 2% voting rights min. 25 %  
 
     
 voting rights see free-float 
min. 25% by 
individuals  
   
max. 50 by 
corporate  
973 This holds true except in case where the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive applies. However, as 
the foreign REIT is a tax exempt entity the Directive is not applicable though (see Case 
“Denkavit” and Cornelisse (2006 Part 1), recital 3.2, p. 8). 
974 See Chapter IV, Sec. 5.3.2 above. 
975 See Table V.2-1. 
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 REIT regime option 
election for SIIC 
regime possible not eligible  yes 
Tax treatment 
(foreign REIT) Direct investment    
  income tax 
taxation according 
ordinary rules 
taxation according 
ordinary rules yes 
  capital gains tax 
taxation according 
ordinary rules 
taxation according 
ordinary rules yes 
  Indirect investment 
25% withholding tax,  
but may be reduced 
under DTT to 15%  
max. 20% 
withholding tax yes 
      
* Model of “common 
understanding”  
*SIIC 
violating 
EU law 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
The French REIT regime does comply with EU law to a significant extent, 
especially for the openness for other MSs legal forms of companies, according 
to the “Dassonville-Formula” and the “Cassis de Dijon-principle” following Case 
“Avoir fiscal”.976 Effectively, a foreign REIT as a shareholder in a domestic REIT 
is treated according to the ordinary rules for non-residents, a treatment suspect 
of discrimination on grounds of nationality.977 
 
Other than proceedings where France has been party, there is limited evidence 
for impact from case law on domestic regimes. Rather, the option for SIIC status 
is effectively neither the recognition of a duly established foreign corporation 
according to the rule of mutual recognition, nor beneficial tax treatment for the 
foreign corporation, but “window dressing” only. The requirement for application 
to the SIIC regime can be seen as discrimination against non-resident REITs, 
violating the freedoms violating EU law and putting France similar to its peers in 
the EU. Even though France does show evidence for “fit”, it does not provide 
evidence for integration, rather there is “misfit” of adaptational pressure. 
Therefore, the case study shows the process of Europeanization, but the EU 
has not impacted France as expected. 
 
 
 
976 See Table V.2-1: Legal and Tax overview on the French SIIC regime. 
977 See Chapter IV, Sec. 7.3 above. 
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3.  The Bulgarian REIT – JSSPIC 
Bulgaria represents a non-EU MS at the time of establishment of the REIT 
regime, but incorporated change to take the accession into account. Thus, 
Europeanization and European integration can be assessed. States in 
accession are open to the downloading of EU rules and “benchmarking” to 
transfer “best practices” and policies at domestic level. Bulgaria is a case of a 
State anticipating impulses from the EU by inducing bottom-up processes or 
“endogenising” Europe in domestic politics. 
 
3.1  The new-MS case 
Bulgaria´ real estate market has matured and grown very fast in the last decade 
following the changes of 1989. After the restitution of land title in the nineties 
commercial transactions of real estate property represent business as usual.978 
Bulgaria signed the EU accession treaty in 2005 and joined in 2007. The 
accession has improved the economic environment, and real estate related 
investments have led to a significant development of the market.979 The 
Bulgarian government has learned that taxation is a key to foreign investments, 
and FDI is stimulated by a favourable fiscal policy, with real estate attracting FDI 
of EUR 2.15 billion. 
 
That was recognised by the Bulgarian government when it introduced the 
JSSPIC regime through the Special Investment Purpose Companies Act (SPIC). 
A SPIC qualifies as REIT under Bulgarian law as a “Joint Stock Special Purpose 
Investment Company” (JSSPIC). FDI have not been seen in JSSPIC as a strong 
impact on Bulgaria’s real estate market. Of 314 listed companies 67 were 
JSSPICs in 2008, successful compared to other European REIT vehicles. The 
978 Historically, in view of the legal approach to title over land, Bulgaria has been close to the ex-
Soviet Union. Title over land and real estate was abolished after the 1950s. Afterwards, until the 
end of the 80s there was collectivisation and nationalisation where title had been moved to 
quasi-legal entities controlled by the government (versus the individual historical title-holders) or 
direct by the state. 
979 Previously, the real estate market was characterised by low demand due to low access to 
credits, low income and limited opportunities for foreigners to involve actively in real estate 
investments. The number of real estate transactions for sales has risen from 121,552 in 2002 to 
325,385 in 2007 (see bica (2008), p. 13). 
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number of JSSPICs in Bulgaria now has decreased today to 22980 representing 
Euro 319m market cap. The biggest JSSPIC are agricultural focused.981  
 
3.2  The JSSPIC regime 
In introducing JSSPIC the regime wanted to promote and facilitate the purchase 
of private homes by foreign individuals and to provide room for domestic 
investors to buy-in the real estate market. Bulgaria wanted to present a modern 
and developed picture to the EU attractive for FDI from other MSs and individual 
investors. Analysis explores whether a MS new to the EU follows full compliancy 
or similar behaviourism with respect to tax sovereignty. 
 
3.2.1 Legal Requirements (Legal form and Residency) 
A company eligible for authorisation under the JSSPIC regime must be 
structured and operated as a special kind of domestic joint-stock company, the 
AD, including the denomination as JSSPIC. Different to the French SIIC, the 
JSSPIC must have its registered seat and place of effective management in 
Bulgaria. The JSSPIC provide for different conditions compared to its peers in 
the EU. Whereas, the European REITs limit corporate shareholdings to 
maximum of 30%, the Bulgarian regimes requires a minimum of 30% corporate 
shareholdings, with voting rights limited to maximum 5% per shareholding. 
 
3.2.3 Tax treatment 
The public limited company that complies with the legal requirements qualifies 
under the SPIC for licence to becoming a Bulgarian REIT, the JSSPIC, in order 
to benefit from the beneficial tax treatment. Licence can be obtained from the 
Bulgarian FSC subject to an application within six month as from its registration 
with the Commercial Register.982 
 
980 As per 31 July 2012 (See EPRA (2013b), Bulgaria, Recital 1, p. 1). 
981 Traditional asset for JSSPICs is agricultural land. Every Bulgarian citizen is the owner of 
some small plots and for this reason for the ten to twenty years to come the market is expected 
to be active by the time the processes are regulated. JSSPICs specialised in farmland account 
for BGN 250mn of assets under management (AUM) almost 70% of the total AUM of the 
JSSPICs and its BGN 359mn of AUM.  
982 See EPRA (2013b), Bulgaria, Recital 2.1, p. 2.  
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Like it is key for REIT structures the JSSPIC as well is tax transparent at its 
level. Distributions to its shareholders are being taxed on their individual level 
depending on their legal personality. While the distribution received by the 
domestic corporate shareholder is tax-exempt those dividends distributed to 
individual shareholders shall be subject to taxation though. The resident 
individual shareholder faces a 5% domestic final withholding tax.983 By contrast 
the corporate foreign shareholder faces generally the same withholding tax at a 
rate of 5% as described above for the individual domestic shareholder unless 
the lower respective DTT withholding tax rate applies in favour for the corporate 
shareholder provided successful completion of the advanced procedure of the 
Tax and Social Security Code has been gained.984 Capital gains realised from 
the sale of JSSPIC shares are tax exempt for both, the corporate and the 
individual shareholder either foreign or domestic as long as the JSSPIC shares 
are listed at the stock exchange.985 
 
Interestingly, foreign REITs invested in Bulgarian real estate are taxed 
differently to even to a foreign corporate shareholder not being involved in real 
estate business. The foreign REIT faces a 10% (!) withholding tax on its rental 
income from Bulgarian real property. As a consequence there neither for the 
corporate nor for the individual shareholder of the foreign REIT any tax 
privileges. As a result it is more disadvantageous for a foreign corporate i.e. a 
REIT to invest directly in real property in Bulgaria, rather investing in a Bulgarian 
REIT a JSSPIC.986 
 
However, the situation differs in case of i.e. a foreign REIT investing in a 
Bulgarian company. In this case the foreign corporate shareholder receiving the 
983 This applies equally for the non-resident individual shareholder too unless a lower rate is 
provided under a DTT which rate has been reduced as of January 1st, 2008 from 7% to 5%. This 
means that the majority of non-resident recipients of Bulgarian sourced dividends will not have 
to invoke DTT benefits. Treaty benefits are needed under the DTT’s, which provide for a lower 
withholding tax rate on dividends which are the Austrian, Maltese and Kuwaiti (see Ernst & 
Young, (2008 BG). 
984 According to the Bulgarian law, DTT provisions do not apply automatically. The beneficiary of 
the income needs to previously apply for permission to the Bulgarian revenue authorities to 
obtain tax relief, should the total income, subject to withholding taxes exceed BGN 100.000 
(50.000 EUR). The deadline for the revenue authorities to issue their statement is two months 
as of the date of filing the application. 
985 See EPRA (2013b), Bulgaria, Recital 4, p. 6/7. 
986 See EPRA (2013b), Bulgaria, Recital 5, p. 7. 
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dividends is exempt from taxation provided it is a EU entity.987 Dividends paid by 
Bulgarian companies to entities resident in a MS, are exempt from Bulgarian 
source taxation, provided the following conditions are met: 
 
1. the EU company owns at least 15% of the equity capital of the Bulgarian 
subsidiary; 
2. for an uninterrupted period of at least 2 years; and 
3. the EU parent as well as the Bulgarian subsidiary are subject to corporate 
income tax in their respective jurisdiction.988 
 
The operative business of the JSSPIC, however, will be subject to the ordinary 
rules and taxation. Here, the acquisition of real estate triggers registration duties 
(i.e. transfer duties) at a rate of a range of 2% - 4% (RETT989) and a land 
registrar entrance fee of 0,1% are levied on the purchase price of the real 
estate. The purchase price may not be less than the tax value as defined by the 
tax authorities. The acquisition of shares, however, in the company owning the 
real estate is RETT free at the level of the acquirer. In kind contribution of real 
estate in the share capital of the JSSPIC is RETT exempt. Furthermore, the 
transfer of immovable property is subject to notary fee and land registry duty.990 
In addition, the transfer may trigger VAT.991  
 
As a result the advantages of the JSSPIC are the tax free holding and sale of its 
shares that builds the attraction for shareholders to invest in still. 
 
 
 
987 See EPRA (2013b), Bulgaria, Recital 4.2, p. 7. 
988 The tax relief provision applies even when the two-year period has not lapsed at the date of 
dividend distribution, provided a collateral security is furnished to the revenue authority. The 
collateral must cover the full amount of the withholding tax due by means of a money deposit or 
a bank guarantee. The collateral is released upon fulfilment of the 2-year holding condition. 
989 RETT = Real Estate Transfer Tax 
990 Notary fees are capped to BGN 3.000 (i.e. EUR 1.500) while land registry duty is at 0,1% of 
the sale price. 
991 The sale of real estate is not VAT-able as long as land is concerned. However, plots included 
in construction plans etc. are VAT-able. With the VATA 2007 the government introduced a 
distinction between the VAT treatment of new (VAT-able) and old (option for Vatable treatment) 
buildings. 
 
209 
                                                 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE 
CASE STUDIES 
 
3.3  JSSPIC findings 
The concept of the JSSPIC was planned to create a classical US-REIT 
comprising of typical features i.e. tax transparency and minimum distribution 
quotas. However, within the legislative process the government has given focus 
to the situation of the domestic real estate market that was not yet developed as 
such. Real property was cheap, however, identified as investment opportunity. 
Therefore, the JSSPIC provided a structure to assist the development of the real 
estate sector and promote Real Estate companies for going public. At the same 
time the government wanted to provide individuals with a mean to invest in real 
estate. The later, however, not on grounds known for i.e. the US in order to 
provide a means for pension schemes but to promote the domestic cultural 
situation of individuals buying their private homes rather renting them and by 
this securing the national situation before a buy-out by FDI. 
 
General restrictions for Real Estate investments in Bulgaria with the accession 
to the EU has prevented the JSSPIC to become more successful with and used 
by FDI in Bulgaria. The Treaty for Accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU 
(EU Accession Treaty992) provides for a transitional period prior to direct 
application of the Freedom of Movement of Capital according to Sec 3 of Annex 
VI to the EU Accession Treaty.993 The EU Accession Treaty restrict the 
acquisition of land for second home by individuals, not being holder of a 
permanent resident permit, from the EU or the EEA994 for a period of 5 years 
until 2011 and of agricultural and forest land by legal persons for a period of 7 
years until 2013.995 Though, foreign individuals and legal persons may be able 
to acquire title over buildings and limited “in-rem” rights over land in case of right 
to use and construction. The Bulgarian JSSPIC leaves flexibility to the 
shareholders with setting up the entity under the laws of Bulgaria or other MSs 
provided for the entity´ legal form is of a public limited company.996  
 
 
992 See Commission (2005). 
993 See Commission (2005a), Section 3. 
994 European Economic Area 
995 See Commission (2005a), Section 3, para 2. 
996 See Table V.3-1: Legal and Tax overview on the Bulgarian JSSPIC regime. 
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Table V.3-1: Legal and Tax overview on the Bulgarian JSSPIC regime 
Requirement Criteria JSSPIC European REITs* Suspect* 
Legal 
requirements Legal form 
Public limited 
company (AD) or 
any other domestic 
legal form on shares 
to be listed (acc to 
either MS corporate 
laws) 
Corporation / Stock 
Company yes 
  Registered Seat domestic  domestic yes 
 Listing 
obligatory (either 
MS) 
obligatory at 
regulated stock in 
either MS no 
 
Shareholder 
Conditions  
 
yes 
 corporate holdings min. 30%  max. 30%  
 
shareholding by 
individuals 
n/A 
min. 25 %  
 free-float n/A min. 25 %  
 voting rights 
max. 5% with single 
holdings 
min. 25% by 
individuals  
   
max. 50 by 
corporate  
 REIT regime option not eligible not eligible  yes 
Tax treatment 
(foreign REIT) Direct investment    
  income tax 
10% withholding tax 
on rental income 
taxation according 
ordinary rules yes 
  capital gains tax 
taxation according 
ordinary rules 
taxation according 
ordinary rules yes 
  Indirect investment 
withholding tax, but 
exempt if dividends 
distributed to EU 
entity 
max. 20% 
withholding tax yes 
      
* Model of “common 
understanding”  
*SIIC 
violating 
EU law 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
However, beside these flexible rules which look minded to comply with the 
freedoms of the Treaty this picture is, unfortunately, not valid though. The SPIC 
requires the JSSPIC to having its registered seat as well as its place of effective 
management to be located in Bulgaria only.997 Even though the entity may be 
established and listed in another MS to qualifying under the SPIC and being 
eligible to receiving license from the FSC the entity must, in this situation, 
transfer its residence to Bulgaria. In turn, it shall not be eligible to set up and 
license a JSSPIC and, afterwards, transfer the seat outside Bulgaria in another 
MS since this will lead to the possible loss of SPIC status for which meeting 
997 Ibid. 
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ghee conditions under which it has been granted is required.998 Thus, the 
Bulgarian regime neither recognises the foreign REIT duly established in 
another MS nor qualifies foreign REITs eligible to opt for JSSPIC regime. In this 
case the ordinary corporate entity is subject to corporate tax in Bulgaria. 
 
Viewed from the foreign perspective direct investments by neither individual nor 
corporate investors seem beneficial due to the application of the 10% 
withholding tax on the rental income from real property located in Bulgaria.999 
Thus, a foreign REIT actively operating in Bulgaria may be advised not to invest 
in domestic real property directly. Rather, the foreign REIT shall invest indirectly 
in to domestic real property using a domestic resident entity receiving 
distributions made by the JSSPIC to the foreign REIT tax exempt1000 provided 
the foreign REIT is an EU resident. 1001 However, with respect to applicable EU 
law this alternative does require the foreign REIT to establish for an investment 
vehicle (SPV) under domestic law in order for the REIT to benefit from this tax 
treatment, but was not recognised itself as a duly established legal entity subject 
to equal treatment compared to resident corporations though. Thus, this 
mechanism is suspect of violating EU law still.1002 
 
It documents clearly, the SPIC is focussing to promote the domestic regime and, 
thus, the domestic real estate market only. This consequence is a hindrance to 
the freedom of establishment as well as to the freedom of movement of capital 
according to settled case law.1003 Though, it is interesting that Bulgaria since its 
accession has not been subject to main proceedings before the ECJ in areas 
subject to this thesis as none of the cases subject to the analysis above referred 
to Bulgaria as Party though.1004 Thus the JSSPIC is not a compliant regime with 
EU law rather suspect of violating the freedoms. Different of what might have 
been expected Bulgaria obviously focused more on assisting the domestic 
economy, rather anticipating impulses from the EU by inducing bottom-up 
998 See EPRA (2013b), Bulgaria, Recital “Sanctions” 2.7, p. 4. 
999 See Table V.3-1. 
1000 Ibid. 
1001 See Sec. 3.2.3 above. 
1002 See Table V.3-1. 
1003 See Chapter IV., Sec. 3 ff. above. 
1004 See Chapter IV. above. 
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processes changing the European level or by “endogenising” Europe in 
domestic politics independent to specific pressures from the EU already though. 
Similar to the case of France, the JSSPIC is flexible in allowing for foreign legal 
forms for entity and its listing respectively on either regulated stock in the EU or 
EEA. However, the requirement for domestic residence is even more limiting. 
Thus, the regime appears suspect with its legal requirements and its tax 
treatment, thus, does not “fit” with EU law. With respect to the freedoms and 
ECJ case law, thus, as EU law stands to date, there is a high degree of 
adaptational pressure on the Bulgarian JSSPIC regime. 
 
4.  The Spanish REIT – SOCIMI 
 
4.1  The recent introduction case 
The Spanish real estate market is one of the most important and attractive 
markets for both domestic and foreign investors and its direct investments in 
real estate. Collective investment vehicles are already known in Spain and are 
extant by way of open-ended funds that serve as REIT-like regime. Apart from 
these collective vehicles Spain did not introduce a domestic REIT regime while 
other MSs already did. However, since the Spanish real estate market has been 
hit in 2008 by the crisis the Spanish government was about to assist the 
domestic real estate market and to incentivise investments in Spanish real 
estate, thus brought in to encourage investment into the property sector.1005 
Consequently, the Spanish ministry of economy presented in October 2008 the 
first draft legislation for the introduction of a REIT-Regime under the name 
“Sociedades Cotizadas de Inversión en el Mercado Immobiliario” (SOCIMI). The 
SOCIMI Act was introduced finally in October 2009 with retroactive effect to 1 
1005 In the absence of a history for indirect investment vehicles for small investors like it use to 
be the case in i.e. Germany, France and the Netherlands providing open-end Funds the SOCIMI 
shall provide for such investment opportunity enabling the small investor to generate an income 
stream to realising steady profits. However, beside, there were 28 property companies listed in 
2009 in Spain with a total market cap of E17bn. Spain’s real estate market was estimated at 
€644bn, making it one of Europe’s largest (see Zaidi (2009) and Meyer/Manzanares (2013), p. 
99). 
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Jan. 2009.1006 At this time Spain was the last “core” MS to the EU to establish its 
REIT regime.1007  
 
Though, the case of Spain provide for the case of a MS having established its 
REIT regime domestically only recently. Being one of the last joiners to the 
group of MSs providing for their own REIT regimes domestically, Spain shall be 
a representative example of a MS having absorbed “state-of-the-art” compliance 
with its regime though. Thus, Europeanization is present while Spain adapted 
EU legislation with the establishment of its SOCIMI regime already with the 
impact off the EU is proofed. However, since Spain has revised its domestic 
regime mainly with regard to its direct tax treatment recently in 2013 (negative) 
adaptational pressure from other MSs may have been involved representing a 
case of cross-loading. However, the acceptance and acknowledgement of EU 
law as the driver for a compliant REIT regime is rare though. 
 
4.2  The SOCIMI regime 
The SOCIMI Is a quoted property company that derives its income primarily 
from long-term investment in immovable property (real estate) distributes its 
income annually and, in general, does not pay income tax related to immovable 
property that is so distributed.1008 Spain was best situated to have analysed the 
experiences the other MSs already made with its REIT regimes and, 
additionally, was able to take into consideration the relevant ECJ case law that 
1006 See Act 11/2009 governing the ‘Sociedades Anónimas Cotizadas de Inversión en el 
Mercado Inmobiliario’ (the so-called ‘SOCIMI’). Since the government started discussions on the 
draft with market participants and on the political level the draft has been revised by the second 
draft of November 17th, 2008 and the third draft published on June 26th, 2009. The draft of 
November 2008 already included significant changes to the first draft and was accepted by the 
government already. However, the public discussions to the draft have led to further changes. 
1007 When introduced finally late in 2009 it was part of a multibillion-euro rescue plan included 
€3bn package to kick-start development and bank lending, that the government announced its 
plan for the SOCIMI to attract capital to Spanish real estate and increase liquidity in the sector. 
According to investors, the regime is mainly devised as a way to assist the banks with their 
overload of property. It was expected that banks are likely to place their residential assets that 
they have received from their borrowers the years before into SOCIMIs. Due to the crisis, 
though, there has been, unfortunately, in fact no establishment of a domestic REIT company 
and, consequently, there has been no development of a domestic REIT market to date though. 
(see PropertyWeekGlobal (2009), p. 6). 
1008 See Ley 11/2009, de 26 de octubre, por la que se regulan las Sociedades Anónimas 
Cotizadas de Inversión en el Mercado Inmobiliario (“Ley”), Preamble, Sec. II, BOLETÍN OFICIAL 
DEL ESTADO, Nr 259, 27.10.2009, Sec. I, p. 89693. 
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has shaped especially the direct tax area though.1009 Thus, the creation of a EU 
law compliant regime was possible. In this context the SOCIMI regime provides 
for an interesting case to the analysis in this chapter, thus, representing the third 
case study.  
 
4.2.1 Legal Requirements 
The qualifying legal form under the Spanish Corporate Law to establish a 
SOCIMI is a SA – Corporation (“Sociedades Anónimas”). The SA use to bear a 
minimum share capital of € 15m.1010 However, this requirement was reduced 
with the new legal tax system for SOCIMI published by the Spanish government 
in late 2012 to 5m only.1011 The name of the company has to indicate the 
qualification of the company as being a REIT and the abbreviation of the 
corporate structure, i.e. “Sociedad Anónima Cotizada de Invérsion en el 
Mercado Inmobiliario, Sociedad Anónima” or in short “SOCIMI, S.A.”.1012 
 
The public limited company is entitled to apply for the SOCIMI regime only 
provided it being resident in Spain. There is, however, no express regulation in 
the Articles of the Ley dealing with the incorporation of the SOCIMI. However, 
the Ley is making specific reference to the Spanish Corporation Act1013 and, 
furthermore, it has to bear in mind that that the special tax regime is included in 
the Spanish Corporate Income Tax Act. This means, that in general terms, and 
not taking into account consideration made as regards the application of the 
principle of non-discrimination, the SOCIMI must be considered as a Spanish 
resident CIT taxpayer. According to the Spanish CIT in force, an entity will be 
considered a Spanish CIT taxpayer only, if it is qualified as tax resident in Spain, 
which in the framework of corporations is required to being set up under 
Spanish Corporate law or having its registered office and its central place of 
management in Spain. Consequently, even in the absence of any specific 
wording to the resident condition for the SOCIMI, such mentioning is not 
1009 See Chapter IV above. 
1010 Ley Article 5 (1). 
1011 Such minimum share capital requirement was €15m under Law 11/2009, amendment to the 
Ley dated 20.12.2012 (see CliffordChance (2012), p.1). 
1012 See EPRA (2009), Spain, Recital 2.1, p. 2. 
1013 See under Article 1 section 1 of Act 11/2009 with reference to the Corporation Act Royal 
Legislative Decree 1564/1989 currently called the Corporate Enterprise Act approved under the 
Royal Decree 1/2012 as the regulatory framework for SICIMI. 
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required because, among other conditions, the SOCIMI must be qualified as a 
Spanish taxpayer in order to receive the benefit of the application of this special 
tax regime. However, indirectly Article 8, which is about the application and 
access to the regime, refers to SOCIMIs resident in the Spanish territory 
though.1014  
 
4.2.2 Tax treatment 
As it is the case for the French SIIC as well, the Spanish SOCIMI regime is not 
about a special corporate form rather a special tax regime applicable to 
corporations that comply with certain conditions to qualify for license.1015 In 
order to benefit from the tax treatment designed for the SOCIMI the company 
may elect for the special tax regime. The special regime, however, will apply 
upon and as long as the SOCIMI undertakes qualifying activities and complies 
with the relevant conditions for the SOCIMI only.1016 However, after the 
application the requirements for the SOCIMI regime must be met in the following 
two years after the option fort his tax regime is made but have then to be met 
each of its years of operation in the following.1017 
 
At the start of the SOCIMI regime the tax treatment was different to the regimes 
of those in other MSs. Where the classical REIT provided for full transparency 
on the level of the REIT the Spanish SOCIMI-Regime, however, did not follow 
this concept. Contrary to its European peers the tax treatment of the SOCIMI 
provided for the taxation on its corporate level though. However, even the tax 
transparency at REIT level and deferral of tax treatment to the shareholder level 
was envisaged, in effect single rules of the regime where tax benefits shall be 
given have led to a different system of taxation a REIT level.1018 Even though, 
1014 Ley Article 8. 
1015 Conditions are outlined in Sec. 4.2.2. above as well as in Chapter III, Sec. 3 above. 
1016 The transfer of a corporation to the SOCIMI regime as well as the set up of a SOCIMI, a 
share capital increase of a qualifying SOCIMI and the contribution of assets are generally tax 
exempt and do not trigger transfer taxation neither stamp duties (see Ley Articles 8 and 9). 
These changes, however, upon start of the operation and transfer tax at a rate between 6% and 
7% as well as stamp duty at a rate between 0,5% and 2% are applicable for the purchase of 
assets by the SOCIMI. These taxes max be reduced by 95% where the SOCIMI acquires 
residential real estate for rental purposes. 
1017 Ley Articles 1 and 8. 
1018 See Meyer/Manzanares (2009), p. 847. 
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income derived from qualifying activities is taxed at a flat rate of 21%1019 in 
general under Corporate Income Tax (CIT) representing a lower taxation for 
SOCIMIs compared to corporate not having applied for the regime.1020  
 
Since the introduction, however, market participants questioned the regime. 
During a dialogue over the past years since inception the Spanish government 
enacted in late 2012 with the Amendment to the Ley the highly demanded 
transparent taxation of the SOCIMI setting the tax rate at SOCIMI level to 0%, 
thus, putting it on equal footing with the already existing regimes for REITs in 
other countries, notably in other MSs and transferring the taxation of profits to 
the shareholder upon distribution of the profits.1021 However, non-qualifying 
income will be taxed at a rate of 30% still if i.e. (i) the income derived from the 
letting of assets where the tenant was a related party according to Art. 16 of the 
CIT, (ii) the tenant is a resident of a tax haven for Spanish tax purposes or (iii) 
the income derived from transactions that do not trigger any income for the 
SOCIMI from an accounting standpoint. 1022 As a reference to the basic idea for 
setting up the SOCIMI regime the tax treatment provides for a tax reduction if 
the portfolio of the SOCIMI consist of at least 50% of residential properties. In 
these cases the tax reduction will be 20% off the general taxation according the 
CIT that leads to a effective tax rate of 14,4% for qualifying income derived from 
residential property leasing.  
 
Capital gains are being taxed according to the above rules accordingly that is in 
case they derive from qualifying investments at a rate of 19% whereas those 
from non-qualifying ones at a rate of 30%. It has, however, to be noted that any 
investments from investments that in general are qualifying will be taxed as non-
qualifying ones if there is a non compliance to qualifying rules that are i.e. non-
compliance with the minimum holding or maintenance period1023, where the 
1019 The rate, however, was 18% at start of the regime in 2009 but soon be expected that the tax 
flat rate is about to increase up to a rate of some 19 – 21% due to an increase of the tax rates 
on income and capital gains with the tax reform of the CIT by the Spanish government in 2010 
which happened then later in 2010 actually. 
1020 See EPRA (2012). Spain. Recital 3.1, p. 4/5. 
1021 See CliffordChance (2012), p. 1/2.  
1022 See EPRA (2013b), Spain. Recital 3.1, p. 5. 
1023 The minimum holding period is of 3 years for real estate. This period may be reduced up to 
December 31, 2010 to 2 or just 1 year to the extent that the property has been rented or on the 
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purchaser is a related party according to Art. 16 of the CIT. The full tax rate 
applies as well when the transferee is a tax resident in a tax haven from a 
Spanish standpoint of view.1024 The taxation of capital gains with the corporate 
shareholder still follows the general taxation rules for corporations and therefore 
will be in general at a rate of 30% as well. However, there are exemptions for 
portions, which correspond to non-distributed profits. There will be a tax credit 
granted at a rate according to which relevant profits have been taxed earlier 
already. In case of a taxation of retained earnings at a rate of 30% in case of the 
transfer of shares1025 the credit will be at 30% as well. The individual 
shareholder will in general be subject to the taxation of capital gains as well. 
However, there can be a partial or even full exemption according to the income 
tax rules applicable for individual taxpayers that may or may not lead to gains 
taxed at personal tax rates applicable.1026  
 
In turn for the tax transparency of the SOCIMI itself its shareholders will be 
subject to taxation for dividends. Thus, the general exemption of dividends is 
cancelled for corporate shareholder as well as for domestic individuals.1027 Both 
types of shareholders will be taxed according to ordinary rates under CIT 
though.1028 
 
Furthermore, there are no withholding taxes that apply with respect to the 
foreign shareholder. However, depending in the case of a foreign shareholder 
resident in a country with which there is no automatic exchange of information 
the dividends will be taxed at a rate of 21%.1029 Furthermore there is a 
surcharge1030 of 19% on dividends on the level of the SOCIMI in case 
market for rent in the 5 or 10 years respectively prior to the date of election of the SOCIMI 
status. 
1024 See EPRA (2013b), Spain, Recital 3.1, p. 5. 
1025 Art. 30.5 CIT; See EPRA (2013b), Spain, Recital 4, p. 6/7. 
1026 If there is a calculated gain, this gain will be tax exempt according to the following formula: 
Exempt Capital Gain = (10% x CA x nº years) – dividends received. This holds true for the 
foreign shareholder as well but is subject to limits of Double Tax Treaties and its provisions with 
Spain. Where effective exchanges of information clauses are missing the taxation will be at a 
19% tax rate. 
1027 Exemption remained at €1.500 only (see CliffordChance (2012), p. 2). 
1028 The ordinary tax rate for dividends is 30% under CIT. 
1029 See EPRA (2013b), Spain, Recital 5, p. 8. 
1030 The surcharge were introduced with recent amendments by Act 11/2009, through Act 
16/2012, the Spanish government has set up a special 19% surcharge that will be imposed on 
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distribution shall be to a shareholder owning a share equal or more than 5% of 
the capital stock or where the shareholder is resident in a tax haven which 
applicable tax rate is less then 10% on the distributed dividends. The latter, 
however, shall not be applicable for any MSs though. Where and when the 
surcharge was imposed at the level of the SOCIMI on dividend distributions, no 
(further) withholding tax is applicable.1031 Interestingly, there is exception in case 
the dividend is paid to another REIT with a 100% distribution policy.1032 The 
question, however, whether this applies for the benefit of domestic SOCIMI-
REITs only or may be called by foreign REITs as shareholder in a SOCIMI as 
well can be left open. It is likely the Spanish subsidiary established as a SOCIMI 
where its Mother-company is a Spanish corporate though. Otherwise there will 
be no distribution of 100% of the profits as i.e. in the case of a dominations and 
profit transfer agreement. A foreign REIT, however, in case being the 
shareholder directly in the SOCIMI is not legally and will not effectively by 
distribution policy distribute its profits at a rate of 100% to its shareholders 
though as this will likely harm its financial situation though. 
 
4.3  SOCIMI findings 
The SOCIMI regime is in its legal requirements and tax treatment comparable 
with other MSs regimes, thus follows generally the classical “flow-through” 
concept. Like other, the SOCIMI regime is a pure tax regime, which is open for 
any company using a legal form that allows for listing of its shares like a joint 
stock company. Furthermore, the SOCIMI must be resident in Spain in order to 
qualify as a resident taxpayer under Spanish tax law and as a pre-condition to 
apply for license. Thus, it seems there is in general access for any foreign 
company i.e. a foreign REIT to the SOCIMI regime. In this respect the SOCIMI 
follows the same concepts with its legal requirements as France does with the 
SOCIMI dividend distributions. The reason why this special surcharge has been introduced as 
an amendment is because, under the new special tax regime, qualified SOCIMIs are taxed at 
0% CIT rate in order to avoid the absence of an final taxation at the level of the final shareholder 
(at least 10% of the dividend received). The Spanish government has considered the inclusion 
of this special 19% surcharge. 
1031 On the other hand, the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive will be applicable on dividend 
distributions in the event of a qualified entity foreign shareholder (entities included in the 
attached Directive list) when dividend distributed was subject to the special 19% tax rate at the 
level of the SOCIMI. 
1032 See EPRA (2014), p. 43. 
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SIIC regime providing for a regime that does not seem suspect, rather “fit” to EU 
law requirements.  
 
Table V.4-1: Legal and Tax overview on the Spanish SOCIMI regime 
Requirement Criteria JSSPIC European REITs* Suspect* 
Legal 
requirements Legal form 
public limited 
company (SA)  
Corporation / Stock 
Company no 
  Registered Seat 
Domestic or either 
EU MS  domestic no 
 Listing 
obligatory (either 
regulated stock 
EU/EEA) 
obligatory at 
regulated stock in 
either MS no 
 
Shareholder 
Conditions  
 
yes 
 corporate holdings n/A max. 30%  
 
shareholding by 
individuals 
n/A 
min. 25 %  
 free-float 
min. 25% (at 
MAB1033 less than 
5% possible) min. 25 %  
 voting rights n/A 
min. 25% by 
individuals  
   
max. 50 by 
corporate  
 REIT regime option not eligible not eligible  yes 
Tax treatment 
(foreign REIT) Direct investment    
  income tax 
ordinary tax 
treatment for non-
resident corporate 
taxation according 
ordinary rules yes 
  capital gains tax 
taxation according 
ordinary rules 
taxation according 
ordinary rules yes 
  Indirect investment 
0% tax provided 
subject to tax in 
country of residence 
at a tax rate of min. 
10%, otherwise 21% 
withholding tax,  
but tax credit in DTT 
case possible 
max. 20% 
withholding tax yes 
      
* Model of “common 
understanding”  
*SIIC 
violating 
EU law 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
However, conditional for access is the foreign REIT providing at least for a PE 
with which it operates in Spain in order to comply with the domestic residence 
requirement though.1034 In the absence of specific provision for the requirements 
to be met in order to qualify for application to the regime (equivalence test) in 
1033 MAB = Mercado Alternatiovo Bursatil (see EPRA (2014), p. 42). 
1034 See EPRA (2013b), Spain, p. 6 and 9 and Table V.4-1: Legal and Tax overview on the 
Spanish SOCIMI regime. 
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Act 11/2009 of 26 October as well as its recent amendments introduced Act 
16/2012 of 27 December which clearly determine the key elements to consider 
for foreign REITs as equivalent to the SOCIMI will be to a high degree of 
uncertainty.1035  
 
Furthermore, even though limited to seek for SOCIMI status there are 
shareholder conditions to meet still. The conditions, however, are marginal only 
in case of listing at the MAB resulting possibly into no free-float effectively. 
Nevertheless, this condition is suspect while setting a requirement in addition to 
what is required under the rule of mutual recognition though. 
 
Since the tax rate was set to 0% recently in late 2012, setting the SOCIMI at a 
transparent level in tax terms Spain provide for different treatment at 
shareholder level too.1036 Distributions by the SOCIMI to its shareholders are 
subject to withholding tax, whereas, distributions to the resident shareholder are 
not.1037 The non-resident corporate shareholders could be eligible under the EU 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive and a relevant DTT, provided that the relevant 
conditions are met only.1038 Furthermore, any profit from direct investment by 
the foreign REIT is subject to ordinary taxation for non-resident corporate.1039 
Thus, the SOCIMI regime is now suspect to violate the freedoms as the other 
case studies subject to this analysis too. This is an interesting development 
within the European REIT universe. At the time of its establishment the SOCIMI 
regime was not transparent at the REIT level, rather was to treat all 
shareholders equally and taxed dividend payments to shareholders, irrelevant of 
its residence. This concept, thus, ought to be the first and only EU law compliant 
1035 In the Absence of specific provisions in Spanish law it will, in this context, be subject to apply 
for a binding resolution before the Spanish tax authorities in order to get consistent equivalence 
criteria on a case by case analysis. Therefore, EPRA (2013b), Spain, Recital 5, p. 8 refers to a 
case-by-case evaluation since the bases for the analysis are not defined in the laws yet. 
1036 See Table V.4-1: Legal and Tax overview on the Spanish SOCIMI regime. 
1037 Ibid. Different opinion provided by Meyer/Manzanares (2013), p. 100. 
1038 See EPRA (2013b), Spain, Recital 4.2, p. 8. 
1039 Ibid. Generally the same situation is found for the taxation of capital gains. As outlined 
above, capital gains are not fully tax exempt However, they are being calculated according to 
Personal Income Tax Act rules. This regime is applicable not only for Spanish resident 
individuals rather for foreign shareholders too. This position was then confirmed by the ECJ 
recently where it decided that a Spanish capital gains tax which is less favourable to shares 
quoted on a foreign stock exchange as opposed to shares quoted on a Spanish exchange is not 
in line with the free movement of services and capital (see Case C-219/03, “Commission v 
Spain”). Following the decision of the ECJ Spain was to change its regime. 
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regime though. It seems for this reason that there cannot be account for any 
case subject to proceedings analysed above1040 having Spain been Party to. 
Unfortunately, due to the so-called financial crisis has offset Spain from the 
radar of international investors, whereas the tax treatment at REIT level was of 
no interest for resident Spanish investors though. The revised regime to a fully 
transparent flow-through regime has set pace for the SOCIMI success 
becoming a desirable investment vehicle in Spain.1041 However, the regime is 
now set at the same footing with its European Peers, thus, there is “misfit” to EU 
law and pressure on Spain to adapt its requirements though. 
 
5.  Case Study findings  
This chapter concludes that REIT regimes in MSs are suspect of being 
incompatible with EU law and its freedoms in different ways. Suspect 
regulations are found in the legal requirements for qualifying entities excluding 
foreign resident REITs. Not only the different treatment at shareholder level but 
the inherent differentiation made between resident and non-resident 
shareholder is of issue being taxed as an ordinary foreign corporate or 
shareholder. Where, however, simply due to the origin a foreign REIT does not 
benefit from a domestic REIT regime, clear discrimination on grounds of 
nationality exists. 
 
Awareness for EU law does not seem to be highly developed in MSs that have 
not undergone the EU compliance test. Since in the past MSs have given no or 
only little attention to potential incompatibilities of its regimes with Community 
law the focus has recently changed. MSs fear of abuse of its tax regimes and 
loss of tax base is the key driver in setting up its tax treatment of the (foreign) 
REIT regime. The UK and Germany have given focus to the taxation of foreign 
investors i.e. shareholders in its domestic REITs, being well aware of the 
“dilemma”.1042 The regimes are suspect of violating the freedoms under the 
Treaty. Going forward, the risk for MSs imposing withholding tax non-compliant 
with the Treaty is to loosing its right to imposing withholding tax on distributions 
1040 See Chapter IV. above. 
1041 See Serrano de Haro/Fernandez (2014), p. 14/15, PropertyEU (2014). 
1042 See Cornelisse (2006 Part 1), recital 3.3., p. 8 with further reference to the local discussions 
and papers i.e. for the UK: HMT (2005), p. 12, para 4.4; for Germany: EBS (2005). 
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to foreign shareholders and the right to levy income tax on property income 
realised by a foreign REIT. Hence, MSs will not be of control of their domestic 
tax revenue, thus, find themselves captured in the situation that they wanted to 
prevent that is the fear of tax revenue loss. This general conclusion is fuelled by 
the results of the case studies too. Differential treatment of domestic and cross-
border situations starts with the legal requirements already. Interestingly, the 
MSs regimes subject to the case studies have a similar approach, which, 
according to the analysis above, is represented by the majority of the REIT 
regimes extant in MSs though.  
 
Table V.5-1: Case Study findings – overview 
    Case Study  Findings     
Criteria Suspect SIIC JSSPIC SOCIMI Suspect 
Legal    France Bulgaria Spain   
requirements 
Case 
Study       
common 
understanding 
Legal form 
yes 
SA, SCA or 
any legal form 
on shares, 
incl foreign 
Public limited 
company (AD) 
(either MS 
corporate laws) 
Public limited 
company (SA) yes 
Registered 
Seat 
yes  domestic 
(either MS) domestic  
domestic 
(either MS) yes 
Listing 
no 
obligatory 
(either MS) 
obligatory 
(either MS) 
obligatory 
(either 
regulated 
stock 
EU/EEA) 
no 
Shareholder 
Conditions 
yes 
  
 yes 
corporate 
holdings 
 
max. 60% 
single 
min. 30%  n/A  
shareholding 
by individuals 
 
max. 60% 
single 
n/A n/A  
free-float 
 min. 15% with each less 2% 
voting rights n/A 
min. 25% (at 
MAB1043 less 
than 5% 
possible)  
voting rights 
 
See free-float 
max. 5% with 
single holdings n/A  
Tax 
treatment 
(foreign 
REIT)         
REIT regime 
option 
yes 
election for 
SIIC regime 
possible not eligible not eligible yes 
1043 The SOCIMI can be listed on either the main board oft he Madrid Stock Exchange (XMAD) 
or the Mercado Alternatiovo Bursatil (MAB) (see EPRA (2014), p. 42). 
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Direct 
investments      
income tax 
yes 
taxation 
according 
ordinary rules 
10% 
withholding tax 
on rental 
income 
ordinary tax 
treatment for 
non-resident 
corporate yes 
capital gains 
tax 
yes 
taxation 
according 
ordinary rules 
taxation 
according 
ordinary rules 
taxation 
according 
ordinary rules yes 
Indirect 
investment 
yes  
25% 
withholding 
tax,  
but may be 
reduced 
under DTT to 
15%  
withholding tax, 
but exempt if 
dividends 
distributed to 
EU entity 
21% 
withholding 
tax,  
but tax credit 
in DTT case 
possible yes 
            
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
All regimes subject to the case study are with their legal requirements generally 
well in compliance with EU law and settled case law though. The free movement 
of corporate in inbound cases where foreign Corporate and REITs moving-in 
without the application of any pre-conditional rules1044 is well recognised as well 
as their respective legal form since lawfully established in its Home State.1045 
Hereunder, especially with the SIIC and SOCIMI regimes a well established 
understanding of the case law with respect to the recognition of incoming 
corporate and its respective legal form.1046 This holds true with a view to the 
residency requirement where a flexible approach allowing for residence 
domestic or either MS.1047 However, this pure formal view does not reflect realty 
properly. Rather, the formal situation is “window dressing” only, since this formal 
situation is countered with the requirements set to meeting the conditions for 
domestic regime in full. These requirements, however, include inter alia to 
meeting the requirements under domestic tax laws, which in the case of 
especially those regimes reflecting pure tax regimes only, like the SIIC and 
SOCIMI. Hereunder, the foreign REIT is to provide for a taxable entity under 
domestic law, which in effect, requires the foreign to setting up for a SPV under 
domestic law though. Thus, the foreign REIT is de facto not recognised equally 
1044 See as required by the ECJ with its Case “Dassonville” (Chapter IV, Sec. 3.1 above). 
1045 See as required by the ECJ with its Cases “Cassis de Dijon” and “Avoir fiscal” (Chapter IV, 
Sec. 3.2 and 3.3 above). 
1046 See Sec. 3.2.2 above and as required by the ECJ with its Cases “Centros”, “Überseering” 
and “Inspire Art” (Chapter IV, Sec. 4, 5 and 7 above). 
1047 See Table V.5-1. 
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to a domestic corporation and, thus, the legal requirements do not respect the 
freedoms though. Additionally, there are shareholder conditions to meet, which 
require additional or different conditions. Where the foreign REIT is to meet 
these conditions may require a change of structure or even the legal form. 
Therefore, as a facit it can be concluded that the regimes in the MSs subject to 
the case study are in “misfit” with EU law though. 
 
Whereas, the JSSPIC regime require the domestic REIT company to having its 
seat domestically as a condition for becoming a domestic taxpayer under its tax 
laws to qualifying to apply for REIT status.1048 This lead to either a transfer of 
the company´ seat into Bulgaria in case a foreign corporate seeks for REIT 
status. This obviously constitute a limitation to apply for the respective domestic 
REIT regime, thus, is a hindrance to the freedom of establishment as well as the 
freedom of movement of capital. Hereto, the ECJ clearly outlined that there 
shall, however, be no difference in treatment between a resident versus a non-
resident1049 as well as where a foreign entity is comparable in its essentialia to 
domestic ones it shall be treated as a domestic entity though. 
 
As regards the legal requirements the regimes analysed in the case studies it 
can be concluded that the SIIC and the SOCIMI regime only seem to fully 
comply with the framework set by EU law, whereas the JSSPIC is suspect with 
regard to its requirement for residency, thus, clearly being contrary to what has 
been stated by settled case law already.1050 This is the more interesting since 
especially Bulgaria shall have this already taken into consideration while 
designing their respective regimes. However, it seem that national interests, 
especially with a view to the critical situation of the Spanish economy and 
setting incentives to stimulate it has been of focus rather compliance with EU 
law though. 
 
Different picture, though, is shown by the case studies with regards to the 
respective tax treatments. Whereas, the treatment for the domestic REIT is not 
1048 Ibid. 
1049 See Cases “Schumacker” and “Stauffer”(Chapter IV, Sec. 5.2, 5.2.2 and 5.3.1(7) above). 
1050 See Table V.5-1. 
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suspect of infringing EU law, the case is different for the foreign REIT operating 
in the Host State though, the case for the foreign REIT operating in the Host 
State proofed to be suspect though. There is, however, no difference whether 
the foreign REIT is operating directly or indirectly via a shareholding in a 
domestic REIT. In the case of direct investments in the Host State the foreign 
REIT shall be treated under the domestic REIT regime. Even though all regimes 
subject to the case studies provided for lenient conditions towards the legal 
requirements, this is different with access to REIT status. Common to all 
regimes is the fact that they do not represent a specific legal form of a corporate 
under the respective domestic corporate laws rather all regimes represent a 
special tax regime eligible for those companies complying with certain 
conditions, the REIT regime requirements under the respective domestic REIT 
regime and its laws. Thus, all regimes require a company domestically to elect 
for application to get access to the advantageous i.e. the beneficial tax 
treatment. Even though access to the regime seem possible for foreign 
companies as well by just applying for REIT status, in fact that is not possible as 
such. To this point there is no difference in between the group subject to the 
case studies. Whereas the regimes generally do not require domestic residence 
this is, however, not sufficient for getting access to domestic REIT status 
though. With all other MSs as well the foreign company applying for access to 
the domestic regime for its activities in the Host State must provide at least for a 
qualifying subsidiary, i.e. a PE, which is subject to corporate income tax in the 
Host State, either due to their legal form or tax election.1051 The very approach 
is taken for applying to the SOCIMI regime and for getting licensed under the 
JSSPIC regime too. However, Bulgaria and Spain have made it clearer in their 
regime outlining that as a condition for getting access to the regime the 
company applying must be a resident taxpayer under its respective CIT though.  
 
However, this approach does not seem to be compliant in light of the applicable 
EU law and settled case law by the ECJ. Taking the principle of non-
discrimination as well as the freedom of establishment any foreign REIT once 
legally established in a MS und the Home State laws must be recognised in any 
other MS. Therefore, where a MS, such as those of the case study group, 
1051 See i.e. for France EPRA (2013b), France, Recital 2.2, p. 3. 
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provide for a domestic REIT regime domestically shall grant access to their 
domestic regime to foreign established REITs though.1052 Notwithstanding the 
above statement, it holds true that discrimination arise in the event that the 
domestic regime was not granted to an REIT established according to the 
regime and laws of another MS rather, in addition, which fulfils all and every 
legal requirement under the domestic regime (i.e. legal requirements, operating 
activities and Status). Consequently, the regimes require the foreign REIT, in 
addition to being established as REIT under its Home State REIT regime, to 
fulfil all requirements for the equivalence test which by content differs meaning 
that the foreign REIT qualifies under the domestic REIT regime to apply for its 
status only when meeting all and every requirement of the domestic regime 
though. In the absence of a specific regulation containing the key elements for 
such a equivalence test it is to understand that in very limited and restrictive 
cases only a foreign REIT established under the regime of another MS could 
claim for the application of the principle of non-discrimination successfully. Thus, 
the requirement, not necessarily express but in fact, by a domestic regime for 
the fulfilment of an equivalence test is suspect of violating EU law. 
 
Furthermore, suspect elements become most obvious to distributions. Dividends 
paid to the non-resident shareholder are subject to dividend withholding tax in 
case of the JSSPIC and ordinary corporate tax rules in case of the SIIC and 
SOCIMI respectively, whereas there is an exemption if the dividends paid to a 
resident shareholder though.1053 It is remarkable to see that i.e. the SIIC regime 
was introduced in 2003 with little regard being paid to the tax position of foreign 
shareholders and the impact of EU law. Today, several non-French quoted 
REITs are benefiting from the SIIC regime in connection with their portfolios of 
French properties. Property income of French subsidiaries, benefiting from the 
SIIC regime are flowing to the foreign EU parent companies/REITs, free of any 
French tax, as the French tax authorities have accepted opening up the SIIC 
regime to foreign companies that meet the conditions for the SIIC status. 
Moreover, it is most likely that France cannot impose withholding tax on 
1052 See Cases “Cassis de Dijon” and “Stauffer” (Chapter IV, Sec. 3.2. and 5.3.1(7) above). 
1053 See Table V.5-1. 
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dividends distributed by a French resident SIIC, as France does not impose a 
withholding tax on domestic dividends.1054  
 
The most important difference of the SOCIMI regime when it started in 2009 has 
been the different tax regime applicable. Originally, the Spanish government did 
not to leave the SOCIMI tax transparent on its level but established a regime 
that was to tax any income and profits to be distributed to its shareholder at the 
SOCIMI level already. Even though the tax rate at SOCIMI level was considered 
to be a special rate not representing the ordinary rate to tax on ordinary 
corporate´ income under Spanish CIT.1055 Rather, the rate from start 
represented a reduced 19% flat rate though. In case of meeting the Asset test 
that is 50% of the income is originated form residential real estate a further 20% 
exemption on that portion of income is eligible for the SOCIMI possibly bringing 
its tax rate further down to effectively 15.2%.1056 This tax was the final tax for 
residents as well as for non-resident taxpayers and shareholders of the SOCIMI 
as generally none of them were taxed on dividends and capital gains derived 
from their investment in a SOCIMI.  
 
This concept represented a different understanding of the REIT in Spain and 
compared to other MSs having established its REIT regimes. One of the key 
elements of a REIT is the tax transparency at the company level, which 
transfers the taxation of the income of the REIT to the hands of the 
Shareholders where tax is paid according to the individual tax rate. In deciding 
differently the Spanish REIT was the only one to tax the income at company 
level already. Obviously, the success of the SOCIMI regime lacked behind the 
expectations of the government as market participants in Spain started to 
question this tax regime for the SOCIMI already. In fact, until today, there is no 
SOCIMI extant, which according to market observers is owed to the non-
transparent nature of the SOCIMI only.1057 Finally, in December 2012 the 
government amended the regime significantly in this respect introducing a 0% 
1054 This holds true except in case where the Parent-Subsidiary-Directive applies. However, as 
the foreign REIT is a tax exempt entity the Directive is not applicable though (see Case 
“Denkavit” and Cornelisse (2006 Part 1), recital 3.2, p. 8). 
1055 The ordinary tax rate in Spain on corporate income is 30% according CIT. 
1056 See EPRA (2013b), Spain, Recital 3.1, p. 4 et seq. 
1057 See i.e. Zaidi (2009) and CliffordChance (2012), p.1/2. 
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taxation of the SOCIMI though.1058 The elimination of the taxation of profits at 
REIT level transformed the regime from a taxed into a transparent regime 
though.  
 
With this change the SOCIMI was put “on equal footing”1059 with the already 
existing REIT regimes in the EU, it changed its situation towards EU law as well. 
The issues in taxation identified of being suspect with regard to EU compliance 
are generally the rules dealing with the taxation of the non-resident shareholder. 
Where the REIT is fully transparent the taxation of profits must be secured 
through the taxation of such profits in the hand of the shareholder. In case of a 
non-resident shareholder the dividend payment is made outside the country, 
thus, those funds are not subject to tax in the territory of the originating country. 
Consequently, prior to making the payment withholding taxes are levied on 
those distributions securing for the taxation of the distributions and, more 
importantly, securing the tax revenue for the MSs. This is the usual concept 
followed by MSs and its REIT regimes though. However, as analysed, such 
treatment with a view to the non-resident shareholder is suspect of violating the 
Freedoms of the Treaty, thus, EU law since the distribution to the resident 
shareholder is not burdened with tax rather is taxed according to individual 
situations that may or may not even lead to a zero taxation of such dividend 
payments. In contrast, the non-resident shareholder may sets himself into a 
comparable situation in its country of residence only if the Home State grants a 
tax credit for the withholding tax paid or has concluded a DTT with the country 
of source whereby the same result applies. This is, unfortunately, not the case 
generally.1060 
 
In this situation an obvious solution is the taxation of profits at REIT level, thus, 
treating resident and non-resident shareholders equally and leaving the taxation 
to a true effect in the hands of any shareholder, irrelevant of its residency, at its 
personal tax situation. Moreover, the country taxing these profits firstly has 
secured its tax revenue from the activities in its territory and may secondly has 
1058 See Sec. 4.2.3 above. 
1059 See CliffordChance (2012), p.1. 
1060 See Chapter II and this Chapter above. 
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to proceed or compensate those to another country subject to a DTT. But 
anyway, the main point is to having secured for domestic tax revenue in a way 
of equal treatment of persons (whether individuals or legal persons) though. In 
this respect the original SOCIMI regime was to the most extent possible in 
compliance with EU law and its Freedoms. This created a special case with the 
SOCIMI until Spain amended the regime to the 0% taxation. Based on the 
amendment Spain sets itself in the same suspect situation with other MSs 
regimes though.  
 
In the case of indirect investment the foreign REIT does not benefit from the 
domestic REIT regime either. Whereas the taxation of dividends distributed to 
the foreign shareholder of the domestic REIT is not subject to withholding tax, 
even by different means applicable, it is however open for further deduction 
according to a DTT applicable. However, the reduction under a DTT usually will 
be by 15% off that there is effectively a tax leakage of 6 – 10% under the 
SOCIMI and the SIIC regime respectively though. Interestingly, this is different 
under the JSSPIC regime under which withholding tax does not apply where 
dividends are distributed to an EU entity.  
 
Notwithstanding, concerning withholding taxation there are suspect rules within 
domestic tax regimes though since not all of the possible situations provide for 
clear EU compliancy. There is clear different fiscal treatment compared to the 
domestic case leading to discrimination of the non-resident case, which is 
violating the freedoms though.1061 In between MSs REIT regimes, however, 
almost all of them follow a tax transparent approach on REIT level but there is 
no such common understanding existing towards the taxation of foreign 
investors. The differences are mostly being motivated by countries fear of abuse 
in terms of tax evasion. Herewith, the impact of the EU seem to be limited to 
downloading of “hard” law, but transformation in to the national laws is limited to 
cases of direct applicability such as in the case a MS is subject to judicial 
proceedings i.e. Party of a lawsuit pending before the ECJ. Decisions from the 
ECJ in these situations seem to be implemented and, as it was seen, lead to 
adjustments in domestic regimes accordingly. Beyond these proceedings and its 
1061 See Cases “Commerzbank” and “Saint Gobain” (Chapter IV, Sec. 5.3.1 (3) and (4) above). 
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Parties involved, however, there is no such implementation of EU law and 
respective adjustment of domestic regimes though. Rather, there seem to exist 
kind of cross-loading in between the MSs and its regimes creating a “common 
understanding”, which, however, is suspect of violation of EU law, whereas any 
kind of adaptational pressure does exist legally, but seem not to urge MSs to 
adjust domestic laws accordingly. However, “key” for further global growth and 
spread for REITs in MSs is to achieve a harmonisation of rules that will foster 
the growth of a European REIT´ brand´ and encourage cross-border investment 
from one MS to another. 
 
6.   Conclusion 
Thus, the regimes subject to the case studies are suspect, even though partly, 
to being in conflict with EU law, thus, being suspect of violating the 
freedoms.1062 The impact of the EU on domestic regimes has not resulted in “fit” 
to all extant MSs REIT regimes. The case studies do not differ with the overall 
assessment of “fit”, towards the “common understanding” between all MSs 
providing domestic REIT regimes. Thus, “misfit” has brought forward 
adaptational pressure to adjust their regimes accordingly. The case study 
findings confirm that the fear of loss of tax revenue is the main driver for MSs to 
keep their eye on sovereignty and hinder to seek for solutions, which then are 
cross-loaded to other MSs and uploaded to the level of the EU. Thus, the 
process of Europeanization has not resulted in integration, and seems to require 
assistance from the EU to harmonise. Activities from the EU shall be discussed 
in the following chapter to explore the process of Europeanization towards a 
possible harmonisation of REITs towards a EuroREIT regime with “fit” with EU 
“hard” law. 
 
1062 See Table V.5-1: Case Study findings – overview. 
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Chapter VI: EU “Soft” Policies and the “EuroREIT” 
 
 
1.    Objectives for this Chapter 
To identify evidence of Europeanization, distinction in this thesis is made 
between directly applicable policies with which MSs REIT regimes have to 
comply, so-called “hard” policies and laws, covered in the previous chapters, 
and policy suggestions and ideas promoted by the EU, so-called “soft” activities 
and proposals. This chapter addresses policy, which the EU attempts to 
influence, but the final say reside with the MSs. This process explains the 
interaction of MSs and EU institutions producing change on domestic level.1168 
ECJ case law has struck down barriers to the freedoms,1169 and 
Europeanization in the implementation of EU law and the change on domestic 
level1170 from competition to “shared beliefs”1171, is seen by vertical mechanisms 
such as adaptational pressure on MSs to adapt their domestic rules.1172 This 
may not directly lead to harmonised REIT regimes, but may be “… uploaded (by 
MSs to EU institutions) and following European integration downloaded …” to 
the MSs.1173 Hence, Europeanization becomes European integration;1174 
“negative integration connects to positive integration”.1175 Without discussing the 
process of Europeanization in detail, the different actors and their interaction, 
insight for MSs REIT regimes coming to a harmonised REIT regime on EU level 
will be analysed.1176 
 
ECJ cases are taken into consideration with its implied normative power 
influencing activities by the Commission towards harmonising MSs tax regimes. 
1168 See Radaelli (2006), p. 59 with reference to Gualini (2003), p. 152, and the idea of 
Europeanization as “explanandum”. 
1169 See Radaelli (2006), p. 70, Harcourt (2003), p. 179(200). 
1170 See Howell (2004), p. 42 with reference to Dyson/Goetz (2002). 
1171 See Howell (2004), p. 44, 158. 
1172 Ibid, See Case “Schumacker” and the trilogy of cases “Centros”, “Überseering” and “inspire 
Art” (see Chapter IV above). 
1173 See Howell (2004), p. 46, 48 referring to this process as “cross loading” (EN3). 
1174 See Howell (2004), p. 151; See Caporaso (2007), p. 28 et seqq. on the “three-step model” to 
the process of integration, see Figure 2.1 “Europeanization and domestic change”, p. 28. 
1175 Sweet (2002), p. 8. 
1176 See Howell (2004), p. 176; See for details to the discussion on Europeanization in i.e.: 
Featherstone/Radaelli (2003), Howell (2004), Radaelli (2006) and Graziano/Vink (2007). 
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In the absence of a EU mandate where national governments control the 
process “facilitated coordination”1177 helps MSs to engage and direct policy 
promotion and diffusion by themselves. Resulting from “soft” policies toward 
harmonising tax treatment in MSs REIT regimes examples can be found of 
“cross-loading” between MSs using concepts from Directives already and 
uploading MSs ideas and policies to the EU.  
 
Thus, the “common understanding” within REIT regimes shall be taken further 
as a concept-building basis for a EuroREIT and possible solutions for its direct 
tax regime. The harmonisation of REIT regimes in the EU towards a EuroREIT 
requires assistance from the EU and MSs as well, which this chapter addresses 
by  
 
• examining mechanisms for change at EU level in the area of corporate 
(direct) tax through “facilitated coordination”; 
• providing solution to overcome MSs fear of loss of tax base and helping the 
achievement of a harmonised REIT model;  
• formulating an approach toward a European REIT “fit” with EU law; and  
• understanding the likelihood of a EuroREIT regime through the process of 
Europeanization. 
 
2.    EU “soft” policies  
It became clear to the Commission that vested interests in MSs were hindering 
mutual understanding according to the Treaty.1178 As the MSs came closer to a 
mutual understanding of an internal market national rules come to be replaced 
by Community rules.1179 As local tax systems have been more under attack from 
ECJ decisions1180 MSs may move towards a tax harmonisation. 
 
In this context EU “soft” policies shall be discussed and suggestions for best 
practise provided towards the harmonisation of European REIT regimes. The 
1177 See Bulmer/Radaelli (2005). 
1178 See Fairhurst/Vincasi (2003), p. 420. 
1179 See Weatherill (1995), p. 226. 
1180 See Persoff (2004), p. 6. 
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EU acts as a “policy entrepreneur”1181 for so-called “soft” law or non-binding 
forms of regulation such as recommendations, declarations and resolutions, 
leaving the MSs to set the agenda.1182 Policy learning is the expected or desired 
outcome of these endeavours.1183The processes is known as the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC), a policy transfer platform for diffusion of “soft” policies, 
termed by Bulmer and Radaelli “facilitated coordination”.1184 
 
2.1  Harmonisation v Mutual recognition 
The Commission does not advocate “full EU company tax harmonisation”, rather 
seeking to promote a single tax base for companies, stressing that the level of 
tax rates is a matter for MSs.1185Assisting the harmonisation of laws and REIT 
regimes will depend upon the success of the harmonisation of MSs different tax 
treatment. Where the tax treatment is equally applied to resident and non-
resident taxable individuals and companies, any legal requirements suspect of 
being discriminatory may build ground to argue for different treatment. Since the 
real-seat principle has been de-facto dismissed by the ECJ1186 there is no 
reason for any REITs to establish according to the domestic regime and its 
company laws. As long as any REIT legally established under an MS’ REIT 
regime is recognised as “REIT” by another MS in which the REIT has “moved” 
single operational activities, the legal requirements set by the MS of its 
incorporation are guiding only whether the requirement is a specific legal form 
for company, conditional listing and the location of the stock exchange or 
shareholder requirements. It provides the moving-in REIT to be treated under 
the domestic REIT regime and its beneficial treatment.  
 
Settled case law provides for MSs to mutually recognise a duly established 
REIT under the regime of one MS.1187 Harmonisation requires acceptance of 
MSs to acknowledge decisions by the ECJ without being Party to the main 
proceedings, assessing its national rules and transferring the rulings outcome 
1181 See Ladrech (2010), p. 169. 
1182 See Radaelli (2005). 
1183 See Ladrech (2010), p. 182. 
1184 See Bulmer/Radaelli (2005). 
1185 See MEMO/03/237 of November 25 2003. 
1186 See Chapter IV, Section 4.1 above.  
1187 See Chapter IV, Sec. 7.1, 8 above. 
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into its national laws. Since MSs do not apply case law to their national rules 
without being sued, or object to recognition of foreign established companies, 
activity by the Commission seems necessary, through a Directive to reach 
mutual recognition of EU REITs and safeguard the compliant application of EU 
law. Hereto, EPRA has outlined1188: 
 
“If the growth of cross-border property investment in the EU is to be 
supported, … (there is need) … for a coordinated and harmonized 
approach to the direct tax aspects of cross-border investment … It is 
particularly important that the legal certainty in this strategically 
important area should be achieved through the political process and 
not through the comparatively arbitrary resolution of disputes that find 
their way before the courts.”  
 
2.2  Harmonising tax treatment 
Assuming that there is room for a compliant EuroREIT, is the EU and its 
institutions able to assist harmonisation not having competences in the area of 
direct tax.1189 What follows is an exemplified overview on relevant “soft” policies 
and activities towards harmonisation in the field of direct taxation already taken 
by the EU to identify potential processes towards a harmonised “EuroREIT”. 
 
2.2.1 The harmonisation model 
Since the founding of the EU, company taxation has received particular 
attention as an important element for the establishment of the internal 
market.1190In the early years the Commission´ focused on the harmonisation 
process of corporate income tax regimes. Traditionally, the Commission has 
intended to favour a harmonisation in corporate tax rates as well as tax bases. 
First attempts made by the EU were for Groups of Experts to propose 
harmonisation models.1191 They proposed initiatives to achieve a limited degree 
1188 See EPRA (2009), Sec. 1.14, p. 4 and EPRA (2013), Sec. 6, p. 34/35. 
1189 See Chapter III, Sec. 2.2. 
1190 See Dankó (2012), p. 211. 
1191 Most prominent Groups of Experts and their Reports have been the Tinbergen-Report 
(1953), Neumark-Report (1962), Werner-Report and Tempel-Report (both of 1970) as well as 
the Ruding-Committee (1992). All of the Reports proposed for the harmonisation of tax systems 
and tax rates with the objective of harmonising taxes throughout the EU. 
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of harmonisation of the corporate tax system, base and also rates.1192 Action by 
the Commission to implement the recommendations through Directives proved 
unsuccessful.1193 To re-launch the integration process the Commission passed 
a Council Resolution1194 giving emphasis “on broad performance standards1195 
rather than compliance with detailed technical specifications”1196 by stating that 
 
“… the … work of harmonisation … have to be directed mainly at 
national laws having an impact on the common market …”.1197 
 
After the recommendations by the Ruding-Report the Commission accepted the 
existence of numerous tax obstacles to cross-border activities1198 and 
abandoned the broad objective of corporate tax harmonisation, focussing 
instead against harmful tax practises i.e. the elimination of remaining form of 
double taxation in order to promote investment. Influenced by the OECD’s 
Report on Harmful Tax Competition the Commission expressed their identical 
concern1199 in 1997 leading to the Code of Conduct for business taxation 
(CoC).1200 The results in 1999 are commonly known as the “Primarolo-List”,1201 
1192 See Dankó (2012), p. 211. 
1193 However, the European Parliament (the “Parliament”) for the reason that the evaluation 
basis should be harmonised first before the tax system can be harmonised rejected this directive 
(see Kopits, 1992, p. 11). Furthermore, there have been two further attempts by the 
Commission, focussed more on loss compensation, in 1984 and 1985. Those were later 
withdrawn as well. A draft proposal of 1988 for the harmonisation of the tax base of enterprises 
was never tabled, due to the reluctance of most MS (see Commission at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/taxation/company_tax/gen_overview/index_en.htm; 
Commission (2001a), pp. 4, Dankó (2012), p. 212). 
1194 The Commission established fundamental principles on which the new approach would be 
based: Legislative harmonisation is limited to adaption, by means of Directives; drawing up the 
technical specifications voluntarily, Mutual recognition according to the “Cassis de Dijon”-
principle (see Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 (as result of the Commission (1985), Part 2.)). 
1195 See Standards such as by the “Committee for Standardization” (CEN) or the “European 
Committee for Electro technical Standardization” (CENELEC). MS have to accept products 
market with the appropriate standard mark as to conform within the “essential requirements” of 
the Directive that has lead additionally to Art. 114 paras 4, 6 and 9. 
1196 See Fairhurst/Vincazi (2003), p. 422. 
1197 See Commissions (1979). 
1198 See Nickson (2004), p. 183. 
1199 The Code of Conduct for business taxation was set out in the conclusions of the Council of 
Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of 1 December 1997 (see Commission (1998) and 
Commission (1997), but established at a Council meeting on 9 March 1998, under the 
chairmanship of UK Paymaster General Dawn Primarolo, to assess the tax measures that may 
fall within the scope of the Code of Conduct for business taxation. 
1200 See European Union (1998). The CoC was a proposal as part of the ECOFIN passing 1998 
a tax package consisting of three elements which have been the taxation of savings income, 
withholding taxes in cross border interests and the CoC that was then accepted in 1998 by the 
Council for the MS´ (see Council (1998)). The CoC was designed to detect measures, which 
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the cornerstone for the development of harmonisation with the requirement that 
MSs shall refrain from introducing any new harmful tax measures (“standstill”) 
and amend laws or practices that are deemed to be harmful in respect of the 
principles of the Code (“rollback”).1202 Some have seen a change of the 
Commissions policy in this statement,1203 but the Commission has stressed that 
the aim is not quick harmonisation but standardisation in the long-term towards 
harmonisation. Rather than promoting harmonisation of MSs tax systems, the 
Commission called for better co-ordination of national policies in between 
MSs.1204Harmonisation actions focus on the elimination of tax obstacles to all 
forms of cross-border economic activity violating the freedoms.1205  
 
2.2.2  Harmonising corporate taxation 
With its new strategy for EU company tax policy1206 the Commission concluded 
that 15 separate sets of company tax rules create numerous tax obstacles to 
unduly influence the location of business activities in the EU (see Commission (1997), at A) 
setting out criteria against which potential harmful measures are to be tested. Criteria have been 
e.g. level of taxation, benefits reserved for non-residents only, “ring-fencing” measures, 
advantages given even in the absence of any real economic activities, profit determination in 
contrast to common rules, lack of transparency etc. 
1201The Primarolo-List is named after the Chairmanship of the UK Paymaster General Dawn 
Primarolo. Findings identified 66 harmful tax regulations out of 271 by which 40 are within MSs 
and its tax regulations. Further findings were related to 3 in Gibraltar and 23 in dependent or 
associated territories. These are describable under i.e. the common descriptions of (i) financial 
services, (ii) insurance, (iii) intra group services, (vi) holding and (v) offshore companies, and (vi) 
tax free zones (see Report (1999)). 
1202 See Commission (1997), at C and D. Since then, the CoC-Group has been monitoring 
standstill and the implementation or rollback and reported regularly to the Council (see i.e. 
Commission (2002), part III, pp. 223-305. Two panels of experts were established; one of 
academic and one from business and the trade unions to prepare for “an analytical study of 
company taxation in the European Community” (see Martinez-Serrano / Patterson (2003), p. 
19). These reports have led to official legal proceedings by the Commission because of violation 
of the Treaty due to harmful national company tax regimes since 2001 (see i.e. joined cases C-
182/03 and C-217/03 Kingdom of Belgium (C-182/03) and Forum 187 ASBL (C-217/03) v 
Commission of the European Communities, (2006), ECR I-05479). 
1203 See Nov (2005), p. 326. 
1204 See Commission (2006), p. 4. 
1205 See Commission (2001b). This activity was assisted going forward with the Commission 
adopting Communications in 2004 and 2009. The 2004 Communication provided for a strategy 
i.e. for co-ordinated action in company law and tax to reduce the risk of financial malpractice. In 
this context, the Commission suggests more transparency and information exchange so that tax 
systems are better able to deal with complex corporate structures (see Commission (2004)) and 
the 2009 Communication identified actions that MS should take to promote “good 
governance”1205 in the tax area (i.e. more transparency, exchange of information and fair tax 
competition) (see Commission on EU Harmful tax competition at: http://ec.europa.eu/ 
taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/armful_tax_practices/index_en.htm). 
1206 Parallel, the European Tax Conference took place in 2002 in Brussels which referred to a 
new strategy for EU company tax policy that was presented by the Commission in late 2001 
already (see Martinez-Serrano/Patterson (2003), p. 23). 
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cross-border business in the EU.1207 Therefore, it proposed a long-term 
comprehensive reform for companies to achieve a consolidated corporate tax 
base under a single set of tax rules for their EU activities.1208 The reform was 
about different models on harmonising corporate taxation, enabling EU 
multinational enterprises using one company tax system with cross-border 
consolidation for their EU-wide activities.1209  
 
The Commission presented four methods for consolidated base taxation: Home 
State Taxation (HST), Common Consolidated Base Taxation (CCBT); a 
European Union Corporate Income Tax (EUCIT); and a compulsory harmonized 
tax base (HTB).1210 
 
Table VI.2.2-1: Comparison of proposals on company taxation 
  HST CCTB EUCIT HTB 
Application 
Optional Optional Compulsory or optional Compulsory 
Nr of system 
Existing 151211 Existing 15 plus new one Existing 15 plus 1 only 1 
Participation All or some 
companies 
All or some 
companies 
All or some 
companies All companies 
Main Feature 
Tax base 
computed in 
accordance with 
tax code of 
company’s 
Home MS 
New 
harmonised EU 
rules for the 
determination of 
a single tax 
base 
Compulsory EU CIT 
for large 
multinationals 
Harmonisation of 
company taxation 
rules by devising a 
single EU 
company system 
as a replacement 
for existing 
national systems 
Advantages 
Quick, simple 
and pragmatic 
First step of 
harmonised tax 
base on EU 
level 
Tax levied at EU 
level could be 
source of revenue 
for the EU 
Most complete 
solution and best 
option for 
improving the 
functioning of the 
internal market 
and the 
competitiveness of 
EU enterprises 
1207 See Weiner (2002), p. 1316 with reference to the statement by Philippe de Buck, secretary-
general of the Union of Industrial and Employer's Confederations of Europe (UNICE). 
1208 See Commission (2001a). 
1209 See Weiner (2002) providing for a summary of the EU Company Tax Conference in 2002, 
which proposed their results of different models. As benefits i.e. tax-based distinctions between 
branches and subsidiaries would disappear; Cross-border mergers would not incur adverse tax 
consequences and, most importantly, cross-border loss offset would automatically occur (see p. 
1315.) 
1210 See Weiner (2001) and (2002a), for detailed description of the methods. 
1211 The Conference on Company Taxation 2002 in Brussels was about the analysis of 15 
different tax systems (see Martinez-Serrano/Patterson (2003), p. 16). 
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Politically 
feasible 
Politically 
feasible   
Higher 
transparency, 
efficiency and 
effectiveness 
  Harmonisation of 
rules not 
required 
Harmonisation 
of rules not 
required 
    
Disadvantages 
Competition for 
tax Bases 
among MSs 
Specific and 
technical 
problems for 
achieving 
common 
taxation rules: a 
new tax code to 
be devised 
Political problems for 
its approval 
Higher political 
problems for 
achieving an 
agreement 
  
Complications 
related to its 
application 
across MSs 
More 
complexity: 
multinationals 
need to know 
MSs rules to 
choose for best 
option 
Complexity: all MSs 
rules   
          
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Implementing a consolidated tax base across the EU would require a 
mechanism to distribute the EU-consolidated tax base to the MS for taxation at 
the local rate. The basic idea was to agree a system of consolidated base 
taxation with formula apportionment to distribute the common tax base among 
the MSs.1212 Each of the methods generally provides a way for EU companies to 
calculate their EU group income on an EU-wide basis. Except for certain 
variations of EUCIT, each method allocates the tax base to the MS.1213 As the 
EU economy becomes more integrated and companies increasingly operate 
EU-wide, apportionment may be a better way to tax companies than the present 
arm’s length system.1214 
 
Under HST, the tax rules that apply for any consolidated group in any given MS 
depend on the residence of the parent company. Effective tax rates will continue 
1212 All methods proposed by the Commission use a formula to allocate the tax base to the MS, 
which requires to adopting a formula to implement a comprehensive solution. In contrast to a tax 
system based on separate accounting and arm’s length pricing, under formulary apportionment, 
companies do not attempt to calculate the income of the affiliated entities of the corporate group. 
Instead, the corporate group first combines (or, consolidates) the income of each of its 
operatives into a single measure of taxable income. The group then uses a formula to apportion 
the income to the various locations where the group conducts its business. This formula is 
generally the share based on of business activity in a location to the total business activity in all 
locations (Weiner (2002), p. 1315). 
1213 See Weiner (2002a), p. 11. 
1214 See Weiner (2001), p. 530. 
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to vary across and within the MSs under HST.1215 Pursuing the HST option 
might result in a divergence of tax rules across the MSs, which would not be in 
the interests of the EU.1216 The allocation of income to each MS of operation 
requires a new set of company accounts, but represents already extant reality 
for REITs though. Harmonisation of the common tax base does not seem 
realistic considering the unsuccessful activities towards harmonisation. The 
CCTB provides a model that leaves MSs its tax sovereignty since the tax base 
allocated shall be taxed at the local tax rate of the MS where the allocated tax 
base originated. The use of international accounting standards such as the 
IFRS limits the differences in local GAAP systems.  
 
The major issue for the HST and CCTB is the allocation of tax revenue using 
the method of formulary apportionment, which requires common agreement on 
a method to calculate the allocation. The method of formulary apportionment is 
drawn from the US and Canadian system, where the corporate tax base is 
allocated between the states and the provinces. Under formulary apportionment, 
companies do not separate the income of an affiliated corporate group along 
geographic lines, but first calculate net income for the entire group and then 
apportions that income to each location where it does business through a 
formula.1217  
 
2.2.3  Summary on harmonisation 
Realistic chances are given in literature for the HST-model and the CCTB-
model.1218 The Commissions Communication of 2003 stressed the long-term 
goal of providing companies with a common consolidated tax base for their EU-
wide activities by agreeing on certain accounting standards i.e. derived from the 
IFRS, while giving progress to the allocation mechanism for taxing rights 
between MSs. Both the regulative and the economic environment changed 
1215 See Weiner (2002a), p. 12. 
1216 See Weiner (2001), p. 1317 with reference to Herve Le Floch Louboutin, director of the 
French Ministry of Finance. 
1217 See Weiner (2001), p. 523. Literature sees potential distortions using formulary 
apportionment as it distorts company’s business decisions (see Weiner (2001), p. 524 et seqq. 
with further reference to McLure (1980), Gordon/Wilson (1986), Mintz/Weiner (2001)). 
1218 See Nickson (2004), p. 184; European Council Regulation 2157/2001 and related Council 
Directive 2001/86/EEC; for Germany: Statute for the Introduction of the European Company of 
December 23rd, 2004. 
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radically regarding the CCCTB project in recent years. Treaty of Nice and later 
the Treaty of Lisbon ratified the possibility of enhanced cooperation under a 
common tax policy like the CCCTB1219, thus providing a basis for a harmonised 
taxation for the EuroREIT. 
 
3.   The EuroREIT model 
The EU has taken into consideration the creation of a EuroREIT for assisting the 
development of the internal market and promoting the freedoms.1220 A 
harmonised REIT model requires the removal of barriers to entry and market 
differences among MSs, with rules for legal requirements and tax treatments 
governed by the EU´ legal environment.  
 
With their respective Global REIT Survey’s EY and EPRA presented in 2005 a 
Global REIT chart listing a “EuroREIT” and proposing an “EU REIT” 
respectively.1221 The chart listed the abbreviation “N/A” since the EuroREIT 
does not exist, but was “to meet increasing demand for European investment 
exposure with cross-border tax …”.1222  
 
3.1  The compliant structure 
The following lists relevant criteria and details relevant for a harmonised REIT 
regime compliant, which “fit” with “hard” EU law using the criteria of the 
structured framework.1223 
 
 
 
 
 
1219 See Dankó (2012), p. 216. 
1220 The introduction of a EuroREIT regime will serve a number of interests not only linked to 
harmonisation, but also drawing offshore funds back onshore and into the national “tax net”. 
Most of these offshore funds exhibit many of the characteristics of onshore REITs but contribute 
very little to the tax base of European member states at the moment. The introduction of a 
European REIT regime may prevent funds from migrating offshore in the first place and positive 
effect on tax revenues and other indirect economic benefits will bring these vehicles back 
onshore (see EPRA (2010 Supp), p. 6). 
1221 See Ernst & Young (2005) and EPRA (2005). 
1222 See Ernst & Young (2005). 
1223 See Chapter II, Sec. 5 above. 
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3.1.1 Legal requirements 
 
(1)   Legal form  
It is best if REITs follow a corporate typed legal form that allows for and shall be 
listed at a stock exchange leading to more publicity of the REIT.1224 This allows 
focus on sector or geographical segments, while ensuring sufficient 
differentiation to existing real estate investment vehicles, namely to open-ended 
real estate funds. Therefore, the EuroREIT is preferably established in the form 
of a stock company with limited liability, a legal form known to all MSs domestic 
company laws already. Since MSs have to recognise a duly established 
company, even incorporated in another MS, there shall be no ground to hinder 
the acceptance of such basis. Thus, any legal form included in the Annex to the 
Parent-Subsidiary-Directive may be used for the EuroREIT in general.1225 
 
Where the recognition of a foreign established entity is questioned the 
EuroREIT may opt to use a “European” entity, that is the European Company 
(known by its Latin name of “Societas Europaea”, SE1226) a company form 
legally recognised within the EU by the MSs.1227 The SE must have a minimum 
capital of EUR 120.000,1228 far below the common understanding of some Euro 
13-15m. Whereas MSs requires a larger capital for companies in certain types 
of activity, the same requirement will apply to an SE with its registered office in 
that MS. Thus, for a REIT set up in a MS the share capital requirements under 
1224 See Beck/Droste/Zoller (2004), p. 195 
1225 See Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 6.12, p. 75. 
1226 The company structure of an SE allow corporate bodies o establish a European Company. It 
is a legal instrument based on EU law that gives companies the option of formatting a European 
Company known formally by its Latin name of “Societas Europaea” (SE). An SE may operate on 
a Europe-wide basis and be governed by EU law directly applicable in all MS. The European 
Company Statute is established by two pieces of legislation that is a Regulation establishing the 
company law rules (Regulation 2001) and a Directive on worker involvement (OJ L294, 
10.11.2001, pp. 22-32). The Regulation and the Directive entered into force three years after 
their formal adoptions in the MS (see Martinez-Serrano/Patterson (2003), p. 26, footnote 23). 
1227 The SE may be established using the legal forms known in the MS as listed for in Annex 1 of 
the Regulation (2001), “PUBLIC LIMITED-LIABILITY COMPANIES REFERRED TO IN 
ARTICLE 2(1)”, where all public company forms extant in MS and i.e. used for the purpose of 
national REIT regimes as well. The SE can be established by way of Merger (Art. 2(1), 17-31), 
Formation of a Holding Company (Art 2(2), 32, 33) and Formation of a Subsidiary (Art. 2(3), 35, 
36) or, by the Transformation of an existing public limited company (Art. 2(4), 37) (see 
Commission (2001)). 
1228 See Art. 2 (4) and Art. 37 of the SE Act. 
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its REIT regime would apply or the required capital according to the common 
understanding for a EuroREIT. 
 
(2)  Residency 
A REIT shall preferably be resident in the country under which regime the REIT 
is listed, but that shall not limit its activities cross-border for the recognition of 
the domestic REIT in another country. 
 
Using the recognised legal form of an SE, its registered office must be where it 
has its central administration, its true centre of operations.1229 The SE has 
appear in a register designated by the law of that MS. MSs REIT regimes are of 
the common understanding that the residence of a REIT must be domestic in 
the MS under its REIT regime.1230 For Euro REIT the question of residence is 
relevant to taxation of income, but may not be the connecting factor for the tax 
treatment anymore. 
 
(3)   Listing 
A fundamental advantage of listed REITs is the fungibility of its shares, ensuring 
liquidity for investors provided that the shares are widely held. The SE is a 
public company form based on shares, which can be traded at the stock 
exchange. Since MSs fear that REIT regimes will be abused for private 
structures the EuroREIT regime still imposes a listing requirement at a stock 
exchange within the EU according to the applicable rules of that MS. Since most 
of the MSs REIT regimes allow listing of its REITs at any regulated stock, 
provided the stock market is within the EU. This understanding was common 
between the MS that the EuroREIT as an SE may be listed at any stock in the 
EU1231 even other than where the SE has its registered seat.1232 
1229 The SE can easily transfer its registered office within the EU to another MS without being 
wound up and to form a new one in another MS (Art. 8 SE Act). The transfer of its registered 
seat will not have negative tax consequences as well (see Directive 2005/19/EC of 17 February 
2005 amending Directive 90/434/EEC). 
1230 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.1.1 above; Table II.5.1-1: Requirements for Legal form & Residency 
by MS REIT regimes. 
1231 According to Cornelisse a EuroREIT shall be listed on a stock exchange in at least two 
different MS (see Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Footnote 105, p. 75. 
1232 However, the requirement for mandatory listing could become a hindrance for the market 
considering the expenditures in time and costs implied (see Ernst & Young (2005)). This can be 
seen in the US where more and more the REITs do not apply for listing (see Hughney (2005), p. 
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(4)   Shareholder requirements 
Generally, the structures contain various minimum investor or shareholder 
requirements, to ensure that the REIT is owned by a broad and diverse group of 
investors rather than single shareholders, therefore a EuroREIT should have 
shareholder requirements too.1233 According to the common understanding 
identified shareholder requirements shall exist on the single shareholder level as 
well as on to the free-float of shares.1234No single investor shall hold more than 
10% of the shares, or more than 5% of the voting shares. Holding of shares by 
corporate shareholders shall be limited to below 50%, with sufficient free float to 
providing for trading of shares, thus liquidity for shareholders. The 
recommendations on a global level including provisions for the classical US-
REIT are at a rate of at least 40% but may be in a range of 50% to 70%.1235 This 
shall be preferred at EU level, although under the “common understanding” a 
free float starts at a minimum of 15% already, sufficient at start of the model but 
may be increased over time. 
 
3.1.2 Operating activities 
REITs operating activities should be designed as loose as possible as 
performance indicates. For permitted activities, all regimes focus on the 
ownership of income-producing properties,1236 So that operating activities of the 
EuroREIT shall be limited to passive real estate activities. A definition of passive 
real estate activities includes investments in the acquisition of properties for the 
REIT and sale of properties from the REIT as well as leasing activities with the 
total AuM.1237 
 
Restrictions will apply for activities not passive investments although ancillary 
services, so-called non-qualifying activities, are not restricted. Ancillary Services 
B8). Therefore, going forward it may be considered to give companies the option whether or not 
to apply for listing themselves at the stock exchange. 
1233 See for different opinion Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 6.1(11) and 6.12, p. 75. 
1234 See Chapter II, Sec. 6.1 above (Table II.6.1-1: Common understanding of legal 
requirements – overview). 
1235 See Beck (2005), p. 114. 
1236 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.2 above (Table II.5.2-1: Conditions to Operating activities of REIT 
regimes in MS – overview). 
1237 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.2 above. 
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are conducted for the passive investment activity and for generating passive 
investment income. Therefore, ancillary services are activities within the value 
chain of real estate investments from project development to trading, brokerage, 
finance leasing, asset management as well as property and facilities 
management, cleaning and activities for third parties. If the REIT conducts such 
activities outside the limits of a qualified activity the relevant income derived 
from these activities or services will not benefit from the “tax flow through” REIT 
treatment but be taxed at the ordinary tax rate of the MS of residence. Ancillary 
Services shall, therefore, be limited to servicing the assets of the EuroREIT 
only. Where ancillary service is rendered to third parties a limitation shall apply 
up to a maximum of 20%1238 of the GAV of the AUM.  
 
This allows active asset management, often regarded as enhancing risk and 
volatility, but in practice the opposite is true. Without restrictions on the 
investment range of REITs their major purpose as real estate investment 
vehicles could be abused. The simple holding of assets will not lead to 
appreciation of the assets, but the use of the whole chain of all property 
investment activities, from the acquisition and development of property for long 
term accumulation of rental income and capital appreciation to the holding of 
shares of other property companies, should be included to a limited quota and 
certain holding periods.1239 
 
The development of land and properties by the REIT should be qualifying 
activities for a Euro REIT, with room for an understanding on EU level where 
developments are allowed to a limited extent, since regimes of the MSs provide 
criteria to limit those activities. The limitations seek to prohibit pure speculative 
activities, keeping in mind that the REIT regime is intended to provide small 
investors with access to real property investments otherwise not accessible. For 
the EuroREIT development activities can be allowed, limited for own assets and 
own account of the EuroREIT under the “common understanding” of the 
1238 See i.e. for G-REIT and SIIQ at 20% and SIIC and SOCIMI for 50% (Chapter II, Sec. 5.2 
above; Table II.5.2-1: Conditions to Operating activities of REIT regimes in MS – overview). 
1239 See Beck (2005), p. 113. 
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MSs.1240 To mitigate development-risks, such activities shall be limited to 20% 
of the GAV and the volume of a single development of the AUM.1241 
Additionally, the EuroREIT shall provide for minimum holding periods, for a min. 
5 years after its completion. In case the EuroREIT does not meet these 
limitations its respective income taxed according to ordinary rules.1242 This 
gives, incentive to activities by REITs, which shall assist the long-term holding 
and management of assets versus short- term profit-maximising of higher risk, 
and thus a threat to small investors. 
 
The question remains whether the EuroREIT should be limited to certain 
property sectors. Some regimes have been established solely for the residential 
market, e.g. the Finnish F-REIT, the Spanish SOCIMI and the Portuguese 
SIIMO, while other regimes (e.g. the German G-REIT) do not allow investment 
into residential properties. The G-REIT regime has been challenged on this 
limitation since the beginning, and it was limited to existing properties 
constructed before establishment of the G-REIT, whereas new properties are 
qualifying investments. With the on-going debate in Germany on this issue and 
experience in other countries, one may assume that the low level for qualifying 
assets should not apply to the EuroREIT. Using the “common understanding” 
identified above, almost all regimes do not limit investments into the residential 
sector, so a EuroREIT should be allowed to invest into this sector for its 
qualifying operational activities1243 and for property investments overseas. 
According to the “common understanding” a few MSs restrict geographical 
scope but the EuroREIT should not be so limited as it would be violation of the 
freedom of movement of capital.1244 
 
 
 
1240 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.2 above (Table II.6.6-1 Common understanding for the “European 
REIT” – overview). 
1241 Ibid. 
1242 Ibid. 
1243 In comparison the majority of REIT regimes allow residential investment. In the USA there 
are 18 REITs classified under this sector. This kind of specialisation, however, is only seen with 
mature REIT regimes whereas less experienced markets do not have such specialisation (see 
Chapter II, Sec. 5.2 above). 
1244 See Chapter IV, Sec. 7.1 above. 
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3.1.3 Status 
 
(1)   Asset Test 
At least 70% of the total assets of the EuroREIT must be comprised of qualified 
investments.1245 Since almost 50% of all MSs REIT regimes provide for a 
limitation of the investment volume into a single property the “common 
understanding” would limit a maximum of 20% of the GAV.1246 
 
There can be further limitations for qualifying investments i.e. in securities (i.e. 
mortgages and bonds), including the ones in other REITs, interests in listed real 
estate companies, shareholdings in other servicing companies and holding of 
cash. Even though these limitations are not part of the “common understanding” 
identified already they assist toward the objective of a EuroREIT, but only up to 
a maximum of 10% of the GAV of the AUM. 1247  
 
(2)   Income Test 
Under the income test requirements the qualifying income for the Euro REIT 
such as the renting, leasing and sales activities of real assets should represent 
a minimum 70% of the REIT´ total income per annum. 1248 
 
(3)   Gearing Test 
To avoid the distributable profit being eroded and to protect the REIT1249 against 
excessive leverage that put many non-REIT property funds in difficulty during 
the so-called financial crisis, the EuroREIT shall be have leverage restrictions, 
an accepted concept of MSs REIT regimes already.1250 These restrictions will 
be fairly conservative, rate not exceeding 60% of the GAV of the AUM (a level 
1245 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.3.1 above as well as Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 6.7.2, p. 72. 
1246 Ibid. 
1247 Ibid. 
1248 Ibid. 
1249 Leverage is considered to pose “… a substantial risk to the stability and the integrity of the 
financial system…” according to Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 
2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 095/2010, OJ 
L174/1, 1.7.2011 (“AIFMD”), para 51. 
1250 See “common understanding” at Chapter II, Sec. 6.3 above (Table II.6.6-1 Common 
understanding for the “European REIT” – overview). 
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slightly lower than that found within existing regimes today). 1251 A threshold of 
60% under the AIFMD1252 represents not only a common understanding, rather 
a harmonised level for leverage by financial instruments. Such thresholds serve 
well for a EuroREIT regime.1253 
 
(4)   Distribution Test 
A fundamental criteria of REITs is the obligation to distribute most of its profits to 
the shareholder annually, these profits subject to tax at individual tax rate. The 
EuroREIT should provide for a distribution obligation at the lower and of existing 
regimes, since funds withheld through depreciation seem not to ensure 
sufficient scope for active asset management. To secure a minimum equity ratio 
and liquid funds for its operational business the obligation to distribute profits 
annually should not comprise the profit in full. Without a clear set in MSs extant 
REIT regimes recourse is made to the “common understanding” with an 
obligation that is rather higher than lower, at a minimum level of 90% of the 
profits of the last financial year.1254  
 
Regular distribution requirements provide a regular source of tax revenue for 
governments.1255 Some REIT Regimes provide retention rules to meet 
investment strategies by the REIT, but the distribution obligation is different to 
classical investments in securities. 
 
 
 
1251 The average according to the “common understanding” identified in Chapter III, Sec. 3.3 
above, is at 65% LTV. There is, however, the Bulgarian regime limiting its JSSPIC for the 
gearing up to 20% under the condition of duration of 1 year only. But this does not serve for a 
serious financing of international active REIT vehicles and was not able to proof being 
considerable during the financial crisis and its leakage of financing. Other regimes give 
orientation by way of limiting the interest payments due to loan obligations (i.e. the Italian SIIQ) 
or by setting a ration to the equity existing (i.e. the UK-REIT) but all ending economically around 
a number at or shortly above the 60% limitation proposed (see Chapter II, Sec. 6.3 above). 
1252 See i.e. Paragraph 263 I KAGB, which provide for a leverage (loan to value) quota of max. 
60% of the GAV for the case of an closed-end fund. The AIFM-Directive is implemented in 
Germany with the new “Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch” (KAGB, Capital Investment Act) on 22 July 
2013 (see Table II.6.6-1 Common understanding for the “EuroREIT” – overview). 
1253 See as well Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 6.7.2, p. 72. 
1254 However, distribution quota´ in a range of 80 % to 90% seem to be market standard on a 
global basis (see Chapter II, Sec. 4.4.2 and Chapter II, Sec. 5.3.4. above; Table II.5.3-2: 
Conditions to Status of REIT regimes in MS (cont’d) - overview). 
1255 See Lewis (2010), p. 4. 
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3.1.4 Tax treatment 
 
(1)   REIT level 
The tax treatment of the EuroREIT´ profits shall be different for income derived 
from qualifying or non-qualifying activities. To the extent the profits are derived 
by qualifying activities there shall be no taxation at the level of the EuroREIT. 
Thus, the EuroREIT is tax transparent following the “flow through” - principle of 
its (qualifying) income in full.1256 
 
Different treatment will apply for income derived from non-qualifying activities. 
Considering that the EuroREIT will be an SE by its legal form the respective tax 
treatment of an SE in the EU will apply. Consequently, the EuroREIT will not 
benefit from the tax transparency at the level of the REIT. Therefore, any profits 
that originate from non-qualifying activities the EuroREIT will be treated the 
same as any other multinational company in the legal form of an SE. As a 
consequence the EuroREIT at its (REIT-)level is subject to the tax regime and 
laws of the MSs and its national legislation where the REIT SE has been 
established and registered. To the extent the EuroREIT maintains subsidiaries 
or branches in other MSs each of these entities are subject to tax and charges 
in the respective MS where the subsidiary or branch is resident. REIT regimes 
in MSs already today follow this principle commonly either by way of a direct 
exemption1257 of the REIT´ profit from any tax or by way of applying a zero tax 
rate or do not calculate the income portion from qualifying activities to the 
taxable income basis. 
 
This concept looks consequent for the tax treatment of income distributions from 
non-qualifying activities either in case of a domestic shareholder or in the case 
of a foreign shareholder, irrelevant whether the shareholder would be an 
individual or a corporate one. In this context any activity and payment of 
dividend follows the same way like in the case of any other non-tax transparent 
company. 
 
1256 See as well Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 6.3, p. 70 et seq. 
1257 See for example the Bulgarian JSSPIC, the France SIIC, the UK-REIT and the G-REIT, 
Chapter II, Sec. 5.4 above; Table II.5.4-1 Taxation of REIT - overview. 
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Furthermore, with regard to capital gains the tax treatment shall follow a 
transparent approach as well. Different proposal could be that the EuroREIT 
shall be eligible to write off gains realised against the cost price of another real 
property, subject to a period of three (3) financial years, provided the property 
was located in the same MS as the property that was sold.1258 However, this 
proposal ignores the fact that such proposal limiting the reinvestment to the 
certain MS in which the gain was realised is suspect to violate EU law while 
discrimination the free movement of capital within the internal market, which 
would require the reinvestment to qualify for in any MS though. Therefore, a EU 
law compliant model already is preferable though. Thus, gains shall flow through 
to the EuroREIT to its shareholders without being taxed at the level of the 
EuroREIT itself. Hereto, the “common understanding” identified serves well for 
the blueprint of this tax model for capital gains. As identified, MSs conceptual 
approach to capital gains is that they are effectively not taxed either by way of a 
full exemption or those gains are qualified to be taxable at all.1259  
 
The above shall be true for the foreign (Euro)REIT operating directly in the Host 
State though. In case of an extant mutually recognised model for a EuroREIT 
there shall be according to settled case law no differences being made in which 
MS the EuroREIT was established since once legally established in one MS the 
EuroREIT must be recognised as a REIT on all other MSs.1260 Since the 
EuroREIT is an EU wide concept i.e. like the SE there is, however, no difference 
in treatment according to whether or not a MS provide for a local REIT regime 
though. Thus, a EuroREIT established in a MS shall benefit from a tax 
transparent treatment at its level for income derived in a Home State alike a 
EuroREIT established under the Host State´ regime is treatment. Therefore, 
investments made by a “foreign” EuroREIT will not be taxed at its REIT level 
though. 
 
(2)   Shareholder level – foreign shareholding treatment 
At shareholder level the distinction that is made today by MSs REIT regimes 
with regard to the shareholder´ residence still must be objected. According to 
1258 See Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 6.7.3, p. 73).  
1259 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.4 above. 
1260 See ECJ i.e. with Case “Cassis de Dijon” (see Chapter IV, Sec. 3.2 above). 
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settled case law the ECJ made clear that any differentiation on grounds of 
residence i.e. of a shareholder constitute a discrimination of the foreign 
shareholder, thus, is a violation of the freedom of establishment1261 and/or the 
freedom of movement of capital1262, as the case may be.1263 
 
Consequently, the concept for tax treatment at shareholder level for the 
EuroREIT must follow an EU law compliant model, which does not differentiate 
in between resident and non-resident shareholders. Therefore, the model shall 
ensure equal treatment of the certain type of investment whether it is conducted 
directly in domestic real property1264 or, furthermore, indirectly by way of 
shareholding in a domestic investment company i.e. a domestic REIT or other 
types of domestic company form. The latter alternative shall be analysed in the 
following in more detail with the alternatives for solution hereto are threefold: 
 
(2.1)  Tax at source 
First, in case of income generated by a foreign REIT through its direct or indirect 
investment in domestic real property in the Host State a source tax by the Host 
State on income generated may be implemented.1265 This has been a 
fundamental and consistent feature of provisions based on the OECD Model 
Tax Convention for a long time.1266 This taxation would, however, in principle 
conform to the OECD-Model according to which the State in which the real 
property is situated has the right of taxation.1267 This tax at source in the Host 
State would safeguard for the taxation of any income derived from real property 
activities in that Host State.1268 However, it does neither recognise the key 
criteria of a REIT to being tax transparent1269 nor does this alternative respect 
the fact that a REIT duly established under any MS’ national REIT regime must 
be recognised as REIT under the REIT regime of the Host State as a domestic 
1261 See ECJ i.e. with Case “Aberdeen Alpha” (see Chapter IV, Sec. 5.3 above). 
1262 See ECJ i.e. with Case “Commission v Germany”, Case “Commission v Portugal” and Case 
“Santander” (see Chapter IV, Sec. 5.3 above). 
1263 See ECJ i.e. with regards to Case “Commission v Belgium” (see Chapter IV, Sec. 5.3 
above). 
1264 See Sub-Sec. (1) above. 
1265 See Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 6.4, p. 71; EU REIT Coalition (2009), p. 4 et seq., 11. 
1266 See OECD (Report 2007), Recital 21, p. 6. 
1267 See Art. 6 OECD-Model (2012). 
1268 See Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), p. 71. 
1269 Ibid, Sec. 6.3, p. 70. 
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REIT though.1270 Therefore, this alternative would be valid only when the 
income of resident and non-resident REITs from domestic real property would 
be burdened with taxation of such income at source equally. This concept, 
again, is contradictory to the leading ideas and objectives of REIT regime that 
this alternative seem to trigger other equations to solve in terms of cross border 
taxation of companies though. 
 
(2.2)  Withholding tax 
Secondly, where a foreign REIT is acting as a (foreign) shareholder through a 
domestic REIT or other type of (tax transparent) domestic vehicle the EuroREIT 
may follow the model to tax any income at REIT level and require the EuroREIT 
to deduct withholding tax before any distribution is made to its shareholders 
irrelevant of their residence. This concept of withholding taxation equals the 
treatment under the ordinary SE taxation rules already. Income of the domestic 
entity (whether REIT or other type of corporate) in the Host State to which the 
EuroREIT is a shareholder would be burdened with withholding tax in the 
country of the residence of the (Host State) entity already before the (foreign) 
EuroREIT as its shareholder receives the dividend payment.1271 In other words, 
the shareholder receives its dividend representing a portion of the income of the 
REIT that equals the shareholder´ shareholding less withholding tax deducted 
there from.  
 
However, this model would not take into account the individual tax rate to which 
the certain shareholder would be subject to in its State of tax residence. The 
rate for a withholding tax may be at a level of i.e. 20%1272, whereas, the 
personal income tax rate might be lower in the State of residence. 
Consequently, direct or even economical double taxation is at risk though. For 
its avoidance proper mechanisms of crediting or refunding portions of taxes to 
the shareholder are necessary. This seems to be the situation as of today with 
1270 See Case “Cassis de Dijon”, Chapter IV, Sec. 5.4 above. 
1271 Whereas, in case the EuroREIT invests cross-border into a non-REIT entity under the Host 
State laws such dividend payments are already burdened with corporate income tax under the 
domestic laws at applicable rates though. Thus, in this situation further bilateral agreements may 
be necessary in order to prevent the dividend income of the shareholder is not, at least, 
economically, double taxed. 
1272 See Cornelisse (2006 Part 2), Sec. 6.8, p. 73 et seq. 
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many cases of cross-border income and mechanisms by MSs in place though. 
This is, unfortunately, a breaking through of key criteria essential for any 
investor to invest into a REIT as its Shareholder. Thus, such mechanisms may 
from another point of view not be preferable for MSs, since, first of all this model 
is lacking Investor´ interest. This was seen recently with the Spanish SOCIMI 
that provided for such model originally and, thus, was revised inter alia for 
reasons of lack of interest by participants in the Spanish real estate market 
though.1273 Furthermore, the model must be applied in a non-discriminatory way 
including the domestic shareholders as well. There must, however, not be a tax 
credit for the domestic shareholder, as the foreign shareholder may not receive 
such a credit though.1274 Where the foreign shareholder, however, does not 
receive a tax credit or similar benefit compensating the tax paid in the Host 
State under its Home State regime the foreign EuroREIT is placed 
disadvantageous, thus, leading to an economic double taxation of the same 
income which, again, would constitute a violation of EU law though. 
Furthermore, in a situation where the REIT domestically may not be taxed at all 
or is taxed on its income not producing at least the same amount necessary to 
be credited to in order to economically compensate the tax at source, there is an 
effective economic burden to the disadvantage of the foreign REIT only. Finally, 
the taxation of income at this level leads to escalating tax charges, which make 
post tax returns from a REIT non-competitive when compared with other 
investment vehicles and prevents a REIT from being used as a pan-European 
investment vehicle.1275 
 
 
1273 See Chapter V, Sec. 4 above. 
1274 Here, the existent regimes seem to follow a similar path and levy the distributions to foreign 
shareholders with a withholding tax. Even though tax rates differ, however, not significantly, 
there seem to be a common understanding that, irrelevant of what rate the withholding tax in a 
MS might be, all of them grant the possibility for reduction under the regulations of a Double Tax 
Treaty (DTT). Since the existing DTT concluded in between MS are based on the OECD Model 
Treaty that provides for a withholding tax rate of 15% (this rate is recommended in case of 
cross-border investments in the case of REITs in the EU by EPRA (See Wijs (2010), p. 13)) in 
these cases the EuroREIT will impose a withholding tax of that rate to dividend payments to 
non-domestic shareholders as well. This treatment may be at least applicable to shareholders 
resident in another MS and limited as well to non-EU shareholders where their country of 
residence provide for a DTT with the MS where the EuroREIT is resident that provides for equal 
treatment vice versa. The treatment should be given, therefore, on the basis of mutual 
understanding, only. 
1275 See EU REIT Coalition (2009), p. 4. 
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(2.3) Tax transparency 
Thirdly, and as another alternative, MSs shall elect for a full tax transparent 
model for the EuroREIT. This model would require the MS to fully refrain from 
any taxation either of income at source at the level of the real property or of 
dividends at the level of the REIT before the distribution of its income through 
dividend payments to its shareholders. Thereby, leaving the tax treatment of 
distributions to the level of the shareholders at their personal (income) tax rate. 
Under this second concept, foreign shareholders in the EuroREIT will 
immediately benefit from the tax transparency at the level of the EuroREIT 
shifting their income to its MS of residence.1276  
 
Acknowledging MSs fear of loss of tax revenue through even tax optimisation 
models used by internally acting companies it will be difficult for them to accept 
this flow-through model especially with a view to the foreign shareholder as well. 
In this scenario, MSs have to accept to loosing tax revenue that would have 
arisen would the distribution to the foreign shareholder have been taxed in their 
territory already (i.e. according to the withholding taxation model above). This 
means in fact that MSs have to leave income derived from operational activities 
in real property within their territory tax exempt or in other words waive their 
right to tax that is to negate their sovereignty. However, according to the case 
law analysed1277 this model is not suspect to violating the freedoms, thus, would 
be compliant with EU law though.  
 
 (2.4)  Transparency – consistent tax treatment  
The first and second proposal as outlined based on taxation of income at source 
by the situs state in which the property is located as well as levying a 
withholding tax on distributions to the shareholders does not take extant EU law 
sufficiently into account.1278 However, any solution of the issue has to consider 
EU law properly otherwise not the mere problem is countered rather it 
represents a reaction to the problem without solving its origin that is a national 
rule violating EU law though.  
1276 See Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), p. 71. 
1277 See Chapter IV above. 
1278 See for different opinion i.e. Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 6.4, p. 71; EU REIT Coalition 
(2009), p. 4 et seq., 11. 
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The third model proposed above, however, shall be preferred from an EU law 
perspective though. This model, uniquely, combines the essential objectives of 
a REIT regime featuring especially its tax transparency1279 with the framework 
and requirements provided under applicable EU law including its detailing by 
ECJ case law. This model seem to contradict to MSs tax sovereignty since, at 
first sight, there will be no tax levied at income derived from domestic activities 
by a foreign tax-resident EuroREIT and, thus, results in a loss of tax revenue in 
full. Thus, the enforcement of the principle of material universality is limited by 
the principle of territoriality.1280 This conclusion is not based on true terms 
though. There shall be no loss of tax revenue which should be generated from a 
direct taxation in the country of its source rather this shall be assisted by a 
model of mutual assistance for the MS of the source to recuperating its eligible 
tax revenues. Hereto, it is not an argument based on fair grounds to asses such 
a model of making it difficult for MSs to assess taxes due properly. This picture 
does not take into account already extant EU-wide legislative instruments, which 
are capable to solving this issue properly. There shall, however, finally not result 
any leakage of tax revenue for the MS in which territory the income has been 
generated. Furthermore, the divergence of the principle of material universality 
and formal territoriality emerges the effective exchanges of information in 
between MSs for efficient supervision of fiscal enforcement.1281 The tax that will 
be levied in the domestic shareholder case shall be recoverable for the MS 
using existing AEOI mechanisms in the EU though. Consequently, the 
application of a zero tax rate at the level of the EuroREIT must not have the 
disadvantage of eroding MSs rights of taxation though.1282 
 
There is first of all the mechanism already provided by Art. 26 OECD-Model.1283 
This rule provides ground for the automatic exchange of information in tax 
matters.1284 Though limited since it requires for the information requested to 
1279 See EU REIT Coalition (2009), p. 4, 11. 
1280 See Czakert (2013), p.596. 
1281 See Vogel/Lehner (2008), Preamble, Recital 16. 
1282 Different opinion provided by Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 6.3., p. 70. 
1283 See OECD-Model (2012). 
1284 See for details relevant to the automatic exchange of information under Art. 26 OECD-Model 
(2012) in: Czakert (2013), pp. 597-599. 
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being substantial information it is sufficient for Art. 26 and a request for 
information based thereon that the facts submitted to the requested State shall 
enable it to sufficiently identify the taxpayer relevant.1285 Obviously, the OECD-
Model is not direct legally binding since it is a recommendation only. As such it 
requires agreeing and integrating such clauses of the OECD-Model into DTTs 
concluded between MSs. There is a wide use of the OECD-Model, though 
certain rules i.e. such as on the automatic exchange of information in tax 
matters1286 are not an integral part of DTTs today still.1287 However, meanwhile, 
there is common understanding in all relevant economies and financial centres 
of its States to accept the automatic exchange of information as standard 
amongst themselves for the effective and transparent exchange of information 
on tax matters though.1288 
 
Moreover, MSs shall make use of extant binding EU law such as i.e. the AEOID 
instead already. 1289 The AEOID provide for a mechanism of cooperation of the 
tax authorities of the MSs inter alia in the area of direct taxes. This mechanism 
is used in the EU since the late 70th when the “Mutual Assistance Directive” was 
released already.1290 This Directive implemented basically the scope of Art. 26 
OECD-Model into binding EU law. With its revision by the Administration 
Cooperation Directive1291 in 2011 the scope of the Directive was extended i.e. 
with respect to real property and income thereof.1292 The revision of the AEOID 
the scope of the Directive was extended to all direct “… taxes of any kind 
1285 See Czakert in: Schönfelder/Ditz (2008), Art. 26, Recital 56. 
1286 See Art. 26 OECD-Model (2012). 
1287 This Standard provided by Art. 26 V OECD-Model (2012) was objected, and partly is still, by 
Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and Luxembourg as well as the standard was not used by many 
other States though (see Czakert (2013), p. 596). 
1288 See OECD Report (2011). 
1289 See AEOID as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation. 
1290 See Mutual Assistance Directive (1977). The objective of the Directive was to combat 
international tax evasion and avoidance, therefore, strengthening collaboration between the MS' 
tax administrations and facilitate the exchange of information relevant for the correct 
assessment of taxes on income and on capital. Under this Directive, MS' competent authorities 
are required to exchange any information which appears relevant for the correct assessment of 
taxes on income and on capital and the assessment of indirect taxes. It took, however, time to 
see the Directive being integrated into the national laws of the MS´. Germany, for example, 
transformed the Directive into national law not before 1985 with the EGAHIG of 1985.  
1291 See AEOID. The Directive is transformed into German law with the resolution of the German 
Bundestag in its session on 6./7.06.2013. 
1292 See Art. 8 AEOID. 
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….”.1293 Herewith the AEOID adapted more closely the standard set by the 
OECD-Model leading with its extension the EU and its MSs into a system of an 
obligatory exchange of information though.1294  
 
With this Directive MSs do not need to have this system to agree and integrate 
into their single DTTs with other MSs rather relying on the obligation for the 
exchange of information being applicable law in the EU. Different to 
recommendations in Literature1295 to overcome the lack of information in cross-
border taxation matters direct applicable law i.e. through Directives, prevent 
MSs as well as the EU from having to accept a limited coverage of such 
cooperation to and in between those MSs having agreed upon, whereas, for the 
remainder cases a patchwork of DTTs only. However, with this Directive MSs 
have a tool to manage its internal taxation systems, especially as regards direct 
taxation receiving the necessary information of such cases as with foreign 
shareholders and its dividends received from another MS though.1296 Applying 
mandatory rules and obligations MSs having the power to efficiently cooperate 
at EU wide level to overcome a lack of information1297 in cases such as i.e. of 
foreign shareholders1298 whether legal or natural persons.1299 
 
The system proposed above to leaving the income tax except unless it is 
distributed to the shareholder and taxed in its MS of tax residence does not 
contradict with extant systems in taxation though. Additional to the mechanisms 
for assistance and cooperation to exchange information as outlined above there 
is, furthermore, a refunding system in place with regards to VAT already. The 
VAT-Refund-Directive provides for a system of cooperation to refund of value 
added tax to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country.1300 
Even though, the VAT-Refund-Directive is a refunding based system, 
1293 See Preamble, para 6, and Art. 2 I AEOID, excluding, however, indirect taxes, such as VAT, 
customs duties and other kinds of excise duties. 
1294 See Czakert (2013), p. 600. 
1295 See i.e. Cornelisse (2006 Part 2), Sec. 6.3 – 6.6, p. 70 et seqq.; EU REIT Coalition (2009), 
p. 5, 11. 
1296 See AEOID, Preamble, para 2. 
1297 Ibid, para 10. 
1298 Ibid, para 3. 
1299 Ibid, para 7. 
1300 See VAT-Refund-Directive (2008) providing for arrangements for the refund of value added 
tax to taxable persons not established in the territory of the country following the VAT-Directive 
(1979). 
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nevertheless, MSs are used to systems of exchanging information and ex post 
assessment of tax matters. In conjunction with the AEOID the system shall not 
be of issue for MSs to agree upon. However, the recovery of tax shall be limited 
to the amount equalling the one based on the individual tax rate of the 
shareholder in its MS of tax residence which shall be collected by the tax 
authorities of the MS of the tax residence of the shareholder and transferred to 
the tax authorities of the MS of source of the income. In case of income, which 
comprise of different source MSs the tax collected on that income shall be split 
proportional to each MS of source. Additionally, in order to prevent the 
shareholder from any kind of double taxation of such income the MS of tax 
residence shall refrain from applying additional taxes i.e. by granting a credit in 
turn, if applicable.1301 
 
The participation of MSs other than the MS of residence of the EuroREIT 
requires the income portion in the tax base of the EuroREIT be separated and 
identifiable. Hereto, a split of the accounts of the EuroREIT with respect to its 
non-domestic income from i.e. direct holdings in real property in another MS or 
dividends received from shareholdings in a cross-border situation is necessary 
but shall not create additional administrative burden to the EuroREIT though. 
Already today, according to almost all REIT regimes the REIT is obliged to split 
its income into qualifying and non-qualifying income since for the latter the tax 
transparent regime does not apply.1302 Thus, the accounts provide for the 
separate accounting of certain activities already. In order to benefit from full tax 
transparency for its cross-border activity´ income it seem proportionate to have 
the REIT to provide its tax authority with filings separating not only the income 
into qualifying and non-qualifying rather additionally according to its source as 
well.  
 
As it is possible for the tax authority to distinct the tax treatment in between the 
portion of income resulting from qualifying or non-qualifying income respectively 
this shall hold true for any portion of income originating from a non-domestic 
source as well. Thus, any portion of tax payable by the EuroREIT may be 
1301 See as well EU REIT Coalition (2009), p. 5, 11. 
1302 See Chapter II, Sec. 5.3.2 above; Table II.5.3-2. 
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identifiable with its relevant portion of income. Following the separation of the 
income and its taxation in the MS of residences of the EuroREIT the tax 
revenue generated there from may be easily be split in between the MS of its 
origin. However, considering that every portion of income may not be 
represented in the overall tax base of the EuroREIT due to cost, depreciation et 
al., thus, any split of tax revenue shall be applied proportionally only.  
 
Either way, it is to acknowledge that the models discussed above all have their 
pros and cons to be validly discussed. Though, balancing out the different 
conditions of each of the models discussed it seems that the increasing 
administrative burden compared to a direct taxing system with refunding 
mechanism shall be proportional for MSs with respect to EU law being the only 
possible alternative which is in line with both requirements applicable EU law 
and attractiveness of the REIT regime in place to investors. The latter is, 
however, usually not taken into account by the authors proposing for different 
models though.1303 Obviously the above model discussed assumes a situation 
within the EU where those rules are adaptable by way of a regulation 
though.1304 
 
(3)   Solution for EuroREIT tax treatment: Home State Taxation-Model 
Taking the activities and methods above further to the situation of a REIT 
established in a MS and more specifically to the proposed tax treatment for the 
EuroREIT there is reason for the proposed model in this respect. The model 
proposed is similar to the HST though as it assumes the taxation of income will 
be effected ultimately in the hands of the shareholder of the EuroREIT only, 
whereas, the EuroREIT itself is tax transparent though. Thus, the tax rate 
applies where the shareholder is resident i.e. the corporate income tax rate of a 
corporate shareholder in its Home State. However, instead of accepting the 
taxation in the Home State of the Parent only, the proposed model for the tax 
treatment of the income of the EuroREIT in the hands of its shareholder is the 
allocation of the tax revenue generated by the MS in which the shareholder is 
resident (Home State) to each of the other MS´ (Host State´) that would have 
1303 See for different models i.e. Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 63-6.6, p. 70 et seqq. 
1304 This is not possible for cross-border situations beyond the EU, though, these situations are 
outside the scope of this thesis, thus, shall not be regarded in detail. 
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generated tax revenue if they would have been eligible to tax income originated 
from domestic activities in its territory. It is, however, to acknowledge that the 
Home State would tax the Shareholder´ income based on its personal tax 
rate.1305 Therefore, the tax levied upon the income distributed may not be taxed 
at a rate equal to the Host State´ tax rate where the income or a portion of that 
income was generated from activities in that MS though. Consequently, the Host 
State may not receive a portion of the tax revenue that equals or is relative to 
the portion of the overall income that was generated and, thus, does not 
represent the very same amount of tax revenue, i.e. from a withholding tax 
levied at source, the Home State would have had generated though.  
 
As it is with the original HST method as well the concept of ‘mutual recognition’ 
is fundamental to home state taxation.1306 Together with the mechanisms extant 
for AEOI the proposed treatment for the EuroREIT provide for a concept using 
the undisputed benefits of the HST and eliminates the essential critic concerning 
the Home State taxation only. Rather, the proposed treatment safeguard the key 
criteria of a REIT that is the tax transparency at its level combined with providing 
tax revenue to the Host State based on the relevant income generated from 
activities in its territory using the concept of formulated apportionment though. 
The fact that the revenue may not be at the same amounts compared to them 
having been taxed directly is a disadvantage that shall be acceptable while 
balancing out the pros and cons though. In this balance the additional 
administrative burdens for the MSs may be possible to be shared between the 
1305 Although the Tienbergen-Report (1953) did not regard harmonisation of direct taxes rather 
on turnover taxes, which have been identified firstly as being an obstacle to the internal market. 
Therefore, in 1952 the High Authority of the ECSC set up an Committee of Experts, the 
Tinbergen Committee, according to its Chair Jan Tinbergen from the “Nederlandse 
Economische Hoogeschool”, Rotterdam, to investigate the impact on the common market of the 
various turnover tax systems, the Tinbergen Committee at the time recommended the 
“destination” principle (the equivalence of (value added) taxes levied in the country of 
consumption (destination principle) or in the country of production (origin principle), as long as 
the tax was levied on all goods at the same rate) already as the taxing system to overcome 
national sovereignty (See Hitiris, 2003, pp. 124) and, thus, achieve harmonisation. However, 
since the destination principle was generally adopted for international trade at that time and the 
competence of the ECSC was then confined to the coal and steel sector, the Tinbergen 
Committee recommended the application of the destination principle also for the trade of this 
sector (see Haufler (2004), p. 22). This divergent opinion may be explained by the time of 
issuing of that report which was before the foundation of the EC during the “transformation 
period” of their predecessors and the development of the 1951 (ECSC) to which the European 
Economic Community towards the EU through the Treaty of Rome in 1957 with which also this 
subject has become a new dimension on that the opinions have changed. 
1306 See Weiner (2002a), p. 13. 
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EuroREIT and the MSs. While it shall be proportionate to require the EuroREIT 
to provide its Home State tax authorities with information on the income and in 
which MS it was generated at what portion it then seem reasonable to require 
the Home State based upon this settlement to distribute the respective tax 
revenue received to the Home State’s relevant.1307 
 
The approach is similar to the one promoted by EPRA, called the “Single 
Country taxation”.1308 However, the proposal above is not about allocating an 
amount equalling a withholding tax that would have been levied in the Host 
State on Income derived from the foreign REIT, rather the concept is based 
upon a true flow through model where the foreign REIT finally distributes the 
dividends to its shareholders whether they be residents in the Home State of the 
REIT or resident in another MS. Thus, tax will be levied in the country of 
residence of each of the shareholders on the amount distributed applying the 
individual tax rate of the shareholder. Any tax revenue due to the tax authorities 
in the country of residence of the shareholder will then be split among the tax 
authorities of the MS where the REIT has originated its income. The split of the 
tax revenue will be made using the model of formulated apportionment1309 
based on separate accounts provided by the REIT to the tax authorities 
identifying not only for qualifying income and those parts of the income from 
non-qualifying activities, furthermore, separate accounts provide for the 
separation of the origin of the income proportionally. The following shall outline 
the principles of the proposal: 
 
1.  Assuming a REIT A is operating in different MSs (MS A, MS B and MS 
C) each have a REIT regime, each would recognise, under the principle 
of Mutual Recognition, the other’s REIT regime, and if the REIT in MS A 
(A-REIT) makes an indirect investment in the other MSs B and C, MS´ B 
and C would treat A-REIT in the same way as it would treat one of its 
1307 However, as the EU economy becomes more integrated and companies increasingly 
operate on an EU-wide basis, apportionment may be seen as a better way to tax companies 
than the present arm’s length system. Thus, the answer to whether consolidated base taxation 
with formula apportionment in the EU is a “dream come true” or the “EU’s worst nightmare” may 
be that it is both (See Weiner (2001), p. 530). 
1308 See EPRA (2009), Sec. 4.11, p. 16 et seqq.; EPRA (2013), Sec. 18, p. 37. 
1309 See Weiner (2001), p. 542. 
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own REITs (B-REIT and C-REIT respectively) assuming that indirect 
investment is made using a tax exempt vehicle in MSs B and C 
respectively. 
 
2. As regards an indirect investment by A-REIT in MSs B and C, it should 
benefit from tax exemption if and to the extent that the rules of MS B for 
B-REITs confer tax exemption on corporate subsidiaries of B-REIT. 
Same shall apply in MS C respectively. In the example shown this 
results in the income from the investment in MSs B and C, each 25K, is 
neither subject to tax in B nor in C rather will “flow-through” tax exempt 
and distributed to A-REIT in full, totalling to 50K, without any tax 
leakage. 
 
3.  A-REIT distributes its profits from its investments in MSs A, B and C, 
totalling to 75K, according to the rules under MS A for A-REITs at a rate 
of 90%1310 by way of dividends to its shareholders in MS A (A-
Shareholder) that is 67,5K. As part of its tax filing duties A-REIT provide 
its Tax Office in MS A with accounts separating the income according to 
its MS of origin (MSs A, B and C respectively) proportionally outlined as 
a number in per-cent.1311 
 
4.  The total income of A-Shareholder include the dividend income from A-
REIT, less personal allowances and other income related expenses and 
qualified deductions1312, resulting in a taxable base assumed to be at 
50K is subject to A-Shareholder´ individual´ ITR at assumed 35% 
resulting in tax revenue payable to the Tax Office in MS A at an amount 
of 17,5K. 
 
5.  Through an allocation process handled by the Tax Office of MS A, a 
portion of the tax revenue, which is attributable to the income from MS B 
and/or C is transferred to the Tax Offices of MSs B and C respectively. 
1310 See i.e. Status requirement for the compliant EuroREIT structure (see Sec. 3.1.3 above).  
1311 According to the Method of formulary apportionment (see this Sec. above). 
1312 See i.e. “Werbungskosten” (Income related expenses) and “Betriebskosten und -ausgaben” 
(Professional expenses and operational cost) as envisaged in §§ 4 IV, 9 ITA. 
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The allocation process uses the method of formulary apportionment1313 
whereby MS A applies the per-cent number for the income from MS B 
and/or C according to the accounts provided by A-REIT to the total 
amount of the tax revenue received. In this example the portion of the 
income form each of the investments is 33,3% each. Thus, the total tax 
revenue received is apportioned in relative portions of 33,3% each and 
distributed by the Tax Office of MS A to the Tax Offices of MSs B and C 
accordingly. Therefore, the Tax Office of MS A pays out an amount of 
5,83K, equalling 33,3% of the total tax revenue received by A-REIT, to 
each of MSs B and C, whereas MS A keeps 5,83K for itself reflecting its 
portion of the tax revenue from A-REIT though. 
 
Figure VI.3.1-1: Proposal and formulary apportionment of income - example 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
1313 See for details Sec. 2.2.2 above. 
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Using the example above1314 MS B and MS C each receives a portion of the tax 
revenue allocated at 5,83K each that is less tax revenue compared to the case 
of a withholding taxation at source or withheld by A-REIT for direct distribution to 
the Tax Offices of MSs B and C. Compared to the latter case the tax received 
under the proposal made is at 93% of the tax that would have been generated 
by them if they would have levied withholding tax at 25% at source. Same holds 
true for MS A as well as they would have taxed the domestic income of 25K at 
the ITR of A-Shareholder at 35% that would have resulted in 8,75K rather 5,83K 
under the apportionment method. The tax allocated to each of the MSs involved 
may differ significantly since the tax base of A-Shareholder may vary according 
to its personal situation though. 
 
However, the leakage in tax revenue received by the MSs involved does not 
differ compared to the alternative methods proposed i.e. applying a withholding 
taxation concept.1315 In case of the levying of a withholding tax either at source 
in MS B and/or C or by way of deduction from dividends by A-REIT before its 
distribution to A-Shareholder ends up in a comparable situation. Proposals 
applying withholding tax require the MS of residence of the Shareholder, MS A, 
to grant a credit for the withholding tax paid. Thus, the portion of the tax revenue 
that is credited falls apart fro MS A and is not compensated elsewhere. Using 
the example above MSs B and C each would have levied a tax at 25% on the 
income of 25K, thus, would have withheld an amount of 6,25K. The remaining 
income from the investment in MSs B and C at 37,5K would have been 
distributed to A-REIT. Together with the domestic income of 25K A-REIT would 
have distributed 56,25K only instead of 75K that is less of 18.75K though. 
Assuming again the offsetting from personal circumstances at 25% (14,06K) the 
resulting tax base for A-Shareholder would be at 42,19K, thus, ending to an 
amount of 14,77K tax revenue of which the withholding tax paid in B and C of 
total 12,5K is credited though. MS A therefore, ends up with a tax revenue 
payable by A-Shareholder at an amount of 2,27K only. Additionally; there is 
neither automatism nor mutual application by MSs for providing its residents a 
credit for withholding tax paid abroad. Thus, the general risk of income to be 
1314 Shown in Figure VI.3.1-1. 
1315 See EPRA (2009), Sec. 4.10 et seqq., p. 16 et seqq.; EPRA (2013), Appendix 1, p. 36; 
Cornelisse (2006 Part 2), pp. 69 et seqq. 
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double taxed, i.e. in cases where the countries involved have not signed a DTT 
or at least economically be double taxed where the crediting or other types of 
acknowledgement of the tax paid does not compensate the amount of 
withholding tax paid already. Therefore, the classical case for withholding 
taxation at source, the “situs country taxation” as proposed i.e. by EPRA,1316 
puts both the foreign REIT and its shareholder in a disadvantageous situation. 
Furthermore, such concept does neither comply with the requirement for a flow-
through approach to taxation nor fair allocation of that tax between the situs MS 
where the property is located.1317 
 
The example shows clearly that the application of any tax concept for cross-
border income using withholding taxation either at source or to the obligation of 
the REIT before distributing dividends puts the tax authorities in the MS of 
residence of the REIT in a significantly disadvantageous situation leaving that 
MS with less tax revenue compared to a formulary apportionment method used. 
Furthermore, Investors facing a withholding taxation do not benefit from the 
flow-through of profits in full since its distributions made are less of the 
respective amount due for withholding tax though. However, the flow-through of 
the profits by way of dividends in full, subject to distribution obligation rate 
though, is key for the attractiveness of any REIT regime as this was especially 
seen with the Spanish SOCIMI regime having hanged its prior withholding 
regime to a transparent concept though.1318 Thus, any leakage resulting from 
taxation does not meet the interest of the Investors which may be with their 
individual income tax situation taxed at lower rates while benefiting i.e. from 
domestic regime rules or are just tax exempt at all. In such cases a credit is 
useless though. Consequently, any concept shall respect a flow-through 
approach in full accepting the allocation of any tax revenue due for a portion of 
income. Furthermore, this is the only method to acknowledge the individual and 
personal income situation of the Shareholder for whom´ benefit the regime was 
originally designed. The leakage in tax revenue that may be experienced by 
MSs tax authorities seems to reflect again a least common denominator as the 
1316 See EPRA (2009), Sec. 4.18 et seqq., p. 18 et seqq. and EPRA (2013), Appendix 1, Sec. 
18, p. 37 for the so-called “direct approach”. 
1317 See Examples provided by EPRA for an “indirect” and “direct” approach at EPRA (2009), 
sec. 4.10 et seqq., p. 16 et seqq. and Appendix II, pp. 29-43. 
1318 See Chapter V, Sec. 4 above. 
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risk for tax leakage and its net effect shall be minimised to the lowest extent 
possible. Any leakage left with either MS involved is, however, proportional with 
a view to the overall aim MSs have sign-up jointly that is to achieve an internal 
market without barriers though. This proposal may fulfil many dreams of EU 
businesses. In general, allowing companies to consolidate their EU activities 
under a single corporate tax base means that EU companies would no longer 
have to establish transfer prices for many internal transfers within the EU, they 
would be able to offset losses incurred by an affiliate in one MS against profits 
earned in another MS, and the tax consequences of cross-border 
reorganisations within the consolidated group would be simplified. In essence, 
providing for consolidated base taxation with formula apportionment would allow 
companies doing business in several MSs to contend with one company tax 
system and to treat their operations as EU operations. Thus, achieving a 
common consolidated tax base in the EU outweighs the disadvantages 
associated with using a formula to distribute that income to the MSs.1319  
 
3.1.5 Sanctions 
As with any type of model its governance is essential for compliance of its 
players thereto. The eligibility to a beneficial tax treatment shall be provided for 
those REITs only that comply with the requirements of the applicable regime 
set. This shall not be limited for a (first) single fiscal year rather for coming 
periods as well when tax exemptions are applied for hidden reserves or transfer 
taxes i.e. with minimum holding periods. Therefore, sanctions shall exist on the 
level of penalties only and/or the level of the loss of status. The specifics for 
certain facts leading to either consequence varies that a determination of a 
“common understanding” is not selective.1320 
 
(1)   Penalty 
The breach of simple criteria’s to the regime of a REIT has to be separated from 
those of statutory rules, which shall lead to different consequences but should 
lead to a penalty only. The fine, however, shall be of monetary nature by way of 
1319 See i.e. Weiner (2002b), Cornelisse (2006 Part 2), p 75.  
1320 See Chapter III, Sec. 3.5.2 and Sec. 4.5 above. 
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a simple payment or by a loss of the beneficial tax treatment respectively for a 
certain financial period and/or limited to a certain part of income only. 
 
The loss of tax treatment shall apply for breaches of statutory rules only i.e. the 
violation of the asset test, the income test, the gearing test and the distribution 
test. The loss will lead to an additional tax charge i.e. applied on those incomes 
that has been gained from activities in excess of the limits for qualifying 
activities or from non-qualifying assets. Here, the relevant incomes will be 
treated according to the standard tax rates applicable for non-REITs i.e. 
ordinary corporations. Then, corporate income tax shall apply at ordinary rates. 
 
(2)   Loss of status 
Where, however, the breach of statutory rules is observed for at least 3 
consecutive years or where the EuroREIT does not comply with the legal 
requirements a loss of status shall be the consequence. The latter will especially 
apply for a de-listing of the EuroREIT or the violation of shareholder 
requirements such as the limitation of a single-shareholding quota or the free-
float requirement. 
 
3.2  Summary for EuroREIT 
The discussion above shows a basis for a EuroREIT regime that can be 
mutually acceptable to the MSs under the common understanding identified 
above1321. Extant harmonisation in corporate laws provides a mutually accepted 
legal form of the SE, building the framework for a EuroREIT. An acceptable 
“EuroREIT” must not only meet common understandings, but recognise EU law 
as essential for its capital and real estate market. Any (withholding) tax levied on 
dividends paid to shareholders holding EU citizenship, or where the REIT is 
registered in another MS, seems an infringement of EU law on grounds of equal 
treatment under Freedom of movement and establishment.1322 Taking 
1321 See Chapter II, Sec. 6.6 above. 
1322 Not only MS investors are of importance in this respect. Additionally, it must be realised that 
Non-MS-investors will invest in the EuroREIT. Because, subject to certain exceptions, Art. 56 of 
the EU Treaty apply not only to transactions between MS but also to transactions from non-EU 
countries where their residents can invoke the right of freedom of movement of capital of their 
investments in EU (see Opinion of the Advocate Général Geelhoed delivered of 10.04.2003 in 
Case C-452/01, “Margarethe Ospelt and Schlössle Weissenberg Familienstiftung” (Case 
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applicable EU law as it stands today1323 the common understanding does not 
change significantly the case for a EuroREIT. The analysis made shows a 
common understanding already for Legal requirements and Operating activities 
and Status, and the common understanding is assisted by extant harmonised 
laws with the corporate form of the SE.  
 
Table VI.3.2-1: Requirements of the EuroREIT - overview 
Requirement Criteria EuroREIT 
Legal  Legal form 
European Company - Societas 
Europaea (SE)  
  Share Capital 
min. EUR 120.000 but subject to MSs 
REIT regimes 
  Registered Seat domestic (either MS) 
  Listing obligatory 
  Stock market regulated stock in either MS 
  Shareholder conditions max. 10% single holdings 
   min. 15% free float 
    < 50% corporate shareholdings 
Operating activities Acquisition and Sales qualified 
(Passive property 
investments) Leasing qualified 
    
 Ancillary Services Asset Management own assets only 
   max. 20% GAV (third party services) 
  Development own assets/account only 
   
max. 20% of GAV and for each single 
project 
   min. 5 year holding period 
Status Asset Test min. 70% 
  Income Test min. 70% 
  Gearing Test max. 60% 
  Distribution Test min. 90% 
Tax REIT Level tax transparent 
 capital gains tax exempt 
  qualifying income tax exempt 
  non-qualifying income taxed acc. MSs applicable tax rates 
     
  Dividend payment tax exempt 
      
  Shareholder Level 
taxed in MS of residence at individual 
tax rate  
Sanctions 
breach of single regime 
requirements monetary penalty 
  breach of statutory rules loss of tax treatment 
  
 
   
“Ospelt”), (2003), ECR I-09743, para 46/47). However, a more detailed analysis of this aspect is 
out of scope of this thesis as well as on the description of the EuroREIT model and will, 
therefore, not further evaluated though. 
1323 See Chapter IV above. 
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breach of statutory rules for 3 
consecutive years loss of status 
  violation of legal requirements loss of status 
      
Source: Original by W. Speckhahn 
 
Unfortunately, under REIT regimes in MSs today, mutual recognition of such a 
EuroREIT regime faces hindrances, with its different tax regimes the most 
obvious differences from MSs regimes. The above analysis shows 
governments’ fear of abuse and loss of tax revenue for distributions made to a 
non-domestic shareholder and the case of a foreign REIT direct investment. 
Taking the common understanding as the “logic” of MSs regimes the application 
of a withholding taxation would be a possible formal solution, but there is a case 
for changing tax treatment towards an approach aligned to EU law. The ideal 
concept shall be formal relevance with EU law and “compliance” with the key 
criteria for a REIT regime. Any taxation of income prior to being distributed to 
the shareholder contrary to a flow-through system does not find Investor´ 
interest for the regime to be accepted.1324  
 
This may be achievable already for MSs to extend its domestic REIT regime to 
the foreign REIT. Art. 24 III OECD-Model may require a country to extend its 
domestic regime to foreign companies holding domestic immovable property 
through a PE.1325 MSs shall accept income to be taxed in the MS of tax 
residence of the shareholder, relying on the recovery of the tax revenue with 
harmonised means such as mechanisms under the AEOID. In balancing the 
regime compliance with EU law and attractiveness to the market, the 
administrative burden for MSs to recover tax revenues from income generated 
in its territory seem economically reasonable and proportional. 
 
A system which preserves balance between a competitive EU - compliant REIT 
regime and protection of the local tax base, is feasible and will address pave the 
way for countries looking at introducing a REIT regime.1326 A EuroREIT would 
remove the differences and restrictions in MSs REIT regimes today, but there 
1324 See i.e. Case Study on the Spanish SOCIMI (Chapter V, Sec. 4 above). 
1325 See OECD (Report 2007), Recitals 51 et seqq., p. 13 et seq. 
1326 See Hughes/Lewis (2008), p. 97. 
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seems no room for MSs to remove such differences and restrictions by 
themselves, since it would require the renegotiation bilateral Treaties, which is 
time consuming and requires a joint understanding with the other contracting 
MSs. Change may be achieved by using the mechanisms under the Treaty, 
adopting regulations or directives according to Art 288 in conjunction with Art. 
352. Agreeing on harmonised institutions such as the SE could eliminate these 
problems for real property investment.1327 These features build the framework 
for any (Euro)REIT regime to interest Investors or for any corporation interested 
in converting to a REIT. The increasing interest in global real estate investment 
in this direction should be welcomed by investors and help create a flatter 
European market. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
The harmonising process fuelled by ECJ case law and the Commission has led 
to the emergence for a European framework for a consistent REIT regime in the 
EU. Reactions to ECJ case law show a process of “cross-fertilisation”1328 forcing 
MSs to confront issues that might have otherwise have lain dormant, creating a 
“horizontal process of policy adjustment associated with Europeanization”.1329 
This adjustment concerns direct taxation, an area where the EU has no 
competences, but can influence domestic change through facilitated 
coordination and diffusion of policy ideas and practices. The EU role is as “… 
mediator or facilitator of cross national policy transfer …”1330, setting a level 
playing field for MSs to acting jointly, cross-loading their concepts for REIT 
regime on common taxation to seek a EuroREIT regime mutually recognised 
throughout the EU. The EU is setting the platform and “soft” policies without 
success in direct tax. Although the EU has abandoned its objective of corporate 
tax harmonisation, it is active in providing for “soft” policies for harmonising 
corporate taxation solutions to transferring the “misfit” into “fit”. This can 
overcome MSs fear of loss of tax base and tax sovereignty while helping the 
emergence of a harmonised REIT model.  
1327 See Cornelisse (2006, Part 2), Sec. 7, p. 75. 
1328 Anthony describes the dynamics of change emerged from pressure by European law 
leading to change on domestic level in MS as “cross-fertilisation” (see Anthony (2000), p. 83). 
1329 See Bulmer/Radaelli (2005), p. 345. 
1330 See Bomberg/Peterson (2000), p. 12. 
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Chapter VII: Conclusion –  
The Europeanization of MSs REIT 
regimes 
 
 
This research sought to address impact of the EU on domestic legislation in the 
case of MSs REIT regimes, with focus on their direct tax treatment in cross-
border situations. The EU has had a considerable impact on MSs’ company and 
(direct) tax laws, and this research has shown that MSs have already created a 
joint understanding of the essentiala for European REITs. Through a definition 
of the “REIT” as an investment vehicle, the (true) REIT regimes established in 
the EU by MSs, the research offers in summary as its main original contribution 
to knowledge the first comparative analysis of all MSs REIT regimes (with more 
in-depth investigation of selected jurisdictions), identifying from case law and 
policy the emergence of a “common understanding” of what a European REIT 
should comprise. It thereby identifies through a common denominator approach 
essential elements for a possible harmonised European REIT in the future.  
  
This joint understanding of criteria for REIT regimes follows the example of the 
classic US REIT,1383 but MSs were influenced and guided by local conditions, 
domestic legal and tax frameworks, and are moving toward a European 
understanding that has been “cross-loaded” between the MSs. Different MSs 
have implemented REITs with a common approach on certain corporate law 
issues (such as the legal form of the REIT) but differing on other issues (such as 
the level of minimum share capital, the debt to equity ratio, etc.). While details 
differ there is common understanding for the criteria for a REIT regime, 
including the tax treatment.1384 This understanding does not yet form an official 
consensus, as EPRA outlines, but does create a level playing field for a 
minimum standard for agreement between MSs. 
 
1383 See Chapter II, Sec. 7 above. 
1384 See Chapter II, Sec. 6.4.3 above 
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In the absence of a fully harmonised internal market, especially in a harmonised 
and uniform company tax law, all MSs required essentially the same conditions 
and criteria for companies under its REIT regime. REIT regimes differ still in 
detailed provisions with variation in structures providing suspect provisions on 
recognition of foreign REIT companies and cross-border situations in 
particular.1385 Case “Cassis de Dijon”1386 builds a basis for discussion about 
MSs REIT regimes and compliance with EU law putting MSs REIT regimes not 
complying with EU law in a disadvantageous position and in violation of EU 
law.1387 MSs are prohibited to impose additional regulation, “dual regulation” of a 
“product” prevented under the mutual recognition rule unless (i) there is 
justification for a discriminatory measure or (ii) there is no mutual situation in 
both MSs. Whereas foreign REIT must be treated equally to a domestic REIT in 
the Host State, the differences between MSs REIT regimes become 
increasingly fuzzy. Thus MSs have to mutually recognise the duly established 
(foreign) REIT for equal tax treatment. REITs with cross-border activities or 
receiving income from property in another MS could consider lodging complaints 
or bringing the case to the ECJ if they are excluded from the privileged regime 
under the legislation of that Host State.  
 
Negative integration is provided through settled case law from the ECJ 
pressuring MSs to change their domestic laws to comply with EU law and 
freedoms of establishment and movement of capital1388. ECJ settled case law 
require mutual recognition of legally established companies throughout the EU 
and prohibit discrimination on ground of nationality. Herewith, the ECJ assisted 
the Europeanization of MSs tax regimes providing negative integration through 
the “back-door”.1389 This pressure has led MSs to adjust their company laws and 
REIT regimes, allowing companies to benefit from the domestic REIT regime of 
being incorporated, resident and listed elsewhere in the EU, the mutual 
recognition of foreign structures.1390 Hence, MSs did “adopt their processes, 
policies, and institutions to new practices, norms and rules, and procedures that 
1385 See Chapter IV Sec. 7.1 above. 
1386 See Chapter IV, Sec. 3.2 above. 
1387 See Chapter V, Sec. 7 above. 
1388 See Chapter IV, Sec. 4 above. 
1389 See Chapter IV, Sec. 8 above. 
1390 See Chapter IV above. 
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emanate form the emergence of a European system of governance” indicating 
that the Europeanization of MSs REIT regimes is happening. Change in MSs as 
a result of “hard” EU law and “soft” policies runs from modest adjustments of 
individual policies to pressure on national policy styles, and makes a EuroREIT 
achievable.1391  
 
Europeanization of legal requirements and the rule of mutual recognition seem 
to be interfered with by criteria for (direct) tax treatment that render mutual 
recognition useless.1392 The next task is harmonisation of different (direct) tax 
treatment models in MSs REIT regimes to overcome a “misfit” with EU law. To 
safeguard domestic tax revenue MSs are ready to breach “hard” EU law and 
one of the essential criteria of REITs is tax transparency. Activities and 
measures non-compliant with EU law to safeguard the tax revenue base leads 
to rules that discriminate against non-residents.1393 Greater trust between MSs 
is possible by showing that they are not far apart with each of their domestic 
REIT regimes ´ and that there may be harmonisation without losing sovereignty 
in direct tax by agreeing to a level playing field from a common framework of a 
EuroREIT.  
 
The “common understanding” identified by the comparative analysis provides 
the ground necessary. Activities on HST and CCTB provide for a level playing 
field for MSs and the harmonisation of direct tax regimes. The proposal for a 
single REIT tax base consequently applied together with a full flow-through of 
dividends to shareholders, thus accepting the tax exempt status of a REIT, 
combines the different tasks to harmonising the tax treatment through the 
method of formulary apportionment. This research for the first time applied the 
method to REITs direct tax treatment, respecting the tax sovereignty of the MSs 
with a fair share of tax revenue between the MSs involved.1394 A uniform EU 
REIT regime, therefore, seems to be a question of time only since MSs may be 
better off to cooperate for a uniform EU REIT regime. This thesis outlined a 
uniform EU law-compliant EuroREIT that has not been subject of any academic 
1391 See Chapter VI, Sec. 2 above. 
1392 See Chapter IV, Sec. 3 and 4 above for ECJ cases on company law. 
1393 See Chapter IV, Sec. 7 above. 
1394 See Chapter VI, Sec. 3 above. 
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research in either law or economics hitherto, even though Literature urged the 
EU towards introduction of a EU-REIT as the “ideal” REIT.  
 
Assessing the impact of the EU on national policy a distinction between normal 
EU policy-making and its effects is important. Negative integration through ECJ 
case law as a “normal” EU policy-making process leads to “a much more 
horizontal process of policy adjustment associated with Europeanization”. The 
findings show in the area of direct tax that without any competence for the EU, 
there will likely be no activity from the MSs neither, unless the Commission 
leads the process through providing for policy ideas or proposals, so-called 
“soft” policies. Through the proposal developed in this research to solve the 
direct tax treatment for REITs the EU might bring forward the harmonisation of 
MSs REITs with “facilitated coordination”, while MSs keep control of the process 
and, thus, of their sovereignty in direct tax. Facilitated coordination leaves the 
initiative for integration in the hands of the MSs, who can reform as they see fit. 
Even where misfit pressure is absent, the recognition that a practice urged by 
fellow MSs could strengthen domestic practices with peer review as a 
contributing element.  
 
Although the Commission has concluded that full EU company tax 
harmonisation rather than promotion of single tax base for companies shall be 
of issue, the harmonisation of the tax regimes for REITs is not contrary to this 
policy. To avoid MSs re-negotiating DTT with relevant MSs and to find solution 
for tax treatment in cross-border situations a uniform framework for a EuroREIT 
requires Commission´ action. Industry Groups have lobbied for a uniform 
framework for some ten years, and without focused activities by either the 
Commission or MSs establishment of the EuroREIT may not be close. Since 
activities of the EU in the last decades towards harmonisation have not been 
successful, its permanent penetration resulted in some harmonisation through 
secondary EU law such as Directives. This is an interesting development 
considering the requirement for unanimous decision in direct taxation with the 
“Parent-Subsidiary”-Directive, the “Merger”-Directive, the Directive on 
“Administrative cooperation in the field of taxation”(AEOID) replacing former 
Directives. 
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Examples for “moderating” impact through “soft” EU policies existing company 
law with the successful introduction of the Societae Europeae (SE), and the EU 
also moderates activities in the area of direct tax showing readiness and political 
will to remove obstacles to cross-border investments and achieve an internal 
market. Thus, activities on EU level have harmonisation effects and there is a 
driving force from the OECD as seen with the Standard for the automatic 
exchange of information, mutually agreed by way of bilateral agreements (most 
recently between Germany and the US in 2013). These activities were taken up 
by the Commission with its proposal to amending the AEIO. Thus, the Directive 
sets a framework for new concepts on taxation of income in cross-border 
situations such as a REIT operating from its Home State in another (Host)State. 
Technically the best way to assure that MSs will get their fair tax share of 
income from property located within their territory would be a harmonisation of 
REIT regimes and tax treatment´ of shareholders, if not a uniform EuroREIT. 
For this mechanism to work properly the Home State should accept taxing 
universal income of companies resident followed by transferring allocated 
revenue to the Host State of origin of the income through formulary 
apportionment of tax revenues. This method was used by this research for the 
tax treatment of REITs. In combination with better exchange of information 
between MSs tax authorities this can overcome the fear of loss of tax base while 
accepting the rule of mutual recognition. Taking the “common understanding” 
identified with top-down Europeanization through down-loading of Treaty 
freedoms and settled case law, the proposals for the allocation of taxes by 
formulary apportionment of revenue provide the missing element for a 
harmonised EuroREIT in the EU.  
 
There is little room for top-down Europeanization, but rather cross-loading and 
bottom-up activities by and between MSs. Together with mediating and 
facilitating these activities, interaction between the participants at all levels, 
vertically and horizontally, promotes Europeanization. There is no contradiction 
to Bomberg/Peterson (2000) calling for policy transfer, so distortions to 
competition are avoided. Policy transfer is part of the process leading to 
Europeanization, a mechanism to explain the change at various levels of the EU 
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and its MSs. However, it may be doubtful to see harmonised REIT structures 
within Europe. Although the EU fosters cooperation and common ground among 
its MSs, the task of achieving one common European REIT umbrella will likely 
follow a long and uncertain path. Preserving the right balance between a 
competitive EU law compliant REIT regime and the protection of the local tax 
base should be a feasible objective. The Commission has stated its readiness to 
assist activities with the Expert Group under ECOFIN outlining: 
 
“Harnessing the potential of REITs in attracting increased levels of 
institutional investment in real estate, including social housing, would 
be greatly enhanced by ensuring the development of a consistent 
REITs framework across the EU. A EU level playing field should be 
created and complex tax structuring should be avoided. The 
introduction of an EU-wide REIT should be explored. … Mutual 
recognition may be established and best practices, such as relating to 
the most optimal structuring of REITs, should be shared. Cross-border 
investment through REITs should be facilitated.”1395 
 
 
 
1395 See Moran (2013), p. 40.  
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EuR  Zeitschrift für Europarecht (Journal of European Law) 
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Euribor  Euro Interbank Offered Rate 
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et al.  et alii (and others) 
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FA   Finance Act 
 
FATCA  Foreign Account Tax Compliancy Act (USA) 
 
FAZ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) is a leading daily 
Newspaper in Germany 
 
FBI   Fiscale Beleggingsinstelling (FBI) is the Dutch REIT  
 
FCP Fonds Commun de Placement (FCP) is a mutual investment 
fund under Luxemburg law 
 
FDI   Foreign Direct investment 
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FIBRA Fideicomisos de Invérsion de Bienes Raices is the Mexican 
REIT 
 
FII Fundo Investimento Imobiliario (FII) is the REIT regime by the 
Brazilian government  
or 
Fondes de Invérsion Inmobiliario the Chilean REIT-like Fund 
typed vehicle 
 
FIM Financial Instruments Markets Directive (the “FIM Directive”), 
EU-Directive 2004/39/CE of 21 April 2004, 
 
FPI Fonds Proprietère d’Investissement (FPI) is a type for a holding 
for French OPCIs 
 
F-REIT Finish REIT 
 
FSC Financial Supervision Commission in Bulgaria 
 
FSMA Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) of the UK 
or 
Belgium Financial Services and Markets Authority 
 
FTA French Tax Authorities 
 
FTC French Tax Code 
 
FTSE Financial Times Stock Exchange is an independent company 
jointly owned by The Financial Times and the London Stock 
Exchange. FTSE Group (FTSE) is a world-leader in the creation 
and management of over 120,000 equity, bond and alternative 
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FTTA Foreign Transaction Tax Act (FTTA) of Germany 
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G 
 
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
 
GAV Gross Asset Value 
 
GCL General Corporations Law (GCL) of the State of Maryland, USA 
 
GDP Gross domestic product 
 
GmbH Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) is a limited 
liability company under German Corporate law 
 
G-REIT German-REIT or German Real Estate Investment Trust 
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HKSFC Hong Kong Security and Financial Committee 
 
HMT Her Majesty’s Treasury  
 
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
 
HK-REIT Hong Kong REIT 
 
HST Home-State-Taxation-Model 
 
HTB Harmonised Tax Base 
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ICTA Income and Corporation Taxes Act (ICTA) of the UK 
 
i.e. id est 
 
IEIF Institut d´Econonmie et d´Investissement Francaise 
 
IF Investment Fund (IF) is a vehicle for collective property 
investments under Netherlands law 
 
IFD Initiative Finanzplatz Deutschland (IFD) is a lobby group for the 
German financial sector. It operates in cooperation with the 
Federal Ministry of Finance and the Bundesbank 
 
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards 
 
IGA Inter Governmental Agreement 
 
IIF Immobilien Investmentfonds (IIF) is a REIT-like investment 
vehicle under Austrian law 
 
Inc. Incorporation 
 
ING SICAFI Belgium Return Index  
ING SICAFI Belgium Return Index is a performance Index of all 
listed SICAFIs in Belgium by ING Investment Belgium 
 
INREV European Association for Investors in Non-listed Real Estate 
Vehicles 
 
InvG Investmentgesetz (InvG) is the German Investment Act that 
comprises of the legal framework for OEPFs 
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ImmoInvFG Immobilien-Investmentfondsgesetz (ImmoInvFG) is the real 
estate investment Act providing fort he regulatory framework for 
IIFs in Austria 
 
ICTA  Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 (UK) 
 
IPO Initial Public Offering 
 
IRC Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (IRC) is the Income tax code in 
the USA 
 
I-REIT Israel REIT 
 
IRS Internal Revenue Service (USA) 
 
ISA  Individual Savings Accounts  
 
IStR  Internationales Steuerrecht (International Tax Law) 
 
IStR-LB  Internationales Steuerrecht-Länderbericht (International Tax 
Law – Country Report) 
 
ITA Income Tax Act  
 
ITR  Income Tax Rate  
 
 
J 
 
J-REIT Japan REIT 
 
JSE Johannesburg Stock Exchange (South Africa) 
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JSSPIC Joint Stock Special Purpose Investment Company (JSSPIC) is 
the Bulgarian REIT 
 
 
K 
 
KAG Act Bundesgesetz vom 23. Juni 2006 über die kollektiven 
Kapitalanlagen (Kollektivanlagengesetz) of Switzerland 
 
KAGB Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch (Capital Investment Act), 
implementing the AIFM-Directive (Directive 2011/61/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 
2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 
1060/2009 and (EU) No 095/2010, OJ L174/1, 1.7.2011 
(“AIFMD”)). 
 
 
L 
 
LG Landgericht (German District Court) 
 
LLC Limited Liability Company according to US Federal States 
Corporations law 
 
LLP Limited Liability Partnership according to US Federal States 
Corporations law 
 
LPT Listed Property Trust is the Australian REIT 
 
L-REIT Lithuania REIT 
 
Ltd Limited 
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M 
 
max. Maximum 
 
M-DAX Midicap-Index of the German stock (Deutsche Börse), which 
comprises of the 50 liquid shares of the second row of the DAX 
stock market Index totalling 100 stock companies 
 
MFT Mutual Funds Trust (MFT) is the REIT regime by the Canadian 
government 
 
mn Million 
 
min. Minimum 
 
M-REIT Islamic Real Estate Investment Trust is the REIT regime by the 
Malaysian government 
 
MS or MSs Member States of the European Union 
 
 
N 
 
N/A Not Applicable 
 
NAREIT National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts (NAREIT) 
is the representative voice for the US-REITs and publicly traded 
real estate companies worldwide 
 
NAV  Net Asset Value 
 
NJW Neue Jusristische Wochenschrift 
 
 
cxi 
REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS (REITS) IN EUROPE - 
ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY 
NV Naamloze vennootschap (usually abbreviated N.V. or NV) is the 
Dutch term for a public limited liability company. The company is 
owned by shareholders, and the company's shares are not 
registered to certain owners, so that they may be traded on the 
public stock market. The phrase literally means “innominate 
partnership” or “anonymous venture” and comes from the fact 
that the partners (the shareholders) are not directly known. This 
is in contrast to the term for a private limited company, which is 
called Besloten Vennootschap. 
 
Nyrt. Nyilvánosan müködö részvénytáraság (Public limited company 
uaccording to the Company Act of Hungary) 
 
 
O 
 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
 
OEPF Open-End Property Fund (OEPF) is a collective investment 
scheme under the German Investment Act 
 
OJ Official Journal of the European Union  
 
OPCI  Organisme de Placement Collectif dans l´Immobilier (OPCI) is a 
property funds regime under French law 
 
 
P 
 
PE Permanent Establishment 
 
PFPO Property Fund for Public Offering (PFPO) is the REIT regime by 
the government of Thailand 
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PLC Public Limited Company 
 
P-REIT Pakistan REIT 
 
Ph-REIT Philippine REIT 
 
PMRECON Paul Mitchell Real Estate Consultancy 
 
PR-REIT Puerto Rico REIT 
 
PUT Property Unit Trust (PUT) is the South African REIT 
 
 
Q 
 
Q Quarter 
 
 
R 
 
RD Royal Decree  
 
REIC Real Estate investment Company (REIC) is the name for the 
Greece REIT regime 
 
REIF Real Estate Investment Fund is the name for the Costa Rican 
REIT-like regime 
 
REIT Real Estate Investment Trust 
 
REOC Real Estate Operating Company 
 
RICS Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 
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S 
 
S-REIT Singapore REIT 
 
SA Société Anonyme (SA) is a Limited Liability Company according 
to French Corporations law  
or  
Sociedad Anónyma the corporate legal form in Spain 
 
SCA Société en Commandite par Actions (SCA) is Corporation on 
shares according to French Corporations law 
 
S & P 500 Standard & Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) is a performance Index by the 
Rating Agency Standard & Poor’s of capital investments in the 
top 500 stock listed companies worldwide and the most followed 
equity index 
 
SE Societas Europaea 
 
SE Europe South East Europe, comprising of the countries: Romania, 
Bulgaria, Turkey, Serbia and Greece 
 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a supervisory 
Authority for the US financial sector 
 
SICAFI Sociétés d´Investissement à Capitale Fixe Immobilière (SICAFI) 
is the Belgium REIT 
 
SICAV Société d´Investissement à Capital Variable (SICAV) is an 
investment company in the form of a joint stock company 
(société anonyme)  
 
SIF Act Special Investment Fund Act of Luxembourg 
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SII Sociedad de Inversion Inmobiliaria (SII) is a real estate 
investment company under Spanish law 
 
SIIC “Sociétés d´Investissement Immobilier Cotée” (SIIC) is the 
French REIT 
 
SIIQ Società di Investimento Immobiliare Quotate (SIIQ) is the Italian 
REIT 
 
SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
 
SOCIMI Sociedades Cotizadas de Inversión en el Mercdo Immobiliario 
(SOCIMI) is the Spanish REIT 
 
SpA Società par Anzoni the Italian corporate legal form 
 
SPIC Special Purpose Investment Companies Act (Bulgaria) 
 
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle 
 
StuW Steuer und Wirtschaft (Tax and Economy (Journal)) 
 
SZIT Szabalyozott Ingatlanbefektesi Tarasag (Hingarian REIT) 
 
 
T 
 
TEGoVA  European Group of Valuers Association 
 
TP Taxe professionelle (TP), a local business licence tax on 
tangible assets (i.e. real properties etc.) under French Tax laws. 
 
Treaty Treaty of the European Union 
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T-REIC Real Estate Investment Company (T-REIC) is the REIT regime 
by the Turkish government 
 
Tr Trillion 
 
TRS Taxable REIT Subsidiary 
 
 
U 
 
UCITS Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable 
Securities (UCITS)  
 
UPREIT Umbrella Partnership Real Estate Investment Trust (UPREIT) is 
a special type of REIT in the USA 
 
UK United Kingdom 
 
UK-REIT United Kingdom REIT or United Kingdom Real Estate 
Investment Trust  
 
ULI Urban Land Institute 
 
USA United States of America (USA or US) 
 
USD United States Dollar 
 
US-REIT United States REIT or United States Real Estate Investment 
Trust 
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V 
 
VAT Value Added Tax 
 
 
 
Y 
 
YEL Yearbook of European Law 
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1. Exhibit II.4-1: Chronological overview of REIT and REIT-like regimes globally 
Year  Country REIT-Regime Abbreviation 
1960 USA Real Estate Investment Trust US-REIT 
1969 Netherlands Fiscale Beleggingsinstelling FBI 
1972 Puerto Rico Real Estate Investment Trust PR-REIT 
1985 Australia Listed Property Trust LPT 
1989 Chile Fondes de Invérsion Inmobiliario* C-FII 
1991 Luxemburg Unions Collective d'Investissement* UCI 
1992 Thailand Property Fund for Public Offering* PFPO 
1992 Thailand Property Fund for Public Offering* PFPO 
1993 Brazil Fundo Investimento Imobiliario FII 
1994 Canada Mutual Funds Trust MFT 
1995 Belgium 
Société d'investissement à capital fixé en 
Immobilière SICAFI 
1995 Turkey Real Estate Investment Company T-REIC 
1995 Argentina Fideicomiso Financiero Inmobiliario* FFI 
1997 Costa Rica Real Estate Investment Fund* REIF 
1999 Greece Real Estate Investment Company REIC 
1999 Singapore Real Estate Investment Trust S-REIT 
2000 Japan Real Estate Investment Trust J-REIT 
2001 South Korea Real Estate Investment Trust CR-REIT 
2003 Austria Immobilien Investmentfonds* IIF 
2003 Hong Kong Real Estate Investment Trust HK-REIT 
2003 Taiwan Real Estate Investment Trust T-REIT 
2003 France Société d'investissement Immobilière Cotées SIIC 
2003 Uruguay Real Estate Investment Trust* U-REIT 
2004 Bulgaria 
Joint Stock Special Purpose Investment 
Company JSSPIC 
2004 Mexico Fideicomisos de Invérsion de Bienes Raices FIBRA 
2005 Malaysia Islamic Real Estate Investment Trust M-REIT 
2006 Dubai Real Estate Investment Trust D-REIT 
2006 Israel Real Estate Investment Trust I-REIT 
2007 Luxemburg Special Investment Fund* SIF 
2007 United Kingdom Real Estate Investment Trust UK-REIT 
2007 Germany Real Estate Investment Trust G-REIT 
2007 Italy Società di Investimento Immobiliare Quotate SIIQ 
2007 Thailand Real Estate Investment Trust Thai-REIT 
2007 New Zealand Portfolio Investment Entity* PIE 
2008 Lithuania Real Estate Investment Trust L-REIT 
2008 Pakistan Real Estate Investment Trust P-REIT 
2008 India Real Estate Mutual Funds* REMF 
2009 Philippines Real Estate Investment Trust Ph-REIT 
2009 Finland Real Estate Investment Trust F-REIT 
2009 Spain 
Sociedad Cotizada de Invérsion en el Mercado 
Inmobiliario SOCIMI 
2010 Portugal Sociedades de Investimento Imobiliàrio* SIIMO 
2011 Hungary Szabályozott Ingatlanbefektési Társaság SZIT 
2013 Ireland Real Estate Investment Trust IRE-REIT 
2013 South-Africa Real Estate Investment Trust SA-REIT 
    *REIT-like only    
Derived from: EPRA (2013) 
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2.  
2. Exhibit IV.4-1: Cases on company/corporate law – overview 
# Year  C- Case MS Freedom  Decision 
       
1 1986 79/85 Segers NL 
Right of 
Establishment 
A company may pursue its activity 
in a MS different from the MS 
where its branch/registered office 
is established 
2 1988 81/87 Daily Mail UK 
Right of 
Establishment 
Company´ are not eligible to 
transfer its seat to another MS 
while retaining its status of 
Company in Home State 
3 1993 330/91 Commerzbank UK 
Right of 
Establishment 
Different treatment of fiscal 
residency is covert discrimination 
4 1994 1/93 Halliburton NL 
Right of 
Establishment 
Companies are free to choose its 
form of establishment; Equal 
treatment to comparable situations 
is mandatory 
5 1999 212/97 Centros DK 
Right of 
Establishment 
Different legal conditions i.e. 
minimum capital requirements in 
the Home State of incorporation 
and the Host State do not entitle 
the Host State to refuse “mutual 
recognition” 
6 1999 200/98 X and Y SWE 
Right of 
Establishment 
Granting certain tax benefits to 
domestically operating company’s 
only while hindering the 
establishment in another MS of … 
a company incorporated under its 
legislation violates the freedom 
7 2002 208/00 Überseering D 
Right of 
Establishment 
Incoming companies have to be 
respected on the basis of the 
mutual recognition doctrine 
following the “Cassis de Dijon”-
principle 
8 2003 9/02 Lasteyrie F 
Right of 
Establishment 
MS are precluded of measure 
linked with moving of companies 
likely to hinder a company to 
move cross-border breaches the 
freedom of establishment  
9 2003  167/01 Inspire Art D 
Right of 
Establishment 
Mutual recognition principle 
comprise not only a company’s 
legal personality, but the entire 
legal system of the state of 
incorporation  
10 2005 411/03 SEVIC D 
Right of 
Establishment 
The refusal of a national 
commercial court to register a 
cross-border merger may 
constitute a violation of the 
freedom of establishment 
11 2006 196/04 
Cadbury 
Schweppes UK 
Right of 
Establishment 
Company is eligible for protection 
under the scope of the freedom of 
establishment where the “… 
incorporation … correspond with 
an actual establishment intended 
to carry on genuine economic…” 
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Otherwise, such establishment 
may be viewed as being a “wholly 
artificial arrangement”. 
12 2008 210/06 Cartesio HUN 
Right of 
Establishment 
MS are not precluded of 
legislation under which a company 
incorporated under the law of that 
MS may not transfer its seat to 
another MS whilst retaining its 
status as a company governed by 
the law of the MS of incorporation 
(“Cartesio-Rule”) unless national 
law forbids any kind of transfer of 
seat, requires winding-up or 
liquidation though. 
13 2011 371/10 National Grid  NL 
Right of 
Establishment 
A company transfer of its 
registered seat does not affect its 
status as company under the 
Home State laws  
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3. Exhibit IV.5.2-1: Case law on (direct) tax – “Equal treatment” 
# Year  C- Case MS Freedom  Decision 
       
14 1995 279/93 Schumacker D 
Free 
movement of 
persons 
Differential treatment of residents v. 
non-residents is discriminatory when 
situations “comparable” 
15 1995 80/94 Wielockx NL 
Free 
movement of 
persons 
A “comparable situation” is in place 
where non-resident derives his income 
entirely or almost exclusively from 
economic activities in the Host-State 
16 1999 391/97 Gschwind D 
Free 
movement of 
persons 
Threshold for eligibility to domestic tax 
regime my be at 75-90% 
17 2003 169/03 Wallentin SWE 
Free 
movement of 
persons 
Tax benefits must be granted to 
residents and non-residents equally. 
18 2012 39/10 Estonia EST 
Free 
movement of 
persons 
A threshold set at 75% required for 
Home State income shall be sufficient 
for “significant economic activity” to 
benefit from allowance in Home State 
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4. Exhibit IV.5.3: Case law on (direct) tax – Access to tax of non-resident companies 
# Year C- Case MS Freedom  Decision 
 Equal treatment      
19 2006 386/04 Stauffer D 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Any non-resident company 
being comparable in its 
essential criteria with the 
criteria for such resident 
companies shall be treated as 
a resident company  
20 2011 25/10 Missionswerk  BEL 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
MS is prohibited from 
establishing rules that take as 
its criterion the location of 
operations to benefit from 
(lower) domestic tax rates 
21 2011 384/09 Prunus F 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
A permanent regime of tax 
levied on direct holdings of 
non-resident companies 
constitutes a restriction of the 
freedom. 
 Prior authorisa tion    
21 1999 320/97 Konle A 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Activities involving immovable 
property shall not be 
conditional to a prior 
authorisation by the Host State 
23 2000 423/98 Albore I 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
See Case “Konle” 
24 2012 39/11 VBV A 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Investment funds legally 
established in a MS must not 
be subject to a procedure of 
authorisation in another MS 
prior selling its units 
25 2011 250/08 Belgium P 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Limitation of tax benefits to the 
fact having paid registration 
duty in the MS before 
constitutes a restriction of the 
free movement of capital 
26 2000 54/99 Scientologie F 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Any rule of authorisation may 
be lawful though where 
investors subject to the 
authorisation are given 
indication as to the specific 
circumstances in which the 
authorisation is required, 
otherwise a rule contravene 
the principle of legal certainty 
 Tax benefits     
27 1986 270/83 Avoir fiscal F 
Right of 
Establishment 
Tax credits shall be eligible for 
non-resident companies in 
Host State 
28 2004 319/02 Manninen FIN 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Tax credits or foreign 
dividends must be given 
29 2007 292/04 Meilicke D 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
See Case “Manninenn” 
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30 1999 311/97 RBS GR 
Right of 
Establishment 
Higher taxes for permanent 
establishment of foreign 
company are discriminatory 
(Freedom to choose legal form 
of establishment) 
31 1996 107/94 Asscher NL 
Free 
movement of 
persons /  
Right of 
Establishment 
Higher taxes may be non-
discriminatory where other tax 
benefits provide for trade off. 
32 2006 253/03 CLT-UFA D 
Right of 
Establishment 
Higher taxes to branch 
discriminatory (Freedom to 
choose legal form of 
establishment). 
33 2004 315/02 Lenz A 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Tax rate on foreign dividends 
shall not be higher as to 
domestic ones 
34 2007 443/06 Hollmann P 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Capital gains shall not be 
taxed at higher rates in case of 
non-resident recipient 
35 1999 307/97 Saint-Gobain D 
Right of 
Establishment 
Host State must grant to 
permanent establishments the 
same advantage as to resident 
companies. 
36 1993 330/91 Commerzbank UK 
Right of 
Establishment 
Repayment of overpaid tax 
shall be eligible for non-fiscal-
resident companies  
37 2001 
397&410/
98 
Metallgesell-
schaft UK 
Right of 
Establishment 
Cashflow advantages 
constitute a breach of the right 
of establishment. 
38 2002 324/00 Lankhorst D 
Right of 
Establishment 
Interest payments on loan from 
parent company shall be 
deductable from income 
unless rate not arm’s length. 
39 2003 168/01 Bosal NL 
Right of 
Establishment 
Deduction of expenses related 
to foreign shareholding shall 
be eligible 
40 2006 471/04 Keller D  
Right of 
Establishment 
See Case “Bosal” 
41 2006 152/03 Ritter-Coulais D 
Free 
movement of 
persons 
“Negative income” from 
immovable property in the 
Host States shall be taken into 
account for the purpose of 
determining the rate of 
progressive taxation 
42 2007 182/06 Lakebrink LUX 
Free 
movement of 
persons 
Losses from immovable 
property shall be deducted 
form income in Host State 
43 2003 364/01 Heirs of Barbier NL 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Debts related to immovable 
property shall be lawfully 
deductable from the tax base. 
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44 2003 234/01 Gerritse D 
Free 
movement of 
services 
Deduction of business 
expenses linked to the 
economic activity shall be 
eligible for non-resident 
companies 
45 2011 450/09 Schröder D 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Expenditures directly linked to 
the activity and necessary to 
generating the income shall be 
deductable from the taxable 
income 
46 2009 303/07 
Aberdeen 
Alpha FIN 
Right of 
Establishment  
Existence of special tax regime 
and different corporate 
characteristics do not exclude 
comparability 
47 2011 284/09 
Commission v 
Germany D 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Dividends distributed to non-
resident companies must not 
taxed disadvantageous  
48 2000 35/98 Verkoijen NL 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
A rule exempting dividends 
from tax received from a 
domestic company only was 
found to be contrary to the free 
movement of capital  
49 2012 338/11 Santander F 
Free 
movement of 
capital 
Different rules for resident and 
non-resident companies with 
no permanent establishment 
violates the freedoms. 
50 2004 268/03 De Baeck BEL 
Right of 
Establishment 
Capital gains on shares shall 
not differ as regards residency 
of company sold 
51 2004 9/02 Lasteyrie F 
Right of 
Establishment 
Taxation of unrealised capital 
gains at the time of transfer of 
the residence violates the 
freedom 
52 2006 345/05 Portugal P 
Right of 
Establishment 
Deferral of capital gains to the 
condition of reinvestment in 
real property in the MS 
granting the incentive violates 
freedom 
53 2007 104/06 Sweden SWE 
Right of 
Establishment 
See Case “Portugal” 
54 2011 155/09 Greece GR 
Freedom of 
Establishment 
The condition of permanent 
residence for access to tax 
benefits is a covert form of 
discrimination. 
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